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Abstract
This dissertation presents a paired case study of the growth performance of
Turkey and Egypt in the interwar period, in order to shed fresh light on the
income per capita divergence that occurred between them. First, we look at
the extent and determinants of agricultural growth by estimating the net ag-
ricultural output and decomposing the crop output into its components. It is
shown that acreage expansion, population growth and improvement in yields
led to rapid recovery in agricultural output in Turkey, whereas the increas-
ingly intensive cultivation in Egypt was only able to offset the impact of land
scarcity and the earlier deterioration in yields. We also fill a major empirical
gap in the literature by estimating industrial output growth and argue that
although the industrial take off started in both countries in the 1930s, the
output growth in Turkey was much greater. Moreover, industrialisation was
mainly driven by textiles in Egypt, whereas it was more balanced in Tur-
key. Finally, we explore the sources of industrial output growth by focusing
on textiles. The empirical analysis based on a partial equilibrium model im-
plies that the impact of tariff protection on domestic growth was significant
in both countries, yet it was complemented by the favourable movement of
relative prices and wages and, in the case of Turkey, the increase in domestic
incomes in the second half of the 1930s. Overall, it is argued that the greater
expansion of domestic demand in Turkey, which was particularly driven by ag-
ricultural growth, was not only responsible for the per capita divergence, but
also combined with different degrees of tariff protection to lead to a notable
variation between Turkey and Egypt’s industrial performance. Therefore, the
dissertation has implications for the experience of agricultural economies after
the Great Depression. It is argued that in the presence of passive monetary
and fiscal policies, factor endowments, historical development paths and geo-
graphy played a prominent role in determining the extent of recovery in the
1930s.
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Glossary
Ardeb Egyptian unit of volume = 198 litres.
Cantar Egyptian unit of weight = 44.928 kilograms.
Feddan Egyptian unit of weight = 1.038 Acres= 0.42 hectares.
FO Foreign Office, UK.
IUM İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, the central government statistical agency
in Turkey, later DİE (Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü).
LE Egyptian Pound = 100 Piastres= 1000 Milliemes.
Oke Egyptian unit of weight =1.248 kg.
Okka Turkish unit of weigh=1.282 kilograms.
Rotolis Egyptian unit of weight =0.44928 kilograms.
TL Turkish Lira = 100 Piastres (Kuruş).
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1. Introduction
“Whatever the mellowing of
history may reveal, two
features characterise the
[interwar] period. It was an
age of dislocation, and an
age of experiment”
Arthur Lewis
This dissertation presents paired case studies of economic growth in Egypt
and Turkey during the interwar period. Its main motivation is their contrast-
ing economic performances: while their income per capita was comparable
at the onset of World War I, Turkey had grown significantly richer by the
end of 1930s. This divergence is remarkable because the economies of Turkey
and Egypt had certain fundamental characteristics in common at the time;
in particular, they experienced the problems of late industrialisation as pre-
dominantly agricultural countries. What is more, neither the long nineteenth
century nor the post-World War II period witnessed such a divergence. The
interwar period therefore stands out. Yet while there is a large body of scholar-
ship on various aspects of the Egyptian and Turkish economies in the interwar
period, a consistent and comprehensive assessment of the extent and sources
of growth in the two countries is lacking. For this reason, this work aims to
go beyond the scattered pieces of evidence and the precarious generalisations
that abound in the literature, in order to move towards a better understanding
of the beginnings of industrialisation and the sources of divergence in Egypt
and Turkey.
Why are Turkey and Egypt important? First of all, they were two large,
non-oil and predominantly agricultural countries, which were together re-
sponsible for around one-half of the Middle East’s total gross domestic product
(GDP) in the interwar period. They were close to European markets, mak-
ing them both highly exposed to changes in the world economy, especially
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in Europe, in similar ways. It is well known that the world economy in the
interwar period witnessed successive and deepening shocks, a decline and frag-
mentation in international trade and persistent deflation. This led to major
economic, political and social dislocations in Egypt and Turkey and neither
the impact of such dislocations on domestic economies nor their responses
have been adequately investigated in the historical scholarship.
The existing economic history literature on the interwar period in general,
and the Great Depression in particular, is for the most part centred around
the experience of industrial economies in Western Europe and North Amer-
ica. While the research agenda on the causes and propagation of the Great
Depression and economic recovery in the 1930s is ongoing, the experience of
agricultural economies has yet to be integrated with this expanding literature.
The following questions therefore motivate this study: What was the impact
of the severe decline in commodity prices on primary producers? What were
the constraints on their responses? What were the consequences of massive
changes in relative price structures in the interwar period? What forms did
the inward-oriented policies take and how did they affect economic growth
and industrialisation in peripheral countries?
This dissertation attempts to identify the extent and sources of growth in
the agricultural and industrial sectors in interwar Egypt and Turkey, and
thus suggests insights into crisis and recovery in two peripheral economies in
the 1930s. It does not suggest a general explanatory framework regarding
the experience of primary producers as a whole in the interwar period, since
there was a large degree of diversity within the periphery in terms of the
ways they were affected by external shocks and how they responded to them.
However, the comparative focus on Turkey and Egypt does help to further
the understanding of the extent and limits of such diversity.
Another important area to which this dissertation makes a contribution is
on the empirical side. The construction of the historical economic data is of
course an essential element of the economic history discipline and this work
presents a modest attempt in this direction. The existing interpretations of
the interwar economies of Turkey and Egypt are limited by the poor quality
and insufficient amount of statistical data, so a major part of this work is to
fill this gap. In particular, consistent and comparable quantitative evidence
on the industrial sector is scarce, preventing proper assessments of indus-
trialisation, so the new output estimates this work makes for the first time
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provide a reliable basis for discussing Egyptian and Turkish economic growth
in the interwar period, following the best practices in the economic history
discipline.
1.1. Research Motivation: Why Did Egypt and
Turkey Diverge in the 1930s?
The available evidence shows that national income in Egypt and Turkey
moved in tandem during the long nineteenth century. Pamuk estimates that
income per capita in the current borders of Turkey grew by 0.5 percent per
annum during 1820-1870 and 0.8 per cent during 1870-1914 and that the cor-
responding figures for Egypt were 0.4 and 0.8 percent.1 However, the period
1913-1950 saw the beginning of economic divergence in that Turkey achieved
a 0.8 percent average growth rate, whereas an almost complete stagnation
was registered in Egypt. Since World War II Egypt has narrowed the gap
with Turkey, particularly in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The
same pattern can also be seen in Maddison data: while Turkey was around
1.3 times richer than Egypt during 1820-1914, in terms of income per capita
at constant prices measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars, the relative gap
increased to 2 by 1939 and varied around 2-2.5 for much of the rest of the
twentieth century.2
Figure 1.1 looks more closely at 1913-1950 by presenting the available estim-
ates of income per capita. Bulutay et al. produced GDP estimates for Turkey
for 1923-1948 and Özel then linked that series to an estimate for 1913-1914,
based on Turkey’s present-day borders.3 As for Egypt, its national income
remains unknown for much of this period, but some inaccurate estimates are
available for 1913 and the 1940s. They suggest that income per capita only
exceeded the 1913 level in the late 1950s.4 Hence, as will be discussed shortly,
1Şevket Pamuk, Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820. Journal of
Economic History , 66(3) 2006, p.815.
2Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective Historical Statistics.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2007.
3T. Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri (1923-1948). Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi
Yayınları, 1974; and Işık Özel, The Economy of Turkey in the Late Ottoman and Early
Republican Periods, 1907-1939: a Quantitative Comparison. Master’s thesis, Boğaziçi
University, 1997 .
4Pamuk, Estimating Economic Growth; Mahmoud Amin Anis, A Study of National In-
come of Egypt. Ph.D thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1949;
1.1. RESEARCH MOTIVATION: WHY DID EGYPT AND TURKEY DIVERGE IN THE 1930S? 19
Figure 1.1.: Indices of GDP Per Capita, Egypt and Turkey (1913=100 for
both countries), 1913-1950.
Note and sources: Figures at 1938 prices. Egypt: Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic
Policy, pp.318-20; Khalid Ikram, Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition. Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1980, pp.396-99; United Arab Republic, Statistical Pocket Yearbook.
Department of Statistics and Census, 1920-1939; and Pamuk, Estimating Economic Growth. Turkey:
Özel, Economy of Turkey, Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri
income per capita has commonly been viewed as stagnant in the literature,
which has been reinforced by the benchmark consumption estimates sugges-
ted by Hansen and Yousef based on monetary variables.5 By contrast, the
Turkish economy was adversely affected by the world wars, but both shocks
were followed by rapid recovery. Moreover, income per capita grew in a very
strong manner in the second half of the 1930s so that its level in 1939 exceeded
by almost one quarter its 1913 level.
There are many major similarities between the economies of these two coun-
tries, which makes a comparative analysis viable and interesting. First of
all, Egypt and Turkey were the two large non-oil producing countries in the
Middle East.6 Their population was similar in size at around 12-13 million
and Bent Hansen and G.A. Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy in the U.A.R.
(Egypt). North-Holland, 1965.
5Bent Hansen, Income and Consumption in Egypt, 1886/1887 to 1937. International
Journal of Middle East Studies, 10 1979; and Tarik Yousef, Egypt’s Growth Record
Under Economic Liberalism, 1885-1950: A Reassessment Using New GDP Estimates.
Review of Income and Wealth, 48 2002.
6Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth
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people in 1927, and both had 70-80 percent of their labour force employed in
agriculture. Their average income was probably very close by 1914, as stated
above. Throughout the long nineteenth century, both had experienced growth
in the export sector and decline in traditional manufacturing. In the inter-
war period, moreover, they adopted broadly similar economic policies: open
economy policies and negligible state intervention before 1929-1930, the begin-
ning of import substitution during the 1930s, more systematic and elaborate
government intervention and import substitution in the post-war years up to
the 1970s and finally trade liberalisation and a shift towards an export orient-
ation from the 1980s onwards.7 Furthermore, both Egypt and Turkey faced a
severe decline in the prices of their agricultural goods and a deterioration in
their terms of trade after the Great Depression. Economic nationalism gained
currency in both countries starting from World War I and new emerging elites
increasingly called for greater support for industrialisation and development.
There is no doubt that there were significant differences as well: the factor
endowments in agriculture, the degree to which they were vulnerable to ex-
ternal shocks and the capacity to respond to such shocks varied. As will
be seen in this dissertation, such differences are crucial in explaining their
contrasting growth performances in the interwar period. The following sec-
tions, first, provide a brief account of macroeconomic developments in Egypt
and Turkey before and during the interwar period, with an emphasis on the
shortcomings of the historical literature. Then, we discuss the main points
raised in the economic history scholarship on interwar economies as to how
both industrial and agricultural countries coped with the impact of the Great
Depression, especially their policy choices and their consequences. In doing
so, we develop a general conceptual framework in which policy choices and
economic performance in Turkey and Egypt can be placed. Finally, the meth-
odology and contribution of this dissertation are set out.
Century. I.B. Tauris, 1998, p.234-35.
7Bent Hansen, Egypt and Turkey: Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth.
World Bank, 1991, p.xiii.
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1.2. Historical Background
1.2.1. Interwar Turkey: Recovery, Depression and Growth
The nineteenth century witnessed a rapid economic integration of the Otto-
man Empire into the world economy. After the Napoleonic Wars, European
commercial penetration into the Middle East gained momentum and in the
second half of the century it was accompanied by a financial expansion via
foreign lending and direct investment in ports, railroads and trade. This
process resulted in a significant sectoral dislocation in the economy of the
Ottoman Empire. First, cheap imports to a large degree replaced traditional
local manufactures and, second, agriculture became more and more commer-
cialised. The volume of foreign trade progressively increased and agricultural
production came to be more oriented towards export sectors, particularly in
the coastal regions of Anatolia, which were connected to foreign markets via
railroads and ports. In this respect, the Ottoman Empire had a similar ex-
perience to most of the world economy’s periphery before World War I.8
The impact of World War I on Turkey’s economy cannot be overstated.
The republic, which was founded in 1923, took over a devastated economy, as
a number of major political, economic and demographic changes had taken
place during a series of wars that had lasted more than a decade. In the
present-day borders of Turkey, around one fifth of the population had been
lost as a result of wartime casualties, the deportation of the Armenians and the
population exchange between Turkey and Greece.9 The decline in population
not only meant a loss of labour force but also a reduction in human capital, as
the Greeks and Armenians, for instance, had been more involved in trade and
manufacturing than the Muslim population before World War I.10 Besides, the
8For economic developments in the Middle East during the nineteenth century, see Şevket
Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913: Trade, Investment
and Production. Cambridge University Press, 1987; Roger Owen, The Middle East in
the World Economy 1800-1914. Methuen, 1981; and Charles Issawi, De-industrialisation
and Re-industrialisation in the Middle East Since 1800. International Journal of Middle
East Studies, 12(4) 1980.
9Casualties are estimated at 3 million, 1.2 million Greeks left the country and half a
million Turks immigrated from Greece and the Balkans. The total population was
around 13 million in 1924. Şevket Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression:
Another Look at Great Depression. In Şevket Pamuk and Jeffrey Williamson, editors,
Mediterranean Response to Globalization before 1950. Roudledge, 2000, p.325. For the
change between 1913-1925, see Table 1.1.
10In 1919, 73 percent of 3,300 manufacturing enterprises were owned by Greeks and 85
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series of wars had reduced the urban population by 20 percent between 1880
and 1920 and, finally, agricultural production and the animal stock almost
halved between 1913 and 1923.11
Therefore, the recovery in all segments of the economy during 1923-1929 was
a result of demographic recovery and idle resources being brought back into
use in agriculture and industry. As mentioned above, the available estimates
show that income per capita in the 1920s grew rapidly and came close to
its 1913 level by 1929/30.(Table 1.1) Foreign trade was restored, agricultural
production grew in line with the increasing population, and manufacturing,
however small it was, contributed to the process. The output in agriculture
and industry is estimated to have grown rapidly by 50 percent and 80 percent
respectively between 1925 and 1929.12 However, the rise of income per capita
remained at 33 percent due to rapid population growth.
As for the policies of the 1920s, in 1925 the government abolished the
tithe (an in-kind agricultural tax), which had been an important source of
government revenues, and introduced instead a number of cash taxes. A
large-scale railroad construction program was also initiated for both security
and economic reasons, which continued until World War II. Although it is
hard to measure, the impact of these two policies is commonly considered
favourable for agricultural development.13
Meanwhile, economic nationalism and protectionist zeal had been gaining
currency since the war. Decisions taken in the Izmir Economic Congress in
1923 set industrialisation and the creation of a truly Turkish entrepreneurial
class as the primary objectives of policies.14 But policy options were small in
percent of employees were non-Muslims. Sericulture was one of the sectors that was
particularly badly hurt by the loss of the non-Muslim population. Yahya Tezel, Cum-
huriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi 1923-1950. Yurt Yayınevi, 1982, p.87.
11Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.89; Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression,
p.326; and Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.91.
12The problems with these estimates will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. For now,
it should be stated that the new industrial output estimates presented in the Chapter
3 show that these figures have an upwards bias for 1923-1929, but the revisions made
in this dissertation do not alter the timing of recovery.
13For instance, only 2-3 percent of cereal output was marketed in Erzincan, an eastern city,
in the 1920s. The railroad extension probably increased market opportunities by ex-
panding market integration. İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, 1929 Buhranında Türkiye’nin
İktisadi Politika Arayışları. Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1977, p.37.
14Boratav reminds us that the economic idea called “national economy” that had been
formed before World War I was partly implemented during the war and received offi-
cial acceptance after 1923. Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985. Gerçek
Yayınevi, 1988, p.13.
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Table 1.1.: Main Economic Indicators for Turkey, 1913-1939
Population GNP
(1913
prices)
GNP per
capita
(1913
prices)
Imports/GDP Exports/GDP Agricultural
value
added
Industrial
value
added
’000 TL million TL % % TL million
(1913/14
prices)
TL million
(1913/14
prices)
1913 15948 173.4 10.96 15.8 11.4 90.9 15.0
1925 13372 113.2 8.46 15.8 12.6 48.0 8.3
1929 14237 160.3 11.26 12.1 7.3 74.5 14.0
1932 15167 156.3 10.31 7.5 8.8 62.2 11.4
1939 17516 233.9 13.35 6.1 6.6 104.0 22.1
Source: Özel, Economy of Turkey
number until 1929 because the Lausanne Treaty of 1924 placed sanctions on
import policies, effectively ruling out any possible revision of the tariff sched-
ule until 1929. Nonetheless, the government still took a number of measures
to support local entrepreneurs. Thus, İş Bankası and Sanayi and Maadin
Bankası were founded in 1924 and 1925, in order to extend credit for national
enterprises. Sugar and tobacco processing were brought under private mono-
polies, and, most importantly, the Law for the Encouragement of Industry,
passed in 1927, provided subsidies and concessions for domestic industrial
enterprises.
The year 1929 was, however, the turning point for both internal and ex-
ternal reasons. The economic sanctions of the Lausanne Treaty ended in 1929
and the government had been planning to make a radical revision on the tariff
schedule. This caused a speculative increase in imports in anticipation of the
rise in tariff rates.15 By coincidence, it was also the year the first instalment
of the Ottoman debt was to be paid.16 As a result, the Turkish Lira swiftly
depreciated in 1929, which led the government to implement exchange con-
trols. In this sense, it can be maintained that Great Depression was not the
ultimate cause of policy makers’ protectionist leanings, but it did reinforce
the tendency.
The depression was transmitted to Turkey by a sharp decline in commodity
prices. Wheat prices declined by around 60 percent between 1929 and 1932
and stayed there until the war. The shock was also equally severe in the
15Tekeli and İlkin, 1929 Buhranı, pp.78-83
16Turkey took over two thirds of Ottoman debt and paid the first instalment in 1929. The
rest of it was never paid. Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi , p.44.
1.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 24
prices of other crops, such as cotton and sugar beet, but their prices slightly
recovered after 1933. As seen in Figures 1.2 and 1.3, Turkey’s net barter terms
of trade declined by 40 percent between 1929 and 1932 and its exports at
constant prices decreased by around 35 percent. The crisis was most severely
felt in the foreign trade-oriented regions of the country because the decline in
export prices led to an increase in the real value of taxes and credits.17 The
interior cereal-producing regions are likely to have been less seriously affected
because of the smaller degree of market involvement, but in any case the
agricultural sector as a whole undoubtedly suffered from the depression.18 As
a response to the declining prices, the government initiated a wheat purchasing
program in 1932, but its impact remained limited.19
Turkey’s main policy choices took shape in this deflationary environment
and no major shift occurred throughout the 1930s.20 The government decided
to balance trade by decreasing imports and not by depreciating the currency.
On the contrary, the TL appreciated against the US Dollar and British Ster-
ling by around 40 percent between 1929 and 1934, and parities remained there
until the end of the decade.21 The total money in circulation was kept stable
during the 1930s at around TL 160-190 million. Bank deposits remained con-
stant until 1936 and slightly increased thereafter, while the volume of bank
credits followed the same trend, as its share in GDP did not rise during the
decade.22 Finally, the share of government expenditure stayed between 15 and
18 percent of GDP during the 1930s.23 Therefore, both monetary and fiscal
policies remained fairly strict and orthodox, and it is remarkable that policy
17The economic hardships drove peasants to try various survival strategies, like short-term
migration and crop diversification. Also some small peasants underwent foreclosures
and started sharecropping. Elif Akçetin, Anatolian Peasants in Great Depression. New
Perspectives on Turkey , Fall 2000. On the decline in debt payments immediately after
the depression, see Yusuf Saim Atasagun, Türkiye’de Zirai Kredi. Kenan Basımevi,
1939.
18The growing discontent among the peasantry in Western Anatolia led to the enormous
support for the opposition Free Republican Party in the 1931 election. The party was
immediately closed down after the election. Cem Emrence, Politics of Discontent in
the Midst of the Great Depression: The Free Republican Party of Turkey (1930). New
Perspectives on Turkey , 23 2000.
19Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression, pp.334-35; and Tezel, Cumhuriyet
Dönemi , p.362.
20For a detailed account of policy initiatives in the early stage of the depression, see Tekeli
and İlkin, 1929 Buhranı.
21Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.154.
22Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.111.
23Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.388-89.
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Figure 1.2.: Turkey’s Foreign Terms of Trade and Local Prices (1927-28=100),
1924-1939
Source: Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.382.
makers fanatically avoided expansionary policies, unlike their counterparts in
many other countries at the time.
A large degree of policy activism was, however, exhibited in the field of for-
eign trade. With the tariff reform of 1929, the average ad valorem equivalent
tariff increased from 13 percent in 1929 to 46 percent in 1930, and remained
around 40-50 percent during the rest of the decade. Consumption goods,
moreover, were taxed ever more heavily than raw materials and intermediate
goods, so effective rates of protection increased more than the nominal rates.
In 1931 tariffs were complemented by import quotas, then after 1933, be-
sides upward revisions in tariffs, quotas were replaced with quotas stipulated
in bilateral agreements. As part of Germany’s strategy to expand towards
Southeast Europe, clearing arrangements began to frame the foreign trade of
Turkey in the same year. By the end of decade, a large part of Turkey’s for-
eign trade was being carried out through the clearing system and Germany’s
share in exports and imports had increased significantly.24
Against this background, the period after 1932 saw strong economic growth.
24The share of Germany and Austria in exports increased from 14 to 37 percent and in
imports from 17 to 51 percent between 1929 and 1939. Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi ,
p.149.
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Figure 1.3.: Turkey’s Exports and Imports at 1938 Prices (TL Million), 1924-
1939
Source: Turkey, İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri. 1925-1939.
Between 1932 and 1939 agricultural value added increased by two thirds,
industrial value added doubled and as a result GDP per capita increased one
quarter, while the share of imports in GDP almost halved between 1929 and
1939 and that of exports kept decreasing (Table 1.1). The growth remarkably
took place without any recovery in the price level, thanks to the rise in physical
output. However, as Pamuk argues, agricultural growth, particularly in the
second half of the 1930s, has largely gone unnoticed in the literature.25 In
a few instances, it was attributed to the good harvests, the increasing rural
labour force or the open land frontier.26
The historiography has instead paid most attention to industrial growth,
which has predominantly been explained by import substitution and etat-
ism.27 Hence, imports significantly declined and their share in GDP dropped
from around 15 percent in the 1920s to 6-7 percent during the 1930s. Moreover,
the import composition changed in favour of raw materials and intermediate
25Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression.
26Gülten Kazgan, Türk Ekonomisinde 1927-35 Depresyonu, Kapital Birikimi ve Ör-
gütleşmeler. In Atatürk Döneminin Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Sorunları. İktisadi ve Ticari
İlimler Akademisi Derneği, 1977, p.266; and Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.323.
27Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi , p.59; and Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.258.
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goods, which is consistent with processes of import substitution. The share of
consumption goods in imports declined from 63 percent in 1925 to 20 percent
in 1939, whereas the share of intermediate goods increased from 21 to 41 per-
cent and investment goods from 5 to 22 percent.28 On the other hand, major
changes also took place in relative domestic prices and national income, which
means that these import statistics alone are not enough to demonstrate that
import substitution was responsible for industrialisation. The extent to which
industrial output growth was due to import contraction therefore remains to
be definitively ascertained.
Protectionism aside, the rhetoric of official policies began to be geared to-
wards etatism, that is, state-led industrialisation, in 1932.29Etatism was pos-
sible because the new ruling elite organised around Mustafa Kemal’s Repub-
lican People’s Party was based on an urban bureaucracy that had emerged
from the ranks of former military and civilian officials and intellectuals. The
wars and subsequent developments had swept aside the older Ottoman ar-
istocracy and non-Muslim wealthy groups, while undermining the remaining
interest groups, such as trade associations. Consequently, there did not exist
powerful landed or foreign interests that could put pressure on the govern-
ment’s policy choices after 1923. The first five-year plan, which was more a
list of investment projects rather than an elaborate planning document, was
formulated with the help of Soviet experts and started to be implemented in
1934.30 From then on, the state rapidly emerged as an investor and entre-
preneur in key sectors, such as textiles, leather, tobacco, sugar and mining.
During the 1930s around 20 large state enterprises were established and they
began to assume a major role.31
Nonetheless, the conventional thinking in the existing literature seems to
be more based on rhetoric rather than substance. For instance, Tezel argues
that the economic growth and industrial expansion in the 1930s was mainly
28Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.109.
29The term etatism was first formulated in 1931 and was integrated into the program of the
ruling Republican People’s Party in 1932. Korkut Boratav, Kemalist Economic Policies
and Etatism. In A Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun, editors, Atatürk : Founder of a Modern
State. C. Hurst, 1981, p.171. For a comprehensive discussion and chronology of the
policy shift towards etatism, see İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Uygulamaya Geçerken
Türkiye’de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu. 2nd edition. Bilge Kültür ve Sanat, 2009.
30Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression, p.330. The second plan was initiated
in 1938 but its implementation was delayed until the post-war period.
31Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression, p.331.
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accounted for by the public sector, and Boratav maintains that the largest
part of production in industry was carried by public enterprises. Pamuk has,
however, pointed out that although the plan was successfully implemented,
the role of etatism has been exaggerated because only ten percent of total
industrial employment was accounted for by state enterprises when the plan
was completed.32 Instead, the output growth in industry was achieved by
thousands of small- and medium-scale factories and workshops. Furthermore,
the increase in the public share of total investment from one forth during
1927-1929 to 50 percent by the end of the 1930s is misleading because around
half of it went into railroads and other means of transportation.33 This does
not deny that a substantial contribution was made by the state, since the
small- and medium-scale enterprises benefited from backward and forward
linkages with the government factories, but the overemphasis on their role
leads to bias in the interpretation of the industrial expansion of the 1930s.
In short, then, the second half of the 1930s saw both strong industrial and
agricultural growth and increasing state intervention. However, the sources
of growth have never been studied carefully. The economic historiography, as
stated above, has often been preoccupied with the relationship between the
role of the state and industrial growth. The evidence for the role of imports
substitution has been limited to the figures of import rates and the increase in
the share of domestic goods in the consumption of certain commodities. How-
ever, the impact of changes in national income and relative price substitution
effects on the industrial expansion has attracted insufficient attention.
1.2.2. The Interwar Egyptian Economy: “Development
Without Growth”34
The economic transformation in Egypt and Turkey during the long nineteenth
century was mainly similar in nature, while the differences lay in the extent
of the export orientation under free trade and the particular forms it took.
The attempts to transform the Egyptian economy begun by Muhammad Ali
32Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression., p.331.
33Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression, p.331.
34Tignor uses this term to refer to the absence of improvement in the well-being of the
masses despite certain structural changes in the interwar Egyptian economy. Robert
Tignor, State, Private Enterprise and Economic Change in Egypt, 1918-1952. Princeton
University Press, 1984.
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in the early nineteenth century accelerated after 1850s and reached their peak
during 1882-1914 under British rule.35 Muhammad Ali had a well-defined
economic policy based on two elements: the introduction and expansion of
cotton cultivation and the development of a modern industry under strict gov-
ernment control. His radical project eventually met with half success: Egypt
became a large cotton producer and exporter, but his premature endeavour to
establish a modern factory system failed. Subsequently, the period 1820-1914
witnessed the making of a large export-oriented economy. Based on fertile
soil and the Nile, cotton cultivation expanded so much that Egypt came to
supply 4-5 percent of the world cotton output by the turn of century. Since
Egyptian cotton was mainly long and extra long staple, Egypt’s share in this
particular part of the crop even reached 40 and 70 percent respectively by
the turn of century.36 Although many other crops were also produced, cot-
ton remained by far the most important, providing around 75-80 percent of
the country’s export revenues in its heyday in the early twentieth century.37
On the other hand, manufacturing remained limited to the traditional and
naturally-protected industries and those related to the processing of exports
until 1914, probably more strictly than in Turkey.38 Charles Issawi’s well-
known phrase “lopsided development” succinctly characterises this dualism.39
The emergence of such a large commercial export economy was facilitated
by a number of factors. First, irrigation was at the heart of process. The shift
from basin to perennial irrigation through large-scale investments in canals,
dams and barrages, particularly after the British occupation in 1882, resulted
in a great increase in the cultivated area, which was the main source of output
growth before World War I.40 Although the production was still carried out
by small peasant families on small plots with traditional techniques, there
occurred a technical revolution as far as water use is concerned. Second,
the process was accompanied by the inflow of foreign investment and capital,
35Robert Mabro, The Egyptian Economy, 1952-1972. Clarendon Press, 1974, p.7.
36Charles Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century. Oxford University Press, 1954, p.112.
37Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.198.
38For a detailed assessment of the emergence of a cotton-based economy in Egypt, see
Roger Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914. Oxford University Press,
1969; and a brief summary provided by Robert Mabro and Samir Radwan, The Indus-
trialisation of Egypt, 1939- 1973. Clarendon Press, 1976, p.9.
39Charles Issawi, Egypt Since 1800: A Study in Lop-sided Development. Journal of Eco-
nomic History , 21(1) 1961.
40Patrick O’Brien, The Revolution in Egypt’s Economic System. Oxford University Press,
1966, pp.3-4.
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Table 1.2.: Main Economic Indicators, Egypt
Population GDP GDP per capita Exports/GDP Imports/GDP
thousands LE million LE % %
1913 12338 154 12.5 18.0 15.9
1929 14596 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1939 16522 183 11.1 19.0 18.6
1950 20350 254 12.5 18.3 22.3
Sources: Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , pp.318-20; Ikram,
Egypt: Economic Management , pp.396-99; United Arab Republic, Statistical Pocket
Yearbook ; Pamuk, Estimating Economic Growth; Egypt, Ministry of Finance, Statistical
Department, Annual Statement of Foreign Trade. Cairo: Government Press, 1910-1946;
and D.C. Mead, Growth and Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy. Homewood,
1967.
which provided long-term credit for irrigation and land reclamation and short-
term credit for cotton cultivation. Trade and commerce also came to be largely
controlled by European capital. Third, the period saw the creation of large
estates of over 50 feddans held as private property. The large landowners
controlled around 45 percent of all land in 1917 and the roughly 12,000 families
owning these estates administered their land partly by directly cultivating the
land with seasonal labour and service tenants and partly by renting out the
rest.41 The result was a highly unequal land and wealth distribution.
The economic problems faced by Egypt in the interwar period were heavily
determined by this earlier development. For one thing, Egypt had already
brought all its cultivable land into production by the onset of World War I
because of the limited land across the Nile Valley and the amount of water
available.42 Most of the irrigation work had been completed by 1914 and
the cultivated area remained stagnant during 1917-1937 (Table 1.3). In ad-
dition, the land/labour ratio declined as a result of population growth and
Egypt was transformed from a labour-scarce to labour-abundant economy.
Even before 1914, Egypt became one of the countries with a high population
densities, with 700 persons per square kilometre.43 Furthermore, perennial
irrigation and multiple cropping had serious consequences, as the shortage
of sufficient drainage had caused salination and waterlogging, driving down
41Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.31; and Tignor, State and
Private Enterprise, p.10. For a detailed history of the development of landownership in
Egypt, also see Gabriel Baer, A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt 1850-1950.
Oxford University Press, 1962.
42Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.102.
43Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.30.
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Figure 1.4.: Egypt’s Terms of Trade and Cotton Prices (1953=100), 1913-1955
Sources: Terms of trade calculated from the export and import indices in Mead, Growth
and Structural Change, Table V.A.7. Cotton prices from M. el-Imam, A Production
Function for Egyptian Agriculture 1913-1955. The Institute of National Planning, 1962.
cotton yields.44 Therefore, in order to reverse the downward trend in yields,
a significant amount of investment in drainage was needed.
Last but not least, Egypt’s economy and income had become greatly ex-
posed to external shocks due to its nineteenth-century development. As seen
in the Figure 1.4, Egypt’s terms of trade collapsed during World War I and
then saw a sharp recovery in the first half of the 1920s. But the period 1925-
1943 again witnessed a massive decline.45 The change in cotton prices followed
more or less the same pattern, placing a strong pressure on national income
and consumption. The sharp decline in capital flows was also another major
issue, as cotton production was largely financed by foreign investment, which
first declined during the 1907 financial crisis and was then persistently low
during the interwar period.46
Agricultural development in the interwar period was arrested by these
factors inherited from the pre-war period. Total output at constant prices
44Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.31.
45According to Issawi, one reason for the collapse of Egypt’s terms of trade was, inter alia,
that cotton was facing growing competition from synthetic fibres and increasing output
in other countries. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.246-47.
46Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.33.
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Table 1.3.: Trends in Egyptian Agriculture, 1917-1947
Total output Cultivated area Cropped area Cotton yields
LE million (at 1938 prices) million feddans million feddans cantar/feddan
1917 45.21 5.27 6.62 3.75
1927 63.87 5.54 6.61 4.01
1937 65.12 5.28 8.36 5.37
1947 49.39 7.76 9.17 5.08
Source: Acreage and cotton yields from Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East
Economies, p.246. Output figures (three-year moving average) calculated from el-Imam;
and deflated by wholesale prices obtained from Mitchell.
increased slightly during the 1920s but remained constant during the 1930s
(Table 1.3). The cropped area increased by around one fourth during 1917-
1937, outpacing the growth of the cultivated area.47 The amount of drainage
was extended, more chemical fertilisers were applied, and there was a con-
tinuous attempt to improve seeds.48
In the face of a severe decline in cotton prices, the Egyptian government first
pursued a supply-side policy. A restriction on the cotton acreage was imposed
in 1921-1923, and continued in 1926-1929, 1931 and 1932.49 In addition, the
government purchased and held back cotton in order to increase prices in
1921, 1926 and 1929.50 However, the policy of restricting the cotton acreage
was abandoned in 1933, based on the assumption that the Egyptian crop
was too small to affect world cotton prices and then the policy was shifted to
increase output as much as possible.51 In the early 1930s, the government also
provided temporary relief for cotton producers, such as tax reductions and an
arrangement with mortgage companies to reschedule debts. As long-term
measures, Credit Agricole was founded to provide loans for small peasants,
and there were attempts to increase agricultural productivity by means of
drainage extension, heightening the Aswan Dam and seed improvement.52
47O’Brien, Egypt’s Economic System, p.7. The cultivated area here refers to the acreage
cultivated any time in a year, whereas the cropped area includes the land cultivated
in summer and/or winter. Crucially, this means that when the same piece of land is
cultivated in both summer and winter, it is counted twice in the cropped area.
48Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.40; and Issawi, Egypt at Mid-
Century , p.101.
49Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.38.
50Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.122.
51This assumption is generally accepted by scholars. But Yousef recently argued that the
Egyptian crop had market power. Tarik Yousef, The Political Economy of Interwar
Egyptian Cotton Policy. Explorations in Economic History , 37 2000.
52Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.39.
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Meanwhile, the agricultural crisis and the difficulties of World War I had
raised concerns about specialisation. The motto of nationalist circles and the
new emerging Egyptian elite became “diversification” via industrialisation.53
The major economic document of Egyptian nationalism published in 1918 set
the agenda that was going to be followed by almost all governments in the
interwar period.54 It called for greater government support for industrialisa-
tion, increasing agricultural productivity and Egyptian rather than foreign
interests.
However, there existed serious constraints on the government’s capacity to
pursue an active industrial policy in the 1920s. First of all, although the
British unilaterally declared Egypt to be an independent country in 1922, its
independence in terms of economy policy was strictly limited. The earlier
trade agreements had removed tariff autonomy until 1930; the government
was not able to carry out a tax reform until 1936, when the Capitulations
providing foreigners certain privileges were abolished; and fiscal and monetary
policies remained quite passive. The Egyptian pound remained tied to the
Sterling Pound until 1947 at a fixed parity and an independent central bank
was lacking.55 Governments adhered to orthodoxy with a balanced budget
policy or, preferably, small surpluses.56 Hansen and Marzouk asserts that
the passive and conservative policies were mainly designed to promote the
interests of big landowners and merchants.57
In this way, a gradual decolonisation left its mark on Egyptian policy mak-
ing in the interwar years. The presence of powerful landed and British in-
terests substantially prevented the nationalist elements from implementing
their developmental agenda, as policy making was shaped by continuous and
complex bargaining between various groups within the Egyptian elite, which
mainly included landowners, the British, foreign capital and the new bour-
geoisie with industrial interests.58 Owen and Pamuk maintain that the eco-
53Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.140.
54Egypt, Rapport de la Commission du Commerce et de L’industrie. Imprimerie Nationale,
1918.
55The right to issue notes was given to the National Bank of Egypt, which was supervised
by the Bank of England through its advisory board. Owen and Pamuk, History of
Middle East Economies, p.33.
56Mabro, Egyptian Economy , p.17.
57Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , p.19.
58Owen and Pamuk argue that although most of the British officials left government service
in 1922-23, the remaining few and the British High Commission could pressure the
government. Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.36.
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nomic and political influence of large landowners was effectively augmented
after 1922 due to their influence on the large peasant electorate.59 For in-
stance, they occupied 58.5 percent of all parliamentary committees during
1924-1952. Similarly, the fierce debates on tax reform after 1936 prevented
an upward revision in the land taxes, which was another instance of landown-
ers’ influence on policy making.
Against this background, the tariff reform of 1930 was very important in
terms of its impact and consequences. The reform replaced the uniform 8
percent import duty with carefully designed three-tiered specific rates. Raw
materials were rated at 4-8 percent, intermediate goods at 10-15 percent and
final goods at 15-30 percent. Besides the frequent revisions of tariff rates over
the 1930s, the most important development in this field was the depreciated
currency surtax placed on cotton and rayon textile imports of Japanese origin
in 1935. This aimed to counteract Japan’s aggressive export policy and caused
a serious reduction in Japanese imports, which favoured both local producers
and Lancashire. Prohibitive duties on cereals were also put in place, in order
to secure the domestic market for landowners facing erratic cotton prices.
The tariff reform is commonly considered as the source of industrial growth
in the 1930s, but the evaluation of industrial performance suffers from a lack of
reliable statistics and data.60 In the absence of consistent estimates and meas-
ures, the literature largely draws on Samir Radwan’s estimates of the capital
stock, import statistics, census figures for employment, and some scattered
output data on cement, sugar and tobacco. Based on such evidence, it is
usually accepted that the 1930s saw significant output growth and the be-
ginning of import substitution in Egypt.61 One driver of industrial growth is
considered to be the tariff reform and another was that landowners and mer-
chants directed their investment towards industry in the face of the slump
in cotton prices.62 It can also be added that Bank Misr, which was founded
in 1920 as Egypt’s new emerging elite sought to finance national enterprises,
59Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.37.
60Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.43-44; O’Brien, Egypt’s Eco-
nomic System, p.14; Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.141; and Roger Owen, Egypt in
the World Depression: Agricultural Recession and Industrial Expansion. In Ian Brown,
editor, The Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-War Depression. Routledge,
1989, p.141.
61Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.141; and Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Eco-
nomic Policy , p.2.
62O’Brien, Egypt’s Economic System, p.13.
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played a significant role in mobilising resources.63
World War II gave a further stimulus to industrial expansion as a result
of the isolation it brought about. Normal trade linkages were disrupted and
Egyptian factories could even export some of their produce to the neighbour-
ing Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, the allied troops stationed in Egypt
during the war increased demand for manufactures.64 At its peak, Issawi cal-
culates that their total expenditure reached one fourth of national income.65
For Owen and Pamuk, although there is not much doubt about the poor
performance of the Egyptian economy in the interwar period, there is less con-
sensus on why it occurred.66 Three possible explanations have been suggested:
the low level of investment at around 5-6 percent of national income, capital
outflow after World War I and Egypt’s vulnerability to external shocks. On
the other hand, O’Brien, Issawi and Mabro all emphasise the importance of
population growth, which offset any improvement in national income.67 Ob-
viously, given that land productivity was quite high in Egypt by international
standards, the insufficient absorption of the labour force by other sectors,
mainly industry, was the crux of the issue. Commenting on the latter, Is-
sawi points out that given the narrowness of the domestic market due to low
incomes and unequal land distribution, “the needs of the mass of her inhab-
itants for industrial goods [were limited] to a few gallons of kerosene, a few
kilograms of sugar, a few yards of cotton cloth and a few pounds of tobacco,
[so] there is no scope for a modern capitalist industry”.68
Therefore, a number of possible factors, from population growth and lack of
investment to small domestic market, have been suggested to explain Egypt’s
sluggish GDP performance but all such explanations remain as reasonable
hypotheses that have not been tested sufficiently. In particular, the lack of
quantitative evidence on the industrial sector has hindered a more compre-
hensive assessment.
63O’Brien, Egypt’s Economic System, p.14. For a detailed monograph on Bank Misr, see
Eric Davis, Challenging Colonialism: Bank Misr and Egyptian Industrialization, 1920-
1941. Princeton University Press, 1983. Also note that the Egyptian Federation of
Industries was founded in 1922 as a lobbying group.
64O’Brien, Egypt’s Economic System, p.17; and Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.141.
65Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.141.
66Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.35.
67O’Brien, pp.2-3; Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.93; and Mabro, Egyptian Economy ,
p.17.
68Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.249
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1.3. Great Depression and Recovery in the
1930s: The Global Experience
In the sections above we have briefly set out the macroeconomic developments
in Turkey and Egypt in the interwar period. The main point is that in re-
sponse to the unfavourable movement in commodity prices and terms of trade
in the 1930s, both countries resorted to import repression, although the extent
and intensity of protectionism varied between them. In what follows, we at-
tempt to place this policy choice in an international context by discussing the
policy responses to the Great Depression in both industrialised and agricul-
tural countries. The dominant view of the Great Depression emphasises the
role of the policy framework on the extent of the subsequent recovery, so much
of the focus of the present discussion is on the latter. Nonetheless, in view of
the geographical and empirical constraints of this literature, we also under-
line the importance of more structural determinants of economic performance,
such as historical legacies, geography and inter-sectoral relationships.
1.3.1. Theory and Evidence
What marked the world economy in the 1930s was the sharp decline in com-
modity prices, slow recovery in national economies and the failure of world
trade to return to the pre-depression levels. As opposed to the belle époque,
when commodity flows were free, capital and labour internationally mobile,
and world trade grew to an unprecedented scale with the help of a stable in-
ternational currency system based on the Gold Standard, the role of policies
were more critical in the economic performance of national economies in the
1930s.
Recovery in most countries depended on the home market rather than ex-
ports due to the persistent crisis in export sectors. The now dominant view of
the Great Depression, which is discussed shortly, considers adherence to the
Gold Standard to be the most important factor behind the timing and extent
of recovery, as this policy choice had a crucial impact on whether expansion-
ary policies could be implemented.69 Accordingly, the countries that devalued
69This section is largely based on Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters. Oxford University
Press, 1996; Peter Temin, Lessons from the Great Depression. MIT Press, 1989; Barry
Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs, Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s.
Journal of Economic History , 45 1985; Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin, The Slide
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their currencies were more able to use expansionary policies to stimulate do-
mestic demand and therefore performed better than others that defended the
Gold Standard or adhered to fixed exchange rates. This view is, however,
predominantly based on the experience of industrialised countries and the
variation between the performance of countries that stuck to more passive
policies are not sufficiently addressed. In this respect, Turkey and Egypt
provide a good illustration of the subject, as their experience conforms with
the main hypothesis of this framework on the one hand but also points to its
shortcomings on the other.
The dominant view thus asserts that adherence to the Gold Standard, as an
ideology or ethos, played a key role in the transmission and deepening of the
depression and therefore the timing and extent of the recovery. Accordingly,
the massive decline in commodity prices and capital flight from the countries
in deficit during 1929-1931 combined with the policy responses within the
framework of the Gold Standard to result in a contractionary cycle. Once
it was observed that the rules of the gold standard failed to help exit from
the slump, many countries, faced with the severe decline in export earnings,
worsening trade balances and capital flight, began to adopt exchange controls
and increase tariffs to isolate the home market from the external shocks around
1931. These initial policy responses were not due to the theoretical realisation
of the negative impact of the Gold Standard, but rather to the extent of a
shock that was so large that governments needed to take measures to stop the
impact of deflation on national economies and to promote recovery. However,
over the course of the 1930s, such ad hoc policies became systematic and more
elaborate. Britain’s departure from gold in 1931 was a critical moment, since
many countries followed suit by devaluing their currencies, in addition to or
in tandem with other measures. On the other hand, many others continued
to defend the Gold Standard by sticking with artificially fixed exchange rates.
The implication of this thesis is important. Since the rules of the Gold
Standard pushed countries into a deflationary cycle, the recovery from the
Great Depression largely depended on getting rid of the golden fetters, that
is, on abandoning the Gold Standard. But the departure from gold was not
to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why? Journal of Eco-
nomic History , 70 2009; and Ben Bernanke, Macroeconomics of the Great Depression:
A Comparative Approach. In Ben Bernanke, editor, Essays on Great Depression. Prin-
ceton University Press, 2000.
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sufficient to stimulate growth, as it was also necessary to abandon financial
orthodoxy. The possible heterodox expansionary policies, to the extent that
policy autonomy existed, were devaluation, protectionism, monetary expan-
sion and fiscal stimulus.70 However, within the institutional and intellectual
frameworks inherited in each country from the past, the policy choices were
not as many. In principle such policies were designed to shift domestic de-
mand towards locally produced goods. While devaluation helped to expand
domestic credit, boost exports or raise the domestic prices of foreign goods,
thus switching the demand to domestic sales, import repression with fixed
exchange rates was less compatible with expansionary policies.
But why did some countries stay on gold for so long? Eichengreen argues
that domestic politics and the enduring legacy of the economic events of the
early 1920s explain why some countries were late to leave.71 For instance,
in the countries like France, which had experienced high and persistent in-
flation earlier, discretionary monetary policies were viewed as the source of
instability, whereas in other countries such as Britain, which had avoided in-
flation, policy makers were more willing to experiment. The decision also
reflected the differences in the balances of political power, as the tendency for
devaluation that raised the prices of trade goods was favoured by producers
of traded goods and farmers, whereas it was opposed by creditors and those
who produced exclusively for the home market.72 Moreover, there is further
evidence that in addition to the experience of high inflation, the severity of
deflation, degree of terms of trade shocks, political instability and the existing
trade patterns affected how long countries stayed on gold.73.
Since Turkey and Egypt adopted protectionist policies in the 1930s, we
need to discuss the shift towards protectionism in more detail. The protec-
tionist measures in the 1930s sought, in the first place, to check the decline in
agricultural prices and then became much more systematic and comprehens-
ive. Immediately after 1929, Germany, France and Italy introduced higher
70Eichengreen and Sachs, Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery, p.926.
71Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, p.23; Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, pp.10-11; and Douglas
Irwin, Trade Policy Disasters. MIT Press, 2012.
72Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, p.287.
73Holger Wolf and Tarik Yousef, Breaking the Fetters: Why did Countries Exit the Interwar
Gold Standard? In Timotty Hatton, Kevin O’Rourke and Alan Taylor, editors, The New
Comparative Economic History: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson. MIT Press,
2007; and Nikolaus Wolf, Scylla and Charybdis: Explaining Europe’s Exit from Gold,
January 1928–December 1936. Explorations in Economic History 45 2008
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tariffs on primary goods, which was followed by the similar response by many
other countries. The US followed suit in 1931 with the Smooth-Hawley Act,
and Britain opted for an upward tariff revision in 1932. The main tool was
tariffs in this very early stage of the depression, but the financial crisis in
Germany and Austria in the summer of 1931 led to a dramatic reshaping
of commercial policies. First, tariffs were revised upward and, second, they
came to be supplemented by quantitative import restrictions and exchange
controls.74 Eventually, even when world industrial production and income
reached pre-depression levels by the end of the 1930s, national economies re-
mained relatively isolated, as shown by the serious lag in world trade. Lewis
explains this lag as a result of the trade restrictions introduced after the de-
pression.75
Eichengreen and Irwin maintain that national commercial policies in the
interwar period were strongly associated with exchange rate policies.76 Ac-
cordingly, the cross-country variation in the use of protectionist measures
indicates how and why import-restricting policies were increasingly adopted:
those countries which preferred to remain on gold were more likely to restrict
foreign trade because they lacked an independent monetary policy, so they
resorted to trade restrictions to shift demand toward domestic production.77
In other words, the reaction of individual countries to deflation and the crisis
in the export sector was to reflate home markets, which depended on expan-
sionary monetary policies or import repression. The countries that allowed
depreciation had a number of instruments to address deflation and unem-
ployment, whereas the choice of defending fixed rates severely limited policy
options, leaving trade repression as an effective policy to favour domestic
producers against foreign competition.78
74League of Nations, Commercial Policy in the Interwar Period: International Proposals
and National Policies. League of Nations, 1942; and Eichengreen and Irwin, Slide to
Protectionism.
75Arthur Lewis, Economic Survey 1919-1939. 3rd edition. George Allen and Unwin LTD,
1953, p.59
76Eichengreen and Irwin, Slide to Protectionism. For similar arguments see Irwin, Trade
Policy Disasters; and Charles H. Feinstein, Peter Temin and Gianni Toniolo, The World
Economy Between the World Wars. Oxford University Press, 2008, p.135.
77Note that a similar argument had been suggested much earlier: the recovery, after 1932,
was observed in all countries pursuing expansionist credit and/or work-creation policies
behind a depreciated or controlled currency, except the gold bloc countries where de-
flation continued until 1936. League of Nations, Commercial Policy in the Interwar
Period , p.67.
78It is clear that Britain does not fit easily into this framework, as the upward tariff revision
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Now let’s turn to the sectoral aspects of economic recovery in the 1930s. As
a whole, as demonstrated in the movement of prices, the fall in agricultural
prices hit the bottom in 1932, and recovered by only a small margin until the
end of decade. This is why national policies could only provide short-term
relief for the agricultural sector against indebtedness due to the increase in
the real value of taxes and debts. In the long term, countries had a few op-
tions: encouraging the shift towards cash crops, stimulating production via
more intensive use of inputs such as chemical fertilisers or acreage expansion,
if possible. However, there were powerful constraints on the impact of such
policies due to rigidity in demand and supply, so the scope for agricultural
growth was limited, which was one of the reasons why most governments
turned their attention to the industrial sector. On the other hand, the im-
pact of the agricultural crisis on national income and industrial growth has
largely been ignored in the empirical literature on recovery in the 1930s. The
issue is elaborated by Madsen, who shows that the crisis in agriculture had
spillover effects on other sectors, as a sharp decline in prices led to a fall in the
purchasing power of the agricultural population without symmetric effects on
the welfare of those who gained.79 His study looks at industrial countries, so
it is clear that such spillover effects should have been much more pronounced
in agricultural countries because of the larger share of agriculture in national
income.
In short, then, the dominant theory of economic recovery in the 1930s views
the failure of concerted action after the Great Depression and adherence to
the Gold Standard as the primary causes of the transmission and deepening
of the deflationary forces. This is why the 1930s witnessed a large range of
policy experimentation at the national level. In principle, as Feinstein, Temin
and Toniolo states, the relief from the depression during the 1930s primarily
had to come from domestic expansion and industrial recovery in particular
depended on the interaction between government policies and domestic de-
mand.80 It is understood from the above discussion that national policies
in 1932 followed devaluation in 1931. Yet, Eichengreen and Irwin maintains that the
British tariff revision was not an economic necessity; rather, it was the outcome of the
rise of conservative politics plus the balance of payments problems to a lesser degree.
Eichengreen and Irwin, Slide to Protectionism.
79Jacob Madsen, Agricultural Crisis and International Transmission of GD. Journal of
Economic History 61(2) 2001.
80Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, The World Economy Between the World Wars. 2008,
p.163.
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aimed to stimulate domestic markets in a number of ways: the countries that
went off gold devalued their currencies and capitalised on the expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies, which allowed them to perform better than those
that adhered to fixed exchange rates. That was because the countries that
defended fixed rates had to resort to import repression on a larger scale to
shift demand away from imports, but the impact of protectionism on growth
was more limited because of sluggish domestic incomes.
On the other hand, although the view summarised above convincingly ar-
gues for the better performance of the devaluing countries, it is not without
shortcomings. First, it does not address variation between the economic per-
formance of the countries that adhered to fixed rates and passive policies.
Second, its geographical coverage is mostly limited to the industrialised coun-
tries, so a look at the experience of primary producers such as Egypt and
Turkey may help to refine some of these issues.
1.3.2. Peripheral Economies Through the Depression: A
Blessing in Disguise?
As stated above, the interwar peripheral economies have not received due
attention in comparison with the industrialised ones. There only exists a
small number of valuable comparative histories and a relatively larger number
of country-specific studies looking at various aspects of national economies.
The following pages briefly attempt to discuss the insights emanating from
such studies to understand the particular economic problems the developing
regions encountered in the 1930s and relate them to the broader historiography
discussed above.
Broadly speaking, the interwar depression was transmitted to the develop-
ing countries through the decline in agricultural prices and the sharp deteri-
oration in their terms of trade. By the 1920s, most agricultural economies
had already been integrated into the world economy as agricultural exporters
since, as Rothermund states, subsistence agriculture was already a myth by
the 1930s as far as most of the peasants in the primary producers were con-
cerned.81 They began to suffer from declining prices in the second half of the
1920s, but at that stage large capital inflows ameliorated the difficulties of the
export sector. Therefore, the Great Depression came up as such a paradigm-
81Dietmar Rothermund, Global Impact of the Great Depression. Routledge, 1996, p.10.
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shifting external shock that few historians could doubt that the 1930s was a
turning point for the periphery.82
In one way, the difference between the experience of periphery and industrial
countries in the interwar era was a matter of degree. The sharp downward
trend in prices was a worldwide phenomena, yet it was much more pronounced
in agricultural prices, so primary producers more severely felt the deflation
that rapidly translated into a decline in export prices and earnings, terms of
trade and domestic incomes. As a whole, the value of Latin American and
Asian exports declined by 22 percent and their terms of trade deteriorated by
20 percent between 1929-1932.83 While export prices were declining more than
prices of their imports, the nominal interest rate on foreign debt remained the
same, which increased the fiscal burden and worsened the balance of payments
position. An increasing share of exports therefore had to be allocated for debt
servicing.84 At the same time, the inflow of foreign capital was substantially
reduced.85 Defaults started in 1931 and only a few countries maintained
normal debt servicing by 1934. During the depression, primary producers
thus found themselves with a massive debt burden, a crisis in their export
sectors and a decline in national income.
On the other hand, the peripheral economies also differed from industrial
ones in a more fundamental way, since the continuation of deflation in the
early 1930s and the prolonged difficulties worsened the expectations about a
possible recovery, which encouraged radical policy shifts in many countries.
82Nonetheless, there are still doubters. Haber, for instance, rejects the existence of a divide
by arguing that Latin America already had substantial industry before 1930 and import-
substituting industrialisation was a product of a historically longer process. S. Haber,
Political Economy of Industrialisation. In Victor Bulmer-Thomas and J.H. Coatsworth,
editors, The Cambridge History of Latin America: Vol II The Long Twentieth Century.
Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.537.
83Angus Maddison, Two Crises: Latin America and Asia, 1929-38 and 1973-83. Develop-
ment Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1985,
pp.13-14.
84Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence.
2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.191. Diaz-Alejandro recalls that as
early as 1929 Latin America had showed signs of skipping scheduled services of external
debt or blocking profit remittances. C. Diaz-Alejandro, Latin America in the 1930s. In
Rosemary Thorp, editor, Latin America in the 1930s: The Role of Periphery in World
Crisis. Macmillan, 1984, p.20.
85US lending declined from 300 million dollars to negligible levels between 1927 and 1933,
which particularly affected Latin America. N. Fleisig, US and non-European Periphery
During the Early Years of the Great Depression. In Herham Van Der Wee, editor, Great
Depression Revisited. Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p.157.
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Doubts about orthodox liberal economic policies increasingly grew, the reli-
ance on export sectors and raw material production came to be questioned
and policy makers were more and more convinced of the need for a sharp
break with the old policy paradigms. Not least, the concomitant rise in pro-
tectionism in the industrial countries and the influence of nationalist feelings
in the periphery motivated such shifts in policy orientation. Therefore, im-
port restrictions, exchange controls, devaluations and debt default began to
be pursued with the empowerment of the mostly urban-based political groups
that came to power in the midst of the crisis.86
The new policies were mainly oriented towards the industrial sector and
proved successful by and large thanks to the strongly protected domestic
markets: the most update comparison of industrial output between countries
shows that although industrialisation in the periphery can be dated back to
the late nineteenth century, it spread across the periphery on a large scale in
the 1930s.87 During the 1930s Latin America, the European periphery and
the Middle East all outperformed the industrial leaders (Germany, the US
and the UK).88 Moreover, this also translated into stronger GDP growth. As
opposed to the growth patterns in the late nineteenth century, many regions
in the periphery performed better than Western Europe during the interwar
period. Between 1913 and 1950, income per capita grew by 1.4 per cent per
year in Latin America, 1.5 percent in Eastern Europe and 1 percent in Africa,
whereas the average annual growth rate was as low as 0.8 percent in Western
Europe. The exception was Asia, excluding Japan, which saw a 2 percent
decline per year.89
The comparison of the cases of Asian and Latin American economies in the
1930s is particularly interesting because it points to the endogeneity of policy
responses, as subsequent policy changes were associated with the severity of
shock. Maddison argues that the depression was more heavily felt in Latin
86Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, p.222; and Maddison, Two Crises,
p.23.
87Jeffrey Williamson, Kevin O’Rourke and Agustin Benetrix, The Spread of Manufactur-
ing to the Poor Periphery 1870-2007. Social Science Research Network Working Paper
2013. This can also be compared with the findings of Paul Bairoch, International Indus-
trialisation Levels from 1750 to 1980. Journal of European Economic History , 11 1982
and League of Nations, Industrialisation and Foreign Trade. League of Nations, 1943,
p.14.
88Williamson, O’Rourke and Benetrix, Spread of Manufacturing, p.7.
89The growth rates are based on Maddison’s data. Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, The
World Economy Between the World Wars, p.8.
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America than in Asia: during 1929-1932 Latin American GDP declined by
13 percent, whereas Asia saw a fall of just 3-5 percent.90 The fall in import
volume was greater in Latin America and the terms of trade worsened more
sharply. The reason for the difference was that there were closer linkages
between Latin America and the US, where the recovery was more delayed
and in addition Asia had more diversified exports. By 1932, almost all Latin
American countries had left the gold standard and followed expansionary
policies, whereas Asian growth was slower and Asian governments remained
more orthodox in policy orientation.
Diaz-Alejandro also considers the economic performance of individual coun-
tries during the 1930s to be a result of the magnitude of the exogenous shocks,
combined with the policy measures undertaken to adjust to them and the re-
silience of local private agents in responding to the new constellation of profit
opportunities.91 He argues that the ability to manipulate policy instruments
in countries with nominal sovereignty were greatest in countries that were
large (such as Brazil) or had autonomous public sectors. By contrast, smaller
or highly dependent countries had little room for manoeuvre. Furthermore,
it was not only policies that determined economic performance because other
structural features, such as the characteristics of traditional exports and the
extent of foreign control of banking and land, also played a pivotal role in
determining the elasticity of response to the new relative prices.92
Diaz-Alejandro’s argument is in accordance with the argument on the role
of devaluation in economic recovery set out above.93 Reactive countries de-
valued more than passive countries and they moved forward more speedily.
Haber agrees by pointing out that smaller economies industrialised later and
less completely compared to larger economies.94 Similarly, Campa argues
that the findings of Eichengreen and Sachs regarding the connection between
devaluation and the extent of recovery was also true of Latin America, as de-
valuing countries fared better than the passive countries.95 In reactive coun-
90Maddison, Two Crises, p.16-17.
91Diaz-Alejandro, Latin America, p.18.
92In a similar manner, Fleisig argues that the effects of depression in the periphery de-
pended on the type of exports, degree of diversification of exports, organisation of
export industries, and the responsiveness of the import-competing sector. Fleisig, US
and non-European Periphery During the Early Years of the Great Depression, p.175.
93Diaz-Alejandro, Latin America, p.23.
94Haber, Political Economy of Industrialisation, p.537.
95Jose Manuel Campa, Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s: An Extension
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tries, fiscal policy also contributed to the maintenance of aggregate demand,
at least in the sense of not balancing the budget. Other policies that were im-
plemented included land reform (in Mexico), further credit provisioning and
public works.96
What was common in all peripheral economies was that output growth out-
stripped the expansion of domestic consumption that either followed sluggish
GDP growth or declined.97 Bulmer-Thomas maintains that recovery was as-
sured if the import-competing sector expanded more than the contraction in
the export sector, which required a growth in nominal demand.98 He looks
at the sources of income growth in the Latin American countries and finds
that the increase over the 1930s was either due to the revival of exports or
increases in home final demand, particularly in private consumption.99 The
latter was a reflection of loose monetary and fiscal policies. Once the home de-
mand recovered, domestic producers were provided the opportunity to satisfy
a market in which the relative prices of importables had increased.100
On the other hand, the insights emanating from these comparisons are
bound up with the particular characteristics of the cases they are based on.
Although they are useful in pointing out the role of exchange rate and expan-
sionary policies in the context of Latin America, the case of economies that
adhered to fixed exchange rates needs further elaboration. The Eastern and
Southeastern European countries are a good case in point, since their experi-
ence in the 1930s differed so much from many Latin American or Asian coun-
tries. Teichova argues that there were remarkable similarities in the quick and
sustained industrial growth in the agrarian Southeastern economies.101 Al-
though the role of government in economic life increased almost everywhere
to Latin America. Journal of Economic History , 50(3) 1990.
96Diaz-Alejandro, Latin America, p.35.
97Diaz-Alejandro, Latin America, p.40-41.
98Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, p.205.
99Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, p.209. Rothermund also asserts
that the recovery in Latin America was to a larger extent due to the revival of ex-
ports than the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) economists believed.
Rothermund, p.99.
100Also, since consumer credits were scarce, demand for non-durables, rather than dur-
ables, such as beverages and textiles, underwent substantial growth. Bulmer-Thomas,
Economic History of Latin America, p.209
101Alice Teichova, East-Central and South-East Europe 1913–1939. In Peter Mathias and
Sidney Pollard, editors, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 8, The In-
dustrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies. Cambridge
University Press, 1989, pp.939-42.
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after the depression, it was more pronounced in the Eastern European and
Balkan countries, as autarchic inclinations were greatly enhanced by the na-
tionalist and dictatorial regimes in those countries after 1929.102 Governments
came to exercise strict control over international payments and foreign trade
in order to prevent currency depreciations and maintain trade balances. State
intervention also aimed to offset the shrinkage in domestic demand via cartel
legislation, forced syndicalisation and direct state entrepreneurship. In this
way, industrial growth in those countries was strictly associated with import
policies, as the composition of imports sharply shifted away from consumer
goods, which were increasingly supplied by import-substituting local produ-
cers.103
In such a strict framework, therefore, bilateralism with Germany seemed
the only way out to ease the depression in the region’s export sectors.104
Lampe and Jackson argue that clearing arrangements increasingly replaced
the use of convertible currencies at fixed exchange rates, which encouraged
barter trade.105 They show that the share of clearing in the foreign trade of
Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia exceeded one half in the second
half of the 1930s and in these arrangements the ReichMark was consistently
overvalued to attract imports from the region. 106
It is impossible to overlook the fact that Turkey had much in common with
Eastern and Southeastern European countries in terms of import-repressing
policies, conservative exchange rate policies, the rise in state entrepreneur-
102A similar emphasis can be found in Derek Aldcroft, The European Economy 1914-2000.
Routledge, 2001, p.76.
103Teichova, East-Central and South-East Europe 1913–1939, p.956. For similar arguments,
see John R. Lampe and Martin R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950: From
Imperial Borderlands to Developed Nations. Indiana University Press, 1982, p.491.
104The League of Nations argued that the goal of the clearing policy was to open trade con-
trols to help export industries.(League of Nations, Commercial Policy in the Interwar
Period , p. 70). Similarly, Henderson points out that the clearing system aimed at in-
creasing trade volume, even at low terms of trade, and Balkan countries enjoyed a ready
export market in return.(Hubert Douglas Henderson, International Economic History
of the Interwar Period. In The Interwar Years and Other Papers. Oxford University
Press, 1955. – chapter 4, pp. 35-36)
105Lampe and Jackson, Balkan Economic History , pp.461-64.
106The rationale of German policy is a matter of controversy. For Kitson, Germany gave
up terms of trade advantages by paying higher prices for imports from the Eastern
European countries, but for Neal, it was less costly than usually thought. Michael
Kitson, The Move to Autarky: The Political Economy of Nazi Trade Policy. Department
of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No.9201 1992; and
Larry Neal, The Economics and Finance of Bilateral Clearing Agreements: Germany,
1934-8. Economic History Review , 32(3) 1979.
1.3. GREAT DEPRESSION AND RECOVERY IN THE 1930S: THE GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 47
ship, the favourable domestic environment for import-substituting activities
and finally the increasing role of the clearing system. This Eastern European
policy pattern does not, however, contradict the theoretical framework de-
scribed above, since it seems that while protectionism was pursued in the
region to divert industrial demand towards domestic production, the state
sector increased to make up for the lack of investment or to boost the do-
mestic demand via government demand.
In a nutshell, the crisis in the periphery was the derivative of the depres-
sion in the industrial world, whereas the recovery was to a certain extent their
own product. In the terminology of Diaz-Alejandro, the interaction between
the extent of shock, policies and the capacity of domestic agents to exploit
the opportunities determined economic performance. The experience of de-
veloping countries differed from the industrial core in terms of the origins of
the crisis. For them, the depression was almost totally external, as the peri-
pheral economies were more exposed to external shocks and their capacities
to respond were more limited. These differences led to a more dramatic shift
in policy orientation than in the industrial countries. The policies mainly
grew inward looking in all countries, while the devaluation and expansionary
policies were more common in Latin America and led to earlier recoveries.
By contrast, the countries that maintained fixed exchange rates resorted to
import repression and government intervention more heavily, as we saw in
Eastern Europe. However, whatever the policy instruments were, the main
policy objective was to divert demand towards domestic production, due in
part to the persistent crisis in the export sector or the empowering of the
import-substituting interests.
Yet such policies were not costless. Inward-looking policies brought artifi-
cially high domestic prices, price distortions and entrenched the interests of
certain domestic groups, which exploited the economic opportunities created
by the new policy orientations. But it is also true not only that economic re-
covery during the 1930s was greatly helped by the heterodox policies but that
many reactive countries also made progress towards the structural change and
the beginning of industrialisation.
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1.4. Dissertation Contents and Structure
The main themes this dissertation addresses and its methodology are based on
an understanding of the role of agriculture and industry in economic recovery
in the 1930s. First, the economies of Turkey and Egypt were predominantly
agricultural, so the dynamics of agricultural growth had direct and indirect
effects on aggregate income. The direct effect was due to the large share of the
agricultural sector in GDP, which was no less than one half in both countries.
The indirect effect was the result of spillover effects to other sectors. In
principle, agriculture supports the industrial sector by providing cheap food,
labour, savings and demand for manufactures.107 And in interwar economies
the role of agriculture was even greater, not only in agricultural economies
but also in industrial countries. As shown by Madsen, this was because the
role of foreign trade was reduced and the recovery was mainly dependent on
home markets where rural demand was a major part of domestic demand.108
For this reason, pinning down the extent and determinants of agricultural
growth is the essential step towards understanding economic performance as
a whole. Second, despite the lack of structural change in Turkey and Egypt,
both countries seemingly witnessed industrial growth during the 1930s, even
though the quantitative evidence has been inadequate up to now. The begin-
ning of industrialisation during the 1930s in both countries has been attrib-
uted to various factors, such as the rise in protectionism, state intervention
and changes in investment patterns due to the agricultural crisis. However,
all these remain as reasonable hypotheses that need to be elaborated upon.
Therefore, the measurement and explanation of agricultural and industrial
growth are the main methodology employed in the present work. In discussing
industrial growth, the import-restricting policies are given special attention.
What was the extent of agricultural and industrial growth? And what were
their determinants? In particular, what was the impact of tariff protection
on industrial growth?
In answering these questions, the present work does not cover other im-
portant aspects of economic performance. For one thing, this is not a growth-
accounting exercise. Estimates of capital and labour are not available or are
107Bruce Johnston and John Mellor, The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development.
American Economic Review , 51(4) 1961; and W. Arthur Lewis, Evolution of Interna-
tional Economic Order. Princeton University Press, 1977.
108Madsen, Agricultural Crisis
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not of sufficient quality to do such an analysis. Moreover, the time frame
of the present study is limited to 1925-1939 for Turkey and 1919-1939 for
Egypt, so it does not allow us to capture the long-term aspects of economic
growth. This choice is largely driven by the available quantitative data, al-
though focusing on the interwar period provides a more coherent time frame
in terms of external shocks and the policies adopted in each country. There-
fore, the reader should bear in mind that we are interested in the short-term
sectoral analysis and policy responses to external influences, rather than the
fundamental causes of economic growth.
Similarly, this work is not concerned with policy making per se either. While
the Turkish historiography emphasises import-substituting industrialisation
and etatism during the 1930s, the Egyptian literature is mostly concerned
with the problems of the agricultural sector. This difference is meaningful
in view of the different intellectual traditions and the importance of cotton
in Egyptian economy. From the very beginning of the Turkish Republic, in-
dustrial development has been considered by policy makers and intellectuals
the most crucial means of achieving ’independence’, ’self-sufficiency’ or de-
velopment itself, whereas the role of cotton in the Egyptian economy was
so large that even when industrialisation was urgently desired, agriculture
continued to be seen as an essential prerequisite of industrial development.
The policies adopted during the 1930s remarkably show this contrast. While
they were oriented towards the urban sector in Turkey despite the largeness
of the rural populations and the difficulties in agriculture, Egypt pursued a
balanced-growth model aiming to sustain the expansion of both agriculture
and industry. Here, however, we are less concerned with the origins of these
different policy approaches than with their effects.
The dissertation is composed of three parts. The first and second parts,
each including three chapters, present, first, the measurement and analysis
of agricultural growth, second, measurement of industrial growth and, third,
an explanation of industrial growth in Turkey and Egypt respectively. These
two parts follow almost the same methodologies in each chapter in the same
order. Finally the last part, which is Conclusion, brings together the findings
of earlier chapters by comparing and contrasting the interwar Turkish and
Egyptian economies.
Chapter 2 examines agricultural growth in Turkey by making some cor-
rections to the existing output series and further decomposing the crop out-
1.4. DISSERTATION CONTENTS AND STRUCTURE 50
put value into its components (yields, prices, acreage and crop-mix) for the
benchmark years. This exercise shows the extent to which output growth was
determined by each factor. As pointed out above, agricultural growth in the
second half of the 1930s has to a large extent been ignored in the received
wisdom and the chapter argues that it was driven not only by an open land
frontier, as largely suggested in the literature, but also the concomitant im-
provement in yields, particularly of wheat and cash crops. Finally it calculates
the average per capita farm income, which shows how the rural demand for
manufactures changed.
Chapter 3 turns its attention to the industrial sector. The existing inter-
pretations of industrialisation in Turkey during the 1930s largely draw on the
aggregate value added series provided by Bulutay et al..109 But the construc-
tion of this series raises doubts about its accuracy. In order to provide a more
consistent and reliable series, we first estimate the growth of physical output
in each major sector and combine them by using constant value added shares,
adjusted for the change of output composition over time. The new series cor-
rects for the upward bias in the existing series and, in addition, shows the
sectoral aspects of industrial growth. it is shown that the aggregate output
increased by between 8.7 percent per annum over 1925-1939, the textiles grew
most and the other sectors also saw substantial growth.
Trade policies are the subject matter of Chapter 4. Since exchange rates,
monetary and fiscal policies were not particularly expansionary in Turkey,
protectionism appears to have been the most significant policy tool employed
to stimulate domestic industries. On the other hand, however, the industrial
sector also enjoyed favourable relative prices, low wages and beneficial changes
in the agricultural sector. Therefore, the analysis in this chapter aims to
differentiate between such effects. The empirical framework employed for this
purpose is a partial equilibrium analysis and its focus is textiles, which is
chosen because, first, it was the leading growth sector within manufacturing
during the 1930s, second, import substitution was deepest in textiles and,
third, the supply and demand elasticities were probably close for cotton, silk,
woollen textiles and hemp goods. The panel data estimates show that both
tariff-inclusive import prices and domestic income were strong predictors of
the growth of textiles output.
109Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
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Chapter 5 discusses growth in Egyptian agriculture. The decomposition
of crop output shows that the increase in yields to a considerable extent off-
set the impact of the constraint on expansion of acreage under cultivation
and massive decline in prices, which is in line with the arguments for the
shift towards more intensive cultivation in the interwar period. Afterwards
the chapter presents the first estimates of value added in agriculture and per
capita farm income. The main argument of this chapter is that the perform-
ance of Egyptian agriculture was noteworthy in view of the massive shock in
cotton prices, as well as the previous deterioration in yields and structural
constraints.
Chapter 6 attempts to estimate the industrial output growth in major sec-
tors in Egypt at the sectoral and aggregate level for the first time. Just as
in Chapter 4, the main sources are direct output data derived from various
sources, such as British trade reports, the official statistics on raw material
consumption and foreign trade data. The results are cross checked with the
existing qualitative data, previous benchmark estimates and consumption es-
timates. It s shown that the industrial growth grew by 1.3 percent per annum
over 1919-1939. The chapter also finds that industrial growth was highly
skewed in Egypt during the 1930s, in that very strong growth in textiles (7.9
percent per annum over 1919-1939) stands in stark contrast with the stagna-
tion or moderate growth in other sectors. Also, this pattern was the main
difference with the Turkish pattern.
Chapter 7 repeats the partial equilibrium analysis of textiles output for
Egypt. It turns out that the tariff-inclusive import prices and the aggregate
prices relative to the raw material prices were significant drivers of output
growth, whereas domestic income put a check on further expansion. It is ar-
gued that while import-repression worked out quite well in stimulating textiles
output, the stagnant home demand limited the scope of growth in non-textiles
sectors.
Chapter 8 puts together the findings of the earlier chapters to compare
and contrast the economic experience of Egypt and Turkey. It presents the
main arguments of this dissertation in a more compact form, while also look-
ing at the role played by monetary and fiscal policies in the 1930s. The
main argument put forward is that in both countries macro policies remained
passive and/or pro-cyclical, but the policy activism was exhibited in field of
import policies. In this sense, the protectionist policies were more aggress-
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ive in Turkey. However, the effect of the difference in policy activism was
more observed on the extent of industrialisation rather than on the income
per capita divergence. Instead, the latter was the result of the combination of
different sets of factor endowments, the structural constraints inherited from
the earlier period, different paths of institutional development. Turkey was
well endowed with factor endowments, particularly in agriculture, conducive
to economic growth, which was in most likelihood helped by state entrepren-
eurship, whereas Egypt suffered from the economic constraints inherited from
pre-World War I period and massive external shocks, that combined to led
to stagnant domestic demand. Furthermore the lack of political and institu-
tional capacity in Egypt added to the growth deadlock when expansionary
policies were most needed.
Consequently, this dissertation presents a detailed quantitative assessment
of the growth performance in Egypt and Turkey in the interwar period. It
not only sheds light on the extent and sources of economic performance in
these economies, but also fills a major empirical gap in the literature by
suggesting new agricultural and industrial output series. Based on paired
case studies of two large economies in the Middle East, it also contributes to
a better understanding of the experience of primary-producing countries in
the interwar depression.
2. Agriculture in Interwar Turkey:
Overcoming Deflation
2.1. Introduction
The present chapter focuses on the growth of agricultural production in Tur-
key. To begin, it would be useful to recapitulate the main features of Turk-
ish agriculture by the beginning of 1920s, as was outlined in the Introduc-
tion. First and foremost, the agricultural sector was characterised by an
open land frontier and relative labour force scarcity due to the wartime losses
of the earlier decade. This particular factor composition in favour of land
became one of the key factors determining agriculture’s growth path up to
the 1950s. Second, commodity markets were to a large extent fragmented,
with the coastal cash-crop producing areas, the Aegean and Mediterranean
regions, being more integrated with foreign markets, whereas the Anatolian
hinterland largely consisted of small loosely connected localities. Third, the
average farm size was small, as owner-operator peasant families with a pair
of oxen and a piece of land was the rule, except in a few regions where land-
lordism and sharecropping was prevalent, such as Southeast Anatolia and the
cotton-producing regions, Çukurova in the South and Söke in the West.
It is therefore plausible to maintain that at the beginning of the 1920s the
new republican regime took over a farm sector where there was a long way to
go in terms of land use, market integration and commercialisation, so that the
prospect of agricultural growth was bright at least in the short and medium
term. Since three quarters of the total labour force was employed, and around
one half of the national income was produced, in the farm sector, its growth
potential was key to overall macroeconomic growth.
The conventional wisdom has nonetheless focused on two issues with regard
to the agricultural sector in the interwar period. First, the concept of recovery
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has been put forward, which refers to the fact that much of the resources,
basically land, remained unused during the earlier decade due to the wartime
mobilisation of the labour force and the large-scale population exchanges.
Most of the growth in the coming decades was consequently dependent on
the recovery of the population and thus of the land under cultivation.1 This
interpretation is not totally wrong, yet it is not an adequate account because,
as will be shown shortly, agricultural net output returned to the levels of the
prewar period by 1930, and slightly earlier in per capita terms, so the growth
of the 1930s cannot be explained by any kind of recovery concept.(Figure 2.2)
Second, much of the literature has underlined the role of massive deflation
in the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression and the deteriorating do-
mestic terms of trade for agriculture, which left the rural population worse-off
until World War II. Accordingly, the peasantry was squeezed in the interest
of rapid industrialisation during the 1930s.2 The weakness of this argument
is that the increase in crop output in the second half of the 1930s goes largely
unnoticed, as has been pointed out in a few studies.3 While it is true that after
1929 peasants had to pay more and more for the same amount of industrial
goods, rural welfare cannot be explained only by relative prices, especially
given that agriculture still grew despite persistently low prices. Under the
assumptions of limited land, labour and capital, the agricultural sector might
have been worse off in competing against other sectors for production factors.
Yet if there are under-utilised resources in place, as was the case in Turkey in
the interwar years, it can be argued along the lines of dual economy models
that the sectoral relationship can be mutually reinforcing rather than com-
petitive because agriculture can simultaneously ensure both cheap food and
demand for industrial products without sacrificing farm output. This chapter
shows that this was the case in Turkey, as agriculture supported industrial
growth due to various factors, such as the open land frontier, population
growth and increasing land productivity. It is shown that the argument that
the agricultural growth of the early republican period relied almost exclus-
1Hansen, Egypt and Turkey , p.477.
2Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi , pp.61-62.
3Şevket Pamuk, İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Devlet, Tarımsal Yapılar ve Bölüşüm. In
Şevket Pamuk and Zafer Toprak, editors, Türkiye’de Tarımsal Yapılar. Yurt Yayınevi,
1988; Ayça Akarçay, Agricultural Growth in the 1930s. Master’s thesis, Boğaziçi Uni-
versity, 1999; Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression; and Kazgan, Türkiye
Ekonomisinde Depresyon.
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ively on the expansion of land acreage and population growth is rather over
simplistic, as it ignores the substantial improvements in crop yields and the
complex dynamics of agricultural growth.
This chapter presents, to begin with, the revised estimates of agricultural
(crop and livestock) output by making a number of major and minor revisions
to the existing data. It then pins down the sources of the agricultural growth
in order to suggest a reasonable explanation of why it occurred. To do so, the
crop output series are decomposed into their components (price, acreage, yield
and crop composition). And finally farm income per capita is calculated to
get a sense of changes in rural welfare, as well as to obtain a sensible measure
of rural demand for the products of other sectors. The period covered is
1925-1939, as reliable aggregate evidence does not extend back earlier.
2.2. Revised Output Estimates
Bulutay et al. provide the most comprehensive estimates of agricultural pro-
duction before World War II as part of their study of Turkey’s national in-
come.4 Almost all the historiography now rests on this study, as no further
revision to it has been made. At the time, Bulutay and his colleagues made
use of all the official data on output, prices and acreage, making some re-
visions to the raw data to be able to link it with the official figures of the
post-1948 period.5 Methodologically, they calculated the market value of the
agricultural produce, farm and livestock output, including fisheries and hunt-
ing, net of production costs. The crop base is quite comprehensive as they
took into account all the major field crops (cereals and the cash crops like
sugar beet, cotton and tobacco), fruits and vegetables.6
İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü (IUM), the central government institution
which collected and published economic data, started to publish annual series
on output and acreage, on which Bulutay et al. relied, in 1928.7 Then, the
4Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
5Note that by “acreage” we mean the cropped area rather than the cultivated area, on
which no information exists.
6The full list of products is: wheat, barley, rye, maize, beans, broad beans, peas, lentils,
vetch, tobacco, sugar beet, potatoes, cotton, sesame, onion, cobnuts, walnuts, pistachio,
figs, grapes, apples, pears and olives.
7The Merkezi İstatistik Dairesi (Central Statistical Agency) was established in 1926 and
renamed İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü in 1930 with Law 1554. Turkey, Resmi Gazete,
1418, 8/2/1930. For a brief history of the institution, see Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu:
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subsequent official publications incorporated information extracted from the
1927 Agricultural Census to their annual series. And for 1925-26, the incom-
plete data collected from regional administrations were linked by the IUM
to the series that followed. While they admitted that this discontinuity in
the construction of the series possibly caused inconsistencies in the data, Bu-
lutay et al. had no choice but to use this data set, since there was no way of
making a systematic and extensive correction.
However, a closer inspection suggests that some useful corrections are ne-
cessary and possible. Firstly, the official cotton series seems improbable, as
the yield figures show an unusual and dramatic decline from the 1920s on-
wards (from 300-500 to 100-200 kg per hectare) for no explicable reason and
in contrast to the trend in the yields of other crops.8 Bulutay et al. notices
this problem and suggests replacing the official series with new ones based on
the assumption that cotton yields were equal to their 1930 level for the years
prior to 1931.9 Obviously, their suggestion is far from satisfactory.
Instead of this arbitrary solution, we will here construct new raw cotton
output series by going back to the original regional sources and reconstruct-
ing all the output series from the beginning. Cotton is perhaps the only crop
for which such an extensive reconstruction is possible because its cultivation
and marketing were concentrated in the Adana and İzmir regions, where the
regional commodity exchanges published a number of data sources and market
reports. These localities were the centres of two large cotton-producing re-
gions, Çukurova-Mersin and the Aegean respectively, which were responsible
for no less than three quarters of the gross cotton output of the country.10
Thus the present series are based on the sources published by the Adana
Commodity Exchange and the Izmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry.11
The methodology proceeds as follows. First, the annual cotton output of
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=tarihce
8The most detailed sources on the cotton output of Adana and surrounding regions, which
produced more than half of the aggregate cotton output, does not show any negative
trend in cotton yields. Süleyman Sergici, Adana Ticaret Borsasının Ellinci Yıl Kitabı.
Adana Ticaret Borsası, 1964; Adana Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Adana Ticaret ve Zahire
Borsası Yıllığı
9Bulutay et al., pp.19-20.
10Adana Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık, 1938/1939.
11Adana Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık; İzmir Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, Izmir Ticaret
ve Sanayi Odası Mecmuası, 1933(8) and 1939(1); “Bugünkü ve yarınki Türk pamukçu-
luğu”, İzmir Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, Mecmua (October 1935); and Zeki Doğanoğlu,
Mıntıkamızın Kitabı. Ege Sanayi ve Ticaret Odası, 1930, pp. 53-64.
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three principal regions (the Aegean, Çukurova and Iğdır) is obtained. It is
possible to derive the uninterrupted annual series for the Aegean and Çukur-
ova regions, but we have only two data points for Iğdır, which was a small
production area in eastern Anatolia: 12,000 bales (a local unit of weight) in
1929 and 12,500 bales in 1939. Since these numbers indicate some degree of
constancy over time and the output of Iğdır represents a small share of the
aggregate (less than 10 percent), we prefer to take Iğdır’s output as equal to
12,000 bales for all years. The next step is to convert this into the weight in
tons. The weight equivalent of a bale varied from one region to another and
it was usually taken to be equal to 200 kg, although this changed every year.
Adana sources provide the precise equivalent of one bale for each year after
1930, which varied between 200-220 kg. Therefore, these figures are used for
1930-1939, and for the earlier years we assume that one bale equals 200 kg.
In this way, this method provides the sum of cotton output in three major
regions for 1925-1939.
These figures appear as moving in perfect line with the official series after
1931, so they seem reliable and we can extrapolate the official 1932 figure
with our sum of regional output for the earlier period (“own total estimate”
column in Table 2.1). The difference between our own series of cotton output
and the existing ones is clearly observed in Figure 2.1, which shows that both
official estimates and Bulutay et al.’s arbitrary correction leads to a massive
upward bias for the 1920s. However, one should expect an increase in cotton
output due to the greater use of local raw cotton in local factories and the
continued improvements in the cotton yields in the 1930s – just as our new
estimate implies. These points will be taken up shortly.
The second revision to the existing dataset is that we add the cotton seed
series derived from the cotton output estimates. To do so, the estimated
cotton output is simply multiplied by two to obtain the seed output. This
coefficient is obtained from Adana Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık, which
also gives the cotton seed prices of the Adana Commodity Exchange for 1925-
1939.12 Since Adana was the most important location in the cotton seed trade
at the time, those prices can be considered representative.
Finally, the last revision regards wheat output: Bulutay et al. change the
original wheat output series by decreasing all the annual figures by a fixed
12Adana Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık.
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Figure 2.1.: New and Old Cotton Output Series for Turkey (tons), 1925-1929
Source: Table 2.1
amount, which is justified by referring to the method the IUM employed to
correct for the 1948 wheat figure in another study due to over-reporting in
that year.13 But this does not seem to be well justified because it cannot
be arbitrarily taken for granted that there were the same reporting biases
in different years. For this reason, here we instead use the official series for
wheat production.
As far as output and acreage data are concerned, no further changes are
made to the official series. However, it should be noted that the corrections
to cotton and wheat are important owing to their high shares of total output
value.
As for the price data, Bulutay et al. relies on Aktan, who produced the
most comprehensive and reliable documentation of the farm-gate prices of field
crops for the period after 1926.14 For fruit and vegetables, Bulutay et al. make
their own estimates. Their main handicap is that all the original price series
are replaced by the ones which they produce by extrapolating the official 1948
13Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri , p.7. The IUM revised downward the reported
wheat output of 1948 from 4.9 million to 4.4 million tons. Likewise, Bulutay et al.
decrease the reported figures by the same ratio for all the earlier years, because they
want to maintain consistency with IUM’s methods.
14Reşat Aktan, Türkiye’de Zirai Mahsül Fiyatları. Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayın-
ları, 1955.
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figures back all along to the earlier years with Aktan’s series. However, the
latter series are used as proxy because they intend to link the post-1948 series
with the earlier period. However, as in the case of wheat production, this is
far from satisfactory. Therefore, we prefer to stick with Aktan’s original data
for the years after 1926. Finally, Bulutay et al. (1974) calculates 1924-1925
prices based on the change of export and import prices, which is reasonable
for the export goods but not for the others. Instead, we base the 1925 prices
on the change of wholesale Istanbul prices between 1925 and 1926, which is
the only available price data for 1925.15 All the details on sources can found
in the Data Appendix of this chapter.
Based on this methodology, Tables 2.4-2.6 present the revised output, price
and acreage series for 15 field crops and the output and price data for eight
fruits during 1925-1939. Note that barley output is left out from this cal-
culation of the agricultural output because it was used as the major animal
feed and double counting in total value added needs to be avoided. The fruit
output is based on four separate series: hazelnuts, figs, grapes and olives,
for which the output figures are available for the entire period. The series
are then multiplied by a fixed coefficient, 1.32, because the ratio of the value
of these four fruits to the whole fruit output, which also includes walnuts,
pistachios, apples and pears, was around 0.76 (1/1.32) with only a very small
variation during 1933-1939.
On the cost side, Bulutay et al. calculates the costs of seeds, chemical fertil-
isers, manure, animal use, gasoline, machinery maintenance, waste, irrigation
and weeding. Among them, we only take into account seed and fertiliser costs,
oil, machinery maintenance costs and waste, since other figures are either no
more than simple guesses making up a very minimal part of the costs (in
the case of the irrigation and weeding) or are ignored, in the case of animal
use and manure, because they are the output of livestock and, as said above,
the double counting in the estimation of the gross value added of farm and
livestock output should be avoided.16
To calculate the annual seeding cost, the seeding rates are multiplied by the
next year’s crop acreage and the average current prices. We use the seeding
rates for the field crops as calculated by the IUM, which are assumed to be
15İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası Yıllığı.
16The cost of weeding and irrigation is estimated as 0.3 percent of total cultivation costs
in 1948. Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri , p.38.
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constant over the whole period.17 As for the fertiliser costs, since Turkey
was not a chemical fertiliser-producing country, the volume of fertilisers used
was small in amount and wholly dependent upon imports, which were well
documented in the foreign trade publications.18
Other estimates of costs follow Bulutay et al.. In line with the official
method, we assume the waste rate was 3 percent for cereals and other field
crops and 15 percent for fruit and vegetables.19 Oil and machinery mainten-
ance costs are estimated by Bulutay et al. by extrapolating the 1948 figure
with the change in the area under cultivation. The method seems sensible
because there was not any significant increase in the use of machinery and
the number of tractors until the 1950s. Indeed, the large-scale use of mod-
ern facilities such as water pumps, tractors, etc. only started in the 1950s.20
Table 2.7 presents the estimated costs of seeds, machinery, maintenance, oil
and chemical fertilisers.
Finally, the livestock value series in Bulutay et al. (meat, wool, raw skin
and dairy products) are of relatively high quality, as they follow the national
income accounting practice of the IUM in the postwar period.21 We use the
same series, while deducting the value of manure, because manure was an
input into crop production.
Figure 2.2 presents the net agricultural output (both crop and livestock)
in gross and per worker terms. Our estimates are extended back to 1913 to
gauge the extent and timing of the post-war agricultural recovery.22Both series
17Seeding rates are taken as follows: Wheat (180 kg/ha), barley (165 kg/ha), rye (180
kg/ha), maize (60 kg/ha), beans (100 kg/ha), broad beans (200 kg/ha), lentils (80
kg/ha), vetch (80 kg/ha), peas (120 kg/ha), potatoes (2500 kg/ha), cotton (40 kg/ha),
onions (400 kg/ha) and sesame (30 kg/ha). Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri ,
Table 2.10.
18Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri , Table 2.12. Super phosphate and ammonium
phosphate only came to be produced in Turkey from the 1940s onwards.
19Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri , p.38.
20Unfortunately, the data on the number of various kinds of agricultural machinery in the
1927 and 1950 censuses are not precisely comparable, since the coverage changes over
time. However, the number of tractors did stay around 1000-1750 between 1936 and
1948, when there was a boom in the numbers due to the Marshall Program. Similarly,
other tools and machines did not proliferate during the 1940s. Turkey, Başvekalet
İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Zirai İstatistik Özetleri 1936-1956. 1957.
21Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri , Supplementary Tables 19-23.
22For the 1913 level of agricultural output, see Özel, Economy of Turkey, p.12. The rural
labour force is obtained from Turkey, Devlet İstatistik Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Göstergeler
1923-1990. 1990. The labour force is assumed to have changed at the same rate as the
total population between 1913 and 1925. For deflating the current-price output figures,
we calculate a Laspeyres crop price index, based on our dataset of 16 crops between 1925
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Figure 2.2.: Turkey’s Net Agricultural Output: Total and Per Worker (1927
Prices), 1913-1939
Source: Table 2.8.
show that by 1930 the net output had returned to its 1913 level, although the
gross output followed it by a short time lag. Having a sharp decline between
1931 and 1935, output was restored in 1936 at a level slightly higher than in
1913. The extent and cause of the decline in output can best be seen in the
movement of prices in Figure 2.3, which shows that prices halved in a few
years after 1929 and decreased by almost two-thirds in the case of wheat.23
In the rest of the decade, cereal prices remained stable, while cash crops saw
a small recovery. Therefore, the agricultural recovery was almost completed
by 1930, as per capita output reached pre-war levels and the sharp collapse
in output in the early 1930s was corrected from 1936 onwards.
and 1929. Then it is linked to 1913 with the “combined price index” of Özel, Economy
of Turkey, p.11. Note that the population and agricultural output figures that Özel
referred to are already corrected for the current borders of Turkey.
23Silier’s claim that the decline in agricultural prices started in 1926 rather than 1930 is
misleading, in that it is based on the temporary decline after 1925, which was corrected
in the following years. Oya Silier, Türkiye’de Tarımsal Yapının Gelişimi (1923-1938).
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1981, pp.50-51.
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Figure 2.3.: Major Crop Prices in Turkey (Nominal TL, 1927=100), 1925-1939
Source: Table 2.5.
2.3. Sources of Output Growth
The preceding section argued that agricultural output at current prices fol-
lowed a recovery-decline-growth cycle with a high degree of volatility, which
mostly reflected the atypical price pattern of the time. However, it is not
obvious why growth occurred in the second half of the 1930s, given that it
took place against the backdrop of persistently low agricultural prices. One
therefore needs to identify the sources of this output growth, which has not
been attempted so far in the literature. The decomposition analysis provided
below aims to pin down the role of area expansion, yields and prices in the
change in crop output.
In the agricultural economics literature, a number of methods have been
developed since the 1960s to break down total output into its components.24
Since we are interested in the contribution of each factor to the rate of change
rather than to the absolute value of output per se, we employ a multiplicative
model developed by Jamal and Zaman, which expresses the total change in
output as the multiplication of changes in the acreage, yield, price and crop-
24For a brief evaluation of additive and multiplicative methods and alternative component
specifications, see Kiran Kumar Kakarlapudi, Decomposition Analysis of Agricultural
Growth: a Review of Measurement Issues. Munich Personal RePEc Archive 2007.
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composition components. The index formulas can be found in Appendix
A.25 The first three components seem rather straightforward, while the crop
composition needs a few words. By including it, the aim is to account for the
switch to higher-valued crops due to the change of value of each crop per unit
of area. So when the acreage component is described as the change of total
acreage under cultivation, then the crop-composition effect is proxied with
the relative share of each crop in the total acreage and weighted by yields
times prices.
Our dataset covers the acreage, yield and prices series for 16 crops for the
period 1925-1939 (Tables 2.4,2.5 and 2.6) and Table 2.2 presents the results of
the decomposition analysis. The figures in the main lines represent the change
of each parameter from the base year to the final year, that is, Xt/Xo where t
is the final year and o the base year. For instance, the total output increased
by 86 percent and the price index increased by four percent between 1925 and
1929, whereas the crop-mix index declined by one percent. The multiplication
of all component changes provides the total change. The contribution of each
component to the change in total output is then shown in parentheses beneath
each line. For instance, between 1925 and 1929, the change in prices explains
6.7 percent of the total change in output, while yields account for 87.4 percent.
In this way, all figures in parentheses add up to 100 in each period.
If one looks at the whole period under consideration, 1925-1939, the total
output seems to have increased by a modest amount, 12 percent, yet the
component growth rates varied greatly: while the average prices declined by
66 percent, the common yield index increased by 75 and the acreage index
by 48 percent. Both 1925 and 1930 saw good harvests, unlike 1927, 1928
and 1932, so the yields referred to above represent peak-to-peak figures in
terms of yields. Therefore, it seems that, in order of importance, the massive
deflation was offset by improving yields and land expansion. Meanwhile, crop
composition did not make any significant contribution.
On the other hand, the growth dynamics showed a notable variation in the
sub-periods. Three distinct periods can easily be discerned from the move-
ment of total output: moderate growth during 1925-1929, peak-to-trough
during 1929-1932, and trough-to-peak during 1932-1939. However, since the
rainfall was extremely bad in 1932, 1933 is taken as a reference year in con-
25Haroon Jamal and Asad Zaman, Decomposition of Growth Trend in Agriculture: An-
other Approach. Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 47(4) 1992.
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Table 2.2.: Crop Output Decomposition, Turkey
Total output
change
Price
change
Yield
change
Crop-
composition
change
Acreage
change
1925-29 1.86 1.04 1.72 0.99 1.04
% (100) (6.73) (87.40) (-0.84) (6.72)
1929-33 0.28 0.30 0.93 1.01 1.01
% (100) (95.66) (5.57) (-0.47) (-0.76)
1933-39 2.15 1.37 1.09 1.03 1.40
% (100) (41.35) (10.72) (3.79) (44.14)
1935-1939 1.59 0.99 1.32 1.03 1.18
% (100) (-2.88) (60.26) (7.13) (35.49)
1925-39 1.12 0.44 1.75 0.98 1.48
Note: In each line the base year value is equal to 1 and the multiplication of the change in each
component yields the total output change. The figures in the parentheses represent the contribution of
each factor to the total change.
ducting the decomposition for each sub-period, in order to avoid the impact
of random rainfall shocks. In this way, the second-stage decomposition made
for sub-periods leads to a number of observations. First, 86 percent of the
increase in crop output during the recovery period (1925-29) is predominantly
explained by rising yields, whereas the acreage expansion remained quite lim-
ited (4 percent). Second, during 1929-1933 output contracted by 72 percent
and 96 percent of this decline was due to the massive deflation, which was
helped by a concomitant deterioration of yields that accounted for 5.6 percent
of the decline. As prices dwindled and profits collapsed, the lower yields dealt
the final blow.26 Finally, from trough to peak during 1933-39, the output
increased by 115 percent and this was accounted for by land expansion (44
percent), recovery in prices (41 percent) and recovery in yields (10 percent).
This was also the first time that crop composition made a positive contribu-
tion to overall growth (3.8 percent), which reflects the limited but sustained
efforts to encourage the production of cash crops, such as cotton, tobacco and
sugarcane, in accordance with the rapid industrial development of the time.
26One piece of anecdotal evidence shows that farmers tended to decrease the amount of
land they cultivated with wheat in the face of declining prices in 1929 and 1930 in some
localities, such as Kırklareli, a Thracian town in the far north-western corner of Turkey.
However, this might have been more of the case in labour-scarce places like the whole
of Thracia, since prices went down so much that the profits did not cover labour costs.
Hakkı Nezihi, İstanbul Mıntıkasının İstihsal ve İhraç Maddeleri. Sanayi Nefise Matbaası,
1931, pp.11, 52. However, this may not have been the case in land-scarce areas, since
the total acreage remained almost the same.
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It should also be noted that a recovery in prices took place during 1933-1935
so if the reference year is taken as 1935 instead of 1933, as in the final row of
Table 2.2, the output was 59 percent higher in 1939 and the contribution of
acreage, yields and crop-composition were 35, 60 and 7 percent respectively,
while prices actually pulled down the output slightly.
It is quite remarkable that the post-1933 recovery has attracted so little
attention. What is curious about it is that crop prices remained low un-
til World War II, which made quantity increases the only source of output
growth. As Pamuk argues, this was far from a statistical artefact, as the al-
ternative sources, like foreign trade statistics, also reflect the trend shown in
the official output figures.27
Pamuk argues that two different “but not mutually exclusive” explanations
are possible.28 The first relates to the effect of government policies, which
likely induced higher output and/or productivity. These policies include the
abolition of tithes in 1925, the rapid expansion of railways, which extended
the existing lines towards the interior regions (mainly the central and eastern
provinces), the wheat purchasing programs and, not least, the development of
the state’s involvement in agricultural research and innovation.29 It is gener-
ally accepted that both the abolition of tithes and the expansion of railroads
brought about substantial changes in farmer’s incentive structures. The tax
burden, as will be argued shortly, was effectively reduced in the 1930s relative
to 1925, and the railways probably allowed farmers in the interior regions
to exploit new market opportunities.30 Akarçay supports this argument, for
instance, by finding a positive correlation between railroad connections and
output increases in the 1930s.31 Other government policies may, however, have
been less important. While state research programs on seeds and cultivation
27Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression, p.335. While Turkey was a net im-
porter in cereals before 1920s, it became a net exporter in the following decade. Also, in
an earlier piece Pamuk, İkinci Dünya Savaşı cites Eldem, who checks alternative sources
for the existence of this output growth and finds no inconsistency. Pamuk, İkinci Dünya
Savaşı, p.95; and Vedat Eldem, Türkiye’de Sanayileşme Hareketi. İstanbul Üniversitesi
İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, 8 1947
28Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression, p.335.
29Toprak also underlines the other institutional developments which might have increased
market efficiency, such as the standardisation of weights and the development of local
commodity exchanges. Zafer Toprak, Türkiye Tarımı ve Yapısal Gelişmeler, 1900-1950.
In Şevket Pamuk and Zafer Toprak, editors, Türkiye’de Tarımsal Yapılar. Yurt Yayınevi,
1988, pp.20-22.
30Toprak, Türkiye Tarımı.
31Akarçay, Agricultural Growth, p.78-80.
2.3. SOURCES OF OUTPUT GROWTH 67
techniques became increasingly well organised in the 1930s, Tekeli and İlkin
argue that their impact on cereal production was to be observed no earlier
than 1940. For instance, the wheat seeds developed in the research centres
were distributed to farmers on a very minimal scale before 1943.32 Similarly,
the Agricultural Bank was assigned to purchase wheat in 1932 to prevent
further declines in prices and it increased its purchases over time, yet its im-
pact may not have been particularly significant.33 In the 1932/33 season, the
bank purchased around one percent of the total wheat and six percent in the
subsequent season. Given that around one third of the crop was marketed,
the bank seems to have bought 20 percent of the total marketed output.34
Hatipoğlu argues that wheat purchases remained rather modest in the 1930s
and it was only during World War II that the Soil Products Office, which
replaced the Agricultural Bank in 1938, assumed an increasingly important
role by enlarging its purchases so much so that 28 percent of the total output,
that is, close to the whole marketed output, was purchased by the Office in
1944.35 The modest impact of state purchases in the 1930s is also claimed by
Pamuk, who compares the domestic and international wheat prices but finds
no disparity between them.36
The second explanation Pamuk puts forward is the demographic recovery
and peasant behaviour in response to deflation.37 The role of population
growth obviously made it possible to increase the acreage under cultivation.
This had been one of the main aspects of Turkish agriculture since the nine-
teenth century, but the huge population loss during wars and the deportation
of the non-Muslim population made for an acute labour shortage in the coun-
tryside in the early 1920s. The rapid recovery in the labour force and the
increase in its male composition facilitated acreage expansion over the whole
interwar period. Pamuk further puts forward a behavioural hypothesis re-
garding the relationship between prices and peasants.38 Accordingly, it was
32İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Devletçilik Dönemi Tarım Politikaları: Modernleşme Çabal-
arı. In Şevket Pamuk and Zafer Toprak, editors, Türkiye’de Tarımsal Yapılar. Yurt
Yayınevi, 1988, p.56.
33Law 2156, Turkey, no. 2395, 8/5/1933.
34Tekeli and İlkin, Uygulamaya Geçerken, p.112.
35Şevket Raşit Hatipoğlu, Türkiye’de Zirai Buhran. Yüksek Ziraat Enstitüsü, 1936, pp.110-
13.
36Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression, p.336.
37Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression, pp.336-37.
38Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression, p.337.
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likely that peasant families responded to the low prices by increasing work
effort or “working harder to cultivate more land”, in order to maximise their
income by ignoring the opportunity cost of leisure. He refers to the increase
in the cultivated land-labour ratio as supporting evidence.39
Although the existing evidence does not permit a conclusive analysis, it is
possible to derive some useful insights based on aggregate and geographical
data. To explore the pattern of recovery of crop output in the 1930s, we sug-
gest considering the quantity growth in terms of acreage and yields separately
as we did in the output decomposition presented above.
First, the expansion in cultivated acreage can obviously be explained by
population growth. Indeed, the cultivated acreage per labourer showed the
expected movement, that is, decline in the early stage of the deflationary
period and increase in the later stage, but the long-term trend remained quite
stable (Figure 2.4).40 A similar pattern is also observed in the cultivated land
per draft animal, except that the late 1930s witnessed a small relative decline
in that ratio. Furthermore, the rapid increase in the number of iron ploughs,
which were superior to the old-fashioned wooden ones, helped both to open
new fields and possibly to increase the yields on the existing fields.41 Tezel
also agrees on the simultaneous relationship between population increase and
acreage expansion: as the new rural families emerged, the new fields were
opened to cultivation to the extent that the existing local property structures
allowed the land resources to expand.42
As for the increasing yields, the pattern is more difficult to explain since
one intuitively expects yields to decline, or at least not to increase, as a res-
ult of more marginal land being brought under cultivation. To figure out
whether any structural trends or random shocks were behind such a devel-
opment requires some further elaboration. We first look at the trend growth
rate of individual crops over 1928-1939, when the both acreage and output fig-
39Akarçay elaborates more on this hypothesis, yet she does not provide additional evidence
to support it. Akarçay, Agricultural Growth.
40Total cultivated area is divided by the official rural labour force estimates from Turkey,
Devlet İstatistik Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Göstergeler . For the land/animal ratio, the total
land under cultivation is divided by the sum of cattle, buffaloes and horses. The use
of horses as draft animals was particularly encouraged in the 1930s. Tekeli and İlkin,
Devletçilik Dönemi Tarım, pp.79-82.
41The number of iron ploughs in use were as follows: 211,000 in 1927, 266,000 in 1933,
410,000 in 1936 and 440,000 in 1940. The jump in the plough stock seems to have
happened between 1933 and 1936. Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.326.
42Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.325.
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Figure 2.4.: Acreage Per Labourer and Draft Animal in Turkey (Hectares),
1925-39
Source: Table 2.8
ures were most reliable because these estimates are based on the same official
source.43 Among 15 crops we find that the yields of wheat, cotton, tobacco,
potatoes and sugar beet show positive trends, while other crops did not have
any trend.44 The annual growth rates are as follows: 3.2 percent for wheat,
4.7 percent for cotton, 1.9 percent for tobacco, 4.7 percent for potatoes and
6.7 percent for sugarcane. Since these five crops on average make up 64 per-
cent of the total output value during 1928-1939, they drive up the common
yield index.
The rise in the yields of cash crops is far from surprising due to the sustained
government efforts to increase the yields and in a few cases – for example,
sugarcane – the close supervision of cultivation by the buyers.45 Cotton,
sugar beet and tobacco were largely supported by import substitution in the
corresponding industries, price guarantees and high import tariffs. The price
43SIS started to publish the annual crop data from 1928 onwards and extrapolated the
data back to earlier years using separate sources.
44We exclude cotton seed since its yield is the same as cotton. The natural logarithm of
yields is regressed over the time trend to find the trend growth rate for each crop.
45Tekeli and İlkin, Devletçilik Dönemi Tarım, p.61. Also see Tekeli and İlkin, Uygulamaya
Geçerken for the developments in sugarcane cultivation. Tekeli and İlkin, Uygulamaya
Geçerken, pp.127-30.
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incentives encouraged farmers to not only produce more but also to allocate
the better areas for such crops. For instance, two German agricultural experts
reported on sugarcane cultivation in 1940 and pointed out the existence of
much better conditions in the sugar beet fields compared to those of other
crops and the larger water and fertiliser use.46
Furthermore, the systematic effort to adopt better seeds is most obvious
in the case of cotton.47 The continuous seed experimentation led to the ex-
ploration and adoption of new types, called Cleveland and Akala, which were
superior to the local types in terms of the price premium and fineness of cot-
ton fibres spun from it.48 Cleveland quickly spread after 1934 in Adana and
accounted for more than half of total cotton output in the 1938/39 season.49
More importantly, new seeds not only resulted in a greater price premium,
but also in higher yields.50
The increase in wheat yields, by contrast, was a different case. It was the
major staple crop and produced in almost all corners of the country, where
totally different climatic regimes prevailed. However, the regional comparison
of the change of wheat yields and acreage gives a very striking perspective. For
all nine regions that had different geographical and climatic characteristics,
we work out the trend growth rates of wheat acreage and yields over 1928-
1939 and look into the differences and similarities of regional patterns.51 To
negate the effects of random shocks, we take 3-year moving averages of yield
estimates. What is revealed is a clear regional dualism (Table 2.3). On the one
hand, in the commercialised coastal regions (the Aegean and Mediterranean)
and in the Central Plateau the quantity increases were chiefly due to increasing
46T. Roemer and G.Blohm, Türkiye’de Pancar Ziraati Hakkında Rapor. Zerbamat
Basımevi, 1940, pp.35-36. Also for the description of the seed distribution and close
inspection of cultivation by the factory experts, see Gustav Mikusch, Şeker Sanayimiz
Hakkında Rapor. Ankara Başvekalet Matbaası, 1934, pp. 34-35.
47For the research efforts in cotton cultivation, see Tekeli and İlkin, Uygulamaya Geçerken,
pp.130-133.
48Cleveland was developed at the seed-breeding stations in Adana, through experiments
on the American seeds that started in 1926. It was close in quality and price to the
American Upper Middling type. Adana Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık, 1938/39.
49In January 1936 Law 2903 (Law of Cotton Reclamation) allowed the government to
determine what kind of the seeds to be planted in each location. For a brief discussion
and for the subsequent laws, see Tekeli and İlkin, Uygulamaya Geçerken, pp.130-132.
50Adana Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık, 1938/39, p.218.
51The regions are as follows: Central, Aegean, Marmara, Mediterranean, Eastern, South-
eastern, Black Sea, Central Plateau, South-western. See Akarçay, Agricultural Growth,
pp.52-53.
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Table 2.3.: Regional Growth Rates of Wheat Yields and Acreage in Turkey,
1928-1939
Yields Acreage Average rainfall
Trend Growth
rate
Trend Growth
rate
Trend Growth
rate
Central n.t. strong 4.2% n.t.
Aegean strong 5.8% n.t. n.t.
Marmara n.t. strong 8.2% n.t.
Mediterranean strong 5.8% weak -2.7% n.t.
Eastern n.t. strong 10% n.t.
South-Eastern n.t. strong 3.3% n.t.
Black Sea n.t. strong 3.3% n.t.
Central Plateau strong 8.2% n.t. weak 4.6%
South-Western n.t. strong 6.2% n.t.
Note: n.t.: no trend. Strong: trend at 95% significance level. Weak: trend at 90% significance level.
yields rather than acreage expansion. On the other hand, the wheat acreage
was significantly expanded in all the other regions, where yields were stagnant.
In other words, the improvement in yields and acreage expansion did not
overlap at a regional level. On the contrary, yields were stable on average in
the regions where the area under wheat swiftly increased.
In addition to this, we check the average rainfall change in all regions and
find that there was not any significant positive trend in the Aegean and Medi-
terranean regions where yields improved. In this respect the Central Plateau
stands out as the only region where rainfall significantly increased.52 There-
fore, Kazgan’s argument that larger rainfall caused increased output does not
seem useful.53 What is more, the fact that the rise in yields was observed in
crops apart from wheat, cotton, sugarcane and tobacco and that they were
cultivated in very diverse climates rules out the possibility that rainfall can
explain the higher productivity.
This regional dualism in the growth of wheat output can be interpreted via
the relationships between land availability, population recovery and switches
between different crops. The best possible explanation seems to be that popu-
lation growth translated into higher land productivity in the more commercial
coastal regions because there was little additional available land and thus lim-
52The average rainfall figures between 1929-1939 were obtained from Turkey, İstatistik
Umum Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Yıllığı..
53Kazgan, Türkiye Ekonomisinde Depresyon, p.266.
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ited scope for extensive growth. On the other hand, in the other regions, the
increasing manpower might have led to land expansion under cultivation as
the scope of intensive growth was quite limited in view of the technical back-
wardness and capital scarcity in those regions. In this sense, the mechanism
Pamuk refers to – that is, the response of peasant families to low prices –
might have worked in different ways in different geographies. Other develop-
ments at the time, such as better seeds, credit expansion, and the increasing
number of iron ploughs and draft animals, might have contributed to this
positive exchange between factor endowments. As stated above, any inter-
pretation of output growth in the 1930s on such limited evidence has to be
insufficient, but this brief crop-based and regional analysis provides an im-
portant insight: it seems that in the places where the land frontier was not
open, effort was directed towards increasing yields, whereas in land-abundant
localities, mostly interior regions, extensive growth tended to be accompanied
by stagnant yields because the new land brought into production was more
marginal.
2.4. An Estimate of Agricultural Income
As stated in the introduction, the lack of consumption data does not allow us
to identify how the growth of the agricultural output in the second half of the
1930s was transmitted to the non-farm sectors, particularly to manufacturing.
There is no doubt that the increasing output of both cash crops and cereals
provided the necessary raw material at low prices and helped to keep industrial
wages low. However, to be able to make a reasonable inference about the
demand for manufactures, we need to estimate agricultural incomes more
precisely, which requires two more key variables: taxes and credits.
Students of interwar economic history are familiar with Fisher’s debt-deflation
theory, which argues that nominally fixed cash payments became one of the
crucial economic and, not least, political issues in the US and many other
countries after the Great Depression due to the dramatic falls in commodity
prices. Accordingly, the rise in the real value of debt and taxes led many
farmers into a debt cycle, which brought about a collapse in land markets,
widespread bankruptcies, and the foreclosures of the rural banks.54 However,
54Temin, Lessons, p. 64; and Irwing Fisher, The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depres-
sion. Econometrica 1933.
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in what follows we argue that Turkey did not experience a serious rural finan-
cial crisis due to the underdeveloped credit markets and the small degree of
commercialisation in the countryside, as well as government efforts to mitigate
the cash shortages that were felt in certain regions. Therefore, the financial
distress was limited to a few years after 1929, but as soon as the recovery
began in 1933, such problems were overcome.
2.4.1. Taxes
The system of rural taxation in Turkey underwent a number of significant
institutional changes in the Ottoman period.55 From the 15-16th to the 19th
centuries there occurred a transition from timar, the feudal tenure system,
to different forms of tax farming, through which the central authority sold
the right of the collection of the in-kind tax from the peasants, the tithe, to
various intermediaries, in return for a fixed predetermined amount of money
for a certain period.56
Although the tithe was one major source of state revenues in the early
years of the republican regime (1923-1925), the government abolished it and
introduced a new and modern tax system in 1925. It was based on a number of
new cash taxes to be collected by the state agencies rather than intermediaries
and also increased the excise taxes on certain goods.57 The importance of
such a major institutional reform can be seen in the share of the tithe in
wheat output. In principle it was raised at 10 percent of wheat output. If
a 20-30 percent marketing ratio is assumed, with the rest consumed for self-
consumption or seeding, then the 10 percent tax was equivalent to around
one third of the total cash earnings of the bulk of the farmers.58
The amount of rural taxes collected is well documented in the official pub-
55Şevket Pamuk, Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914. İletişim Yayınları, 2005.
56Tax farming effectively became a mode of domestic borrowing, as the state financed its
deficits by increasing the duration of the contracts and demanding a larger share of
the future taxes in advance. Pamuk, Osmanlı-Türkiye, pp. 146-52. Moreover, tax
collection became an arena of political struggle between the central authority of the
empire, which sought to establish a strong central bureaucracy and to finance military
expenditures, and local elites, ayan, who attempted to restore their own financial and
political authority over their regions.
57Reşat Aktan, Türkiye’de Zirai Vergiler. TMMOB Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası, 1965; and
Çağlar Keyder, The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey 1923-1929. Cambridge
University Press, 1981.
58Keyder, Definition of a Peripheral Economy ; and Nezihi, İstanbul Mıntıkasının İstihsal
ve İhraç Maddeleri .
2.4. AN ESTIMATE OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME 74
Figure 2.5.: Taxes and Net Credit Inflow in Turkey, 1925-1939
Source: Taxes and credit data from Atasagun, Türkiye’de Zirai Kredi , vol. 3. Net agricultural output is
our own estimate (Table 2.8).
lications on state finances, Mali İstatistikler, which is also recapitulated by
Atasagun.59 The type of taxes that were applied during the period 1924-1939
were as follows: the tithe (1923-1925), land tax (1925-1935), animal taxes
(whole period) and the wheat tax (1934-1941), which was intended to sup-
port wheat prices. Among them, the land and animal taxes formed the largest
part. The ratio of total tax payments to net agricultural output is a telling
indicator: it declined from 7-8 percent during 1923-24 to 2-3 percent during
1925-29, and then 4-6 percent during the 1930s (Figure 2.5).60 The financial
distress can be seen in the rise in the taxes/output rate in the early 1930s.
As a result, the new tax system reduced tax burden on the peasantry from a
long-term perspective, but in the short term 1930-1935 was a difficult period.
At a minimum, it seems sensible to assume that the introduction of cash taxes
must have contributed to the commercialisation of the countryside by forcing
the peasantry to enter the cash nexus on a greater scale than before.
59Atasagun, Türkiye’de Zirai Kredi .
60The net output figures of 1923/24 are from Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
Others are our own estimates.
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2.4.2. Net Credit Inflow
The formation of formal rural credit institutions goes back to 1863 when Mid-
had Pasha, the governor of Niş and Tuna (two Balkan provinces), founded
small credit institutions of an experimental nature, named Memleket Sandık-
ları, to help farmers to access cash when needed.61 Thereafter, they were
expanded throughout the Ottoman Empire.62 The principle was simple: the
sandıklar were self-financed, short term, credit oriented (from three months to
a year) and decentralised. After two decades of experimentation, these micro-
credit institutions were integrated under the Agricultural Bank in 1888, which
became the main channel through which formal credit was mobilised for the
agricultural sector, not only in the Ottoman period, but also in republican
Turkey.63 The bank provided loans for farmers as well as for the farmer co-
operatives, which significantly expanded in number and size in the interwar
period.64 Tekeli and İlkin argue that after the Great Depression the govern-
ment preferred the provision of extra loans to the reduction of interest rates,
and that the credit cooperatives were given tax exemptions.65
Atasagun’s monograph on the Agricultural Bank is an extensive quantit-
ative and qualitative source, giving the breakdown of the type and amount
of loans, repayments, outstanding debts and the regional distribution of the
loans, as well as the description of the ways the bank operated. Since we are
here interested in the net financial flow to the agricultural sector, we need to
know the total credits net of repayments. Whether the repayments were made
on the principal or interest does not matter for our purpose. According to
the accounts of the Agricultural Bank and the credit cooperatives, the repay-
ments notably lagged behind the new loans supplied, implying that the loss
61T.C. Ziraat Bankası, Yüzyıllık Teşkilatlı Zirai Kredi. T.C. Ziraat Bankası, 1964; and T.C.
Ziraat Bankası, Ziraat Bankası 50 Senelik Hayat ve Faaliyeti. 1939.
62At the beginning, the capital needed was mobilised through a part of state-owned land
being cultivated by the farmers of villages cooperatively. After a certain period, a new
tax (15 kg of wheat per oxen) was issued to specifically finance loans.
63There was also a number of banks providing short-term loans of smaller amounts: na-
tional banks, such as Ottoman Bank, Türkiye İş Bankası and Türk Ticaret Bankası,
while many provincial banks funded the production of certain crops, including Milli Ay-
dın Bankası (figs), Manisa Bağcılar Bankası (grapes), and Akhisar Tütüncüler Bankası
(tobacco). See Atasagun, Türkiye’de Zirai Kredi , vol.. 3, pp.142-45.
64The origin of cooperatives can be traced back to the 1880s, though they started to give
loans in 1929. The total number of cooperatives increased from 191 to 591 (covering
around 10 percent of all villages in Turkey) during the 1930s. Atasagun, Türkiye’de
Zirai Kredi , vol. 2, pp.64-65.
65Tekeli and İlkin, 1929 Buhranı, pp.187-88.
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of the bank and cooperatives was compensated for from government funds.66
The loans other banks advanced are not taken into account since, as Atas-
agun maintains, they were short-term small loans (with at most one year of
maturity).67 He also predicts that the informal loans varied between 5-14 TL
million throughout the period, which was around one fourth of the total loans
of the Agricultural Bank in 1925. But there is not any substantial evidence
on the precise size of the informal loans.
Therefore, we define the total credit inflow as the new loans advanced by
cooperatives or the Agricultural Bank net of all repayments, and it turns out
that it was about 3 percent of the net agricultural output during 1925-1929.
However, it increased up to 9 percent during 1929-1934, which outstripped the
increase in the taxes/output ratio. In this respect, the credit expansion seems
to have more than offset the rise in the tax burden (Figure 2.5). Given that
the loans were distributed mainly in the commercial regions, we can argue
that the financial distress was cancelled out by the loan injection.68
Summing up, it can be argued that the sharp deflation after 1929 did not
result in a major financial crisis for two reasons: First, commercial relations
had not diffused into all regions and across all segments of the peasantry. The
land mortgage system was non-existent and rural banks were small in number
and only provided short-term credits in small sizes. The crisis, however,
severely hit the commercial regions that were connected to the foreign and
domestic markets. On the other hand, first, the credit expansion mitigated
the impact of the crisis, as demonstrated in the figures of new loans, in those
regions, and second, such financial difficulties became less of a problem from
the mid-1930s due to the recovery in output. Besides the small degree of
commercialisation, the tax reform of 1925 also reduced farmers’ tax burden,
as measured by the tax ratio to net output.
2.4.3. Per Capita Agricultural Income
It is now possible to present the disposable farm income per capita, which is
taken to be equivalent to the net output net of tax payments and the loan
66Atasagun, Türkiye’de Zirai Kredi , pp.131-33.
67Atasagun 1939, p.223.
68For the geographical distribution of the credit cooperatives and thus how the cash crop-
producing areas benefited from the loans more than others, see Atasagun, Türkiye’de
Zirai Kredi , vol. 3, p. 230.
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outflow divided by the size of the rural population. The rural population series
is derived from the official population estimates: three population censuses
were carried out in 1927, 1935 and 1940.69 These benchmark figures show a
constant rural population share of around 75 percent of the total population.
This suggests that there was not any significant difference between the growth
rate of rural and urban areas. We therefore extrapolate these benchmark
figures on the basis of the total population’s growth rate.
Before proceeding, one needs to be reminded of the potential shortcomings
of this particular methodology of income estimation: we do not consider the
labour costs and rents. This is for two reasons. First, we are only interested
in the net available income within the agricultural sector, while the question
of rents and labour costs is more about the distribution of total rural income
between the tenants, landowners, landless labourers and small cultivators that
inhabited it. Any potential bias in making this assumption can be assumed
to be small because the dominant pattern of land use in Turkey was small- or
middle-scale land holdings cultivated by independent peasant families. Wage
labour was hired only at certain times of the year, when extra labour was
needed particularly in cash-crop cultivation. In any case, wages cannot be
considered a net resource outflow from agriculture because those who sold
their labour were predominantly the peasant families who had seasonal surplus
labour time. Similarly, the renting out of land was limited to a few regions
and thus absentee landlordism was only an exception in Turkey. Second, since
we are mainly interested in the change of farm income, taking into account
wages and rents would not have much impact on the final estimates, given
that there is no evidence that the share of wages and rents, however small it
might have been, changed in the interwar era.
Figure 2.6 presents the new estimate of disposable per capita agricultural
income at 1927 prices. The current prices are deflated in two ways, first with
the aggregate wholesale price index, and secondly with the industrial price
index, both with the base year as 1927, so that we can see the difference if
the industrial price level differs from the other prices by a large margin.70 A
couple of inferences can be made from this picture: first of all, the farm income
per capita largely follows the net agricultural output in terms of broad trends:
69Turkey, Devlet İstatistik Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Göstergeler .
70For the price indices, see Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri , Supplementary Table
25.
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Figure 2.6.: Farm Income Per Capita in Turkey (TL, 1927 prices), 1925-1939
Source: Table 2.12.
gradual improvement in the 1920s, which was followed by a sharp decline until
1934-35, and a quick recovery in the second half of the 1930s (Figure 2.2).
This is so due to the fact that credit expansion and tax payments cancel each
other out to a large extent. Second, there does not seem to be a consistent
disparity between the farm-income estimates deflated in different ways, except
between 1931-1933. Last and more importantly, there is no doubt that the
rapid increase in farm income after 1935 gave a strong stimulus to industrial
expansion in the 1930s, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.
2.5. Conclusion
In summary, the growth performance of the agricultural sector in interwar
Turkey was determined by a number of major factors: relative land abund-
ance, demographic recovery and the massive decline in commodity prices. The
1920s saw a recovery period, when both net agricultural output and farm in-
come returned to the pre-war levels. Thereafter, the massive output decline
of the early 1930s was reversed by the successful recovery of the rest of the
decade. This chapter first calculated the net output by making a few major
and minor revisions to the existing official quantitative evidence. Second, it
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discussed the sources of the change in output over 1925-1939 by means of
an output decomposition and by looking into some regional and crop-based
patterns. Finally, it presented an estimate of farm income, which is a proxy
of the rural demand for manufactures. The last section linked this chapter
with the following ones.
The economic historiography has mostly missed the last stage of output
growth by treating the whole interwar period as a whole. However, it was re-
markable since it took place in the face of persistently low prices. The output
decomposition carried out in this chapter shows that the output increase after
1935 was due both to acreage expansion and an improvement in the yields.
The former was related to increasing manpower and the greater number of
draft animals and iron ploughs. On the other hand, the yield improvement
was crop-specific: it was driven by higher productivity in cash crops (cotton,
sugar beet and tobacco) and wheat. The literature suggests several ways to
explain the increasing yields of cash crops, whereas the case of wheat is more
interesting. Although our analysis is not fully conclusive, the existing evidence
indicates that the increasing wheat output had an interesting regional dual-
ism: in mostly interior regions, land expansion translated into output growth,
whereas in the most commercial regions (the Aegean and Mediterranean) it
was due to the increase in yields. Therefore, the dominant interpretation of
interwar agricultural growth as an example of extensive growth should not be
overstated.71 Instead, it should be considered to be a result of the relationship
between population growth, land expansion and land productivity. What is
more, the contribution of the larger cultivation of cash crops such as cotton,
tobacco and sugar beet should not go unnoticed.
71Şevket Pamuk and Zafer Toprak, Sunuş. In Türkiye’de Tarımsal Yapılar. Yurt Yayınevi,
1988, p.16.
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2.6. Appendix
Data Sources on Commodity Prices
• Wheat, barley, maize, beans, cotton, sugarcane and tobacco:
1926-1939 farm-gate prices. Source: Aktan, Türkiye’de Zirai Mahsül .
• Rye:
1927 price is the weighted average of regional farm-gate prices (Tur-
key, Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1927 Ziraat Tahriri Neticeleri. 1950).
Other years are derived by extrapolating the 1927 price with barley
prices, which are used as a proxy because both barley and rye were used
primarily as animal feed.
• Potatoes:
1927 price is the weighted average of regional farm-gate prices (Tur-
key, Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1927 Ziraat Tahriri). Other years are
derived by extrapolating the 1927 price with the annual average re-
tail prices of potatoes in Istanbul (Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum
Müdürlüğü, Fiyat İstatistikleri. 1941, p. 46).
• Sesame:
1927 price is the weighted average of regional farm-gate prices (Tur-
key, Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1927 Ziraat Tahriri). Other years
are derived by extrapolating the 1927 price with Istanbul Commodity
Exchange annual average prices (Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum
Müdürlüğü, Tarım İstatistikleri 1928-1936. 1937; and Turkey, Başvekalet
İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Fiyat İstatistikleri 1941 ).
• Onion:
1927 price is the weighted average of regional farm-gate prices (Turkey,
Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1927 Ziraat Tahriri). In the first stage, to
get 1927-1939 prices, 1931-1940 Istanbul retail prices (Turkey, Başvekalet
İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Fiyat İstatistikleri 1941 ) are extended
back by the Istanbul wholesale price index (İstanbul Ticaret Odası,
Istanbul Ticaret Odası Mecmuası). Then the 1927 farm-gate price is
extrapolated forward by this index.
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• Fruits:
Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
• Broad beans, chickpeas and lentils:
1927 price is the weighted average of regional farm-gate prices (Turkey,
Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1927 Ziraat Tahriri). For the other years,
the 1927 price is extrapolated with bean prices in Aktan, Türkiye’de
Zirai Mahsül .
• Vetch:
1936 farm-gate price (Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü,
Tarım İstatistikleri 1928-1936 ) is extrapolated by bean prices.
• 1925 prices:
The commodities are classified as export goods and others. The former
includes hazelnuts, grapes, figs, olives, cotton, tobacco and sesame,
whose 1926 prices are extended back by the export unit prices. For the
rest, the 1926 prices are extended back by the annual average prices of
the Istanbul Commodity Exchange (İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası,
Yıllık).
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Data Tables
Table 2.4.: Crop Acreages (Hectares) in Turkey, 1925-1940
Wheat Barley Rye Maize Broad beans Chickpeas Beans Lentils
1925 3129640 862988 139146 474834 49279 61117 64646 29563
1926 3541984 1529258 195494 346729 108096 28184 32137 23554
1927 2439838 1010360 174664 174914 21372 28095 27463 10460
1928 2842500 1553700 361800 342200 58100 34400 81300 33700
1929 2774420 1380400 222000 463801 49100 53100 54900 22000
1930 2809300 1511300 199800 378501 30700 57200 62800 35200
1931 2902290 1484180 246277 420701 48500 64100 78800 26400
1932 2656467 1365050 169660 364200 51700 44600 59100 29200
1933 2686502 1376488 344094 447482 63539 50496 119554 29306
1934 3155761 1609250 274945 436772 57889 81742 104596 41266
1935 3429404 1724020 305991 409361 67876 74226 68091 34812
1936 3530257 1817713 374785 423576 74073 70706 67888 29899
1937 3303109 1747761 339530 471649 63830 70422 66326 27759
1938 3830341 1959695 455956 469341 63928 67515 69641 30400
1939 3973133 1998801 425308 469034 74405 69284 69828 32314
1940 4381420 2092789 463808 509990 71661 72486 76414 34684
Vetch Potatoes Sugarcane Cottonseed Cotton Onion Sesame Tobacco
1925 132783 25546 3700 173951 173951 26801 70771 66288
1926 89939 26574 5022 46201 46201 15808 105963 70082
1927 67489 13580 8678 99128 99128 9439 46005 88605
1928 151700 26400 9100 177542 177542 12000 49400 66210
1929 141500 66200 10700 184979 184979 12300 45200 52647
1930 159300 31400 8900 275385 275385 19300 73600 70856
1931 125500 45400 14900 216740 216740 26200 66700 74683
1932 91800 30100 17400 155651 155651 20700 55500 27974
1933 144435 35502 11271 161632 161632 19831 70551 51037
1934 143912 65239 57887 196719 196719 17622 65481 48647
1935 127802 46644 25630 210602 210602 18204 66146 54062
1936 128965 54625 28773 253663 253663 38976 71873 84800
1937 104577 53180 28049 308574 308574 35946 64251 94500
1938 115059 55687 22920 275249 275249 39079 57730 84001
1939 114046 63436 36878 292643 292643 41805 66633 76043
1940 111637 68227 40887 324636 324636 43393 79851 78054
Source: Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri
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Table 2.5.: Crop Prices (Piastres/Kg) in Turkey, 1925-1939
Wheat Barley Rye Maize Broad beans Chickpeas Beans Lentils
1925 13.80 5.45 7.39 9.40 10.03 12.11 13.00 11.69
1926 12.10 5.00 6.31 6.60 9.83 12.15 13.30 12.62
1927 11.90 6.70 8.45 6.60 9.90 12.24 13.40 12.71
1928 13.60 7.80 9.84 7.20 12.78 15.80 17.30 16.41
1929 12.60 7.50 9.46 8.80 14.92 18.45 20.20 19.16
1930 7.30 3.70 4.67 5.30 10.64 13.15 14.40 13.66
1931 4.00 2.90 3.66 3.30 6.13 7.58 8.30 7.87
1932 4.20 2.60 3.28 2.70 4.43 5.48 6.00 5.69
1933 3.70 1.90 2.40 2.20 3.40 4.20 4.60 4.36
1934 3.60 2.00 2.52 2.80 4.21 5.21 5.70 5.41
1935 4.60 3.00 3.78 4.30 5.17 6.39 7.00 6.64
1936 4.70 3.00 3.78 4.40 5.39 6.67 7.30 6.93
1937 4.70 3.00 3.78 4.20 5.69 7.03 7.70 7.30
1938 4.30 3.00 3.78 3.90 5.76 7.12 7.80 7.40
1939 4.40 2.80 3.53 3.70 7.54 9.32 10.20 9.68
Vetch Potatoes Sugarcane Cottonseed Cotton Onion Sesame Tobacco
1925 8.58 7.05 1.60 2.49 62.90 6.92 24.88 71.23
1926 7.71 6.55 1.49 2.91 46.10 6.45 24.23 64.90
1927 7.76 6.73 1.59 5.03 63.40 6.73 23.76 73.10
1928 10.02 7.34 1.61 6.26 65.50 7.32 22.63 57.00
1929 11.70 6.94 1.66 3.11 62.30 4.57 20.82 72.70
1930 8.34 4.63 1.63 1.78 49.40 4.27 14.78 72.40
1931 4.81 4.67 1.42 1.94 31.70 5.80 11.50 36.11
1932 3.48 3.65 1.18 3.01 30.00 8.08 13.73 35.27
1933 2.67 1.77 1.23 2.08 30.70 6.66 8.71 30.60
1934 3.30 1.52 1.12 1.85 33.10 5.46 9.04 45.42
1935 4.06 4.10 0.98 2.26 38.00 8.49 11.63 54.33
1936 4.23 3.63 0.70 3.27 40.90 8.27 14.23 53.42
1937 4.46 4.32 0.74 2.87 37.90 4.47 14.32 48.40
1938 4.52 4.70 0.87 3.99 34.00 9.38 14.98 43.81
1939 5.91 4.81 0.99 3.79 37.80 11.04 13.01 46.99
Source: See the text.
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Table 2.6.: Crop Yields (Tons/Hectares) in Turkey, 1925-1939
Wheat Barley Rye Maize Broad beans Chickpeas Beans Lentils
1925 0.34 1.45 0.83 1.10 0.52 0.65 0.37 0.39
1926 0.70 0.94 0.88 1.12 0.33 0.94 1.17 0.87
1927 0.55 0.62 0.58 0.74 0.92 0.44 0.42 0.44
1928 0.58 0.58 0.30 1.22 0.49 0.53 0.68 0.26
1929 0.98 1.23 1.49 1.34 0.67 0.98 1.50 0.66
1930 0.92 1.02 1.55 1.24 1.08 0.84 1.06 0.58
1931 1.03 1.22 1.86 1.34 0.94 0.94 1.10 1.64
1932 0.73 0.86 1.26 1.17 0.94 0.93 0.76 0.49
1933 0.99 1.16 0.77 1.23 0.99 0.77 0.35 0.64
1934 0.86 1.04 0.89 1.12 1.02 0.61 0.90 0.48
1935 0.74 0.80 0.71 1.11 1.56 0.55 0.76 0.54
1936 1.09 1.19 1.20 1.62 0.66 0.65 0.77 0.67
1937 1.12 1.25 1.07 1.18 1.05 0.84 0.88 0.86
1938 1.12 1.22 0.89 1.28 1.02 0.81 0.90 0.82
1939 1.06 1.15 0.96 1.36 0.94 1.00 0.88 0.80
Vetch Potatoes Sugarcane Cottonseed Cotton Onion Sesame Tobacco
1925 0.54 2.84 1.75 0.44 0.22 1.67 0.32 0.85
1926 0.81 2.87 1.51 1.13 0.56 2.17 0.29 0.78
1927 0.58 1.53 2.76 0.47 0.24 1.57 0.24 0.79
1928 0.44 1.87 7.37 0.30 0.15 3.49 0.60 0.65
1929 0.83 2.02 5.20 0.28 0.14 4.99 0.82 0.69
1930 0.79 3.64 10.27 0.27 0.14 2.77 0.39 0.67
1931 0.78 2.42 17.27 0.31 0.15 3.27 0.46 0.68
1932 0.73 2.46 8.72 0.38 0.19 2.25 0.38 0.65
1933 0.63 3.01 16.22 0.24 0.12 4.10 0.38 0.79
1934 0.66 3.27 7.50 0.26 0.13 3.45 0.39 0.67
1935 0.41 2.27 17.39 0.38 0.19 3.57 0.30 0.67
1936 0.68 3.38 15.79 0.40 0.20 2.65 0.55 0.89
1937 0.64 3.23 11.86 0.32 0.16 2.51 0.39 0.77
1938 0.75 3.26 12.66 0.44 0.22 2.84 0.45 0.70
1939 0.81 4.10 17.22 0.42 0.21 2.93 0.51 0.86
Source: See the text.
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Table 2.7.: Costs of Agricultural Production (TL Million) in Turkey, 1925-
1939
Seeding Machinery
maintenance
and oil
Chemical fertilisers Crop waste
1925 102.4 12.72 0.01 8.9
1926 60.4 16.07 0.12 12.6
1927 77.2 10.21 0.07 7.8
1928 91.8 14.86 0.08 10.4
1929 81.2 14.31 0.09 16.5
1930 52.0 11.03 0.13 9.8
1931 27.3 9.75 0.20 6.7
1932 29.6 7.55 0.07 4.0
1933 28.2 7.09 0.13 4.8
1934 28.7 8.28 0.09 5.2
1935 42.6 9.72 0.07 6.5
1936 40.4 11.28 0.19 9.9
1937 46.4 11.67 0.55 9.3
1938 47.1 12.66 0.54 9.6
1939 53.2 13.22 0.21 10.4
Source: See the text.
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Table 2.12.: Estimates of Farm Income in Turkey, 1925-1939
Gross ag-
ricultural
income
Rural
taxes
Taxes/
Income
Net credit
inflow
Credit in-
flow/Income
TL million TL million % TL million %
1925 754.8 25.32 3.4 17.98 2.4
1926 798.0 19.53 2.4 17.96 2.3
1927 712.0 19.95 2.8 17.27 2.4
1928 747.3 19.60 2.6 21.85 2.9
1929 884.9 24.05 2.7 20.06 2.3
1930 664.7 24.11 3.6 28.32 4.3
1931 604.6 22.51 3.7 30.79 5.1
1932 539.9 20.14 3.7 32.68 6.1
1933 432.6 19.12 4.4 33.76 7.8
1934 405.0 24.35 6.0 33.07 8.2
1935 441.4 29.90 6.8 39.58 9.0
1936 635.3 32.06 5.0 37.32 5.9
1937 655.6 35.03 5.3 41.13 6.3
1938 678.7 33.79 5.0 37.87 5.6
1939 739.2 35.30 4.8 41.23 5.6
Farm
income
Farm
income
per
capita
Wholesale
price
index (I)
Industrial
price index
(II)
Farm income
per capita
(1927 prices,
deflated by
(I))
Farm income
per capita
(1927 prices,
deflated by
(II))
TL million TL 1948=100 1948=100 TL TL
1925 747.5 75.3 32.5 43.7 77.37 69.99
1926 796.4 78.6 33.7 42.7 77.90 74.70
1927 709.3 68.6 33.4 40.6 68.58 68.58
1928 749.6 71.0 34.3 40.6 69.10 70.93
1929 880.9 81.7 34.8 42.1 78.37 78.80
1930 668.9 60.7 26.5 32.5 76.51 75.97
1931 612.9 54.5 22.7 27.3 80.14 81.11
1932 552.5 48.1 19.5 21.5 82.34 90.84
1933 447.2 38.1 17.2 20.2 73.98 76.55
1934 413.7 34.5 17.8 21.2 64.75 66.17
1935 451.1 36.5 19.5 23.3 62.53 63.74
1936 640.5 51.0 21.6 27.1 78.80 76.36
1937 661.7 51.7 22.5 27.9 76.81 75.23
1938 682.8 52.5 21.4 25.5 81.90 83.44
1939 745.1 55.6 21.7 26.0 85.62 86.82
Notes: Column 1 is the net agricultural output in Table 2.8. For taxes and credit inflow, see the text.
Price indices (I and II) are from Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
3. Industrial Expansion in Interwar
Turkey: New Estimates
3.1. Introduction
Given that the beginning of industrialisation in the 1930s has received much
attention in Turkey’s economic historiography, it is remarkable that the em-
pirical evidence has remained so weak. The existing literature is mostly based
on the estimates of industrial value added produced by Bulutay et al..1 In ad-
dition, official industrial statistics began to be published in 1932, providing
valuable information on the medium- and large-scale enterprises that benefited
from the Law for Promotion of Industry.2 Furthermore, there is a relatively
large amount of data on the state-owned enterprises in certain sectors, such
as sugar, mining and textiles. The downside of the existence of quantitative
data of this kind is that it has led many scholars to limit their attention to
the state sector and/or large-scale enterprises, which has therefore created a
bias in the interpretation of the nature and extent of industrial growth in the
1930s.
Bulutay et al.’s estimation procedure consists of two stages. First, for 1932-
1939, they extrapolate backwards the official value added figures of the 1940s,
using the dataset on the enterprises that benefited from the Law for Promotion
of Industry. Thus, for 1933-1939 their estimate has a significant selection
bias, as it leaves out the handicraft and home production that constituted
more than half of total value added in 1927.3 The implicit assumption that
1Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
2Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Sanayi İstatistikleri 1932-1936. 1938;
Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Sanayi İstatistikleri 1936-1941. 1945.
3It is hard to measure the precise value added share of handicrafts from the 1927 industrial
census. By looking at the number of employees per enterprise in 1927, a reasonable guess
would put it at more than half. However, the definition of handicraft is another problem:
if having less than 10 employees is the criteria, then more than 95 percent of enterprises
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factory and handicraft output grew to the same extent is tenuous at best, since
during 1929-1939 rapid industrialisation largely came from the expansion of
the former. As a result Bulutay et al. series is likely to overestimate industrial
growth for 1932-1939. Second, for the period 1923-1932 their second stage of
extrapolation is made by using transaction and income tax data. Yet it is
far from obvious how the tax data represents the growth of manufacturing,
because no sectoral breakdown of taxes is available.
The only correction to Bulutay et al.’s estimates was suggested by Zendisayek,
who takes the Bulutay et al. indices as representative of factory output and
combines it with a separate index for handicrafts, which is based on Eldem’s
estimates of handicraft value added.4 However, this methodology is problem-
atic in two ways. First, Eldem’s estimates are no more than simple guesses.
His short paper neither explains his methodology nor specifies his sources,
which casts a huge doubt on its correctness. Our extensive research of the
primary sources shows that it is nearly impossible to measure the handicraft
output separately since it was almost totally undocumented. Second, the
weighting procedure that Zendisayek uses inherently overestimates growth
due to the fact that she applies the 1938 weights of the factory and handi-
crafts output to the whole period, including 1927, even though factory output
– and consequently its share of value added – probably grew faster than han-
dicrafts.5 Even though it is not possible to precisely determine the rise in
the share of large enterprises, the establishment of both stated-owned and
private factories in certain sectors such as textiles, leather production and
sugar refining after 1933 suggests that it should have increased to a signific-
ant degree. To illustrate the weakness of Zendisayek’s method, if the share of
factory output is reduced in favour of handicrafts for the 1920s, one comes up
with smaller growth rates of around 3-4 percent per annum, rather than the
5.2 percent found by Zendisayek. In other words, due to 1938 weights being
taken as constant for the whole period, the factory output is over-represented
in her common index.
satisfied this condition. What is clear yet is that the overwhelming proportion was
small-scale, working with one person, family labour or 5-10 employees.
4B. Zendisayek, A Reevaluation of Turkey’s Industrialization Performance: Large and
Small Firms During the Great Depression. Master’s thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1997;
and Eldem, Türkiye’de Sanayileşme.
5She obtains 1938 weights from the official estimates in Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik
Umum Müdürlüğü, Türkiye Milli Geliri 1938, 1948-1951. 1954.
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Thus, there is much reason to suppose that neither of these earlier estimates
provide a reliable measure of industrial growth. Furthermore, these available
estimates do not provide any insight into the composition and structure of
manufacturing growth. This chapter therefore attempts to fill the gap in the
literature by providing a more reliable and consistent estimate of the sectoral
and aggregate industrial output series. First, a brief note on the methodology
is provided. Then we present how each sectoral series is constructed, which is
followed by a discussion of the weighting procedure. Finally, we discuss the
new output estimate in relation to these earlier attempts.
3.2. Estimation Methods: An Overview
Considering all the methodological problems of the existing data, as was
briefly described above, here we prefer to move in a different direction. The
main problem is to obtain a reliable measure of industrial growth in the ab-
sence of sufficient direct output data. This is carried out in two stages: first,
we provide estimates of physical output growth in 15 different sectors, in-
cluding construction, utilities and mining, as well as manufacturing; then we
combine them in a single aggregate index.
Typically when the institutional capacity of economic data production is
small, as was the case in interwar Turkey, the census type data are the primary
sources for information on production, value added, employment or the level
of technology. The first industrial census in Turkey was carried out in 1927,
and the second one in 1950. The coverage of the 1927 census is large enough
to rely on, because both small and large enterprises were covered, so it is
extensively used here in the weighting procedure. On the other hand, the
population censuses took place more often: 1927, 1935 and at every five-year
period thereafter. Among them, the 1935 census is particularly useful, since it
gives information about the employment composition within industry at the
time, thus making it possible to compare the post-1929 situation with that
previously, although the 1940 census unfortunately did not renew the indus-
trial employment data. Furthermore, direct output data is usually available
for the sectors where government exercised strict supervision/monopoly, such
as tobacco, alcohol, salt, mining and utilities. Also for textiles and the food
processing sectors, one finds some direct yet fragmentary regional or sectoral
evidence, although its use requires care and caution.
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Any attempt to estimate output growth based on such imperfect evidence
must necessarily be imprecise and precarious. However, it does not make it
impossible to obtain reasonably reliable estimates. The attempt to measure
British industrial growth before the mid-nineteenth century is a good case
in point. Hoffman’s first-generation index provided the common ground for
other scholars to refine the measurement of the extent of the British industrial
revolution.6 The second- and third-generation indexes presented by Deane
and Cole, and later Crafts, Harley and Crafts and Harley all used similar
or reconstructed versions of the basic sectoral series that Hoffman and later
Deane and Cole used.7 These series are based either on the relevant input
indices, which best reflect output growth in the corresponding sectors, or
reasonably relevant proxies. For instance, the cotton industry is represented
by retained cotton imports, the wool industry by the sum of the estimated
domestic clips and imports, clothing by a weighted average of textile output
and the whole food and drink industries by a transformation of population
growth with an index of milling and baking. This is necessary because, as
Harley remarks, “the data for this period are imperfect and so any estimates
of growth are controlled conjectures”.8Similarly, Feinstein argues that in the
absence of direct output data, using the underlying input sectoral data and –
manipulating it whenever possible and necessary – is “not only legitimate but
also inevitable”.9
The problem of insufficient economic data has also faced those working
on Italian industry post-unification. Gerchenkron’s estimates of industrial
growth before 1913 mostly used input data. The growth of the silk industry
was measured by raw silk output, cotton by the net imports of cotton and flour
milling by wheat consumption.10 His series were later significantly improved
6W.G. Hoffman, British Industry, 1700-1950. Oxford, 1955.
7P. Deane and W.A. Cole, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959. Cambridge, 1962;N.F.R.
Crafts, British Economic Growth, 1700-1831: a Review of Evidence. Economic History
Review , 36 1983; C.K. Harley, British Industrialisation before 1841: Evidence of Slower
Growth During the Industrial Revolution. Journal of Economic History , XLII 1982; and
N.F.R. Crafts and Nick Harley, Output Growth and the British Industrial Revolution:
a Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View. Economic History Review , 45(4) 1992, Nr. 4.
8Harley, British Industrialisation, p.272. Crafts and Harley’s aforementioned papers make
an improvement on the choice of weights rather than the basic series provided mostly
by Deane and Cole. For a full list of the data sources, see Crafts, British Economic
Growth, p.180.
9C.H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855-
1965. Cambridge University Press, 1972.
10A. Gerschenkron, Notes on the Rate of Industrial Growth in Italy, 1881-1913. In Eco-
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by various scholars. In his comprehensive revision of Italian industrial growth
before 1914, Stefano Fenoaltea masterfully uses a different technique: textile
series are reconstructed by means of different stages of production, controlling
for foreign trade and lags between transformations in each stage.11 This
procedure causes the output variation across time not only to be dependent
on the underlying input data, but also on the changes in foreign trade of
various intermediate goods. Thus, it is a technique that works well, as it
captures the effects of foreign trade on output at different stages of production.
For instance, the growth of cotton spinning and weaving should vary when
weaving develops much faster than spinning due to imports of cotton yarn.
More generally, if one country is specialised in a particular stage of a certain
industry, then the raw material consumption is not going to reflect the growth
of the whole industry. In this sense, Fenoaltea’s method successfully makes
this distinction.12
The methodology of the present work is in accordance with those cited
above. The textile and to a lesser extent leather series are constructed follow-
ing Fenoaltea, to the extent that the available data permits: the production
process is vertically, and horizontally in a few cases, divided and the sub-
sequent series for input and further intermediates are obtained. For other
sectors, either direct output figures or proxies are used. For instance, the
refined sugar output is very well documented, while wheat consumption rep-
resents the growth of flour milling. Lastly, the utilities, mining and construc-
tion output indices are obtained from Bulutay et al..13 Table 3.1 summarises
which proxy measures are used in each sector.
To test the validity of these proxies, they can be compared to the avail-
nomic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. Harward University
Press, 1962b.
11Stefano Fenoaltea, The Growth of Italy’s Cotton Industry, 1861-1913: a Statistical Re-
construction. Rivista di Storia Economica, 17(2) 2001; Stefano Fenoaltea, The Growth
of Italy’s Silk Industry, 1861-1913: a Statistical Reconstruction. Rivista di Storia Eco-
nomica, 5(3) 1988; Stefano Fenoaltea, The Growth of Italy’s Wool Industry, 1861-1913:
a Statistical Reconstruction. Rivista di Storia Economica, 16(2) 2000; Stefano Fenoal-
tea, Textile Production in Italy, 1861-1913. Rivista di Storia Economica, 18 2002. Also
for an extensive historiographical survey, see Stefano Fenoaltea, Notes on the Rate of
Industrial Growth in Italy, 1881-1913. Journal of Economic History , 63(3) 2003.
12On the other hand, Fenoaltea does not make significant changes to other manufacturing
series: the wood processing output is measured by the finished lumber output, tobacco
by the total weight of output, leather by the statistical interpolation of four data points
in various years and so on.
13Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
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Table 3.1.: Overview of Sectoral Output Measures for Turkey
Sector Proxy Measure
Cotton textiles Yarn consumption
Silk textiles ditto
Woollen Textiles ditto
Hemp goods ditto
Skins and hides Consumption of processed leather
Milling Wheat consumption
Olive oil Direct output
Tobacco Output of manufactured tobacco
Alcohol Beer and wine output
Sugar Refined sugar output
Wood working Timber consumption
Utilities Electricity and gas output
Mining Output of major minerals
Construction Consumption of building iron and cement
able anecdotal evidence, in order to cross check the estimated growth rates.
Furthermore, the estimated consumption of manufactures, together with re-
lative prices, can be considered as a way of testing the consistency of the
independent output estimates.
After obtaining all individual sectoral series, the problem is then to com-
bine them into an aggregate output index, which requires a sound weighting
system. In principle, if complete output price data are at hand, then it would
be possible to get price-weighted quantity indices (Paasche or Laspeyres).
However, in most cases, the output price data is lacking. The second-best
alternative is to produce a constant-weighted index by using sectoral value-
added shares. In the present work, these shares are derived from value-added
and employment data based on the 1927 industrial census. However, taking
constant weights for the whole interwar period can be unreliable in view of
the significant changes in the composition of industrial output. Given that
some sectors, particularly textiles, grew more than others during the 1930s,
the 1927 weights will result in an underestimation of the aggregate output
growth. Therefore, in order to adjust the weights, we produce another set of
weights for the 1930s on the basis of the change in the volume of output and
prices at sectoral level between 1927 and 1935.
In the end, by its nature, the present estimation procedure admittedly con-
tains uncertainties, measurement errors and simplifications. First of all, our
3.3. SECTORAL OUTPUT ESTIMATES 97
failure to take into consideration technical change over time constitutes the
most serious problem. For instance, if the increasing mechanisation in spin-
ning leads to more yarn being obtained per unit of raw cotton, we are unable
to capture this effect. This bias might be significant in textiles in partic-
ular, since production became considerably more mechanised in the 1930s.
One should therefore keep this in mind when interpreting the final indices.14
Secondly, another limitation is that we cannot perfectly observe the invent-
ory changes for every sector due to the absence of data. In many cases we
consequently take the three-year moving averages as a second-best solution.
This leads to a downward or upward bias in year-to-year fluctuations rather
than in the general trends.
3.3. Sectoral Output Estimates
3.3.1. Textiles
The construction of textile output series, and partly leather processing, are to
a large degree inspired and informed by Fenoaltea’s works on the Italian textile
industry, as described above. Following his technique, we make the vertical –
and horizontal in the case of leather – disintegration of the production process
to take into account foreign trade in intermediate goods, weight losses between
successive stages, and inventories. The vertical disintegration means that we
start from raw fibre consumption and then move on to the yarn and lastly
arrive at fabric output. In each stage, the net imports and waste are taken
into account, while technical coefficients are used to capture the weight losses,
whenever necessary. The next section explains the reconstruction procedure
and data sources for cotton and silk textiles, carpets and rugs, woollens and
finally the goods made of hemp.
Cotton Textiles
The following simple equations summarise the estimation procedure for cotton
textiles:
14Similarly, the interwar period witnessed notable technical industrial advances in the
world, yet that was more of the case in American industry and less in Europe, so it
is highly doubtful such developments reached Turkish industry at all. For a review of
technical changes in the interwar period see Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, The World
Economy Between the World Wars, pp.14-15.
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LY = [RAW + ImRAW − δ(INV )] ∗ 0.9
LFAB = ma(LY + ImY )
FCO = (LFAB + ImFAB)/Population
where LY stands for the local yarn output, RAW local raw cotton output, Im-
RAW net imports of raw cotton, δ(INV) raw cotton inventory change, LFAB
local fabric output, ImY net yarn imports, FCO per capita fabric consumption
and finally ImFAB net fabric imports.
The estimation procedure starts with raw cotton consumption. As demon-
strated in Chapter 1, the two available raw cotton output series had serious
flaws, so we needed to estimate a more consistent series based on the regional
output figures. The yarn output is defined in the first equation above, where
the net inventory change and net raw cotton imports are added to the local
raw cotton output (see Table 3.2 for all relevant series).15 Furthermore, a
10 percent waste of raw cotton is assumed, as suggested by various expert
reports, in order to proceed from raw cotton consumption to yarn output.16
The year-end inventories of cotton are only available for the most import-
ant region, Çukurova, which produced more than half of the total output.17
We expand these regional inventory figures by the ratio of total raw cotton
output to Çukurova’s output in each year in order to obtain an estimate of
the aggregate year-to-year inventory changes. In this way, we find that the
inventory change was almost negligible before 1931, but it reached significant
levels in the depression years (1931 and 1933) and at the time when the total
output increased significantly (1937 and 1938).
In the second equation, the yarn output is combined with net yarn im-
ports, which leads to the total yarn consumption.18 We are unable to observe
15The two categories, raw cotton and cotton wadding, which are grouped as raw cotton in
the foreign trade data are aggregated.
16İstanbul, İstanbul Pamuklu Mensucat Sanayi Raporu. In 1930 Sanayi Kongresi Raporları.
Milli İktisat ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti, 1932.
17Adana Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık.
18Bleached, carded and dyed yarn are aggregated due to the absence of another unit of
measure. Fenoaltea argues that length, rather than weight, can be considered as another
and more relevant unit of measure, as one should take into account the possible quality
improvement in textile production. He converts all series in weight into the series in
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Figure 3.1.: Cotton Textiles in Turkey: Output, Imports and Consumption,
1925-1939
Source: Table 3.2
changes in yarn inventories, so we use the three-year moving average of yarn
consumption to reflect it. This represents total fabric output, assuming that
all of the yarn waste was recycled. Finally, in the last equation, the sum of
net fabric imports and local fabric output divided by population provides per
capita fabric consumption.19 Note that although a proportion of the cotton
yarn should be allocated to consumption in the silk industry, it is simply
ignored because of its negligible size.20
As a result of this methodology, the variation in final fabric output over
time is due to the underlying raw cotton output, the raw cotton stocks and
foreign trade at each stage. Turkey was a net exporter of raw cotton and a net
importer of yarn and fabric, so foreign trade carries a large weight in the final
figures. The raw cotton exports followed a U-shape pattern, as the decline
length using a weight-length conversion method. Fenoaltea, Italy’s Cotton Industry.
What makes his point relevant in our case is that interwar Turkey witnessed increasing
factory-based mechanisation in the textile sector. However, consistent length figures
are not available and, moreover, Fenoaltea’s conversion method does not seem to bring
about a significant change in final growth rates.
19All fabric types are aggregated, excluding the finished cotton goods.
20Silk output figures were clearly not comparable in size to cotton output.
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in the early 1930s was reversed after the mid-1930s with increasing foreign
demand due to the worldwide recovery from the Great Depression. Yarn
imports continued to be significant throughout the period, whereas fabric
imports gradually declined in accordance with the increase in local output.
Figure 3.1 compares the estimated fabric output and the net fabric imports
from 1925 to 1939, together with the implied per capita consumption. The
local output was around 15,000 tons in the 1920s and almost tripled during
the 1930s. Meanwhile, the imports halved gradually over the whole period,
with the result that the per capita consumption exceeded the level of 1920s
in the second half of the 1930s. The share of imports in total consumption
was around 50-60 percent in the 1920s, then it was reduced to 15 percent by
1939, which clearly indicates the extent of import substitution.
How do these indirect estimates compare with the additional evidence? We
have some direct output data derived from official sources for the post-1933
years. For the sake of comparison, the factory fabric output can be taken as
the sum of the yarn produced by factories and net yarn imports.21 As seen
in Table 3.3, the factory fabric output seems to have increased from 12,000
tons to 27,000 during 1933-1939, while our aggregate figures rose from 21,000
to 50,000 tons. The gap can be explained by unobserved home consumption
and the cotton consumed by handlooms. That the growth rates of aggregate
and factory production are very much comparable suggests that the market
expanded across both segments (factories and handlooms) to a similar degree
between 1933 and 1939. By contrast, the separate fabric output series in
Eldem and Tekeli and İlkin, presented in Table 3.3, claim to cover both factory
and handicraft output, but there is little difference between their series and
the factory output figures that we derive from official sources.22 Their bias
seems to have two origins: first, they underestimate factory output, and,
second, both of them refer to Eldem’s simple guess for the handloom output,
which remains almost constant at around 9,000 tons over 1933-1939.
More fragmentary evidence also supports the estimates provided here. A
number of market reports presented by textile experts to the Industrial Con-
gress in 1930 indicate that already by 1930 the number of handlooms was
21The yarn production of 15 factories is provided in Turkey, Ticaret Vekaleti, Konjonktür .
22Eldem, Türkiye’de Sanayileşme; and İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Savaşmayan Ülkenin
Savaş Ekonomisi: Üretimden Tüketime Pamuklu Dokuma. In İlhan Tekeli and Se-
lim İlkin, editors, Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Köktenci Modernitenin Ekonomik Politikasının
Gelişimi. Volume 2, Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2004.
3.3. SECTORAL OUTPUT ESTIMATES 102
Table 3.3.: Comparison with Existing Estimates of Cotton Textiles Output
(Tons), Turkey
Factory output Eldem (1947) Tekeli and Ilkin (2004) Own estimate
1933 12418 12400 12423 21409
1934 16219 15000 15961 29057
1935 14292 15400 15154 30668
1936 18097 18000 18520 40076
1937 22444 22500 22401 40965
1938 26007 26000 24849 49887
1939 27061 27100 26414 50925
Source: The factory output is the sum of mechanically-spun yarn of factories and yarn
imports. Turkey, Ticaret Vekaleti, Konjonktür(various issues).
around 30,000 all over the country and only 3,000-4,000 producing about
2,000 tons of fabrics were in and around Istanbul.23 One third of all hand-
looms in the country were located in the remote villages, producing their own
hand-spun yarn and fabrics for self-consumption and/or selling in the sur-
rounding small local markets. It is impossible to get a reliable estimate from
these fragmented figures but a liberal guess based on them implies that the
total handicraft output should be 10-12 thousand tons by end of the 1920s,
which is consistent with our estimates. Combined with the long-term trend
in our series, non-factory output also seems to have decreased between 1929
and 1933 and revived afterwards in accordance with the total output, so that
the growth in factory output in all likelihood outpaced that in non-factory
output between 1929-1939.24 Furthermore, the total raw cotton consumed
by nine large factories in Turkey in 1934-1935 was estimated by the cotton
commission of Turkofis to be 76,205 bales, equivalent to around 14,000 tons
of cotton yarn, allowing for 10 percent waste.25 Combined with yarn im-
ports in 1934, the total yarn consumption by mainly factories was around
18,000-19,000 tons. By comparison, we estimate 1934 output at 30,000 tons,
so the gap, 10,000-11,000 tons, reasonably stands for home and handloom
consumption.
Although it is hard to directly measure the actual extent of the downturn
23Pamuklu Sanayi Encümeni, Rapor. In 1930 Sanayi Kongresi Raporları. Milli İktisat
ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti, 1932; A. Fazlı, Pamuklu Mensucat Sanayimiz. In 1930 Sanayi
Kongresi Raporları. 2nd edition. Ankara Sanayi Odası, 1932
24This fact is more clearly seen in the aggregate output indices presented at the end of this
chapter.
25Adana Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık, 1938/39, p.210.
3.3. SECTORAL OUTPUT ESTIMATES 103
and the following revival of handlooms, it is therefore clear that there was
a substantial amount of non-factory production that is not reflected in the
estimates of Eldem and Tekeli and İlkin. In this respect, our indirect estimates
are more consistent with both the official figures and anecdotal evidence.
Silk Textiles
During the 19th century, the Mediterranean was one of the major raw silk
suppliers, along with China and India.26 Although sericulture in Turkey was
not comparable in size to Italy or Japan, the income emanating from silk-
worm raising and later processing was particularly important for a specific
region in the West, Bursa and its neighbourhood. Both the cocoon and raw
silk production were largely concentrated there, while the reeling and weaving
spread to the rest of the larger surrounding region. Cocoon output signific-
antly expanded in the late nineteenth century and after a short-term setback
due to diseases hitting silkworms, the onset of World War I saw the heyday of
sericulture.27 However, the worldwide decline of natural silk in the interwar
years as a result of the expansion of the artificial substitutes adversely affected
the local industry. Moreover, population exchanges immediately after World
War I led to the emigration of the Christian population, who had long been
engaged in the silk business. It took time for the remaining local residents
to obtain the necessary skills to raise mulberry trees and improve their man-
ufacturing capacity. Meanwhile, some of the mulberry fields were converted
to tobacco and the other fields remained of poor quality.28 The extent of the
reversal can be strikingly seen in the number of reeling machines at work,
which decreased from 1,441 in 1913 to 561 in 1940.29
The official statistical sources are quite limited on the state of the interwar
silk industry, providing only fresh cocoon figures starting from 1933. In the
very late Ottoman period, the whole industry was monitored by the Ottoman
Public Debt Administration (Düyun-u Umumiye), so the number of famil-
ies producing cocoons, cocoon output, raw silk produced and the number of
looms are well documented for the years prior to 1920. We are also better
26Giovanni Federico, The Economic History of Silk Industry, 1830-1930. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1997.
27Dalsar discusses the history of sericulture in Anatolia in detail. Fahri Dalsar, Türk
Ticaret ve Sanayi Tarihinde Bursa’da İpekçilik. İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1960.
28Bedia Sükrü, İpek Böceği ve İpek. Coğrafya Enstitüsü, p.29.
29Aziz Duru, İpekböcekçiliği. Bursa Koza Satış Kooperatifleri Birliği, 1937.
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informed of the state of mechanisation at the reeling and weaving stages:
there were 561 hand reeling and 7,739 steam reeling machines in operation
in 1913, showing a high degree of mechanisation.30 As for weaving, Bursa
had 348 power looms and 617 handlooms in 1920. These figures indicate that
reeling was rather mechanised, whereas weaving to a large degree depended
on traditional handlooms. The extent of mechanisation most likely remained
unchanged in the interwar years.
The estimates of cocoon, raw silk and silk yarn output are linked with the
following equation:
DRI = [FRE + ImFRE] ∗ 0.35
RAW = (DRI + ImDRI) ∗ 0.3
Y ARN = ma(RAW + ImRAW ) ∗ 0.9
CONS = (Y ARN + ImY ARN + ImFAB)/Population
where DRI stands for dried cocoon output, FRE fresh cocoons, ImFRE im-
ports of fresh cocoons, RAW raw silk, ImDRI imports of dried cocoon, YARN
silk yarn, ImRAW imports of raw silk, ImYARN imports of both natural and
artificial silk yarn, ImFAB imports of silk fabrics and finally CONS represents
the per capita fabrics consumption. In this procedure, the production process
is disaggregated into three stages: drying of fresh cocoons, reeling and yarn
production.
The estimation begins with the fresh cocoon output, which is obtained from
the official agricultural statistics for the years 1933-1939. For the earlier years
except for 1927, the data is taken from a number of additional sources.31 The
missing value for 1927 is the simple interpolation, which is sensible because
no source indicates an extraordinary output shock in 1927. Then by adding
30Reşat, İpekli Mensucat Sanayimiz. In 1930 Sanayi Kongresi Raporları. 2nd edition.
Ankara Sanayi Odası, 1932a.
31For 1924-1929: Bursa Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, İpekçiliğin Lüks Vergisi Karşısındaki
Durumu. 1943; 1930-32: İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık, 1937, p.59. These
numbers were cross-checked with the additional evidence in Sükrü, which gives the
cocoon production in Bursa between 1924-32, Duru for 1932. Sükrü, İpek Böceği ve
İpek ; and Duru, İpekböcekçiliği . The following sources were also consulted: Turkey,
Ziraat Vekaleti, İpek Böcekçiliği. 1938a; Süheyla Soner, Bursa İpek Atölye Sanayi. İÜ
Coğrafya Fakültesi, 1947; Dalsar, Bursa’da İpekçilik ; İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası,
Yıllık.
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the net import of the fresh cocoons, we get the total domestic fresh cocoon
consumption.
The next step is to get the dried cocoon in weight from the fresh cocoon
series. It is well known that drying significantly reduces the weight of the fresh
cocoon, and, based on the contemporary sources, we take the coefficient of
0.35 to reflect the weight loss. Subsequently, the net imports of dried cocoon
are added to the domestic output. One should notice that since cocoons
were mostly exported as dried, the deduction drives a wedge between the
underlying fresh and dried cocoon series. At this stage, we need another
technical coefficient reflecting the weight changes during the reeling, which
generates raw silk from dried cocoons. It is taken to be 0.3 based on the
relatively large amount of anecdotal evidence. Thus, assuming 10 percent
waste in yarn production, yarn output is the sum of local raw silk and net
imports. Assuming the inventories were held as raw silk, we take the three-
year moving average of raw silk consumption. Consequently, the local yarn
is added to the net imports of both natural and artificial silk yarn and then
fabric imports, which leads to the total fabric consumption. All the waste in
fabric production is assumed to be recycled.
The resulting fabric output is presented in Figure 3.2 in comparison with
imports and per capita consumption. The output turns out to have increased
four times from 1925 to 1939, with a short-term decline between 1932 and
1934. After 1929, the imports and local output were negatively correlated,
and imports were negligible after 1936. Import expansion in 1934-35 was the
result of the inflow of cheap Japanese goods, which came to a halt with tariff
modifications in 1936, as will be discussed in the following chapter. On the
other hand, the per capita consumption does not show a trend during the
period under consideration. The gradual decline in the 1920s was slightly
offset in the early 1930s, and then it returned to the level of the 1920s in the
second half of the 1930s.
Oriental Carpets and Rugs
The production of oriental carpets and rugs in Turkey was a traditional
export-oriented industry. The production was relatively more market ori-
ented, and export production was geographically concentrated in western
Anatolia and conducted by small- or medium-scale traditional workshops.
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Figure 3.2.: Silk Textiles in Turkey: Output, Imports and Consumption, 1925-
39
Source: Table 3.4.
The output was highly sensitive to foreign demand and suffered from the neg-
ative demand shock in the 1930s, including when the United States, one of
the principal buyers of the Turkish carpets, increased import duties.32 Total
exports were around 1,400 tons during 1925-29, but swiftly decreased to neg-
ligible levels in the following decade. Other than that, direct data on local
consumption is quite scarce. The present output estimate therefore recon-
structs local consumption based on cotton textiles consumption and the rel-
ative prices.
To begin, we need a benchmark estimate of local sales. The report presented
to the 1930 Industrial Congress by the manager of a large textile factory
estimates the total output at around 7-7.5 TL million in 1929 and 9-9.5 million
in 1928.33 The export values are also comparable to his figures: TL 5.4 and
6.5 million in 1929 and 1928, respectively. Eldem also predicts that 61 percent
of the output volume was exported in 1929.34 One should obviously expect
32Reşat, Türkiye’de Mensucat Sanayi: Halihazırı ve İnkişafı. İstanbul Ticaret Odası,
1932b.
33Reşat, Türkiye’de Mensucat Sanayi .
34Eldem, Türkiye’de Sanayileşme.
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a higher share of exports in value than in volume because of higher export
prices. Therefore, we prefer to take an intermediate position by assuming 0.3
as the share of local sales in volume in 1929. Thus, we find 580 tons of local
sales based on the export figure of 1,352 tons.
Next we construct a demand index in order to extrapolate this benchmark
estimate. The index formula is derived from the consumption equation of one
commodity:
Ci =
(
Pi
P
)α
Y β
where Ci is the consumption of commodity i, Pi its price, P aggregate price,
Y real income and α and β own price and income elasticities respectively.
Here, the real consumption of a commodity is a function of its relative price
with respect to the aggregate price level and real incomes. For simplicity, we
assume the same elasticities for carpets and cotton cloth, so we estimate carpet
consumption from cotton cloth consumption through their relative prices in
the following way:
Ccar = Ccot
(
Pcar
Pcot
)α
where Ccar and Ccot denotes the indices of carpet and cotton consumption and
Pcar and Pcot. α is the own-price elasticity, which for both goods is assumed to
be -1.3, as Hansen accepted for cotton textiles.35 The consumption of cotton
textiles was estimated in the earlier section, including both local output and
imports. For 1929-1939, the price series are the simple average of the available
wholesale cotton cloth prices (both imported and locally-produced goods) and
carpet prices on the Istanbul commodity exchange. For the earlier period,
these series are taken back with the average import prices for cotton cloth
and the export prices for carpets, as they best reflect the domestic prices.36
Local sales in 1929 are then extrapolated with the demand index obtained
above to get the local sales series. The latter is combined with exports to
35Hansen, Income and Consumption. We tried alternative elasticity figures, ranging from
-1 and -1.5, yet the resulting output series remains relatively stable.
36Price data is obtained from İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Sicilli Ticaret Gazetesi
ve Piyasa Cetveli .
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Table 3.5.: Carpet Output in Turkey, 1925-1939
Carpet
exports
Cotton cloth
consumption
Cotton cloth
prices
Carpet
prices
Local
demand
index
Local
carpet
sales
Total
Carpet
Output
tons 1929=100 TL/roll TL/m2 tons tons
1925 1326 112 13.1 17.2 78.5 705 2032
1926 1416 101 11.9 19.1 54.5 490 1906
1927 1436 86 11.1 18.6 44.1 396 1833
1928 1621 96 11.8 16.1 64.4 579 2200
1929 1352 100 11.4 16.0 64.5 580 1932
1930 963 75 10.1 16.4 39.7 357 1320
1931 791 75 8.4 13.4 40.8 367 1158
1932 409 81 7.7 11.3 49.0 440 850
1933 356 91 6.9 9.3 62.4 560 917
1934 301 106 7.9 7.9 106.2 955 1256
1935 209 113 8.4 7.8 123.8 1113 1322
1936 218 133 7.9 7.8 135.1 1214 1432
1937 111 139 7.7 8.4 124.7 1121 1232
1938 0 163 7.7 8.6 142.7 1283 1283
1939 0 157 7.2 8.5 125.5 1128 1129
Source: See the text.
arrive at the total local output. Note that since the cotton cloth series was
already corrected for inventory changes and the export series represents annual
figures, no further correction for inventories is needed in this case.
Table 3.5 presents all the component series. The estimated final output
declined by more than half between 1928 and 1932 and remained at around
two thirds of the 1925-1928 level despite the moderate recovery after 1933.
The increase in local sales in the second half of the 1930s turns out to be
slightly larger than cotton cloth consumption, since carpet prices fell more
than textile prices. However, what after all determined the output pattern
was the enormous and prolonged decline in exports as a result of external
demand changes. The recovery in domestic demand fell short of making up
for the external shock.
This result can be compared with the additional evidence on the mostly Ae-
gean production. The data on the carpet output for the main export-oriented
Aegean towns and a few interior cities implies a 70 percent decline from 1929
to 1936, which is higher than our own estimate (26 percent).37 Yet, one should
observe the huge regional dislocation. For instance, while the output of three
famous towns, Uşak, Simav and Gördes, almost disappeared, the neighbour-
37İzmir Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, Mecmua, 8(1-2), 1939, pp.23-24 and 1, 1939, pp.8-9.
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ing cities (Isparta and Demirci) and one central Anatolian city, Kayseri, saw
significant output rises during the same period. As Reşat reminded us, the
Aegean production was largely geared toward foreign markets compared to
the other producers. In this regard, the drastic fall in Aegean output was
likely the result of the contraction of export markets.38
Woollen Textiles
Wool was the second most widely consumed fibre in Turkey, due both to
widespread sheep husbandry and a climate suitable for woollen fabrics as well
as other conventional uses of the fibre (carpets, felts, hats). Local wool was
mostly of the worsted type, so they were to a large extent used in the making of
carpets, felts and covers.39 This was more about the fineness of the imported
wool types, while the domestic worsted suited the production of carpets, rugs
and also non-fabric goods to a lesser degree. The production was carried out
by a large number of small workshops and also in rural households for self-
consumption throughout the country, while a small number of factories came
to be built in the 1930s.40 Therefore, the available figures on the industry
are limited to the large factories as a result of the dispersed and small-scale
nature of production.
The production process is here disaggregated into the three broad stages:
The washing of greasy wool, yarn production from clean wool and finally the
manufacturing of woollen cloth, hemps, covers and hats. The equations below
describe the successive stages:
38Reşat, Türkiye’de Mensucat Sanayi , p.9.
39Reşat, Türkiye’de Mensucat Sanayi .
40For the development of the woollen industry over the 1930s and 1940s, see TOBB,
Türkiye’de Yün İpliği ve Yünlü Mensucat Sanayi. Türkiye Ticaret Odaları, Sanayi
odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği, 1959b, pp.28-34.
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DoGRE = SHEEP ∗ 1.75 ∗ 0.97
GRE = DoGRE + ImGRE + INV − CAR
CLE = GRE ∗ 0.58
Y ARN = (CLE + ImCLE) ∗ 0.95
FINAL = Y ARN + ImY ARN
CONS = (FINAL+ IMFINAL)/Population
where SHEEP stands for the sheep flock size and DoGRE, GRE, ImGRE, INV
and CAR the domestic output, total consumption, net imports and inventory
change of greasy wool. The wool that is consumed in carpet production is also
allocated at this early stage. CLE represents the domestic clean wool obtained
after washing. And the rest is straightforward: local and imported clean wool
(CLE and ImCLE) are added to imported yarn (ImYARN) to get the cloth
output. Five percent waste is assumed at the spinning stage. Finally, local
final good output (FINAL) is added to the net imports to obtain the total
consumption (fabrics, felts, covers and hats).41
To begin, the sheep flock size is obtained from official statistics.42 There
are two available series: the sheep of all ages and those subject to animal tax,
that is, those more than one year old. Since the clipping required a certain
age, the second series is preferred. Then the greasy wool yield is taken as 1.75
kg per sheep, with 3 percent of the wool kept on farm. This yield estimate is a
weighted average of wool yields of the existing sheep types in Turkey.43 Then,
the resulting domestic output of greasy wool is combined with net imports,
or better to say net exports because a large part was usually exported. Once
41This section is greatly informed by Esmersoy, which is a detailed contemporary mono-
graph on the woollen industry of Turkey. Sukru Esmersoy, Yüncülük. Yeni Basımevi,
1940.
42Turkey, İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Yıllığı.
43Esmersoy assumes a 1.5 kg average yield, but we make a correction in view of the dif-
ferent wool yields of different sheep types. Esmersoy, p.118. Among the local types,
Akkaraman and Kızılkaraman gave higher yields than all others, which was 2 kg and
they made up almost one half of the total sheep stock in 1935. Therefore, 1.75 is sug-
gested here as a rough weighted average. For the number of sheep types, see Türkofis,
Türkofis Aylık Bülten, 1937(3), p.27; and for the official greasy wool series in the years
after 1937, see Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Zirai İstatistik Özetleri .
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the domestic available wool is obtained, the inventories need to be deducted.
The relevant data is limited to Istanbul for 1930-1939.44 It is known that
the marketed wool produced in central Anatolia, the eastern provinces and
the Marmara region was exported through the Istanbul port, whereas the
produce of the Aegean and Mediterranean regions were transferred through
Izmir port in the west and Mersin port in the south.45 Consequently, in
order to estimate the aggregate stocks, we use the ratio of the wool output
of the regions that were connected with the Istanbul market to the aggregate
output. Their share was around 60 percent in 1935 and 1936, so it is taken to
be constant for all other years and the stocks in Istanbul are inflated with this
coefficient.46 The aggregate figures we arrive at show a significant increase
in inventories in 1933, which was the worst year of the depression. The net
inventory change was -3,700 tons then out of 14,000 tons of available domestic
greasy wool. Although the inventories remained large in the following years,
the net change was much smaller, with the second peak in 1937. As for 1925-
1930, we take the three-year moving average of the greasy wool net of exports
to allow for the inventory change due to the lack of any consistent information.
Once the domestic consumption of the greasy wool, which is the output net
of exports and the net inventory change, is calculated, we need to separate out
the portion of the wool needed for carpet making, as it was the basic input of
oriental carpets, as stated above.47 To do so, we refer to the rough prediction
made by Şevket Torgut, the director of one of the largest textile factories in
Istanbul in 1930, about the total amount of the greasy wool produced in 1928
and its allocation between exports, carpet making, and home and factory
consumption.48His figures are not only consistent with our own estimate of
total greasy wool but also with another report on the state of Turkey’s wool
44Istanbul figures are collected from the daily market report of the Istanbul Commodity
Exchange, İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Piyasa Cetveli.
45İstanbul Ticaret Odası, Mecmua, 1926(6).
46Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Tarım İstatistikleri 1934-1937. 1939,
p.23.
47Although cotton was also used in the production of certain types of carpets, its amount
was negligible compared to the aggregate cotton output, so we do not need to deduct
this sum from the raw cotton series. See İzmir Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, 5(7-8), 1930,
pp.23-24.
48Sevket Torgut, Yünlü Mensucat Raporu. In 1930 Sanayi Kongresi Raporları. 2nd edition.
Ankara Sanayi Odasi, 1932, p.56. Aggregate wool output: 16.2 million okka, of which 7.5
million okka (46 percent) were used for carpets, 4.7 million okka (28 percent) exported,
with the rest equally divided between the factories and other home consumption (1
kg=1.23 okka).
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industry.49 This benchmark estimate of the share of carpet making in greasy
wool consumption, 46 percent in 1928, is applied to our wool output estimate
of 1928 and then the resulting figure (9,522 tons) is extrapolated with the
carpet output index, which we estimated in the preceding section. This is
a key step in the present estimation because a large part of local wool was
used in the carpet industry, which experienced a serious downturn during the
1930s.
After allocating the greasy wool between carpet making and other goods
we move on to the second stage of estimation: deriving the clean wool series
from greasy wool. We obtain the clean wool series simply by multiplying
the domestic greasy wool figures by a technical coefficient of 0.58, which is
derived from a survey of “cleaning productivity” for different types of sheep
in Turkey provided by Esmersoy.50 Since that composition does not seem to
have changed over time, which would have required a radical variation in the
composition of sheep, the coefficient is taken to be constant.
Subsequently, the standard procedure when dealing with cotton and silk
goods is followed to get the final production and consumption figures: five
percent waste is assumed in spinning and the net imports of woollen yarn
are added to local yarn, leading to the local output of fabrics, felts, hats and
other goods.51 It also yields total consumption with net imports. Note that
the available anecdotal evidence suggests that the production of felt, covers
and hats was larger than fabric output.52
The results can be compared with the direct output evidence. The total
woollen yarn output of 14 large factories was around 2,500 tons in 1935, 2,800
in 1936, 3,200 in 1937, 4,500 in 1938 and 6,500 in 1939.53 The pattern is
largely consistent with our own estimate of wool yarn output. In both series,
49İzmir Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, Mecmua, 5(7-8), 1930, pp.23-24. This report states that
the total greasy wool output was 14,000-15,000 tons, of which 4,000-5,000 thousand tons
were used for carpets. The corresponding figures in our series for 1930 are pretty close
to these numbers: 17,800 and 5,700 tons.
50Esmersoy, Yüncülük , p.24.
51Such a small waste rate reflects the rate in the Strayhgarn factories in the 1950s. TOBB,
Türkiye’de Yün İpliği , pp.33-35.
52Torgut, Yünlü Mensucat; İzmir, Yün Mensucat Raporu. In 1930 Sanayi Kongresi Ra-
porları. 2nd edition. Ankara Sanayi Odası, 1932; and Türkofis, 1937(3). This can also
be seen in the distribution of employment within the wool industry in 1927, accord-
ing to which, while the total employment was 3,300, only 1,000 people were working in
spinning and yarn, while the rest were employed in the hemp, covers and hat production.
53Turkey, Ticaret Vekaleti, Konjonktür, 1(7).
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Figure 3.3.: Woollen Goods in Turkey: Output, Imports and Consumption,
1925-1939
Source: Table 3.6.
1938-1939 saw a sharp increase in yarn output and, taken together, the share
of factory yarn output seems to be 45 percent in 1935 and increased to 55
percent in the following years.
The estimates of final output and per capita consumption are presented
in Figure 3.3, where they are compared with net imports. The net imports
declined by 70-80 percent throughout the period, while the local output re-
placed it to a large degree. Imports initially supplied around 40 percent of
total consumption, whereas only a small amount of woollens (400-600 tons)
continued to be imported as the local production rose to such a degree that it
substituted all the second-quality woollens by the mid-1930s. Consumption
per capita followed very closely local output, which was determined by vari-
ous factors, such as the increasing trend of greasy wool production, foreign
demand for local wool and import protection after 1929. One should also pay
attention to the fact that per capita consumption was still not significantly
higher in the 1930s than in the 1920s until 1938-1939. This was also the case
for the consumption of cotton fabrics.
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Hemp Goods
Hemp was the third crop, next to cotton and silk, whose fibres were produced
and marketed on a large scale in Turkey.54 Its production was to a large
extent concentrated in the North-western areas, such as Kocaeli, Kastamonu
and Bursa, where irrigation was cheap. The crop of Kastamonu had the
best quality and its yields were higher than elsewhere.55 Although only one
fourth of the total hemp acreage was in Kastamonu, almost half of the total
output was produced there due to the higher yields, while the rest came from
the neighbouring Black Sea towns. Hemp fibres were basically used in the
manufacturing of bags and ropes for the domestic market, while some small
amount, no more than 3-4 percent of the output, was exported. In return,
a significant amount of rope and strings were imported, though the imports
were reduced in the 1930s.
The present estimation procedure is based on Fenoaltea’s paper, which
provides the technical relationships between the successive transformations
from combing to spinning and weaving to the manufacturing of ropes, strings
and bags.56 There is a question to be asked about how suitable it is to em-
ploy the relationships that Fenoaltea provides for the pre-World War I years.
However, all anecdotal evidence points to the persistence of the traditional
processing methods in Turkey, so it is unlikely that the manufacturing meth-
ods changed substantially during the interwar years.57
The official total acreage data covers 1933 and afterwards, while there are
fibre output figures for only 1933-1935.58 To estimate the acreage of the earlier
54Flax was also produced but the seeds instead of fibres were used as a source of the
vegetable oil and the rest of the crop was usually wasted in most places. Tobler, Mem-
leketimiz Kendir ve Ketenciliği. Birinci Köy ve Ziraat Kongresi Yayınları, 1938b; Turkey,
İktisat Vekaleti, Ketenlerimiz. 1938a; and Tobler, Kenevir, Keten, Jüt Mütehassısı Sı-
fatıyla 1937 Eylülünden Teşrinisanisine Kadar Yapılan Seyahate Ait Rapor. TC Ziraat
Vekaleti Neşriyatı, 1938a.
55The average yield was around 100-150 kg/ha in Kastamonu, while the country average
was around 63 kg/ha. Turkey, Ziraat Vekaleti, Kastamonu Kendirciliğinin Vaziyeti
Umumisi. Ziraat Vekaleti, 1938b; and Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü,
Tarım İstatistikleri 1928-1936 .
56Fenoaltea, Textiles Production in Italy. The technical relationships are identified are as
follows: 1. Combed fibre output=0.4*(0.9*Total fibre harvested+Net imports of the raw
fibre) 2. Tow output=0.87*(0.1*Total fibre harvested)+0.53*(0.9*Total fibre harves-
ted+Net imports of the raw fibre) 3. Total spun fibre=0.93*(Combed fibre output+Net
imports of combed fibre)+0.84*(Tow output+Net tow imports) 4. Total output of cloth,
ropes and strings=0.96*(Total spun fibre+net imports of fibre).
57Tobler, Kenevir Keten Jüt ; and İstanbul Ticaret Odası, Mecmua, 1930(6-7).
58Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Tarım İstatistikleri 1928-1936 .
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years, we extrapolate the figure of 1933 by the acreage of Kastamonu, since
half of the output was accounted for by the regional output.59 As said above,
the direct output data is only available during 1933-1935, and the average
yield of this period seems reasonably stable between 53 and 71 kg/ha, so the
yield 63 kg/ha is used to generate the whole series of hemp fibre output.
The derivation of the output of raw fibre, combed fibre, tow, spun fibre
and final goods can be traced in Table 3.7. It is nevertheless necessary to
point out the limitations of the trade data. The foreign trade data does not
make a distinction between the products made of hemp and linen except for
1939. So we can only have the breakdown of the net imports of items for that
year, and thus have to project the breakdown to the earlier years. There-
fore, following the 1939 data, first, one fourth of net imports of raw fibres
is allocated to hemp. Second, all combed fibres are considered to be linen,
and, third, bleached fibres are taken to be linen and unbleached fibres are
considered hemp. The category of “wrapped-up” yarns are allocated equally
between linen and hemp. The tow imports of both linen and hemp were quite
negligible. It should be noted that the procedure is rather rudimentary, but it
is unlikely to have a significant impact on the results, owing to the small share
of foreign trade in the total output. Hence, the estimates indicate that the
output was relatively stable until the mid-1930s and picked up later. How-
ever, this expansion was not translated into any improvement in consumption,
which exhibits a long-term stagnation.
3.3.2. Leather Working
Leather working was one of the major well-established industries in Turkey. A
large number of tanneries of different scales were spread all over the country
processing raw skins and hides into leather, which was consumed by an equally
large number of workshops for the production of all kinds of shoes, bags,
gloves, belts and harnesses. The country mainly exported sheepskins and in
return imported cattle and calf skins to satisfy domestic consumption. This
particular trade pattern was due to the relative scarcity of locally produced
cattle skins, which were small in size and only suitable to make box calf
(vidala) and vaketa, which, together with sheep and goat skins, was used in
shoe-making. The welt- and belt-making, by contrast, required the heavier
59Turkey, Ziraat Vekaleti, Kastamonu Kendirciliği .
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imported skins.60
The present estimation method starts with the raw skin output and then
moves on to the dried and processed leather. The subsequent series of raw
and dried skins is reconstructed for sheep and cattle separately for the sake
of compatibility with the foreign trade data. At the final stage, they are
combined to get the aggregate output of processed leather, which measures
the final leather goods output. More formally, it follows these equations:
RAWSHEE = SHEEP ∗ 5
RAWCATT = CATTLE ∗ 12
DRIEDSHE = RAWSHE ∗ 0.85 ∗ 0.4
DRIEDCATT = RAWCATT ∗ 0.85 ∗ 0.4
PRO = ma(DRIEDSHE +DRIEDCATT ) ∗ 0.92
CONS = (PRO + ImPRO)/Population
where SHEEP and CATTLE stand for the number of sheep and goats and
cattle, buffaloes and camels slaughtered in public abattoirs. RAWSHE and
RAWCAT are the local raw skin output volume for the two categories and
DRIEDSHE and DRIEDCAT the corresponding dried skin output. PRO is
the total processed leather and CONS is the total consumption, the sum of
local and imported processed leather.
The official data gives the number of raw skins produced for the post-1936
period, so we start from there. To be able to relate these figures to the foreign
trade data, we need to convert numbers into weight figures. For instance,
around 250,000 cattle and 1.5 million sheep skins are reported to have been
produced in 1936, but we need a reference assumption to predict the weight
figures. To do so, the assumed average weight of cattle, calves and sheep is
derived from anecdotal evidence: 12 kg for cattle, buffaloes and camels of all
ages and 5 kg for all sheep and goats.61 These are very rough numbers, yet a
60For a brief description of the state of leather industry, see İstanbul Dericileri, Rapor. In
1930 Sanayi Kongresi Raporları. 1932; Turkey, İktisat Vekaleti, Yerli Ham Derilerimizin
Vaziyeti Hakkında Rapor. 1938b.
61Turkey, İktisat Vekaleti, Yerli Ham Derilerimiz ; TOBB, Türkiye’de Deri ve Kösele
Sanayi. Türkiye Ticaret Odaları, Sanayi odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği, 1959a; Tur-
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lack of precise data forces us to make such an assumption. We also treat 15
percent of skins as non-marketed production; then we get a rough estimate of
raw skin output for sheep and cattle separately during 1936-1938.
Subsequently, unlike the method employed for textiles above, a horizontal
distinction between sheep and cattle skins appears necessary to make it com-
patible with the import and export data. In other words, the raw and dried
skin estimates are done separately as described below and then they are com-
bined. Based on various reports we assume that raw skins lose 60 percent of
their weight during drying, which yields the dried skin output for 1936-1938.62
In extrapolating the output between 1936 and 1938 to all other years, we use
the numbers of sheep and cattle slaughtered in the public abattoirs, producing
the full series of dried skins.63
The exports of sheepskins and import of cattle skins should be added to the
output figures. The foreign trade categorisation is different before and after
1929: sheep and cattle in the pre-1929 years are grouped together, whereas
they are separate in the later period. We apply the breakdown of imports
and exports in the later period to the earlier period because there is not any
reason to expect that the composition of the imports changed over time, as
there was not any structural change in raw leather output. Thus, combining
the dried sheep and cattle skin output with the net imports figures, we get
the total consumption. And finally, 8 percent waste is assumed from the dried
to processed leather series.64 We also take the three-year moving average of
the total processed leather output due to the lack of inventory data.
The anecdotal evidence corroborates our findings: For instance, the output
of cattle skins is said to be at most 1,250 tons in 1929-1930, and our figure
is 1,189 tons in 1929 and 1,173 in 1930.65 Likewise, the share of exports of
sheepskins is considered to be around 65 percent in 1938, and the corres-
ponding figures in our series is 55 percent in 1937, 73 percent in 1938 and 60
percent in 1939.66 Hence, it can be said that our estimates stand within a
key, Ziraat Vekaleti, Türkiye’de Ziraat ve Deri Endüstrisi. 1938c.
62İzmir Dericileri, Rapor. In 1930 Sanayi Kongresi Raporları. Ankara Sanayi Odası, 1932;
Turkey, İktisat Vekaleti, Yerli Ham Derilerimiz .
63Since the slaughtering data for 1924 is only available for Istanbul, we assume the aggreg-
ate figure moved with the Istanbul figure during 1924-25.
64İzmir Dericileri, Rapor.
65Hayrettin, Deri Sanayimiz. In 1930 Sanayi Kongresi Raporları. 2nd edition. Ankara
Sanayi Odası, 1932.
66Turkey, İktisat Vekaleti, Yerli Ham Derilerimiz .
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Figure 3.4.: Processed Leather in Turkey: Output, Imports and Consumption,
1925-1939
Source: 3.8
reasonable range.
As seen in Figure 3.4, while around one fourth of the total consumption
of processed leather came from imports, net imports started to decrease in
the second half of the 1920s and Turkey became a net exporter during the
1930s. Meanwhile, output was relatively stable in the 1920s and progressively
increased in the 1930s. The rise in output was both due to the improving
local sheep skin output and imports of raw cattle hides. Finally, the per
capita consumption pattern seems consistent with textiles, particularly cotton
textiles: there was not a significant trend in the long term and in the short
term the gradual decline from the mid-1920s to 1932/33 – from 0.7 to 0.5 kg
per person – was to a large extent reversed by the recovery in the rest of the
1930s.
3.3.3. Food Processing
Although the whole food processing sector constituted almost 40 percent of
total industrial value added in 1927, as is typical in a traditional economy,
it was one of the most poorly documented industries. This is because the
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small, traditional and family-based enterprises involved in the sector were
diffused throughout the country, except the ones requiring large-scale capital
investments like tobacco and alcohol processing. Therefore, the output of
the food processing sector is represented by five distinct series in the present
estimates: milling, sugar, olive oil, tobacco and alcohol.67 The milling output
is proxied by wheat consumption, which is a rather conventional assumption,
while there is direct output data for others.
Milling
Milling and bakery products are measured by wheat consumption. Another
approach might be to use wheat flour consumption as a proxy, rather than
wheat, since most of the value added is produced in baking rather than milling,
however this does not change much the estimated growth of the industry due
to the small amount of net imports of flour compared to local production.
Aggregate wheat consumption is equivalent to wheat output net of the pro-
portion of output kept as seed, net wheat imports and inventory change. The
amount of seed is calculated as the wheat acreage of the following year times
180 kg wheat seed per hectare, which is based on Bulutay et al..68 It is also
assumed that there was 10 percent waste during processing and transporta-
tion. The inventory figures are derived from the extrapolation of the official
aggregate figures for 1936-1940 with the Istanbul stock data back to 1929.
For the years prior to 1929, a simple ratio of the inventories to the wheat
output net of seeds and net imports is taken. The latter varies between 10
and 30 percent, with the average 20.7 percent.69Thus, the resulting wheat
consumption series show a consistent and strong upward trend, except in the
years 1931-35 (Table 3.13).
Olive Oil
Olive production was concentrated along the western coastal areas from north
to south in Turkey, with the southern Marmara and the Aegean regions the
67Here we draw on the original classification of the 1927 Industrial Census, which is why
tobacco is regarded as part of the food processing sector.
68Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
69For total inventories, see Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Zirai İstat-
istik Özetleri . Istanbul figures from İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Piyasa Cetveli.
Istanbul wheat stock in 1929 from İstanbul Ticaret Odası, Mecmua, 1929, 3, p.184. All
are year-end stocks.
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major localities. Olives provided the principal source of vegetable oil con-
sumed in the domestic market for eating and soap production.70 Poppy, ses-
ame, cotton and flax seeds were the other vegetable oil sources, but their
total production was only around 3,000 tons in 1936, that is, much smaller
than the 28,500 tons of olive oil.71 The total consumption was also around
27,000-28,000 tons, considering inventories and exports. Therefore, it is clear
that olive output is representative of vegetable oil production. That said, we
do not ignore other oil types in estimating consumption.
The statistical yearbooks provide a direct estimate of, first, Aegean olive oil
production during 1924-1939, which constituted between 40 and 70 percent
of the total output, and, second, the total production of Turkey for 1935-
1939.72 Therefore, the problem is to estimate oil output for the pre-1935
period. There are two choices: one is to extrapolate the aggregate output
in 1935 with the Aegean series; the other is to estimate oil output based on
olive output, which is provided by Bulutay et al..73 The latter is a legitimate
method because olives were predominantly used in oil production.74 The
average oil yield during 1935-1939 was 17.6 percent in weight (the share of oil
per kg of olive) and it had a small range of 15.3-19.1 percent during 1935-1939.
The average yield is also taken as 20 percent in some sources.75 Therefore,
we estimate oil output using both methods and compare the results. It turns
out that the two independent estimates are highly correlated with a 0.99
percent correlation coefficient, although we prefer the second method as the
final output series. Furthermore, since the estimated output is basically direct
output data or derived from direct olive output data, we do not need to correct
it for inventories. Finally, the net imports of all kinds of vegetable oils are
added to the local production to get the consumption. Since the inventories
are unknown, the three-year moving average of aggregate consumption is used
(Table 3.14).
70H. Yahya, Zeytinyağı, Nebati Yağ ve Pirine Yağı Sanayi. In 1930 Sanayi Kongresi Ra-
porları. 2nd edition. Ankara Sanayi Odası, 1932.
71Türkofis, Türkofis Aylık Bülten, 1937(7). Nizamettin Turgay, Zeytinyağ ve Elaiotekni.
İktisat Vekaleti, 1938 similarly estimates that between 19,000 and 24,000 tons of olive
oil were consumed in the domestic market. Turgay, Zeytinyağ ve Elaiotekni , p.8.
72Turkey, İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Yıllığı, 1938/39 and 1940/41.
73Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
74Turgay, Zeytinyağ ve Elaiotekni , p.8.
75Recai, Zeytin ve Zeytinyağcılık Hakkında Tetkikat. İktisat Vekaleti, 1930; and Türkofis,
Türkofis Aylık Bülten, 1937(7), pp.21-49.
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Tobacco, Alcohol and Sugar
Cigarette making and alcohol production was under close state supervision,
so the related data on production, sales and costs are fairly abundant.76 At
the time Turkey was a large tobacco producer and exporter, especially of the
oriental type, and the share of the sector in total industrial value added and
industrial employment was quite high, as will be discussed shortly. Our output
series includes the processed tobacco output for 1925-1939 (Table 3.15). It
is also one of the few sectors for which we have sales data and they seem to
have been very much in line with output.
In the case of alcohol, we include the output of the principal drinks (rakı,
wine and cognac) between 1928 and 1939, based on the official data. The
output during 1925-1927 is the extrapolation of the 1928 figure by tobacco
sales, which is based on the assumption that the consumption of alcohol and
tobacco moved in tandem.77 Alcohol consumption in 1928 is the sum of local
output and net imports and is taken as equivalent to the local production due
to the negligible amount of imports afterwards.
The republican governments conceived of sugar as one of the main pillars of
the regime’s industrial performance, along with cotton textiles and wheat flour
(the so-called “three whites”). Since the Lausanne Treaty did not allow Turkey
to revise import duties until 1929, sugar imports came to be monopolised by
the government in 1925, while the government also founded the first sugar
factories in Alpullu and Usak, which were followed by the Eskisehir and Turhal
factories in 1933-1934. All the related economic data is readily available.78
The output and the acreage under sugarcane expanded around ten times
between 1926 and 1939 and the sugar imports declined from around 12,000
to a few tons during the same period.
Output and Consumption
At this point it is worth pausing for a moment to bring together the recon-
struction of the output and consumption growth rates. Figure 3.5 combines
the change of output and per capita consumption in four main food-related
sectors. Sugar output grew to an unprecedented degree, whereas consumption
76Turkey, İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Yıllığı
77The correlation coefficient between the tobacco and alcohol consumption between 1928-
1939 is sufficiently high (0.88) to support this assumption.
78Turkey, İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Yıllığı.
3.3. SECTORAL OUTPUT ESTIMATES 126
Figure 3.5.: Food Processing in Turkey: Output and Consumption (Tons),
1925-1939
Note: Unit of milling output is million tons. See Data Appendix.
declined after 1930, but then recovered afterwards. Import substitution had
been almost completed by 1934 and the growth of sector was subsequently
driven by changes in domestic demand and relative prices. Olive oil is the op-
posite case, as output on average remained stagnant due to the fact that the
olive production was geographically restricted to a certain area and year-on-
year volatility was inevitable. The consumption pattern is similar to sugar,
which also reflects the imports of vegetable oils. Finally, milling and tobacco
represent intermediate cases. Milling output was to a large extent determined
by increasing wheat output, which rose by around three times from 1925 to
1939. Contrary to other sectors, the rise in output meant an increase in con-
sumption, although it was of a smaller scale. As for tobacco, output expanded
to a modest degree, as it increased one half over the period and the rise in
consumption was quite negligible.
Table 3.9 also compares the trend growth rates of output and per capita
consumption for the textile and food processing sectors. Two main points
stand out from the comparison. First, output expansion was more than 5
percent per year in all sectors, except in leather working and tobacco. But
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Table 3.9.: Annual Trend Growth Rates of Output and Consumption in Tur-
key (%), 1925-1939
Output Consumption
Cotton textiles 10.3 1.6
Silk textiles 12.6 -0.5
Woollen textiles 7.2 5.2
Leather working 3.6 -0.9
Milling 9.8 6.1
Olive oil 5.6 -0.1
Tobacco 3.3 1.5
Sugar 33.5 0.2
the case of olive oil is a bit misleading, since most of the growth (5.6 percent
per year) had already been realised by the end of the 1920s, so if one only
considers the 1930s, it should also be put in the same modest-growth cat-
egory as tobacco and leather working. What distinguishes them from other
rapidly growing sectors? The answer clearly lies in the fact that the import
penetration in these branches was already limited and there was already an
established capacity by the 1920s, meaning that most of the domestic mar-
ket was satisfied by local production and that further capacity expansion was
costly. In other words, the initial level of sectoral development in the 1920s
was a crucial factor determining the growth rate in the 1930s. The prospects
of import substitution were limited, export markets were not promising and
local incomes were falling, at least in the early 1930s. Even though demand
began to recover in the mid-1930s, it was not enough to stimulate a strong
growth in tobacco, olive oil and leather working. On the other hand, both ma-
jor supply and demand changes were behind very impressive growth rates in
the rest of manufacturing. As already mentioned, sugar production received a
stimulus from state policies, which induced investment and import protection.
Import protection also greatly stimulated textile output, and lastly, milling
output was to a large extent determined by increasing agricultural production.
In sharp contrast, per capita consumption remained largely stagnant for
most sectors. Although it is true that the consumption levels reached, or
even exceeded in most goods, their 1929 levels by 1938-1939, this was due to
the short-term rise in domestic incomes and statistically significant trends over
1925-1939 existed only in the consumption of woollen textiles (5.2 percent)
and milling (6.1 percent). On the supply side, the drastic decline in the
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exports of carpets and rugs in the 1930s, which used up more than half of
the total wool before 1929, was one factor that resulted in more wool being
available on the domestic market. The same partly holds for milling, since,
as already mentioned, the wheat supply was progressively rising. On the
demand side, when one looks at the price movements, woollens and wheat
seem real exceptions. Hence, the aggregate industrial price index declined by
36 percent from 1926-1929 to 1935-1939, whereas wheat prices decreased by 63
percent. The corresponding figure is 40 and 33 percent for woollen and cotton
textiles, respectively.79 Therefore, it seems that woollens and wheat became
cheaper than an average basket of manufactures, which could possibly explain
the higher consumption rates. There is no doubt that the price elasticity of
demand varies from one good to another, so price movements cannot perfectly
predict consumption patterns, but they can be used as supporting evidence.
3.3.4. Other Sectors
The wood working sector covers both timber production and further pro-
cessing, that is, manufacturing of all kinds of furniture and wooden pieces in
workshops. The volume of timber output of all kinds, which is provided in
the official yearbooks, is here regarded as the best representative proxy (Table
3.16).80 Correction for foreign trade does not make much sense because the
size of the net timber imports did not exceed 2-3 percent of the aggregate
output level.
The utilities index is based on revenue and price data, which is limited to
three big cities (Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir). The only correction that can
be made is by paying attention to the relative urbanisation rate in the three
big cities and the rest of the country. But it seems that the share of three
big cities within the total urban population slightly decreased, from 32 to 30
percent, over the whole period, so it can be assumed that the utilities output
in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir can be taken as representative of the growth
of the whole sector in the country.
The price and revenue data that Bulutay et al. presents is originally divided
79See the preceding chapter for wheat prices and wool. The cotton cloth prices represent
the average wholesale prices of all types of fabric. And the industrial price index is
derived from Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
80Turkey, İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Yıllığı, 1939/40. A large part of the total
volume was constituted by pine timbers.
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into two parts: gas/electricity and water.81 They present the total revenue
for 1930-1948 and average unit prices for 1925-1948. For the post-1930 years,
we divide revenues by unit prices to obtain the quantity figures. And for the
earlier years, the revenue collected in 1930 is taken back using the electricity
and water revenue collected in Istanbul.82 Since more than half of the utilities
revenue was collected in Istanbul, using it as a proxy seems a safe assump-
tion. Thus, we have quantities and prices for electricity and water. Then we
calculate a Paasche quantity index based on these quantity and price series.
For the remaining two sectors, mining and construction, we rely on Bu-
lutay et al.. There is a great deal of data on the mining sector because it
was subject to government supervision. The extraction of all minerals is well
known from the early 1920s, with coal, salt and chrome being the major one.
Iron production did not start until as late as 1938 in Turkey. Until then the
iron-related industries, whose value added was quite small, were dependent on
imports. Bulutay et al. calculate a weighted average quantity index of coal,
salt, chrome, lignite, copper, borate, sulphur, emery and zinc. The weights
they use are derived from the share of each mineral in the total production
value in 1936, with coal, salt and chrome representing 64, 24 and 7 percent of
the aggregate value respectively.83 Finally, the construction sector is repres-
ented by the weighted average of the building iron and cement series provided
by Bulutay et al. (Table 3.16).
3.4. Weighting and Resultant Aggregate Index
The reconstruction of all the individual output series has been set out up
to this point. Now they need to be combined into a single representative
output index by means of an appropriate weighting system. It is impossible to
produce price-weighted quantity indices due to the absence of annual output
and input prices, as well as input-output tables, so our aggregate index is
produced by combining the quantity relatives with respect to the base year
1927 with the constant weights derived from the 1927 industrial census. Also,
we adjust these weights for the 1930s by utilising the change of output and
81Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
82Turkey, İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Yıllığı, 1932/33.
83Although they call it “value added index”, it is more precisely a quantity index with
constant weights.
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prices in each sector.
The industrial census of 1927 recorded the total output value, raw material
costs, the number of enterprises, employment size and horsepower for the
ten broadly defined sectors: mining, processing of agricultural and animal
goods (including leather and tobacco), textiles, wood working, paper, metal
processing and machinery, construction, chemicals, mixed (those engaged in
more than one type of goods) and finally electricity and others.84 These broad
sectors were further divided into a large number of sub-sectors (95 in total).
However, only the number of enterprises, employment and horse power were
reported at this level. The census also covered industrial establishments of
all sizes, regardless of the number of employees. Only home production was
excluded from the enumeration.
In order to work out the weight of each sector, we define value added as
the output value net of all raw material costs. The expenses of raw materials
are already reported in the census (Table 3.10). Table 3.10 thus presents an
overview of industry in 1927. As it appears, the processing of agricultural
and animal products (food processing hereafter) clearly had the highest share
in both the number of employees (43 percent) and value added (64 percent)
and it was followed by textiles. The outlook largely fits that of a traditional
industrial structure, as the local production failed to compete against the
cheap imports of textiles, machinery, metals, chemicals and the like.
At the second stage, we need to further disaggregate the value added of
food processing and textiles into their sub-sectors that are compatible with
our output series.85 The food processing weight should be divided between
milling, sugar, vegetable oils, tobacco, leather and alcohol. Similarly, the
textiles value added need to be allocated between cotton, wool, silk, carpets,
hemp and clothing. The allocation can be done using the number of employees
as a proxy, which is the only relevant available data for 1927.86 However, per
worker value-added varied from sector to sector, so to correct for this factor,
we rely on the official dataset on the medium- and large-scale enterprises that
benefited from Law for Encouragement of Industry between 1932 and 1934.
The following equations describe the method of estimation:
84Turkey, Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1927 Sanayi Sayımı. 1969.
85The last category “electricity and others” is considered as utilities in the present index.
86Horsepower cannot be a proxy, because most of the sectors were labour-intensive and
motor power is not indicative of the value added.
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V Ai =
Outputi − Costsi
Employeesi
V ACi =
V Ai
V Aref
Wi =
Ni ∗ V ACi∑
iNi ∗ V ACi
where V Ai stands for the value added per worker for sector i defined as usual,
V ACi the value added coefficient of sector i with respect to the reference
sector (V Aref ), milling for food processing and cotton fabrics for textiles, and
finally the sectoral weight (Wi) is the share of the value added coefficient of
sector i in the total coefficients. One example may illustrate the process more
clearly: First, the value added in sugar processing is calculated as output net
of raw material costs divided by the number of workers, then it is divided by
the value added in milling, so that all value added figures are normalised with
respect to milling (see Table 3.11). In this way, we get a measure of the relative
value added within food processing. Finally, the number of employees in sugar
processing in 1927 is multiplied by the value added coefficient of sugar, which
is then divided by the total value added produced in food processing. The
latter gives us the share of sugar within food processing in 1927.87 Besides, we
assume that the relative value added within the textiles and food processing
remained the same from 1927 to the mid-1930s.88
The weights worked out above are the within shares. There are also unob-
served sectors both within textiles and food processing and at the aggregate
level (chemicals, paper, mineral/metal processing and mixed industries). The
conventional way to tackle the issue is to assume that the growth of the undoc-
umented sectors is the same as the documented ones. Alternatively, Fenoaltea
87For food processing, the value added coefficients are based on the 1934 data, and for
textiles, the average of 1935 and 1936 data. Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum
Müdürlüğü, Sanayi İstatistikleri 1936-1941 .
88A number of corrections are made to the raw data. First, the number of employees
in leather processing and tobacco seem quite high in the 1927 data, which probably
includes some agricultural producers in the case of tobacco and repairer shops in the
case of leather. The employment figure for leather is therefore corrected by extrapolating
the figure in the 1935 population census by the output change between 1927 and 1935.
For tobacco, the figure in the 1932 industrial statistics is projected backwards in the
same way.
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Table 3.11.: Turkey’s Relative Value Added Coefficients
Textiles V ACi Food-connected V ACi
Cotton fabrics 1.0 Milling 1.0
Cotton yarn 1.2 Sugar 1.4
Silk fabrics 0.7 Olive oil 0.2
Silk yarn 0.5 Alcohol 6.0
Woollen textiles 1.5 Tobacco 6.5
Carpet making 0.2 Leather processing 0.8
Hemp goods 0.8
Clothing 0.6
Note: The reference sectors are cotton weaving for textiles and cereal milling for food
processing.
suggests making reasonable assumptions about the undocumented industries
due to the problem of “double inflation”.89 Accordingly, if the unobserved
series are assumed to move with the observed series and one series is poorly
observed, then that poor series will represent even more than it should. To
avoid this, he suggests to make crude but useful assumptions for the growth
unobserved sectors. Instead, we follow a middle way by tackling the issue in
two stages. First, at the aggregate level, the observed sectors represent the
unobserved part (8 percent of value added in total) in proportion to their
share in the observed part. For instance, the share of mining (2 percent) is
inflated to 2.2 percent and the share of food processing is inflated from 15.1
percent to 16.4 percent. Second, each observed sector in food processing rep-
resents the unobserved part (15 percent in total) in proportion to its share in
the observed part of food processing. Therefore for instance, the within-share
of milling is 33.8 but its share in total value added declines to 26 percent.90
Therefore, the estimated value-added weights of each industry in 1927 are
presented in Table 3.12. The milling accounts for almost one fourth of the
total, which was followed by tobacco, leather processing and alcohol. These
figures are not surprising as cereals indeed had a large share in food consump-
tion and both the tobacco and leather industries had already been relatively
more established by the 1920s. The high ranking of alcohol production is due
to the fact that its value added was much larger than the other sectors.
89Stefano Fenoaltea, Reinterpreting of Italian Economic History. Cambridge University
Press, 2011, p.53.
90The existing eight textile series do not leave any unobserved part within textiles, accord-
ing to the sectoral classification of 1927.
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Table 3.12.: Value Added Weights (%), Turkey
Sector Sub-sector 1927 1935
Mining 3.8 4.6
Food processing Milling 25.5 18.9
Sugar 0.9 3.7
Vegetable oil 4.5 3.3
Alcohol 10.0 9.5
Tobacco 17.5 15.9
Leather working 11.9 7.5
Textiles Cotton spinning 4.7 13.3
Cotton weaving 2.7 4.9
Silk spinning 0.5 0.5
Silk weaving 0.5 1.2
Woollens 3.4 2.5
Clothing 6.5 6.4
Carpet making 1.1 0.3
Hemp goods 0.5 0.3
Wood working 3.8 4.9
Construction 1.1 1.0
Utilities 1.0 0.8
TOTAL 100 100
Source: See the text.
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As stated above, the weights of 1927 should be adjusted for the 1930s due
to the significant variation among the sectoral growth rates. For instance, the
growth in textiles output on average outpaced food processing, which should
have an impact on the composition of industrial output. Thus, using 1927
weights will underestimate the growth of aggregate output for the 1930s. In
the absence of reliable data on employment at the present sectoral disaggreg-
ation, we use the movement of sectoral output and prices to track down the
change in relative value added in each sector.91 To do so, the value added in
each sector in 1927 is calculated based on total value added in 1927 and the
weights calculated so far. Then these value added figures are multiplied by
the rate of change of output value (output times the average representative
output prices) between 1927 and 1935, which is chosen as the reference point
for the 1930s. The sectoral output measures are the output estimates made
above. As for the price data, we identify representative final goods for all
sectors and obtain their prices in 1927 and 1935 from various sources.92 Thus
the new weights in 1935 represent the sectoral value added shares.
Table 3.12 compares the weights in 1927 and 1935 and clearly indicates some
realignment between 1927 and 1935. Milling still remains the most important
sector, yet its share declines from 25.5 to 18.9 percent and it is still followed
by tobacco, whose share decreased slightly. The relative decline of food pro-
cessing took place in favour of textiles all together, whose share increased
from 20.1 to 29.5 percent. Within textiles, cotton spinning and weaving saw
the sharpest rise from 7.4 to 18.2 percent of the value added. That said, the
value-added ranking did not change drastically, as the Spearman correlation
coefficient is 0.88, showing a high correlation between the value added com-
position in 1927 and 1935. Thus, it appears that the change of composition
throughout the period cannot be ignored, so the aggregate output index draws
on the 1927 weights for the period 1925-1932 and the 1935 weights for the
later period. The cut-off point is chosen as 1933 since the output growth star-
91Harley, for instance, offers a different weighting to measure the increase of British indus-
trial output during the industrial revolution using a very similar method.
92For the wholesale wheat and tobacco prices see Chapter 2. For the wholesale prices
of sugar, olive oil, sheepskins, carpets, cotton yarn and cotton fabrics in Istanbul, see
İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Piyasa Cetveli. The prices of raw silk and hemp
seeds measure the price change for silk spinning/weaving and hemp processing (İstanbul
Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık, 1934-35, p.71). The average mining, timber, construc-
tion, electricity and wool prices are obtained from Bulutay et al.. Alcohol prices are
assumed to follow the aggregate price index.
3.4. WEIGHTING AND RESULTANT AGGREGATE INDEX 136
Figure 3.6.: Resultant Output Indices for Turkey (1927=100), 1925-1939
Source: See the text.
ted or accelerated after 1933 as a result of both intensified import protection
and early signs of economic recovery.
The final output indices with chained constant weights are shown in Figure
3.6. First of all, it appears that the aggregate index increased between 1925
and 1932 to a moderate extent, yet the post-1932 years saw a sharp upward
trend. The trend growth rate was 8.7 percent over 1925-1939. The textiles
index grew faster with 10.8 percent per year and the food processing index
rose by 8.5 percent per year.93 Furthermore, the growth pattern of food
processing and textiles also differed. While growth was smoother in the case
of food processing, the textiles output seems to have accelerated after 1930.
This suggests that the import protection probably played a larger role in the
growth of textile industries.
Finally, in order to compare our findings with the existing value added es-
timates, the present output series are used to produce the industrial value
added. As said above, the absence of the detailed annual price data for the
intermediate and final goods makes it impossible to calculate the value added
properly. Instead, given the data limitations, Fenoaltea suggests making the
93The indices of textiles and food processing are the weighted average of the component
indices.
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Figure 3.7.: New Industrial Value Added Estimates for Turkey (1927 Prices,
TL million)
Source: See the text for own estimates.
value-added estimate for a benchmark year to begin with, and then extra-
polate this figure using the output index, which yields the estimated value
added for each year based on the prices of the benchmark year.94 Therefore,
1927 value added figures for each sector are here extrapolated with the output
indices, leading to the total value added at 1927 prices. As seen in Figure
3.7, in 1927 prices, the value added rose from around TL 164 million during
1925-1929 to TL 520 million at the end of the 1930s.
The present estimates however stand in clear contrast to the value added
figures provided by Bulutay et al. and Zendisayek. While we find that the
value added grew by 6.8 percent per year over 1925-1939, Bulutay et al. and
Zendisayek estimate it at 8.9 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively.95 The
cause of the overestimation in Bulutay et al. was explained earlier. For 1932-
1939, they rely on the official industrial statistics, which do not cover small
establishments, and for the earlier years on the tax data, which poorly meas-
ure industrial growth. Meanwhile, Zendisayek’s correction of Bulutay et al.’s
94Fenoaltea, Notes on the Rate of Industrial Growth.
95The value added figures of manufacturing, construction and mining at current prices in
Bulutay et al. and Zendisayek are deflated with the industrial price index with the base
year 1927. Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri ; and Zendisayek, Reevaluation.
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estimates is flawed because she took the share of handicrafts and factory pro-
duction as constant. If she could have observed the change in the share of
factory production, she would have come up with higher growth rates.
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter has provided a comprehensive reconstruction of industrial growth
in interwar Turkey. Sectoral output indices have been carefully constructed
for all major sectors, which then yielded the aggregate output index with con-
stant weights and value added estimates at constant prices. The motivation
for this exercise was twofold. First, the received wisdom on industrialisation
in interwar Turkey, including those made in international comparisons, draws
heavily on the value added estimates by Bulutay et al., which have an upward
bias. Second, until now we have been unable to observe how sectoral devel-
opments were similar or dissimilar, which required consistent and comparable
data at a sectoral level. Thus, the present chapter fills this empirical gap by
serving both purposes. The method of estimation follows the best practices
in economic history, and in particular benefited from the methods employed
to measure British and Italian industrial growth in the nineteenth century.
There is no wonder that the precision of the estimates, just like any other
work of the same sort, is bound up with the data availability and quality.
Overcoming such difficulties has required the combination of the best pos-
sible methods with intuition and reasonable guesses. Furthermore, in order
to minimise errors and omissions, the results have been crosschecked with the
anecdotal evidence as much as possible.
By way of conclusion, a couple of major results should be underlined. To
begin with, the estimated trend growth rate of the total industrial value added
is 6.8 percent per year, which stands between the 8.9 percent and 4.5 percent,
suggested by Bulutay et al. and Zendisayek respectively. This implies that
handicrafts as a whole probably grew less than factory production during the
1930s. And growth came to be more and more oriented towards consumption
goods, with the result that by the end of decade domestic production was
able to satisfy most of the consumption of many light consumer goods, espe-
cially textiles and processed food, by the onset of World War II. The capital
intensive sectors like iron and steel and chemicals did not see notable growth
until the post-war period. Looking at the sectoral growth rates, the expansion
3.5. CONCLUSION 139
seems considerably balanced in the sense that apart from carpet production,
which faced the negative foreign demand shock, all sectors had substantial
development. Yet textiles stand out among them, as its importance increased
markedly. Additionally, the increasing food output, as observed in wheat and
olives, which was discussed in the earlier chapter, led to a significant expansion
in the food related sectors. It should also be noted that although industrial
production grew less than hitherto thought, it still grew rather fast relative
to the rest of the world, as Turkey was among the countries that witnessed
the most rapid industrialisation during the 1930s.
Another important result is that the rapid growth was accompanied by
only moderate improvement in the consumption of manufactures. By the
end of the 1930s, only the per capita consumption of wheat flour, cotton
and woollen textiles undisputedly exceeded the 1929 level. For other goods,
the per capita consumption was either stagnant or declined slightly. This is,
however, consistent with the income per capita level, which sharply declined
after 1930 but fully recovered by the end of 1930s. Although this chapter has
not concerned itself with attempting to explain the industrial growth, the fact
that textiles had a higher import penetration during the 1920s and saw higher
growth rates in the 1930s implies that import substitution was a major cause
of growth. But this does not explain how the other sectors also expanded to a
significant extent. The following chapter takes up the subject in a systematic
manner.
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3.6. Data Appendix
Table 3.13.: Milling Output in Turkey, 1925-1939
Wheat
output
Wheat
acreage
Seeds
require-
ment
Net
wheat
imports
Inventories
(end-
year)
Wheat
consump-
tion per
capita
Million
tons
1000
hec-
tares
Million
tons
Million
tons
Million
tons
kg
1925 1.1 0.64 0.17 0.082 43
1926 2.5 3542 0.44 0.01 0.378 115
1927 1.3 2440 0.51 -0.01 0.153 70
1928 1.6 2843 0.50 0.04 0.213 72
1929 2.7 2774 0.51 0.12 0.383 137
1930 2.6 2809 0.52 -0.01 0.432 124
1931 3.0 2902 0.48 -0.02 0.159 170
1932 1.9 2656 0.48 -0.03 0.333 73
1933 2.7 2687 0.57 -0.03 0.231 127
1934 2.7 3156 0.62 -0.09 0.369 105
1935 2.5 3429 0.64 -0.06 0.154 114
1936 3.9 3546 0.59 -0.03 0.450 160
1937 3.7 3278 0.69 -0.11 0.550 148
1938 4.3 3806 0.71 -0.10 0.800 167
1939 4.1 3939 0.79 -0.02 0.900 163
1940 4397
Source: See the text.
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Table 3.14.: Olive Oil Output in Turkey (Tons), 1924-40
Olive oil
output in
Aegean
Total
olive oil
output
Olives
output
Estimated
oil output
I
Estimated
oil output
II
Net import
of olive oil
Consumption
per capita
(kg)
1924 25000 313346 61346 54121 58769
1925 5500 68936 13496 11907 4101 2.66
1926 16500 206808 40488 35720 41821 1.37
1927 8500 68996 20858 11917 9147 3.14
1928 33000 413616 80977 71439 77522 2.59
1929 15000 186007 36808 32127 21504 3.49
1930 25000 313346 61346 54121 50241 1.83
1931 11500 144139 28219 24895 8126 2.54
1932 26000 325887 63800 56287 54825 1.79
1933 15000 188007 36808 32472 18575 2.63
1934 26000 29446 325880 63800 56285 48795 1.90
1935 12000 28564 150406 29446 29446 22874 2.06
1936 20000 62051 142146 28564 28564 28384 2.23
1937 30000 33579 386027 62051 62051 58627 2.31
1938 20000 61233 180778 33759 33759 28736 2.77
1940 31000 55149 291268 55149 55149 38913 2.31
Source: See the text.
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Table 3.17.: Aggregate Industrial Output Indices for Turkey (1927=100),
1925-1939
Food processing Textiles Aggregate
1925 73.3 102.2 82.3
1926 132.2 94.0 122.5
1927 100.0 100.0 100.0
1928 132.0 102.1 123.4
1929 151.5 135.6 144.0
1930 155.9 85.1 137.2
1931 171.2 106.4 152.3
1932 142.4 126.5 136.5
1933 227.4 179.0 201.8
1934 216.7 191.0 200.1
1935 218.9 266.8 224.4
1936 257.1 224.0 235.7
1937 256.3 365.9 278.7
1938 256.5 296.7 260.0
1939 332.2 397.3 333.1
Note: All are chained indices, where the sectoral indices are combined with 1927 weights
for 1925-32 and with 1935 indices for 1933-1939. See the text for details.
Table 3.18.: Value-Added Estimates at 1927 Prices for Turkey (TL Million),
1925-1939
Own estimates Bulutay et al (1974) Zendisayek (1997)
1925 164.6 182.0
1926 245.1 202.7
1927 200.1 250.4
1928 246.8 253.4
1929 288.1 273.1 217.3
1930 274.4 313.5 226.3
1931 304.8 321.5 238.7
1932 273.2 379.8 253.2
1933 330.4 446.7 273.3
1934 333.7 509.3 287.8
1935 360.1 488.3 291.4
1936 397.4 471.3 287.4
1937 455.8 513.8 302.1
1938 460.6 614.4 327.4
1939 520.6 696.6 356.3
Source: See the text for own estimates. Current-price value added estimates of Bulutay et
al and Zendisayek are deflated with the industrial price index.
4. Industrial Growth and
Protectionism in Turkey: The
Case of Textiles
The preceding chapter showed that an impressive industrial expansion took
place in interwar Turkey, but its origins remain to be examined. There exist
a couple of tentative suggestions in the literature with regard to the source of
output growth, such as import substitution, state-led industrialisation and the
favourable domestic terms of trade.1 All these arguments have been supported
with different types of evidence, such as a decline in imports and an increase
in the relative prices of manufactures, yet no one has attempted to provide a
coherent and consistent assessment. This chapter aims to fill this analytical
gap by exploring the sources of industrial growth. The linkage between tariff
protection and industrialisation lies at the centre of the analysis, but the
impact of income growth and relative prices are also considered.
The ways in which tariff protection affects the domestic economy is one of
the most controversial issues in trade history for the very reason that eco-
nomic theory has not suggested a fully satisfactory method for answering the
question.2 The difficulty mainly lies in the effects of trade policy on domestic
and foreign prices, as well as domestic output, through income and substitu-
tion effects, most of which are hard to observe due to the shortage of historical
data. Also, its static and dynamic effects may vary from one country to an-
other. However, despite these difficulties, it is possible to suggest a more
comprehensive analysis instead of the anecdotal evidence and unfounded gen-
eralisations that abound in the literature. This chapter first provides a brief
1Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi ; Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi ; Kazgan, Türkiye Ekonom-
isinde Depresyon.
2Giovanni Federico and Antonio Tena, Was Italy a Protectionist Country? European
Review of Economic History , 2 1998, p.74.
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discussion of Turkey’s trade policy in the interwar period, then suggests an
empirical model to account for the factors behind output growth. The model
is then applied to the case of textiles. This choice is not arbitrary. As shown
in the preceding chapter, textile output grew the most within manufacturing.
Its trend growth rate was 10.9 percent per year over 1925-1939, while the
aggregate output index increased by 8.6 percent. Moreover, the effect of im-
port protection should best be seen in textiles since import penetration had
been greatest in textiles in the 1920s. If manufacturing is taken as a whole,
it is likely that the degree of import substitution would be smaller than for
textiles, which competed against imports more than any other sector.
4.1. Turkey’s Trade Policy Choices in the
Interwar Period
In the interwar years, Turkey’s trade policy followed worldwide trends to a
considerable degree, while still having its own characteristics. During the
1920s import protection was based on the specific duties introduced as part
of the tariff scheme adopted by the Ottoman administration in 1916.3 The
specific duties adopted in 1916 had been designed to provide an average 20
percent protection rate. However, because of the price changes, the ratio of
total duties to import values substantially decreased by the early 1920s, so
the government decided to increase the 1916 rates fivefold for all goods in
1920 and then twelvefold in 1923 for certain goods.4 In the same year the
Lausanne Treaty was ratified, fixing the import duties for the parties to the
treaty for 27 goods at nine times the 1916 level for five years, that is, until
1929.5 Subsequently, two major amendments to the duties were made during
the 1920s. First, in late 1925 all the duties that had been revised by Law
8 were increased to 8 times the 1916 level and then in 1927 the coefficient
3For an evaluation of the tariffs in the 1920s see Orhan Kurmuş, 1916 ve 1929 Gümrük
Tarifeleri Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler. Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar , 1978
4Law 8, July 1920 (Resmi Gazete, 14/2/1337) and Law 295, January 1923.
5Law 342, July 1923. The parties to the treaty were Turkey, the British Empire, France,
Italy, Bulgaria, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece. Actually there was a clause
in the treaty allowing Turkey to adjust the tariff rates in the case of a more than 30
percent depreciation in the value of TL against the British pound to protect the nominal
rates in the face of possible deflation. However, the rates were never revised. See Tezel,
Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.146.
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introduced by Law 295 was increased from 12 to 15.6 However, none of the
latter changes were applied to the parties of the Lausanne Treaty or to any
other countries that had signed a trade agreement with Turkey before the
amendments. In fact, increasingly more and more countries came to sign
trade agreements or modus vivendi with Turkey guaranteeing them the most
favoured nation clause over the 1920s. The duality in the import regime due
to the discriminatory treatment given to the parties of the Lausanne Treaty
thus became less and less effective towards 1929.7 Therefore, as a result of
these legal revisions, before 1929 the specific duties were basically applied at
the 1916 duties times the coefficients 5, 8, 9 and 12 for various sets of goods
and countries.8
At the aggregate level, all these changes resulted in Turkey having a nominal
tariff rate, measured as import taxes divided by imports, of 16 percent of
imports in the second half of the 1920s, which was below the world average
and also the below the level of many European countries (Figure 4.1). In
continental Europe, excluding the USSR, the average tariff rate on agricultural
products was 26 percent in both 1913 and 1926, while the manufacturing
tariffs were 18 percent in 1913 and 25 percent in 1926. The former increased
up to 65 and the latter to 30 percent by 1931.9
When the sanctions of the Lausanne Treaty came to an end in 1929, the
Turkish government decided to make a long-awaited radical tariff revision.
The preliminary tariff schedules prepared by the Istanbul Chamber of Com-
merce and Ali İktisat Meclisi (the economic advisory body consisting of ex-
perts and government representatives) proposed substantial increases in tar-
iffs, but the final scheme that the government put in place went even further.10
The new scheme was much more detailed and comprehensive. It increased
specific rates significantly and led to higher protection for intermediate and
finished goods: the average nominal tariff rate increased from 15 to around
35 percent in a year. Industrial raw materials and goods that were not loc-
ally produced, such as agricultural machinery, were exempted from the higher
6Laws 691 and 1005.
7Almost all major trade partners of Turkey enjoyed the same treatment by 1929. For the
full list, see Mustafa Nuri, Türkiye’de Ahdi Tarifeler. Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1929.
8There were also special duty concessions to the various government enterprises and the
companies benefiting from government subsidies.
9Lewis, Economic Survey , p.151.
10Law 1499. For a comparison of the views of merchants, experts and policy makers on
tariff reform, see Kurmuş, 1916-1929 Gümrük Tarifeleri.
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Figure 4.1.: Turkey’s Aggregate Nominal Protection and Import/GDP Rates
(%), 1923-1939
Source: Turkey, İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, İstatistik Yıllığı; Turkey, İstatistik Umum
Müdürlüğü, Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri ; Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
duties. On the other hand, many consumer goods, particularly textiles, food-
stuff, leather and wood products, and other goods in high local demand, such
as cement, came to be highly protected.11 One should also note that the
new duties were introduced prior to the worldwide deflation in commodity
prices, so the new scheme indicates the protectionist ambitions and economic
mentality of the policy makers.
This initial tariff structure underwent two important revisions during the
1930s. A comprehensive upward revision and refinement was carried out in
1933, and a number of limited amendments were made between 1936 and
1939, adjusting specific duties both upwards and downwards. In principle,
consumption goods became more heavily protected, whereas rates on inter-
mediate goods were decreased. What caused the revisions in and after 1936
was the recovery in domestic demand. For instance, a shortage of cotton yarn
and cement began in 1936, which led the government to make a reduction in
the duties on cotton yarn by 20-90 percent and on cement by 90 percent.12
11Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , pp.145-46.
12Laws 2225 and 2256 in 1933 and various government decrees in 1936-1937: 2/5570 in
November 1936, 2/5790 in December 1936, 2/5827 in February 1937 and 2/7005 in July
1937.
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Besides the new and upward-revised tariffs, the import regime after 1932
took a different shape, as tariffs were supplemented by import quotas and
exchange controls following international trends.13 Import quotas were first
introduced in November 1931,14 when the imports of certain foodstuff, alco-
holic beverages, and cloths were temporarily forbidden, while those of many
consumption goods and intermediate goods were restricted. The quota lists
were then announced every month and then every three and six months. They
were first allocated on a first-come first-served basis, but then new measures
were adopted to increase the number of quota holders.15
After the initial experiments, quotas were transformed into bilateral quotas,
in which each trade partner was given a certain share of a quota arranged in
the bilateral agreements.16 Around the same time in 1933, clearing arrange-
ments came to be prioritised, as can be seen by the fact that by the end of the
decade more than half of the trade was conducted on clearing arrangements,
as was typical of many other Central and Eastern European countries that
were entering the German trading network. In this way, quotas became a
substantial part of commercial bargaining until 1937, when quantitative re-
strictions with the countries with which Turkey had more than a 20 percent
trade surplus were abolished.17 Considering the large spectrum of such coun-
tries, it is possible to argue that quantitative restrictions had become largely
futile by 1937.
To the tariffs and quotas should be added the exchange controls as a way
of regulating the foreign trade in the 1930s. This was an institutional novelty
because the government in the 1920s did not have any means of controlling
exchange rates, that is, neither a central bank nor a reserve of foreign cur-
rencies. Consequently, the value of the TL had been determined on the open
market. However, anticipating higher tariffs in 1929, a large amount of spec-
ulative imports took place, which caused the depreciation of TL against both
sterling and the US dollar.18 This prompted the first attempt to control ex-
13Note also that tobacco, tea, sugar and coffee imports were brought under government
monopolies with Laws 1701 in 1930 and 2054 in 1932.
14Government Decree 2/11940.
15Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.157.
16Government Decrees 1887 and 13888 in February 1933.
17The New Import Regime, Government Decree 2/7005 on 5 July, 1937. The countries
for which the quotas were abolished were Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, France,
Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Greece. The imports from
the US, Egypt, Syria and Palestine were allowed in freely without any conditions.
18The TL/sterling parity was 8.95 in 1925 and 10.32 in 1930, while the TL/dollar parity
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change rates and the government stopped public sector imports for a short
period.19 In February 1930, the TL was pegged to gold and all kinds of cur-
rency transactions came be regulated by the government.20 To supervise this,
Bankalar Konsorsiyumu, a semi-public initiative holding a large amount of
foreign currency, was established the following month. It helped the govern-
ment to control exchange rates until the Central Bank, which was founded
in 1931, started its operations in January 1932. In August 1930 the TL was
pegged to Sterling and thus gold at the rate of 10.30 TL per pound. When
Britain went off gold in 1931, Turkey did not follow suit; instead, it pegged
the TL to the French Franc, which remained on gold. TL was tied to the
Franc until France left the gold standard in 1936, and thereafter an artificial
gold parity was maintained by the Turkish authorities. In short, during the
whole decade a very strict and orthodox monetary policy was adopted, which
led TL to overvalue against other currencies, such as dollar and sterling.
To what extent did Turkish trade policies conform to the international
trends outlined in the Introduction? First of all, the protectionist wave ob-
viously came to Turkey immediately after 1929 with a large policy menu
to choose from. The 1929 tariff reform nonetheless had nothing to do with
the worldwide deflation, but instead reflected the protectionist aspirations of
policy makers, the origins of which can be traced back to World War I. Due
to the international agreements Turkey had entered into, tariff reforms could
be not carried out before 1929. On the other hand, the deflationary environ-
ment of the 1930s allowed Turkey to sustain such high tariffs, although there
is no evidence that the government planned to adopt other measures, such as
quotas, before 1929. They were mostly ad hoc responses to the rapid decline
in export prices and the deteriorating expectations regarding the timing of
recovery. The strict policy in favour of an overvalued currency and balanced
budget required the curtailment of imports and exchange controls. Thus,
increasingly unorthodox policies became necessary to attain quite orthodox
goals, gradually becoming more systematic over the course of the 1930s.
was 1.87 in 1925 and 2.12 in 1930. Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.154.
19Law 1447, May 1929.
20Law 1567, February 1930.
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4.2. Measuring the Impact of Protection on
Industrial Growth
The empirical literature on quantifying the impact of trade protection had
been far from satisfactory prior to the introduction of the concept of effect-
ive protection in the 1960s.21 The first empirical application was made by
Balassa, but it was Capie’s famous work on the British tariff reform in 1932,
along with other similar works, which popularised the concept in the eco-
nomic history literature.22 Effective protection on a good is calculated in the
following way:
gj =
tj −
∑
aijti
1−∑ aij
where, tj= the nominal tariff on the final good, ti= the nominal tariff on
inputs, and aij= the coefficients of intermediate inputs, per unit of output j.
The concept therefore refines the idea of tariff protection by considering tariffs
on intermediate goods, so it leads to estimated protection rates on the final
products that are different from the nominal rates, unless the inputs are not
protected. For this reason, in spite of the identical nominal rates, the effective
protection on good X can be higher than on good Y due to the different value
added coefficients and/or the nominal rates on the intermediate goods.
Capie argues that a reason why effective rates are of interest is that they
shed light on the direction of the resource allocation effects of the tariff struc-
ture because the tariff schedule has the capacity to change the movement of
resources towards highly protected goods in the domestic economy.23 On the
other hand, the subsequent debates about Capie’s work indicated the limit-
ations of the concept, despite its usefulness.24 Its first drawback is the most
21Roger Middleton, Macroeconomic Policy in Britain Between the Wars. Economic History
Review , 64.V1 2011. Also for a brief history of the concept, see Forest Capie, The British
Tariff and Industrial Protection in the 1930s. Economic History Review , 31 1978, p.400.
22Bela Balassa, Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation. Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 63 1965; and Capie, British Tariff. Two earlier examples are Sundararajan
on the US iron and steel industries before the WWI and Hawke again on US industrial
protection in the late nineteenth century. J. Sundararajan, The Impact of the Tariff
on Some Selected Products of the US Iron and Steel Industry, 1870-1914. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1970 1984; andG.R. Hawke, The United States Tariff and Indus-
trial Protection in the Late Nineteenth Century. Economic History Review , 38 1975.
23Capie, British Tariff, p.401.
24J.S. Foreman-Peck, The British Tariff and Industrial Protection in the 1930s: an Altern-
ative Model. Economic History Review , 34 1981; M. Kitson, Solomos Solomou and M.R.
Weale, Effective Protection and Economic Recovery in the United Kingdom During the
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obvious one: it is very demanding as far as data is concerned. To find effect-
ive protection rates, one needs to have the technical coefficients of the value
added structure.25 Economy-wide input-output tables are obviously not suffi-
cient to assess resource flows within manufacturing. Second, notwithstanding
the availability of such data, protectionism usually changes the value added
structure in the economy, thereby changing the coefficients in the value added
structure, while the formula for effective protection assumes free trade values.
Third, and perhaps more importantly, the concept of effective protection
has been criticised on economic grounds: for the effective rates to affect re-
source allocation between industries, domestic prices should rise by the same
amount as the tariff. Foreman-Peck argues that was unlikely to be the case in
Britain in the 1930s because imports and home products were not perfect sub-
stitutes, so import prices did not fully determine home prices.26 Additionally,
if there were constant returns to scale in the home market, due to technology,
competition or the absence of barriers to the entry of new firms, there would
have been no price increase. He also reminds us of some price-fixing arrange-
ments in the British iron and steel industry, implying the presence of some
factors, other than import prices, that impacted on home prices. The same is-
sue was raised by Solomou as well.27 He maintains that the inflationary effects
of tariffs were not so strong in Britain, possibly because of excess capacity in
the depressed conditions of the time. Furthermore, the existence of economies
of scale might have encouraged domestic producers to keep their competitive
edge against imported goods by not raising prices. Similarly, Kitson, Solomou
and Weale argue that the assumptions behind the concept are too restrictive:
full employment, constant returns to scale, perfect competition and the law of
one price. In their view, these assumptions cannot be upheld for the interwar
period.28
1930s. Economic History Review , 44 1991; and Solomos Solomou, Themes in Macroe-
conimic History: the UK Economy, 1919-1939. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
25One alternative is to take a country with low tariffs, which is, however, hard to find in the
1930s. Instead, Capie prefers to derive coefficients from this formula: aij =
p
′
ij/(1+ti)
p
′
j/(1+tj)
where the p
′
ij and p
′
j where the p
′
ij and p
′
j are the values of input i per unit of output
and the unit value of output of industry j, respectively. Capie, British Tariff, p. 403.
26Foreman-Peck, The British Tariff, pp.132-33.
27Solomou, Themes in Macroeconimic History , p. 144.
28Kitson, Solomou and Weale, Effective Protection, p.335. Their parallel argument is that
effective protection represents one framework for analysing the resource flow effects
of tariffs, but nominal tariffs are important as well to the extent that they influence
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Obviously, all these points cast serious doubt on the explanatory power of
the effective protection concept for our case: the underlying assumptions (full
employment, full capital mobility and perfect competition) seem far-fetched
as far as the early period of Turkish manufacturing is concerned. On one
level, it is clear that the domestic prices of manufactures rose in accord with
increasing tariff rates, but the idea that higher tariffs drew capital and labour
towards particular goods is too unrealistic, since profits were not only related
to the input-output price ratio but also to supply and demand elasticities, the
initial level of capacity and investment decisions, which were also affected by
exogenous factors.
The literature does not abound with alternative methodologies for meas-
uring the impact of tariffs. Foreman-Peck suggests an alternative way of
calculating the tariff-induced change in the domestic output, which is itself
an improved version of Richardson’s “import replacement ratio”, as follows:
g = −∆(pm +m− pd − d)
1 + pm +m− pd − d
where pm, pd, m and d are logs of the prices of the imported and domestic
goods and import and domestic output.29 Apart from the strong assumptions
made in the derivation of the formula (such as the same and constant income
elasticities in imports and home output and the perfectly elastic supply of
imports), the basic shortcoming of the model is that price changes are only
assumed to be the result of the imposition of tariffs. For instance, the state of
domestic demand is completely lacking in the model. In short, by comparison,
as Broadberry argues, the effective protection approach might provide a more
useful framework, since Richardon’s and Foreman-Peck’s measure of effect of
tariff is an ex post measure, while effective protection rate is ex ante measure.
Crucially the ex post measures besides not only the effect of tariff but also
changes in other economic variables.30
consumption decisions and macroeconomic processes of import substitution.
29Foreman-Peck, The British Tariff; and H.W. Richarson, Economic Recovery in Britain,
1929-39. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967.
30For a more detailed discussion, see S.N. Broadberry, British Economy Between the Wars.
Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp.132-38.
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4.3. Empirical Model
This chapter however applies a more comprehensive and elaborate empirical
framework suggested by Irwin and Temin and Irwin and Davis, which look
into the growth of US antebellum cotton and iron industries in response to
tariffs.31 Both papers use similar partial equilibrium models, which are based
on the original model developed by Grossman (1986).32 The model perfectly
fits our research question and analytical concerns: it is based on a set of clearly
defined supply and demand equations, takes the domestic prices, as well as the
domestic output level, as endogenous variables and also considers the other
determinants of output growth such as relative prices and domestic income.
So we do not need to assume that the tariff is fully captured by the increase
in the domestic prices or higher tariffs necessarily lead to higher growth rates.
In comparison with ex ante and ex post measures described above, the partial
equilibrium framework suggested here is based on a limited number of as-
sumptions regarding the relative prices and output elasticities. The drawback
of this approach is that it does not address the general equilibrium effects of
tariffs, however, first, our primary concern here is to identify the source of
industrial output growth rather than the macro impact of tariffs. Besides,
as briefly argued in Conclusion of this dissertation, the general equilibrium
effects of tariffs were in most likelihood not contractionary due to the move-
ment of exchange rates and wages. That said, a conclusive analysis should be
based on general equilibrium framework, as suggested by Eichengreen.33
On the supply side of this model, the home textile output function takes
the following Cobb-Douglas form
Q = AepitCα1Lα2Kα3 (4.1)
where C is raw material, L wage labour and K capital.34 pi and t represent the
rate of Hicks-neutral technological change and time respectively. Note that
31Douglas Irwin and Peter Temin, The Antebellum Tariff on Cotton Textiles Revisited.
Journal of Economic History , 61 2001; and Douglas Irwin and Joseph Davis, The Ante-
bellum US Iron Industry: Domestic Production and Foreign Competition. Explorations
in Economic History , 45 2008.
32Gene Grossman, Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the U.S. Steel Industry.
Journal of International Economics, 29 1986.
33Barry Eichengreen, The Political Economy of the Smooth-Hawley Tariff. NBER, 2001 –
Working paper
34See Appendix B for details of the solution of the model.
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there is no restriction on the coefficients of the production function. Raw
material and labour are the traded inputs and are available at exogenous
price pc and w. Capital (K) is the non-traded factor, whose supply grows at
the exogenous trend rate of δ per year: K=K¯etδ.
Therefore, the quantity of raw material and labour employed are determined
by the marginal value of the product of each one being equal to their prices
(pc and w), as follows:
C = α1pQ/pc (4.2)
L = α2pQ/w (4.3)
On the demand side, the domestic goods are imperfect substitutes of im-
ports, which are perfectly elastic in supply and imported at exogenous price
p∗. Moreover, domestic textiles are imperfect substitutes of the aggregate
basket of domestic goods so that the demand function appears as follows:
Q = Beψt(
p∗(1 + τ)
p
)b1(
pa
p
)b2Y b3 (4.4)
where ψ is the secular demand shift, p∗ is the import price of textiles, τ is the
ad valorem tariff rate on imported textiles, pa is the price of the aggregate
basket of domestic goods and Y is the real income. As pointed out above, the
domestic price and output are endogenous variables. Then the domestic out-
put is solved at the equilibrium level and substituted in the supply equation,
which gives, after taking logs, the following reduced form partial equilibrium
output:35
lnQ = β0 + β1t+ β2ln
[
p∗(1 + τ)
pc
]
+ β3ln(
pa
pc
) + β4ln(
pc
w
)
+ β5lnY +  (4.5)
The domestic output is therefore a function of the tariff-inclusive import
prices and the aggregate price level, both relative to the input prices, the
35The system is constituted by four equations, consisting of the four endogenous variables
p, Q, C and L, all as stated above, and the following exogenous variables: pc,w,pa,Y and
p∗. The reduced form allows us to estimate the output from the exogenous variables,
rather than estimating all four equations separately.
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ratio of input prices to wages and the growth of domestic income. t captures
the composite effect of technological change, the capital growth rate and the
demand shift independent of prices and income.
The model was originally estimated from time series data, but the scope of
analysis is here expanded to account for separate effects on different textile
types, so we estimate panel data, which requires us to consider the substi-
tution between different kinds of textiles. Therefore, the original demand
equation is revised to include the relative substitute textile prices (ps/p) as
an independent variable, where ps and p denote the substitute prices and own
prices. Thus, the reduced form equation takes a slightly different form, as
explained in Appendix B:
lnQ = β0 + β1t+ β2ln
[
p∗(1 + τ)
pc
]
+ β3ln(
pa
pc
) + β4ln(
ps
pc
)
+ β5ln(
pc
w
) + β6lnY +  (4.6)
Here, all variables except time trend are expected to have positive values.36
The economic meaning of this is clear: the more expensive the foreign goods,
the more expensive the other goods, including the substitute textiles, and
the higher the output growth rate, as long as raw material prices do not
put a check on profits. Interpreting the coefficient pc
w
is nonetheless a bit
more complicated: the value of the coefficient depends on the relative supply
elasticities of labour and raw materials. Given a fixed amount of demand
and wages, the increase in raw material prices implies higher sales prices and
thus profits. And finally, the higher income growth necessarily induces greater
effective demand.
The downside of panel data estimates in comparison with time series is
that they produce an average value of parameters across the range of different
textiles. If the supply elasticities vary, say, from cotton to silk, the model will
fail to capture the degree of individual parameters. For instance, if cotton
production is more elastic to import prices than silk or woollens, then the
estimated coefficients will only reflect its average impact on output growth.
On the other hand, the fact that all the textile branches grew massively in
Turkey in the 1930s means that the difference between the actual individual
36See Appendix B for the technical details of expected signs of coefficients.
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elasticities and the estimated average ones can be supposed to be relatively
small. This is also the reason why the present model specifically focuses on
fast-growing textiles, instead of covering other manufacturing branches, such
as food processing, which grew much more slowly.
As discussed earlier, Turkish tariffs were supplemented by import quotas
for a range of goods, including textiles, during 1932-1937. However, how the
quota policy differed from tariffs with regard to its protective impact remains
unknown. It is known that quantitative import restrictions were introduced
in the early 1930s mostly in the exchange control countries and German trad-
ing area. In principle, there were a couple of factors behind quotas: First
of all, under tariffs imports were still subject to changes for a large number
of reasons related to the costs of production and prices abroad and in the
home market, whereas quotas reduced this uncertainty on behalf of policy
makers.37 Secondly, under import tariffs, there is still a relationship between
domestic and world prices, determined by the size of duties and transportation
costs, whereas quotas cut this link, thus bringing a more secure protection on
home markets. Additionally, quotas allowing quantitative planning must have
seemed more appropriate from administrative point of view, as they afford a
more predictable and a more precise control than duties, because relevant de-
mand and supply schedules and price policies of exporting countries cannot be
known for sure. Last but not the least, tariffs, unlike quotas, did not allow to
circumvent the most-favoured nation policy, which prevented discriminatory
actions.38 When policy makers sought to give specific concessions to certain
partners, they were able to use bilateral quotas. In this respect, quotas might
have been seen as a way of discriminatory commercial tool, rather than a
protective instrument per se. Therefore, these differences were likely to lead
governments to switch to quotas, as the depth and persistence of deflation by
1931 reduced the prospect of the early and strong recovery in world prices.
37Lawrence Towle, International Trade and Commercial policy. Harper and Brothers, 1940,
p.614
38Towle, International Trade, p.615. Another relevant question might be the persistence
of quota policy: League of Nations points out that although quotas were not necessary
elements of national planning, their persistence in the late 1930s, when recovery began,
can be explained two facts: First, the economic and political insecurity continued.
Additionally, the palliative measures taken in the early stage of the Depression to prevent
isolate home market gave way to policies geared increasingly towards the self-sufficiency
and economic nationalism. League of Nations, Industrialisation and Foreign Trade,
p.35.
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In short, quotas might have either served some additional import protection,
or have been a tool in the bilateral agreements. If they effectively became,
whatever the policy motivations and intentions were, a protective measure,
they had to operate by changing the association between local and import
prices. The implication is that if they were not redundant, that is, if quotas
were not set at lower than the amount of imports that tariffs implied (above
the autarky level), then they should have changed the elasticity of the local
output to the import prices. For this purpose, we check to see if the effect
of foreign prices on output changes during the sub-period 1932-1937 by inter-
acting the import price variable with the dummy variable. This is exactly the
same way that Irwin and Temin control if the protection rates were redund-
ant, that is, above autarky rates, for the periods when they think that tariff
reforms might have changed the linkage between local and foreign prices by
increasing nominal tariffs above the autarky prices.39
4.4. Data
The dependent variable in Equation 4.3.5 is output growth (Q). The phys-
ical output data covers cotton, wool, silk and hemp textiles, which were all
estimated for the period 1925-1939 in the preceding chapter.
The average import prices (p∗) are equivalent to the total value in TL of
the imported fabrics divided by import volume. Cotton fabrics in the trade
data feature all kinds, including the ones that did not compete against the
local production. That is why only the bleached and unbleached types are
considered in calculating average import prices.
The raw material prices (pc) represent the prices of domestic raw cotton,
greasy wool, fresh cocoons (for silk) and finally the hemp seed prices, all home
market wholesale prices.40 The price of the aggregate basket of domestic goods
is represented by the wholesale price index that Bulutay et al. provides, as
39Irwin and Temin, Antebellum US Cotton Industry.
40Greasy wool prices: annual average Istanbul commodity exchange prices. İstanbul
Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık, 1934/35; and Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum
Müdürlüğü, Fiyat İstatistikleri 1941 . Dried cocoon: annual average Istanbul commod-
ity exchange prices. İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık, 1934/35; and Turkey,
Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Fiat İstatistikleri. 1947. Hemp seed prices:
İstanbul Ticaret Odası, Mecmua, 1925; İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık,
1934/35; and Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Fiat İstatistikleri 1947 .
See Chapter Two for raw cotton prices.
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was used in the earlier chapters.41
For the substitute prices we first construct the final good prices as far as
the available data permits. The cotton fabric prices are the average wholesale
prices on the Istanbul Commodity Exchange during 1930-1939 and the data
is extrapolated with the average imported fabric prices for the earlier years.
Wool prices are the only available relevant series representing the greasy wool
prices.42 For silk, we use the wholesale raw silk prices in Istanbul.43 Finally,
the hemp fibre price represents the hemp goods prices.44 Then we take the
geometric average of the four price series to approximate the common substi-
tute prices (ps) by assuming that each good competes against the basket of
all others. All related series are in Tables 4.3 and 4.5.
There is only one available industrial wage series, which Pamuk estimates.45
It is assumed to represent all four sectors due to the lack of sectoral data.
Lastly, we consider the revised real GDP figures, which are based on our own
estimates in the earlier chapters, to represent the change in the demand for
industrial goods. For wages and revised GDP series, see Table 4.6.
The estimates of the ad valorem tariff rates need to be explained in more
detail. There is not any existing estimate of ad valorem equivalents of spe-
cific tariffs to date.46 The nominal protection rate is here measured by the
percentage of custom revenues to the import value for a good. Turkish trade
publications report only the import volume (in kg) and import value in Turk-
ish currency (TL), with further information on the origins of imports. Thus,
the key variable to be estimated for each good is the customs revenue.47
The basic empirical difficulty in deriving custom revenues is the preferential
tariff treatments. More explicitly, in principle there was not a single amount of
41Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
42Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri , Supplementary Table 24.
43İstanbul Ticaret ve Zahire Borsası, Yıllık, 1934/35; and Turkey, Başvekalet İstatistik
Umum Müdürlüğü, Fiat İstatistikleri 1947 .
44Turkey, Ziraat Vekaleti, Kastamonu Kendirciliği .
45Şevket Pamuk, İstanbul ve Diğer Kentlerde 500 Yıllık Fiyatlar ve Ücretler. T.C.
Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2000b, p.84.
46The only exception to this is a calculation of the nominal tariff rates in 1916 and 1929
for a wide range of goods. Kurmuş, 1916-1929 Gümrük Tarifeleri.
47Note that the import duties were not the only taxes on imports. Transaction and con-
sumption taxes were also of significant size. However, both were applied to both local
output and imports, so did not lead to extra protection in favour of local output. Tezel,
Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.147. Actually, Tezel does not explicitly point out that the con-
sumption tax was not discriminatory, which was though clearly stated in Law 2458 and
subsequent revisions (Laws 2546, 2731 and 3101).
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duty applied to all trade partners due to the special concessions determined
in the bilateral trade agreements. However, a closer look reveals that the
preferential specific tariffs were more of a problem during the 1920s owing
to the fact that some trade partners did not benefit from a most favoured
nation clause, which would have provided equal tariff treatment. At this
stage, the reader should bear in mind that we limit our analysis only to the
major trade partners: the countries whose exports to Turkey added up to
around 90 percent of the total imports of each good. This is just a practical
definition to reduce the computational costs. Defined this way, the major
partners appear as the European countries, Japan, Syria, Egypt, and the US.
Within this group, the number of countries that were outside the sphere of
most favoured nation clauses decreased every year, so that by 1929 only Syria
and Egypt remained excluded.
What we do, then, is identify the different specific rates in each year for
certain statistical units and then multiply the imports from each country by
the relevant specific rate. Then we add up the revenues received from each
country’s imports and divide it by the total imports value to obtain the ad
valorem tariff rate for that statistical unit. When more than one specific rate
is identified, then all countries benefiting from a most favoured nation clause
enjoy the lowest rate, and the official not-discounted rate is applied to the
others. In the 1920s, this practically means the partners in the most favoured
nations sphere enjoyed the rates applied to the parties of the Lausanne Treaty,
for which the rates for all goods were frozen until 1929 (at 5 or 9 times the
1916 levels), and to those countries outside that sphere, which were fewer
and fewer, were applied the official rates (that is, at 5, 8, 12 times at the
1916 levels). For the years after 1929, the lowest rate is equivalent to the
official rate minus the discount that was determined by the trade agreements.
That is, if one agreement, say with Germany, specifies a certain amount of
discount on an item, then this applies not only to Germany but also to all
other countries benefiting from the most favoured nation clause. If different
trade agreements set more than one discount rate for the same item, then the
highest discount rate is taken due to the nature of equal treatment.48
Above it was outlined how the official specific duties can be categorised into
four different periods: 1925-29, 1930-33, 1934-37 and 1938-39. The first was
48The procedure is explained in Nuri, Ahdi Tarifeler 1929 .
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characterised by the sanctions of the Lausanne Treaty, the second by the 1929
tariff reform, the third by the 1933 revisions and the last by the 1936 revisions.
Although 1929 reform came into effect in September 1929, almost all imports
of that year happened before September due to the expectation that the rates
were going to be increased, so we take pre-reform rates as representative of
the whole of 1929.49 Similarly, even though the revision in 1933 was made
in the middle of year, we assume that the new rates came to be applied in
the following year because the bilateral trade agreements allowed an extra six
months for the new rates to be effective. Again for the very same reason, the
1936 revisions are considered to be effective between 1937 and 1939.50
Therefore, following the procedure described above, we obtain the nominal
rates for all statistical codes of textile fabrics for all years. The second step is
to aggregate the duties in an appropriate way to obtain the aggregate rates,
such as the nominal rate for cotton or woollen fabrics as a whole. As expec-
ted, there are a large number of statistical codes corresponding to different
kinds of cloths. In principle, as explained by Federico and Tena, the duties
should be weighted with the composition of imports in a hypothetical free-
trade situation. But obviously such a free-trade environment did not exist.51
Nonetheless, even if it was possible to find the “free trade” weights, one should
consider that the import composition for an industry is inherently bound to
change for different reasons, as we see in the rapid and early development of
the textile sector in Turkey. Production is expected to begin with the lower
quality products and develop towards the finer cloth types, meaning that a
gradual change in the types of imports occurs partly irrespective of the tariff
policy. It is therefore controversial as to whether free trade weighting is really
ideal.
The more common method is to use the current quantities, that is, the
current import composition.52 It is true that this systematically biases es-
49Kazgan, Türkiye Ekonomisinde Depresyon, pp.243-44.
50All the necessary information is combined in a number of volumes published by various
contemporary experts. These volumes outline the changes of specific rates at key times
and the discounts rates. Nuri, Ahdi Tarifeler 1929 ; Mustafa Nuri, Türkiye’de Ahdi
Tarifeler. Türk Anonim Şirketi, 1931; Mustafa Nuri, Türkiye’de Ticaret Muahedeleri.
Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1934; Sirri Emilsili, Haşiyeli Gümrük Tarife Kanunu ve
İthalat Umumi Tarifesi ile Ahdi Tarifeler. Secid Basımevi, 1938; Neset Yücelir, Haşiyeli
Gümrük Tarife Kanunu ve İthalat Umumi Tarifesi ile Ahdi Tarifeler. Bozkurt Matbaası,
1935.
51Federico and Tena, Was Italy a Protectionist Country?, pp.75-76.
52Eichengreen and Irwin, Slide to Protectionism; and Irwin and Temin, Antebellum US
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Figure 4.2.: Ad Valorem Tariff Rates in Turkey (%), 1925-1939
Source: See the text.
timates downwards, since the higher duties reduce the imports of the more
protected goods. This means that if a duty is prohibitive for, say single count
cloth, whereas it is nil for the multiple count cloth, given that the substitution
between them is large, then the resulting import of the less protected mul-
tiple count cloth will increase and substitute for the import of the prohibited
single count cloth, which yields in this way a downward bias in the average ad
valorem rate. Yet, Federico and Tena argue, the degree of bias depends on the
diversity of duties within groups. In our case, there were no big gaps between
the duties on the different types of cloths, so the extent of the downward bias
is probably small.53
Therefore, we prefer to follow the conventional method by using the current
values as weights to aggregate the rates of statistical codes.54
Cotton Industry.
53Other alternatives would be the simple averaging of duties across items, using the share
of each item in domestic output or assuming an ideal case of trade vectors, such as
the composition of British exports or world trade. Among all these, the first is clearly
the least perfect because it means no weighting at all, giving the most important and
least important import items the same weights. Similarly, there is no reason that each
country should have a similar import structure, meaning the last method is ruled out.
Also the composition of the domestic output is not practical due to the lack of data.
54Note that the trade statistics do not make a distinction between hemp and flax, so the
nominal duties are assumed to apply hemp only.
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The average ad valorem rates are presented in Figure 4.2 (also Tables 4.4
and 4.5). Cotton (bleached and unbleached) and woollen fabrics and hemp
goods were rated at around 10-15 percent between 1925 and 1929, then they
saw a sharp increase up to 50 percent in 1930 and stayed there in the first
half of the 1930s. The movement in the rest of the decade was more diverse
because of the subsequent changes in official rates, as well as changes in import
prices. For unbleached and bleached cotton cloths, it stabilised around 80-90
percent, while it exceeded 100 percent for woollens by 1939. On the other
hand, the case of silk goods was entirely different, as it had already been
more heavily taxed before 1929 at around 50 percent. However, the nominal
rate on silk fabrics gradually doubled over the 1930s.
4.5. Estimation Results
We present the estimation results of the reduced form output growth equation
in Table 4.1. To begin, it is necessary to remember that the error term in the
main specification (equation 4.3.5) takes the form it = αi + βit in the panel
data, where the first part captures sector-specific disturbances and the second
captures the common error term across both time and sector. The way αi is
handled is of crucial importance to estimate the model. If one assumes that
E[αi|Xi] 6= 0, that is, the unobservable sector-specific effects are correlated
with the predictors, then the fixed effects model should be estimated, and
otherwise random effects are more appropriate.55 In this particular case, one
tends to think that the sector-specific disturbances should be related to the
tariff-inclusive import prices, if not others, because both the import prices
and nominal protection rates were not arbitrarily determined, but instead
associated with the structure of different textile industries. As a matter of
fact, this is usually so when data is at the industry level, that is, not drawn
randomly from the population. The conventional technique to test this is
the Hausman test and it confirms that the error term is correlated with the
regressors.56 Therefore, the pooled OLS and random effect estimates in the
first two columns of Table 4.1 are biased and inconsistent.
55Cheng Hsiao, Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge University Press, 2005; and A. Colin
Cameron and Pravin Trivedi,Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
56A. Colin Cameron and Pravin Trivedi, Microeconometrics Using Stata. A Stata Press
Publication, 2009.
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Columns 3-7 provide the output elasticities estimated by alternative within
effects models. In all specifications, the relative tariff-inclusive import prices
appear strongly significant, which indisputably shows the impact of tariff
protection on output growth. The raw material prices-wages ratio seems
significant except in the last model. As for the income variable, its effect
depends on the time trend. Since income has a strong time trend, it appears
as insignificant if we include the time trend, which explains the difference
between models 3 and 4. In the original equation the coefficient of the time
trend captures the effect of technology, the capital growth rate and exogenous
demand changes. If we assume that capital growth was proportional to the
growth of raw material and labour, all change in demand was due to income
and substitution effects and the impact of technology was negligible, then
we can take model 4 as the base model. Such assumptions do not seem far
fetched, as the industrial growth at the time in Turkey was mainly labour
intensive and it is quite reasonable that income and relative prices capture
most of the change in demand for textiles.
As mentioned earlier, some substitution among different types of textiles
might have happened. This is considered in the last two models by adding
the relative substitute prices as a regressor (as described in equation 4.3.6),
but it does not turn out to be significant. And finally, the last model (column
6) incorporates the possibility that the import quotas might have driven the
protection rates to autarchy levels, which would make tariffs redundant. We
interact the first variable with the dummy variable for 1933-1937. However,
the results do not confirm such a hypothesis, as the import prices remain the
most important driver of the output growth. This supports the view that
quotas were most likely the instruments of trade discrimination rather than
intensifying protection.
Therefore, the estimated coefficients in the base model imply that a 10
percent increase in the relative tariff-inclusive import prices leads to an 8.2
percent increase in local output. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in the raw
material prices-wages ratio leads to a 5 percent increase in output. And
income growth is the most important driver, as a 10 percent increase in real
income results in a 13.7 percent rise in output, which makes sense, as the
income elasticity of demand for non-essential goods is usually more than one.
The conventional post-estimation procedures are followed. The standard
errors in the base model (column 4) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and
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serial autocorrelation. The F-test confirms that there is no need to include
time effects and the Breusch-Pagan LM test shows there is no contemporan-
eous dependence, which sometimes exists in long panels.
These results basically show the extent to which textile output was sensitive
to changes in relative import prices, relative wage costs, as well as real income.
To illustrate the causes of output growth more clearly, it would seem useful
to run a few counterfactual simulations. How much did the protective tariffs
alone or the autonomous agricultural growth in the second half of the 1930s
contribute to output growth? In particular, since the variable ln(P ∗(1+t)/pc)
is determined by average import and raw material prices as well as tariff rates,
it is not easy to figure out the impact of tariffs on the dependent variable
separately.
To answer the question, we use the output elasticities in our base estimation
model, and simulate the counterfactual output growth trajectories of all textile
branches in two separate hypothetical scenarios. First is the case in which
the mild tariff policy of the 1920s was maintained in the 1930s, that is, in
which strong protection was avoided. In this scenario, tariff rates are fixed at
1929 levels and assumed constant during the 1930s. Second, we look at the
case where real farm income remained stagnant after 1935 in line with the low
agricultural prices. Remember that as shown in Chapter Two, output growth
was due to the increases in acreage and yields in the face of persistently low
prices, so it can be taken as an autonomous positive shock. It is easy to handle
this possibility if the growth of agriculture was not related to the growth of
other sectors. On the contrary, the agricultural sector clearly influenced both
industry and services through supply and demand linkages. Therefore, we
just assume that real income increased at the same rate as population growth
(2 percent per annum) in the second half of the 1930s, so that the per capita
income remained the same.
The counterfactual simulations exercises are conducted in the same way as
Grossman does.57 In each scenario an alternative growth path is calculated in
the following way. First, we take the fitted growth rates that the base model
predicts based on historical values of the independent variables. Then we
simulate the alternative implied growth rates, based on the counterfactuals,
using the estimated coefficients in the model. Then the difference between
57Grossman, Imports as a Cause of Injury.
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Figure 4.3.: Actual and Counterfactual Output Levels in Turkey (Tons), 1925-
1939
Note: In Scenario I, the tariff rates remained moderate as explained in text. In Scenario
II, the income grows in line with population growth (2 percent per annum).
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these two predicted and implied rates is subtracted from the actual output
rates, which provides counterfactual growth paths. That is, we change cer-
tain values of two exogenous variables according to two different historical
counterfactuals, and then see what the output growth would have been.
Figure 4.3 compares the output levels in Scenario I (moderate tariffs after
1929) and Scenario II (stagnant income per capita after 1935) with the actual
figures for each sector. It seems that both the tariff rates and income growth
have some explanatory power, while the impact of the former was more sub-
stantial, as the counterfactual output was smaller in the first scenario than
in the second. While the trend growth rate of cotton textile growth was 10.4
percent per annum over 1925-1939, it falls to 6.7 percent in the first scenario
and 8.4 in the second (Table 4.2). Overall, both effects account for more than
half of the output growth. As for woollens, the average growth is half of the
actual level in the first and around two thirds in the second scenario. In this
case, protection and income growth explain almost all growth in woollens.
Finally, silk textiles are a different case, as the counterfactual growth rates
are relatively closer to the actual level: around 40 percent of growth was
explained by these two factors. The existence of different import price and
income elasticities is rather sensible, since they were not perfect substitutes.
Table 4.2.: Actual and Counterfactual Trend Growth Rates for Turkey (%),
1925-1939
Actual
output
growth (%)
Counterfactual
I (%)
Counterfactual
II (%)
Cotton textiles 10.4 6.7 8.4
Woollen textiles 7.2 3.2 5.2
Silk textiles 12.5 9.6 10.6
4.6. Conclusion
The conventional wisdom asserts that the industrial take off in interwar Tur-
key was achieved through an autarchic import regime and/or state-led indus-
trialisation.58 Accordingly, consumer good imports were restricted by high
58Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi ; andKorkut Boratav, 1923-1939 Yıllarının İktisat Politikası
Açısından Dönemleştirilmesi. In Atatürk Döneminin Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Sorun-
ları 1923-1938. İstanbul Yüksek İktisat ve Ticaret Mektebi Mezunları Derneği, 1977;
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tariffs, quotas and exchange controls and state investment was instrumental
to output growth in the absence of sufficient industrial investment.
This chapter calls into question the first part of this widely held view by
assessing output growth in a systematic way for the first time. The textile
sector is chosen as the focus of the empirical analysis for two main reasons.
First, it was the fastest growing sector in the interwar period, as demonstrated
earlier. And second, import substitution was most evident in textiles due to
the high level of import penetration before 1929 and the rapidly declining
imports during the 1930s. So if import substitution was the actual driver
of industrialisation, it should be most clearly observed in textiles. Turkey
undoubtedly became self-sufficient in cereals, sugar and vegetable oils as well,
but the share of imports in domestic consumption had already been relatively
low in the 1920s, so declining imports cannot explain the output growth in
such sectors. For these reasons, the growth of the food processing sectors or
construction was due either to the increasing supply of raw materials (cereals,
for instance) or the changes in domestic demand.
The present empirical analysis is based on a partial equilibrium analysis of
output growth in cotton, woollen, silk and hemp fabrics. The reduced form
equation relates the output growth with relative tariff-inclusive import prices,
relative aggregate prices, the raw material prices-wages ratio and real income
growth. The most important conclusion emerging from this analysis is that
the main driver of output growth was real income growth, which was followed
by tariff-inclusive import prices and the raw material prices-wages ratio. In
other words, industrialisation was not only driven by the increasing costs of
imported goods but also domestic demand and relative raw material prices.
Money wages were kept low throughout the 1930s, which made it possible to
raise profits thanks to the deflation in raw material prices. Counterfactual
simulations show that around 40 percent of growth in cotton textiles over
1925-1939 was accounted for by high tariffs alone, as was 60 percent of growth
for woollen textiles and 25 percent for silk textiles.
Therefore, this chapter has provided a nuanced view of industrialisation
in interwar Turkey. In addition to import contraction, there were also inde-
pendent factors that operated in favour of industrial growth. The import-
restricting regime undoubtedly directed demand to domestic goods, but the
Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi .
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significant increase in real incomes in the second half of the 1930s, which was
partly driven by the expansion of agricultural production, also increased de-
mand in general. Additionally, the change in the domestic terms of trade in
favour of manufactures indicates a rise in industrial profits.
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4.7. Data Appendix
Table 4.3.: Cotton and Woollen Textiles in Turkey, 1925-1939
Cotton cloth Woollen cloth
Average
import
price
Ad valorem
duty
Raw cotton
price
Average
import
price
Ad valorem
duty
Greasy
wool price
TL/kg
% piastres/kg
TL/kg % piastres/kg
1925 1.62 0.11 62.90 4.24 0.15 87.75
1926 1.52 0.13 46.10 4.89 0.14 79.17
1927 1.28 0.15 63.40 5.34 0.13 78
1928 1.40 0.13 65.50 4.86 0.14 79.56
1929 1.42 0.14 62.30 4.71 0.13 81.12
1930 1.39 0.43 49.40 5.33 0.42 56.92
1931 1.14 0.44 31.70 5.71 0.34 47.01
1932 0.86 0.58 30.00 4.81 0.40 38.74
1933 0.91 0.54 30.70 4.36 0.45 36.59
1934 0.96 0.83 33.10 4.20 0.64 45.52
1935 0.88 0.95 38.00 4.17 0.68 49.14
1936 0.94 0.90 40.90 4.07 0.69 50.33
1937 1.13 0.81 37.90 4.66 0.68 58.99
1938 1.17 0.76 34.00 4.67 1.32 50.01
1939 1.15 0.78 37.80 4.33 1.07 52.48
Source: See the text.
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Table 4.4.: Hemp Goods and Silk Textiles in Turkey, 1925-1939
Hemp goods (bags, strings and ropes) Silk fabrics
Average
import
price
Ad
valorem
duty
Hemp
seed
prices
Average
import
price
Ad
valorem
duty
Dried
cocoon
prices
TL/kg % piastres/kg TL/kg % piastres/kg
1925 0.64 0.07 14.90 12.77 0.42 420
1926 0.64 0.08 12.50 13.35 0.58 439
1927 0.55 0.09 9.94 13.43 0.51 307
1928 0.57 0.07 29.54 12.58 0.58 380
1929 0.56 0.07 15.60 14.56 0.52 376
1930 0.40 0.34 15.39 20.35 0.93 329
1931 0.32 0.45 9.77 17.62 0.64 250
1932 0.30 0.48 11.21 15.61 0.71 229
1933 0.23 0.54 13.03 16.13 0.77 164
1934 0.23 0.66 17.56 10.71 0.98 216
1935 0.24 0.52 7.28 12.06 1.06 182
1936 0.25 0.52 10.10 8.14 1.35 195.4
1937 0.24 0.53 10.70 11.62 0.97 208.8
1938 0.21 0.60 12.86 13.48 0.97 258.72
1939 0.29 0.48 12.42 10.62 1.87 210
Source: See the text.
Table 4.5.: Substitute Price Indices for Turkey (1925=100), 1925-1939
Cotton cloth Woollens Silk fabrics Hemp Common index
1925 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1926 91.4 70.4 87.2 83.9 82.8
1927 85.0 70.4 60.5 66.7 70.1
1928 90.6 72.4 57.0 198.2 92.8
1929 87.3 73.1 83.3 104.7 86.4
1930 77.3 51.3 66.1 103.3 72.1
1931 64.4 41.5 71.8 65.6 59.6
1932 58.7 33.7 56.3 75.2 53.8
1933 53.2 28.5 57.7 87.4 52.6
1934 60.3 35.1 36.6 117.8 55.0
1935 64.3 40.1 45.1 48.8 48.8
1936 60.5 46.9 47.4 67.8 54.9
1937 59.1 49.3 55.4 71.8 58.3
1938 59.3 42.3 77.2 86.3 63.9
1939 55.1 44.3 99.0 83.3 67.0
Source: See the text.
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Table 4.6.: Wages and Revised GDP Estimates for Turkey, 1925-1939
Wages Revised value added at 1927 prices (TL million)
Nominal, TL/month Agriculture Industry Services GDP
1925 44.3 775.7 134.4 625.2 1535.4
1926 41.3 790.9 212.3 622.5 1625.7
1927 45.6 712.0 166.9 622.8 1501.6
1928 43.3 727.7 226.7 645.4 1599.8
1929 47.1 849.3 247.3 694.6 1791.2
1930 41.5 837.7 245.5 778.2 1861.4
1931 42.5 889.6 260.0 803.7 1953.2
1932 39.4 924.8 244.4 861.0 2030.2
1933 44.0 840.0 283.5 952.1 2075.5
1934 50.0 759.9 291.9 1006.1 2057.9
1935 39.5 756.1 303.9 974.9 2034.9
1936 38.1 982.3 335.3 1005.7 2323.4
1937 40.2 973.2 391.5 1063.2 2427.8
1938 39.6 1059.2 386.9 1169.5 2615.7
1939 44.8 1137.7 446.3 1248.7 2832.7
Source: The wages series is from Pamuk, Fiyatlar ve Ücretler , p.84. Value added in
industry and agriculture are revised figures provided in Chapters 3-4 and services figures
are from Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri .
5. Agriculture in Interwar Egypt:
Failure to Overcome Deadlock
5.1. Introduction
The main contours of the economic problem in Egyptian agriculture in the
interwar period have already been described in the Introduction. Nonetheless,
recapitulating the main points will remind the reader of the historical context.
First of all, while Egypt can easily be classified as an underdeveloped country
before World War II, it was one of the major cotton producers and exporters
in the world, ranking third after the United States and India in total output by
the beginning of the 20th century.1 The country was specialised in long staple
cotton, giving it a price premium over the short staples. This competitive
position in the world cotton markets was due both to the fertile Nile soil and
a large amount of public investment in irrigation due to the canals and dams
that had been built in the 19th century. However, by the onset of World War
I, the prospects for agricultural growth were quite gloomy, as concerns were
raised in the public and scientific domains regarding declining cotton yields.
They believed that this decline had to be reversed in one way or another
because it was the main determinant of the country’s export revenues. Thus,
this was the main motive behind the large investment in drainage projects
during the forthcoming decades, which apparently succeeded in getting yields
back to the previous levels by the end of the 1930s. Yet the recovery in
cotton yields did not translate into any notable rise in per capita agricultural
output due partly to rapid population increase, but also to the fact that
crop yields were already high by international standards. Further increases
in output actually depended on either an expansion in cultivated land per
capita, export diversification or increasing cotton prices.
1W.H. Johnson, Cotton and Its Production. Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1926, pp.16-17.
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This short description is based on the relatively rich literature on the history
of Egyptian agriculture and basic statistical indicators: crop output, land and
price series, as well as the rich historical sources on Egyptian cotton.2 How-
ever, long-term estimates of agricultural net income, or value added, do not
exist to date, except for a few benchmark estimates. Therefore, this chapter
begins by looking into the sources of crop output growth by applying the same
composition methodology employed earlier in Chapter 2 to the estimates of
output and prices provided by el-Imam.3 Moreover, it provides the first estim-
ates of livestock output value and cultivation costs. By incorporating these
new estimates with those of crop output, we then approximate the net agri-
cultural output, then finally the average farm income by deducting rural taxes
and net credit outflow from net output. For clarification, our methodology is
based on the following two simple equations:
Agricultural net output = Crop total output + Livestock output - Cultivation
costs
Farm income = Agricultural net output - Taxes - Net credit outflow
As we argued in the corresponding chapter on Turkey, land rentals and
labour costs are not considered in this estimate of the farm income, mainly
because they can be considered a matter of income distribution within the
rural population. Admittedly, this assumption is more questionable in the case
of Egypt owing to the larger presence of rentier landowners in Egypt, which
has been the subject of a large amount of historical scholarship.4 However,
since the present work is concerned with documenting the change of farm
income, rather than getting a precise measure of it, the bias is not likely to
be large, given that the existing estimates of the distributive shares indicate
that the shares of rentals and labour costs did not change much during the
time frame of this analysis.5
As was stated above, there were major constraints on the growth of ag-
ricultural output in Egypt after World War I: rapid population growth, the
deterioration of cotton yields and external price shocks. The main argument
2See the discussion of historical context in Egypt in Introduction.
3el-Imam, A Production Function for Egyptian Agriculture.
4A comprehensive source is Baer, History of Landownership.
5Bent Hansen, Distributive Shares in Egyptian Agriculture. International Economic Re-
view , 9(2) 1968.
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of this chapter is that none of these barriers was easy to surmount, since the
population pressure was irreversible, extra land was not available at low costs
and cotton prices did not recover until World War II. Yet this does not mean
that Egypt’s agriculture was static in the interwar period: land came to be
cultivated more intensely, the government invested in irrigation and drain-
age to get yields back to higher levels and finally the improvements in seeds
and cultivation techniques were aimed at reversing the deflationary pressures.
However, although such efforts only had a limited success, they were critical
in easing the agricultural crisis in the interwar period.
5.2. Agricultural Value Added
5.2.1. Crop Output and Output Decomposition
There exist a number of alternative estimates of gross crop production, among
which el-Imam is the best, as it covers all major crops in Egypt, except clover
(berseem).6 The variation among the existing estimates is not large, as they all
point to similar trends, so we here utilise the yield, acreage and price series for
the major 11 crops provided by el-Imam.7 The crop basket consists of cotton,
cotton seed, wheat, barley, maize, millet, rice, beans, lentils, onions, sugarcane
and fenugreek (helba). The extent of the coverage leaves no question about the
representativeness of the data, except that clover, a very widely planted crop
in the cotton rotation, is left out because no reliable acreage and yield data is
available. Nevertheless, since we eventually add the crop and animal output
together and clover was the major animal feed, this omission does not bias
our final value added estimates, although it does cause some underestimation
6el-Imam, A Production Function for Egyptian Agriculture. Alternative series calculated
for different periods are as follows: M. el-Darwish, Index Numbers of Agricultural Pro-
duction in Egypt 1913-1929. Ministry of Finance, Egypt, 1932; Charles Issawi, Un In-
dice du Volume de la Production Agricole. L’Egypte Contemporaine, 205 1942; Patrick
O’Brien, The Long-Term Growth of Agricultural Production in Egypt: 1821-1962. In
P.M.Holt, editor, Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt. Oxford University Press,
1968; Roger Owen, Agricultural Production in Historical Perspective: A Case Study of
the Period 1890-1939. In P. Vatikiotis, editor, Egypt Since the Revolution. 1968; and
Bent Hansen and Michael Wattleworth, Agricultural Output and Consumption of Basic
Foods in Egypt, 1886/1887-1967/1968. International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
9 1978.
7For the comparison with alternative series, see Hansen and Wattleworth, Agricultural
Output and Consumption.
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in the crop value figures.8 Similarly, in order to avoid double counting in
the estimate of agricultural net output, we also leave out barley, since it was
another major animal food and there is no way of figuring out human’s share
of consumption.
The main trends in crop output, total acreage and prices of the two leading
crops (cotton and wheat) over 1913-1945 are shown in the Figures 5.1 and
5.2. It seems that the whole period can be classified into four sub-periods.
First, during World War I the value of output peaked due to wartime inflation,
which is shown in the stationary acreage and the shooting up of cotton and, to
a lesser degree, wheat prices. The prices of cotton and wheat can be taken as
representative since the gross value of cotton, cotton seed and wheat made up
60 percent of aggregate crop output value on average over this period.9 The
second period is 1920-1932, when the decline in output started and deepened
towards the end of the period. What is striking is that this was the case despite
some improvement in the total acreage. The main factor behind the slump was
obviously the ongoing deflation in prices, particularly in the case of cotton.
One can argue that the worldwide deflation after 1929 seems to just have
maintained a deflation that had begun previously in Egypt. Subsequently,
the third period is the rest of 1930s, during which a small degree of recovery
happened, accompanied by a small increase in the price level but a decrease
in the cropped land at the end of the 1930s, the total acreage had declined
to the level of the early 1920s. And finally, as one would expect, total output
value surged massively during World War II due to the soaring prices.
The causes of the changes in output should be discussed in more detail.
To do so, the output change is here decomposed into its main components
with the same methodology as in Chapter 2. To recall, Jamal and Zaman
suggests a multiplicative model which decomposes the total change in crop
output value as the multiplication of changes in acreage, yields, prices and crop
composition.10 The corresponding equations of the decomposition exercise
8The only correction to the raw output series for the absence of clover was made by
Hansen and Wattleworth, Agricultural Output and Consumption, pp.454-55. They
argue that the exclusion of clover and straw causes a strong downward bias in the
estimates of crop value, increasing particularly after the late 1930s.
9On average, cotton and cotton seed alone accounted for 43 percent of the total value.
Moreover, cotton was the main cash crop and thus provided an overwhelming majority
of the total cash earnings.
10Jamal and Zaman, Decomposition of Growth Trend. Note that Hansen applied a variant
of the additive model with the residual element, yet the residual appears rather small
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Figure 5.1.: Total Crop Output (Current Prices) and Acreage in Egypt, 1913-
1945
Source: el-Imam, A Production Function for Egyptian Agriculture.
Figure 5.2.: Cotton and Wheat Prices (Piastres) in Egypt, 1913-1945
Source: el-Imam, A Production Function for Egyptian Agriculture.
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Table 5.1.: Crop Output Decomposition 1913-1939, Egypt
Total change Area effect Price effect Yield effect Crop mix effect
1913-20 1.60 1.02 1.83 0.86 0.99
(100) (5) (129) (-31) (-2)
1920-29 0.74 1.12 0.55 1.19 1.01
(100) (-38) (199) (-58) (-3)
1929-32 0.57 0.88 0.67 1.00 0.97
(100) (23) (71) (0) (5)
1932-39 1.49 1.02 1.24 1.13 1.04
(100) (6) (55) (30) (10)
1913-39 1.002 1.028 0.818 1.155 1.031
Notes: The multiplication of the individual effects yields the total change. The figures in
parentheses indicate the relative contribution of each effect to the overall change in the
total output. The numbers were rounded.
can be found in Appendix A and our estimates are presented in Table 5.1 for
all sub-periods before World War II that we identified above. The relative
contribution of each component is shown in the parentheses under each line.
Looking at the period 1913-1939, we do not observe any notable change in
the gross output during 1913-1939. The price index declined by around 18
percent, but its negative impact was offset by a 15 percent rise in yields and,
to a lesser degree, by a 3 and 2 percent increase in the crop mix and acreage
respectively. Yet, the long-term picture can be deceptive because there were
different dynamics at work in each sub-period. First, the deterioration in
the yields was definitely reversed during and after the 1920s. Even in the
worst years after the Great Depression, when all economic activities were
severely hit, the yield index does not seem to have deteriorated and a 13
percent increase in yields in the rest of the 1930s helped to balance out the
persistent deflationary pressures. Therefore, the improvement in yields should
be considered the most important achievement of Egypt’s agriculture in the
interwar years, when expansion of the cultivated area was not feasible and
the cropped area could only be expanded at a high cost due to the required
investment in land reclamation and perennial irrigation.11
in his model. el-Imam also employed a very similar methodology without including the
price index as a separate component. Hansen, Income and Consumption; and el-Imam,
A Production Function for Egyptian Agriculture .
11Another immediate result of the expanded irrigation was the increase in the cropped
area, whereas the cultivated area remained almost steady. This is clearly seen in the 12
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As mentioned in the Introduction, Egypt’s historiography has largely dis-
cussed the decline in yields in terms of the ecological crisis argument. The
long-term movement of cotton and wheat yields is shown in Figure 5.3.12 Dur-
ing 1900-1920 there was a secular decline in both cotton and wheat yields,
although the decline was less pronounced for wheat. The trend was reversed
for cotton immediately after 1920, whereas the improvement in wheat yields
took place in the 1930s. However, most of the discussion has been centred on
cotton. Almost all primary and secondary sources agree that cotton yields
started to fall at the turn of century due to a number factors: the spread of
cotton to newly reclaimed land, the expansion of perennial irrigation, a lack
of drainage – all led to the rising water table and the resulting accumulation
of salt.13 On the other hand, later in the 1930s, though the perennial irrig-
ation was expanded particularly after the second heightening of the Aswan
Dam in 1933, the drainage works that had been largely ignored prior to World
War I were given priority.14 In addition, this was accompanied by the use of
better cultivation techniques (such as closer spacing and early sowing), con-
trol of pests and diseases, the adoption of high-yielding seeds and the greater
application of fertilisers.15
Perhaps the only heterodox view on the issue is put forward by Ellis Gold-
berg, who argued that the ecological crisis argument is unsubstantiated and
reflects the methodological biases of the dominant “liberal and nationalist his-
percent growth in the area index in the 1920s, which then declined again in the 1930s
because some of the marginal land was left uncultivated. Hussein Kamel Selim, Twenty
Years of Agricultural Development in Egypt (1919-1939). Ministry of Finance, Egypt,
1940, p.77.
12The wheat yields for the pre-1913 years are obtained from Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian
Economy , p.250. And cotton yields are from C.H. Brown, Egyptian Cotton. Leonard
Hill Limited, 1953, pp.16-17.
13Alan Richards, Egypt’s Agricultural Development, 1800-1980: Technical and Social
Change. Westview Press, 1982, 1982, p.111; Selim, Twenty Years, p.114; Issawi, Egypt
at Mid-Century , p.101; Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , p.47;
and Brown, Egyptian Cotton, p.18.
14The total public drain stock increased from 6,500 to 10,000 kilometres between 1922 and
1939. Richards, Egypt’s Agricultural Development , p.121.
15The rapid deterioration of cotton yields due to the mixing of different varieties was
stopped when a special law was issued in 1926, which mandated that all cotton seed for
sowing would be distributed under government supervision. This ensured seed stand-
ardisation, maximising the purity of seeds. Selim argues that the economic value of
agricultural research was best exemplified by Giza 7, the variety that largely replaced
Sakel in the 1930s, since its quality was not inferior and it yielded more. The same
point is also made by Brown. Selim, Twenty Years, p.78; and Brown, Egyptian Cotton,
p.18.
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Figure 5.3.: Long-Term Cotton and Wheat Yields in Egypt, 1900-1945
Source: el-Imam, A Production Function for Egyptian Agriculture; Owen, Cotton and the
Egyptian Economy , p.250; and Brown, Egyptian Cotton, p.16-17.
toriography”.16 Instead, he argues that the aggregate cotton yields decreased
due to the rising share of a special cotton variety, Sakel, whose yields were
lower than the existing varieties. It is indeed true that Sakel’s expansion might
have contributed to the decline in cotton yields, though Goldberg’s critique
has two main problems. First, cotton yields had already started to deteriorate
before Sakel was introduced around 1910, so the shift to Sakel cannot be re-
sponsible for the start of the decline at least. And second, a simple algebraic
exercise based on the average yields of Sakel and other varieties illustrate that
the decline in the aggregate cotton yields was actually much more than the
shift to Sakel would have induced. So Goldberg’s attack on the conventional
view on the decline of yields seems rather exaggerated.17
Returning to Table 5.1, the degree of the area and yield effects, particu-
16Ellis Goldberg, Historiography of Crisis in the Egyptian Political Economy. In I. Gershoni,
Amy Singer and Hakan Erdem, editors, Middle Eastern Historiographies: Narrating the
Twentieth Century. University of Washington Press, 2006. For a larger exposition of the
discussion, see Ellis Goldberg, Trade, Reputation and Child Labour in the Twentieth-
Century Egypt. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
17We elaborated on the issue a bit more more extensively in a commentary on Goldberg’s
thesis. Ulaş Karakoç, A Commentary on Goldberg’s Thesis: Ecological Crisis or His-
toriographical Artifact? The Chronicles (American University in Cairo, Economic and
Business History Research Center) 2012.
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larly in the 1920s, reflect the intensification in cultivation. Richards takes
the cropped area relative to the almost steady cultivated land as a sign of
the intensified exploitation of land.18 Moreover, he points to the qualitative
evidence for the shift from three-year to two-year crop rotation in the interwar
years, meaning that land was increasingly planted more heavily. Although it is
empirically hard to prove, this was possibly another factor, next to expanded
irrigation, behind the increase in the cropped area in the 1920s.19
Another important aspect of output growth concerns the attempts to di-
versify the crop basket. Egypt was never a one-crop producing country, but
cotton was the principal source of monetary revenue. The falling cotton prices
after World War I and wartime food shortages triggered concerns about mono-
cropping and popularised arguments for the merits of crop diversification.20
Thus, in the 1920s restrictions on cotton acreage aimed at facilitating this
shift. Similarly, high import duties on cereals, sugar and rice after 1930 was
another policy favouring the cultivation of such crops. However, while some
historians have emphasised the importance of such attempts to promote di-
versification, these measures were less successful than initially thought. Our
indices show that during 1933-1939, the recovery period, the impact of crop
mix on output growth remained at 10 percent, which was much less than
price and yield effects. Nonetheless, this should not be surprising because
the potential for diversification was actually limited by a number of factors.
First, cotton, along with rice, was on average superior to the other crops in
monetary terms, despite their volatile prices.21 Secondly, there was already
some complementarity between certain crops, such as cotton and clover and
beans, which limited the scope of substitution.22 Thirdly, location, in the
case of sugarcane, fruits and vegetables, that is, the proximity to factories,
18Richards, Egypt’s Agricultural Development , pp.115-16.
19Hansen and Marzouk consider irrigation as the main determinant of the change in cropped
area. Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy .
20Added to this was the question on the future of the international position of Egyptian
cotton, especially due to the growing competition from artificial silk and other countries’
attempt to grow fine cotton, which was considered as a potential threat for Egyptian
cotton from the 1920s onwards. Selim, Twenty Years, pp.87, 129.
21This is also emphasised by Issawi who maintains that the shift from cotton to cereals was
economically senseless, as Egyptian soil was too precious to waste with cereals. Instead,
he argues, other higher value added crops, like fruits and vegetables, should have been
given more attention. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.123. For the comparison of
profits from producing alternative crops, also see Hansen and Marzouk, Development
and Economic Policy , pp.56-57. Cotton and rice were by far the most profitable ones.
22Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , pp.53-54.
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was a critical determinant of the crop decision. And last but not least, the
rigid consumption patterns, such as the preference for maize and wheat, were
another constraining factor. In short, there were already strong barriers to
crop diversification in Egypt, which limited the supply elasticity. Therefore,
the limited shift away from cotton in the 1930s is far from surprising.23
All in all, the most decisive determinant of output growth turns out to be
the prevailing price decline during the whole interwar period, which was not
unusual for a country that had already reached the limits of extensive growth.
During the 1920s the price index halved, and then declined by another third
between 1929 and 1932. And during the rest of the 1930s, a 13 percent
increase in the price level accounted for half of the output growth. On the
other hand, the issue should be discussed for cotton and other crops separately.
For all other crops before 1930, prices were determined under almost free trade
conditions. By contrast, after 1930 the high duties on major crops – wheat,
rice and sugar – led prices to be determined in the domestic market, which is
why the recovery in prices after 1933 can be partly explained by protectionism.
Cotton policy was, however, more complicated. Until 1933, the government
intervened in cotton prices using a number of policy tools, such as restrictions
on cotton acreage, loans to farmers on the security of their cotton to prevent
seasonal fluctuations in prices, and purchases of cotton by the government.24
Acreage restriction was the most widely used policy tool, but the Egyptian
government gave up on it in 1932 with the assumption that the Egyptian
crop was too small to affect world cotton prices.25 Whether Egypt had mar-
ket power in the world cotton market has become one of the most controversial
issues since then. A number of studies on the price elasticity of the demand
for Egyptian cotton have been undertaken, yet no consensus seems to have
emerged. Most of the early contemporary technical works confirmed the wis-
dom of the government in removing the cotton restrictions and switching to
the opposite policy of expanding cotton production as much as possible.26
23A longer discussion is found in Bent Hansen and Karim Nashashibi, Foreign Trade Re-
gimes and Economic Development: Egypt. Columbia University Press for National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1975, pp.147-50.
24The purchases happened in 1921, 1926 and 1929, at three moments of rapid deflation.
Selim, Twenty Years, pp.70-73.
25The removal of the restriction was not applied to Sakel, which remained limited to Delta,
where the best yields were obtained. Selim, Twenty Years, p.72.
26A brief bibliography of the econometric estimates of the supply elasticity of prices is
provided by Yousef, Explorations in Economic History 37 [2000], pp.311-12.
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This belief was also shared by many historians.27 Hansen himself tried his
hand at the issue a couple of times, but concluded that any definite judge-
ment on the precise measurement of the demand elasticity may not be done
due to the lack of sufficient data for proper specifications, which should take
into account short-term speculation, substitutions between consumption of
different textiles and the raw cotton supply responses from other countries in
the medium to long term.28 Finally, the last salvo came from Yousef, whose
econometric study of the demand for Egyptian cotton indicates that Egypt
definitely had market power in cotton, though the vested interests in Egypt,
mainly landlords and British interests, did not allow the cotton restrictions
to continue or to adopt a more effective export tax policy.29 This debate is
beyond the confines of our interest in this chapter, but it needs to be noted
that even though Egypt had market power in long staple cotton, as Yousef
maintains, the wisdom of the policy shift should be considered in relation
to the degree of Egyptian market power rather than its existence per se. In
other words, what matters more is how much change in export revenues would
have been induced by the decline in the Egyptian supply. In this connection,
its long-term consequences, such as competitors’ responses and the possible
shifts to other competing fibres, should also be studied.
5.2.2. Cultivation Costs
The existing estimates of crop value added are limited to a few benchmark
estimates. One was suggested by Hansen, who deducted “purchased inputs”
from gross output and presents his findings for a number of benchmark years.30
The term “purchased inputs” is, however, not explained in the text, but it
seems to refer only to fertilisers. Additionally, Azmi and Minost separately
27Issawi has “no doubt regarding the wisdom of change”. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century ,
p.121. Selim argues that these supply side policies failed because they did not consider
the “deep-rooted problems and worldwide character of the crisis”. Selim, Twenty Years,
p.71. Furthermore, he argues that Egyptian cotton did not have an absolute monopoly
in the long staple market, referring to Craig’s estimate that only 20 percent of Egyptian
cotton was indispensable for spinners, and the rest was open to international compet-
ition. Besides, on the low end of the cotton market, artificial silk was increasingly
competing with coarser and weaker cottons. Selim, Twenty Years, p.129.
28Hansen, Egypt and Turkey , p.108.
29Yousef, Explorations in Economic History 37 [2000].
30Hansen, Income and Consumption.
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provided guesstimates for 1929 and 1930/31.31 Here, by contrast, we offer
the first long-term estimates of output for 1914-1945. The major cost items
under consideration are chemical fertilisers, seeds, oil and maintenance. Note
also that the present method is almost identical to that employed by the
Department of Statistics and Census in the calculation of net output during
1950-1960.32
The information on seeding rates for each crop can be derived from three
different sources: First, Annuaire Statistique, the comprehensive Egyptian
yearbooks, presented an estimate of the total production and consumption
of a few crops for each year, – consumption was estimated by subtracting
the net exports and the amount of seeds from the gross output. The seeding
rates for rice, wheat, maize and beans are thus given in these yearbooks as an
average amount of seeds per unit of area.33 Second, the Egyptian government
helped to establish Credit Agricole in 1931 to supply credits for the small
cultivators, mainly for seed and fertiliser. We have detailed data in Annuaire
Statistique on how much seed per feddan was distributed to debtors for major
crops for each year after 1931. We thus obtain the seeding rates for cotton,
millet, sugarcane, onion, lentils and fenugreek from these annual accounts of
the Credit Agricole.34 In order to crosscheck these rates, we could refer to
Azmi’s assumptions in estimating gross agricultural revenue for 1930/31. His
figures are probably no more than informed guesses, however, and in the event
they turn out to be close to our estimates, apart from in the case of millet,
for which our sources imply 25 ardeb/100 feddan, whereas Azmi takes it as 8
ardeb/100 feddan. We here prefer the former, since it seems more reasonable,
considering the ratio of costs to crop value for other crops. Table 5.2 presents
all the estimated seeding rates: the seed/yield ratio varies from one crop to
31Hame el-Sayed Azmi, A Study of Agricultural Revenue in Egypt, Rental Value of Ag-
ricultural Land and the Present Incidence of the Land Tax. L’Egypte Contemporaine,
1934; and M.E. Minost, Le Revenu Agricole de L’Égypte. L’Egypte Contemporaine,
1930. For the earlier period, Willcocks makes a similar calculation of profits for each
major crop. W. Willcocks, Egyptian Irrigation. Volume 2, Spon and Chamberlain, 1913,
pp.782-83.
32Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , p.73.
33Rice was usually recorded in dariba (a weight unit) and the conventional weight-volume
unit conversion is 1 dariba = 3.2 ardeb.
34There are no separate figures for fenugreek, which was under the category of “others” in
the raw data, so we assume 31 ardeb/feddan indicated the average figure for “others”.
Egypt, Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique [1912-1950], 1937/38, pp.378-79.
Furthermore, in the absence of reliable data on onions, we simply assume a 10 percent
seed cost, referring to the average costs of other crops.
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Table 5.2.: Seeding Rates for Egypt’s Major Crops
Seeding rate Yield
Ardeb/100 feddans Ardeb/100 feddans
Cotton seed 46 316
Rice 33 522
Wheat 53 588
Maize 25 749
Millet 25 862
Sugarcane 9000 75000
Beans 50 478
Lentils 43 404
Helba 31 371
Source: For the seeding rates see the text. Yields from el-Imam, A Production Function for Egyptian
Agriculture. The unit for sugarcane is cantar/100 feddans.
another, with the lowest productivity for millet and maize (2-3 percent) and
highest for the cotton and sugarcane (12-14 percent).
We then calculate the total seeding cost in each year by multiplying these
rates by the acreage of the following years at the current year prices. Even-
tually we find that gross seed costs remained in the range of 4-7 percent of
total output value, which are quite close to the corresponding official figures
for the 1950s.35 All estimated costs are presented in Table 5.11.
After seeding costs, we take into account fertiliser expenditure, which is
here taken to be equivalent to the imports of chemical fertilisers. That is
acceptable since there was not any notable local fertiliser production until
World War II. Animal manure is deliberately excluded from this calculation
because it was an animal output. Import figures imply that the interwar
period witnessed a spectacular growth in the use of fertilisers. From the early
1920s to the onset of World War II, total fertiliser imports increased by around
two and half times, which greatly exceeded the change in cropped area. In
effect, despite the moderate fall in import prices, the ratio of fertiliser costs
to the gross output increased from 1 to 4-5 percent throughout this period
(Figure 5.4). As a land-saving and labour-intensive technology, this rapid
growth makes much sense since it perfectly suited Egypt’s factor endowments,
that is, relative land scarcity. As such, fertilisers, water and labour came as
a complementary package, which was utilised to the fullest in Egypt in the
35Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , p.73.
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Figure 5.4.: Ratio of Cultivation Costs to Total Crop Output in Egypt, 1914-
1945
Source: See the text.
interwar years.36
Lastly we need to look at the costs of machinery and fuel. Although cultiva-
tion was mostly conducted with simple and traditional techniques in Egyptian
agriculture, large-scale irrigation led to a significant use of fuel and some ma-
chinery, such as water pumps.37 Unfortunately, there is no systematic data
on fuel consumption and machinery use in agriculture. To offer a reasonable
estimate, we rely on the machinery and fuel cost figure used by Azmi for
1930/31.38 This was LE 3.35 million, around 5 percent of the total crop value
36Richards also underlines that wheat was more responsive to fertilisers than cotton, so
fertiliser use expanded in line with the increasing wheat acreage. His argument is
confirmed by the Credit Agricole sources, wherein the credit advanced on fertilisers for
wheat was more than those on cotton. Richards, Egypt’s Agricultural Development ,
p.121.
37Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century explains the persistence of backward techniques through
the institutional and social setting of agricultural production, such as the abundance
of labour, small size of landholdings and absentee landlordism. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-
Century , p.102.
38The figure includes the “expenses of fuel and lubricating oil”, “expenses in the form of
wages for mechanics and assistants” and the “value of imported machines for agriculture
as tractors, accessories, spare parts etc.”. Azmi, A Study of Agricultural Revenue in
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in 1930/31. We first construct a cost index, based on the total cropped area
and oil prices. The cropped area data is readily available and the latter is
represented by the retail fuel prices in Cairo, which are available in Annuaire
Statistique. The index is constructed by multiplying the total acreage by fuel
prices and then the 1931 figure is extrapolated with this index. Since the
change in cropped area was largely determined by water use, it is a good
proxy for the irrigated area. The resulting cost figures indicate that the ma-
chinery and fuel made up 4-9 percent of the gross crop output, except in the
periods when fuel prices are exceptionally high, such as at the end of World
War I and its aftermath (Figure 5.4).39
5.2.3. Livestock output
Hansen and Marzouk point out that the main agricultural produce in Egypt
was non-animal because of the shortage of capital, low standard of living
and “almost complete lack of pastures”.40 They refer to the gross figures for
1959/60, when the value of animal output was less than one quarter of the crop
output, whilst its value added was less than a sixth of crop value added. Since
animal output increased more than crop output between the 1930s and 1950s,
it can be argued that the share of animal value added was considerably less
than one sixth in the interwar years.41 However, no satisfactory systematic
estimates of animal output for the interwar period have been suggested to
date. The first attempt was made by Levi as a part of his well-known work on
Egyptian national income.42 He employed a simple income approach by first
identifying the total income emanating from different major sources: land,
commerce, taxes, buildings and so on. He then estimated animal output
from the assumed per family consumption of butter, milk, cheese, fowls, meat
and eggs, all of which were derived from the statistics of the family budgets
collected by the official statistical agency in 1920 to construct a cost of living
Egypt, p.707.
39The number of imported agricultural machinery (pumps, tractors and others) remained
relatively stable until 1937, except in 1932, so the possibility that fuel consumption
per cropped or irrigated area increased was small until then. Samir Radwan, Capital
Formation in Egyptian Industry and Agriculture, 1882-1967. Ithaca Press, 1974, p.269.
40Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , p.65.
41The rate of change of animal and crop output between 1937 and 1960 can be seen in
Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , p.75.
42I.G. Levi, L’Augmentation Des Revenus de L’État. L’Égypte Contemporaine 68 1922.
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index.43 Levi’s work then triggered an exchange between him and Baxter,
who strongly criticised his method and findings on the ground that the meat
and milk consumption figures in the family budgets were too high.44
Later on, Azmi and Minost provided two more figures for animal output.45
Minost, then the general secretary of the Crédit Foncier Egyptien, calculated
the gross output of meat, milk, wool and other animal farm products in a
somewhat crude and ambiguous way. His gross estimate for 1930 was around
two thirds of Levi’s estimate for 1923.46 Similarly, Azmi made some quite
crude assumptions on the average “yields” and “expenses” of cows and buf-
faloes, and the wool and poultry yields.47 His final gross figure for 1930/31
and 1931/32 is around LE 2.1 million, which is strikingly lower than other
estimates. Lastly, Anis provides two benchmark figures for 1937 and 1944. He
points out that since the data on slaughtering is limited to the public abat-
toirs, his estimate is based upon the animal output of female livestock with
“due allowance being made for the births and casualties”.48 He then presents
the output estimates for 1937-1945, classified by animal types plus poultry,
milk and eggs. However, the details of his procedure are left unexplained.49
Table 5.3 brings together all of these estimates to show how broad their
range is. It is hard to draw a consistent conclusion from these figures since
not only their methods and coverage vary significantly but they also lack the
43To arrive at the gross figures, a regional classification is made by Levi, as the different
average consumption units are assumed for Cairo, Alexandria, the cities with 10,000
inhabitants or more, and the countryside of Upper and Lower Egypt. For instance, the
annual average meat consumption per family is taken as follows: 12 rotolis in Cairo, 10
rotolis in Alexandria and 10 rotolis in Lower and 9 rotolis in Upper Egypt (the last two
indiscriminately for cities and countryside).
44James Baxter, Notes on the Estimate of the National Income of Egypt for 1921-1922.
L’Egypte Contemporaine, 1923. Baxter maintains that the consumption survey had
been carried out only in the Governorates and Mudiriya towns, so the figures for other
cities must have been inferred from them without any credible basis. What is more,
the assumed consumption of all animal goods actually exceeded the total stated income
of the clerks, artisans and labourers by 92-97 percent. Although this upward bias
might not be important from the point of the cost of living index calculation as long as
the relative consumption of different goods is measured correctly, it is highly dubious
to derive total consumption from these figures. For his response, also see I.G. Levi,
Réponse à M.J.Baxter. L’Égypte Contemporaine, 1923. The controversy remains open
to further research.
45Azmi, A Study of Agricultural Revenue in Egypt; and Minost, Le Revenu Agricole.
46Minost, Le Revenu Agricole, pp. 541-45.
47Azmi, A Study of Agricultural Revenue in Egypt, pp. 698-99.
48Anis, A Study of National Income, p.121.
49Anis, A Study of National Income, p.125.
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Table 5.3.: Existing Estimates of Animal Output of Egypt
Source Output value (LE Million) Year
Levi (1922) 38.4 1921/22
Minost (1930) 24.1 1930*
Azmi (1934) 2.3 1930/31
Anis (1949) 18.8 1937
Anis (1949) 37.9 1944
Issawi (1954) 42.0 1946/47
* Date assumed, as it is not stated explicitly in the text.
necessary degree of clarity and consistency in methodology. It is only possible
to say that Azmi’s estimate seems out of all proportion.
The estimation methodology employed here relies on official data on flock
sizes and the available price series. A close look at the official sources reveals
that meat, milk and wool output can be calculated if yields per animal are
known for each product. To obtain the technical coefficients, we draw on the
1929 and 1939 Agricultural Censuses and the Statistical and Census Depart-
ment’s official method for estimating livestock output in 1953.50 Furthermore,
for meat production, the slaughtering rate is derived from the Turkish sources
due to the absence of any figure for Egypt.
The procedure goes as follows. To begin, we need the animal flock size.
Annuaire Statistique gives the summary of the animal censuses for each year
from 1914 onwards. These summary tables include the number of the all
kinds of animals (cattle, buffaloes, sheep, goats and the others) in each year
until 1937.51 The censuses were conducted every two years after 1937, and
they are not easily comparable with the earlier years because the timing of the
census underwent a number of alterations: although they had been conducted
in January every year before 1937, the 1937 census was done in March, 1939
in June, 1941 again in January, and the 1943 and 1945 censuses in June.52
The census time matters because flock sizes follow a year-long pattern as
50Egypt, Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Census of Egypt, 1929. 1934; Egypt, Min-
istry of Agriculture, Agricultural Census of Egypt, 1939. 1946; Egypt, Statistical and
Census Department, Ministry of Finance and Economy, National Income of Egypt for
1953: Official Estimate. 1955.
51We only have total numbers for theWorldWar I period, with the female-male composition
reported thereafter.
52For a bibliographical note on the animal censuses in Egypt, see Egypt, Ministere des
Finances, Annuaire Statistique, 1945/46, pp.368-69.
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Table 5.4.: Livestock Coefficients, Egypt
Cattle Buffaloes Sheep Goats
(I) Slaughtering rate (%) 14.95 15.3 38.3 38.3
(II) Average carcass weight (kg) 158.7 138.1 15.7 11.3
(III) Ratio of those supplying milk (%) 59 44 90 71
(IV) Average annual milk yield (kg) 450 994 3.6 4
Sources: (I) from Bulutay et al., Turkiye’nin Milli Gelir i, pp.41-42. (II) from Egypt, Statistical and
Census Department, Ministry of Finance and Economy, National Income 1953, p.17. (III) and (IV) are
from Egypt, Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Census 1939, pp.108-109.
animals are slaughtered at certain times of a year. This inconsistency is
clearly observed in the raw data as the flock sizes appear unusually large
during World War II.
In order to correct for this inconsistency, we first calculate the trend growth
rates of flock sizes for each group of animals and then assume that they grew
by this historical rate during 1937-39.53 That seems reasonable because flock
sizes followed a pretty clear and smooth positive trend with small fluctuations
until 1936. Moreover, neither the slaughterings in public abattoirs nor the
imports and exports show an unusual development during 1937-1939. Then,
for the post-1939 period, 1941 figures are taken as the same as in the official
source since the census month was January, the same as before 1937. The
1943 and 1945 figures are obtained by the extrapolation of the estimated
1939 figure by the ratio of the official 1939 and 1943 and 1945 figures, as
census times were the same in those years. Finally, for the missing years
(1940, 1942 and 1944), when censuses were not undertaken, we make simple
interpolations by the taking average of the following and preceding years.
Thus, this procedure produces the flock size series for the whole of 1914-1945
for four animal categories (cattle, buffaloes, sheep and goats). All components
of livestock output are presented in Tables 5.12 and 5.13.
So now, let’s proceed with the estimates of meat, milk and wool output
one by one. To derive the meat output, we first refer to the slaughtering
coefficient used by Bulutay et al. for calculating Turkish meat production.
The number of slaughtered animals is obtained by multiplying the flock size
with the slaughtering coefficient and then the slaughtered animal series are
53The long-term trend growth rate of cattle, buffaloes and sheep flocks was 3 percent and
it was 5 percent for goats. All are calculated by regressing the OLS of the natural log
of flock size on a constant and the time trend over 1914-1936.
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turned into the meat output series using the average carcass weight (rows 1
and 2 in Table 5.4). The average carcass weight is taken from the official
figures for 1953.54 The meat prices are then taken as the average of the
wholesale cattle, buffaloes and sheep prices in Cairo and Alexandria, which
are all reported in Annuaire Statistique after 1919. For the pre-1919 period
only retail prices are available, so the 1919 wholesale prices were extrapolated
backward with the retail prices. Note that sheep prices are also applied to
goats.
For the milk output, the percentage of animals supplying milk and the
average milk yield per animal are obtained from the 1939 Agricultural Census.
These coefficients are compared with those in the 1929 Agricultural Census
and they seem to be pretty much similar (rows 3 and 4 in Table 5.4). The
prices are the average wholesale prices in Cairo and Alexandria for the years
after 1919 and the 1919 figures are extrapolated backwards with the retail
milk prices. All price data is taken from Annuaire Statistique.55
Lastly, wool production is calculated in a different way due to the lack of
price data. First, the wool output in weight is derived from the flock size times
2.17 kg wool per animal, taken from the 1929 Agricultural Census results.56
Wool prices are available only in the post-1935 period, so for the years between
1935 and 1939, we look at the ratio of wool value to the combined meat and
milk value and they turn out to be in the the narrow range of 10-12 percent.
Therefore, we take their average and apply this to all other years to obtain
the wool output. Note that the calculation is entirely based on sheep wool,
since hairs obtained from other animals were a negligible amount.57
In this way, we have obtained the meat, milk and wool output. The official
animal output estimate for 1953 also takes into account poultry, honey and
wax, silk and worms.58 However, meat, milk and wool output made up 83
percent of the total output for that year, and thus in the absence of the
54Egypt, Statistical and Census Department, Ministry of Finance and Economy, National
Income 1953, p.17.
55According to the results of the 1929 Agricultural Census, around 20 percent of milk was
consumed locally, 60 percent turned into butter and another 20 percent used in cheese
making. In the present study the production of butter and cheese are considered to be a
part of manufacturing. Egypt, Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Census 1929, p.58.
56Egypt, Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Census 1929, p.58.
57While total sheep wool was 3,100 tons in 1929, goat wool was 24 tons and camel hair 14
tons.
58Egypt, Statistical and Census Department, Ministry of Finance and Economy, National
Income 1953, p.11.
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Figure 5.5.: Animal Output and Its Ratio to Crop Value in Egypt, 1914-1945
Source: See the text.
estimate of all these “unobserved” components, we prefer to linearly adjust
our total observed output (meat, milk and wool) by that ratio to arrive an
estimate of the gross animal output.
Finally, Figure 5.5 shows both our estimated total animal output and its
ratio to the gross crop output. It suggests that output was rather stable,
below LE 30 million during most of the 1920s, then had a downturn between
1929 and 1932 and recovered slightly until World War II. Similarly, its ratio
to crop output remained slightly above 30 percent during the 1920s, but it
increased up to 50 percent in the midst of the Great Depression, possibly due
to the greater decline in the crop prices in comparison with animal product
prices. Then the ratio returned to around 35 percent of the normal level in
the second half of the 1930s.
How are these findings compatible with the other existing predictions? Our
estimate for 1937 is close to Anis and Minost for 1930.59 However, it seems
that Levi’s estimate of LE 38 million for 1920/21 is remarkably higher than our
figure for the average of 1921 and 1922, LE 27 million, implying that Baxter’s
criticism that his figures were upward biased was most likely right. Finally
59Anis, A Study of National Income; and Minost, Le Revenu Agricole.
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Figure 5.6.: Crop Output and Net Agricultural Output in Egypt (Current
Prices), 1914-1945
Source: See the text.
Issawi’s gross animal output figure of LE 42 million for 1946/47 reasonably
corroborates our figure for 1945, LE 63 million, once the decrease in prices
right after the war is taken into account.60
As a result, we obtain the net agricultural output (value added) by adding
the livestock output to the gross crop value net of cultivation costs (seeds,
fertilisers, machine and fuel costs). It turns out that gross crop output and
net agricultural output were more or less the same up to the 1920s, when a
consistent gap between them began to open up (Figure 5.6). It was on average
20 percent larger than the crop value during 1920-1945, while this gap was
largest between 1930 and 1932 due to the relative increase in livestock output.
Nonetheless, it is clear that these two series for the most part followed each
other very closely.
To be able to see the contribution of components of net output to the total
change, we deflate all current price crop values, cultivation costs and livestock
output by the agricultural price index that we construct separately.61 Table
60Unfortunately, Issawi does not provide any explanation of his calculations. Issawi, Egypt
at Mid-Century , p.130.
61See Chapter 7 for the details of the construction of the agricultural price index.
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Table 5.5.: Estimates of Agricultural Output in Egypt (LE Millions), 1914-
1945
Crop
output
Cultivation
costs
Livestock
output
Net
agricultural
output
(current
prices)
Agricultural
price index
(1938=100)
Net
agricultural
output at
1938 prices
1914 65.5 8.1 10.3 67.7 97.2 69.6
1915 45.8 8.7 9.7 46.8 108.6 43.1
1916 58.9 11.3 11.1 58.7 151.2 38.8
1917 86.4 13.4 16.7 89.7 225.5 39.8
1918 111.7 15.6 20.2 116.2 233.3 49.8
1919 108.2 16.8 21.3 112.7 263.2 42.8
1920 190.8 23.1 32.4 200.1 455.2 44.0
1921 103.9 19.5 30.9 115.4 172.8 66.8
1922 78.6 14.6 25.7 89.7 166.7 53.8
1923 84.3 11.3 25.3 98.2 164.4 59.7
1924 97.4 12.4 28.1 113.1 192.0 58.9
1925 114.5 12.7 26.7 128.4 226.7 56.6
1926 100.5 12.0 27.8 116.3 159.0 73.2
1927 75.7 10.7 25.9 90.9 144.0 63.1
1928 84.5 11.4 27.0 100.0 157.9 63.3
1929 90.0 11.7 27.7 106.0 150.8 70.3
1930 78.3 10.3 26.0 93.9 120.0 78.3
1931 57.5 8.2 24.6 74.0 99.2 74.6
1932 47.7 8.0 21.9 61.6 86.7 71.0
1933 44.2 8.6 19.5 55.1 75.8 72.8
1934 51.4 8.6 19.3 62.0 104.6 59.3
1935 58.5 10.0 20.0 68.6 94.1 72.9
1936 60.9 9.8 21.1 72.1 95.0 75.9
1937 64.0 10.7 22.0 75.3 98.8 76.2
1938 62.6 9.7 22.5 75.3 100.0 75.3
1939 59.3 9.9 23.0 72.4 95.9 75.4
1940 66.4 10.7 21.8 77.5 101.3 76.5
1941 71.7 10.2 23.5 85.0 128.3 66.3
1942 75.2 13.7 35.0 96.5 182.0 53.0
1943 112.4 17.7 50.9 145.5 222.9 65.3
1944 104.4 17.9 62.8 149.3 254.4 58.7
1945 134.8 20.1 63.9 178.5 273.7 65.2
Source: See the text.
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Table 5.6.: Percentage Change in the Components of Net Output at 1938
Prices (%)
Crop output Livestock
output
Production
costs
Net output
1914-1920 -37.8 -33.0 1.0 -36.9
1920-1929 42.4 158.0 165.2 59.9
1929-1932 -7.9 37.5 12.8 1.1
1932-1939 12.3 -4.8 56.7 6.2
1914-1939 -8.3 126.3 373.4 8.3
Source: See the text.
5.6 presents the resulting percentage change in the three components of net
agricultural output at constant prices. It is very striking that over 1914-
1939, the increase in net output remained very moderate, around 8 percent,
whereas crop output declined by 8 percent, livestock output increased by 126
percent and the cultivation costs by almost four times. In other words, the
decline in crop output and increase in costs was corrected by the small yet
substantial rise in livestock output. This clearly confirms the argument put
forward earlier that agricultural production became more and more resource
intensive in the interwar period.
5.3. Farm Income
Up to this point, we have estimated the net agricultural output and now fi-
nally we continue by estimating two direct cash outflows from the agricultural
sector: tax payments and credit services.
In Egypt rural taxation was predominantly based on the land tax. Under
the British occupation, the survey of state lands started in 1892 and tax
commissions finished estimating the rental value and the rate of tax to be
paid by the cultivator in 1898.62 The ratio was fixed nominally at 28.64
percent of the rental value as assessed in 1898 and this remained so until
1939, when the rental values were reassessed and the tax rate was reduced
to 16 percent.63 The system was strongly progressive as the nominal tax
62The history of the taxation system in Egypt is briefly summarised in Egypt, Ministere
des Finances, Annuaire Statistique, 1928/29, p.501); and Hansen, Egypt and Turkey ,
pp.92-94.
63Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.233.
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was proportional to the rental value. In the meantime, even at the peak
of Great Depression, the government could not revise tax rates due to the
Capitulations, let alone carrying out a comprehensive tax reform.64 Then
World War II delayed reassessment, so the next adjustment only occurred in
1949, when it was reduced to 14 percent.65 Since the tax rate was fixed in
nominal terms, its real value and ratio to output was subject to significant
changes due to the movements of both prices and output. When farmers had
difficulty in paying off their taxes during times of hardship, the government
provided occasional exemptions: between 1942 and 1945 small cultivators
were granted remission and the total land tax was reduced by LE 2 million
between 1933-1934.66
In addition to the land tax, there were two other rural taxes: the ghaffir
(night watchman levy) and the cotton tax. The ghaffir was introduced in 1914
and applied both in cities and the countryside, but it is usually considered
a rural tax because most of the ghaffir revenue, around 92 percent in 1927
and 86 percent in 1931, was collected in the countryside.67 In the cities, it
was levied as a ratio of building tax, whereas in the countryside the commis-
sions appointed by the Ministry of Interior decided its amount.68 The ghaffir
revenues between 1918 and 1945 are obtained from Annuaire Statistique. For
the earlier years, it was not stated as a separate item, so we simply took its
ratio to the land tax in 1918, which was 13 percent, as an approximation.
Cotton tax was first levied in 1920 on the cotton ginned in the country at 35
piastres per cantar, and occasional revisions were made thereafter. Finally, it
was abolished in 1936.69 Since the tax was most probably passed by merchants
onto cultivators, as Azmi argued, it is here considered to be a rural tax.70
Working out the gross sum of the land, cotton and ghaffir taxes, it turns out
64Tignor, State and Private Enterprise, pp.115-16; and A.E. Crouchley, Economic Devel-
opment of Modern Egypt. Longmans, Green and Co., 1938, p.237.
65Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.234.
66Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.234; and Selim, Twenty Years, p.73.
67Minost, Le Revenu Agricole, pp. 551-52; Azmi, A Study of Agricultural Revenue in
Egypt, p.771; Tignor, State and Private Enterprise, p.116; and Issawi, Egypt at Mid-
Century , p.233.
68Azmi, A Study of Agricultural Revenue in Egypt, p.771.
69Azmi, A Study of Agricultural Revenue in Egypt, p.711; and Egypt, Ministere des Fin-
ances, Annuaire Statistique, 1928/29, p.501. The revisions were made in 1922, 1926,
1931 and 1933. Egypt, Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique, 1932/33, p.496
and 1937/38, p.514.
70Azmi, A Study of Agricultural Revenue in Egypt.
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Figure 5.7.: Total Rural Taxes in Egypt, 1914-1945
Source: Tax data from Egypt, Ministere des Finances. Net output is based on our own
estimates.
that together they amounted to around LE 8 million for most of the 1920s and
then gradually declined in the 1930s (Figure 5.7). The reduction in the ghaffir
and the gradual abolition of the cotton tax up to 1936 substantially lowered
total payments. Similarly, the ratio of taxes to the net agricultural output, a
more sensible indicator of the tax burden, remained around 6-9 percent over
the 1920s, whereas it jumped to the 10-12 percent range during 1930-1934
and then smoothly decreased because of both reductions in payments and the
small recovery in the agricultural output.
Turning to credit, the development of cotton cultivation and credit ex-
pansion reinforced each other, which led to a fairly developed credit market.
There were a number of mortgage banks operating in the country, with Crédit
Foncier Egyptien, founded in 1871, the largest mainly working with the middle
and large farmers.71 Until the early 1930s, the Agricultural Bank, founded un-
der the British administration, and credit cooperatives provided small credits,
yet its operations then slowed down until its liquidation in 1937. 72 This was
71Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.221.
72The cooperative movement started in 1908 and they provided small credits, as well small
implements, seeds and fertilisers, but it only gained momentum in earnest in 1923
with government support. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , pp.222-23. It then gradually
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mainly due to the Five Feddan Law issued in 1916, which banned the cultiv-
ators owning less than five feddans from getting loans from mortgage banks
in the name of saving small farmers from the threat of foreclosures. Thus,
the law effectively excluded small cultivators from the mortgage market, and
possibly made them more vulnerable in the informal credit mechanisms until
the early 1930s.73
Since mortgage debts were nominally fixed beforehand, the ongoing defla-
tion in late 1929 led to a growing debt crisis. Heavily-indebted farmers were
faced with the difficulty of paying off debts and the possibility of large-scale
bankruptcies meant that the whole market came to the verge of collapse. The
magnitude of the crisis can be seen in the fact that, according to Hansen,
the annual debt service was around LE 3.5 million, which amounted to LE
12-13 million together with taxes, but the cotton output value, as the main
cash source, declined from LE 40-45 to 15-16 million in a few years after
1929.74 Even with a more liberal guess, assuming a total of LE 10 million
tax and cash payments, the cash obligations were around 10-12 percent of the
net agricultural revenue during 1928-29, and it almost doubled by 1932/33.
Thus, by 1931 forced sales had begun, and between 1931 and 1939 around
188 thousand feddans were expropriated due to a failure to service debts.75
In such an environment, the government needed to take immediate measures
to ease the liquidity crisis, in addition to its failed attempts to stop the fall
in cotton prices. In its effort to ease the liquidity trap, the government first
extended credits for the purchases of fertilisers and seeds in 1930 and then gave
some tax relief in 1932.76 More decisively, mortgage debts were consolidated
through an agreement with three major mortgage banks in 1933. According
to this agreement, the government took on two thirds of the overdue interest
and in return the banks were to extend outstanding loans and reduce interest
rates.77 This led to a reduction of nearly one half of the annual repayment of
expanded so that by mid-century half of the farmers were members of cooperatives.
O’Brien, Egypt’s Economic System.
73Hansen argues that the local money lenders, particularly Greeks, played a major role in
supplying small credits to small farmers after the Five Feddan Law. Hansen, Egypt and
Turkey , p.52.
74Hansen, Egypt and Turkey , p.94. Tignor cites a contemporary estimate of LE 31 mort-
gage debt for a feddan, which was 75 percent of the rental value. Tignor, State and
Private Enterprise, p.117.
75Tignor, State and Private Enterprise, p.118.
76Hansen, Egypt and Turkey , pp.94-95.
77Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century . The arrangement cost the government LE 3.5 million.
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mortgage debt. Subsequently, further reductions in interest rates were made
in 1935 and 1938.78 All debts were then scaled down so as not to exceed 70
percent of land rentals in 1942.79 What is more, the government initiated
the foundation of Crédit Agricole in 1931 to provide small farmers with loans,
which also ensured the abolition of the Five Feddan Law. The aim was to ease
the burden on smaller cultivators by providing short-term loans for fertiliser,
seed and other costs on the security of land or crops.80
In the present estimate, we take the annual net change in the gross mortgage
debt as a proxy of debt service in each year. Unfortunately, the informal
credit market is entirely unknown and the short-term credits provided by
the Agricultural Bank, cooperatives or Crédit Agricole were mostly small in
scale. The data on the mortgage debt is provided in Annuaire Statistique as
an annual index of the gross debt with respect to the 1913 level, whose current
value is also stated, including both principal and interests, and covers four
major mortgage banks: Crédit Foncier, Land Bank of Egypt, Agricultural
Bank of Egypt and Mortgage Co. of Egypt.81 The data shows that the total
stock was reduced by one fourth (from LE 40 to 30 million) during and after
World War I and stayed around that figure during the 1920s. Then it declined
by one third over the course of the 1930s and evaporated to a large degree
owing to wartime inflation during World War II. Note that a part of the
repayments was financed by the government, which took over two thirds of
the overdue interest in 1933, although it was to be paid over a long period, so
it is hard to figure out the extent of government contributions for each year.
We can then obtain the farm income by calculating the agricultural value
added net of tax payments and credit outflows. To deflate the current-price
farm income figures, we use two separate indices: the aggregate wholesale
Selim, Twenty Years, p.74.
78Selim, Twenty Years, p.74. In addition, land rentals also were reduced by a third in 1929
and 1931, with additional reductions made in 1935-36.
79Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.224.
80For a bibliographical note on Crédit Agricole, see Egypt, Ministere des Finances, An-
nuaire Statistique, 1934/35. The extent to which Crédit Agricole managed to serve its
initial objectives is a controversial issue. It was mainly supposed to work with cooper-
atives, but the share of cooperatives in its loans increased from 5 to only 20 percent
between 1933 and 1938. This might have been the result of big landowners’ bid to
make use of bank resources by getting around the legal limitations. Issawi, Egypt at
Mid-Century , p.225. Similarly, Tignor refers to a foreign office official arguing that the
main objective of the bank was to stop land sales and maintain land prices, rather than
to help small farmers per se. Tignor, State and Private Enterprise, p.119.
81Egypt, Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique, 1944/45, p.552.
5.3. FARM INCOME 201
Figure 5.8.: Farm Income Per Capita in Egypt (LE), 1914-1945
Source: See the text.
price index provided by Mitchell and the index of manufacturing prices that
we construct separately.82 Figure 5.8 presents farm income per capita at
1938 aggregate and manufacturing prices. In the first place, it can be clearly
observed that the average farm income largely stagnated. The two income
per capita series, however, do not perfectly follow each other over the whole
period due to the changes in relative prices. In particular, the manufactur-
ing prices increased more than the aggregate prices in the late 1920s. Yet
more importantly, the precise calculation of agricultural net output and farm
income actually confirms the conventional wisdom that Egypt’s agriculture
suffered from a long-term stagnation in the interwar period – a view that had
previously just been based on crop output estimates.
One more comment on the measurement of farm income is in order. As
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, we do not take into account land
rentals in the calculation, since it is considered basically a matter of income
distribution within the rural population. Hansen (1968) brings together the
findings of all the available estimates of land rentals and finds that the share
82Brian Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania, 1750-1993.
3rd edition. Macmillan, 1998. The two wholesale price indices with different base years
presented by Mitchell are spliced to get a single index. See Chapter 7 for the details of
the construction of the index of manufacturing prices.
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of rents in net output, which is equivalent of the gross crop and animal output
net of fodder and seeds, declined from 51 percent in 1923-1927 to 47.7 percent
in 1936-1938.83 Consequently, even if we considered the impact of rentals, we
would not arrive at a different conclusion about the long-term movement of
the average farm income.
That said, the stagnation in average farm income does not precisely reflect
how the purchasing power of the bulk of the rural population changed over
time. That is because there were factors working to the disadvantage or
advantage of the different sections of the rural population. Although it is
impossible to gauge the precise extent of income inequality, some conjectures
can be suggested. First, the Gini coefficient for landownership does not show
any serious deterioration between 1914 and 1952.84 Second, based on both
fragmentary evidence and the nature of agricultural growth in the 1930s,
there is reason to believe that the position of landless labourers did not really
deteriorate. The average wage per day was around 2.5 piastres in 1914 at 1938
prices and it remained around 3 piastres (again at 1938 prices) in the 1930s.85
The evidence is on a par with the labour-intensive character of growth in the
1930s, as mentioned above. The expanded application of water, fertilisers and
two-year crop rotation must have increased the demand for labour, which was
likely to have checked the pressure on wages.
On the other hand, the case of small farmers was more complicated. Among
those who were solely dependent on farm income, that is, those who were out
of the labour market, the conditions were more favourable for the richer:
those who had the capacity to purchase fertilisers and were able to shift to a
2-year rotation could more easily escape the deflationary pressure. In other
words, since increasing the cropped area through irrigation and the yields
with better seeds and fertilisers were the only way to increase output, the
position of rich farmers was more advantageous. Yet government attempts to
ease the financial burden on small farmers by abolishing the Five Feddan Law,
extending credits through Credit Agricole, providing tax relief and reducing
rents in certain years must have been helpful, even though some of these
measures only had a short-term impact. A conclusive analysis is impossible,
83Hansen, Distributive Shares
84Richards, Egypt’s Agricultural Development , p.153.
85Richards, Egypt’s Agricultural Development , p.159. A similar pattern is also mentioned
by Issawi, who argues that rural wages increased by 15-20 percent between 1912 and
1929 and then halved during the depression. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.131.
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then, but one can assume that the well being of all rural classes in the interwar
period increasingly depended on their access to seeds, fertilisers and waters,
and therefore to credits and cash. Therefore, as the access to resources varied
from one group to another, they experienced the agricultural crisis in varying
ways.
5.4. Conclusion
Whether measured by per capita crop output, net agricultural output or farm
income, Egyptian agriculture undisputedly suffered from a long-term stagna-
tion during 1914-1945. In this sense, the conventional wisdom has rightly em-
phasised the role of land scarcity and population increase in the long term.86
Facing the unfavourable set of factor endowments, farmers sought to increase
output in all possible ways: cultivating more valuable crops (like cotton, rice
and sugar cane), employing better cultivation methods, using better seeds and
applying chemical fertilisers.87 The Egyptian government successfully eased
the debt and liquidity crisis in the early 1930s in response to powerful landed
interests, yet it was equally unsuccessful, until 1933, in its bid to increase the
price of Egyptian cotton in the world market by means of supply restrictions.
Whether the policy of cotton acreage restrictions was doomed to fail is still
an open question.
All that being said, it is also important to note that the interwar per-
formance of Egypt’s agriculture was not as poor as is usually portrayed. In
this chapter the new estimates of cultivation costs, livestock value added and
the net agricultural output have strikingly shown how Egypt’s agricultural
production became increasingly resource-intensive, which offset the massive
impact of deflation. From the onset of World War I to 1939, a moderate
increase in net output (8 percent) was achieved due to the almost fourfold
increase in costs and the 126 percent rise in livestock output. The decom-
position of the growth of crop output also clearly indicates that the earlier
deterioration in yields was reversed between 1920 and 1939, as the average
yields increased by one third, even if the expansion in cropped area in the
1920s could not be continued into the 1930s due to the unfavourable prices
(Table 5.1). In this respect, it would seem that Hansen and Marzouk’s argu-
86O’Brien, Long-term Growth, p.190; and O’Brien, Egypt’s Economic System, pp.3-12
87Richards, Egypt’s Agricultural Development .
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ment that Malthusian nightmares for Egyptian agriculture were relevant until
the mid-1930s is misplaced since productivity gains started to be realised in
the 1920s.88 Therefore, the performance of Egyptian agriculture should not
be underestimated, given the resource constraints and unavoidable external
price shocks that it faced. Given that the agricultural production was almost
irreversibly dependent on a valuable crop, long staple cotton, and the social
and institutional framework was to a large extent rigid, even the success to
offset the decline in prices deserves due credit. In other words, Egyptian ag-
riculture had reached the margins of extensive growth by the onset of the
World War I and it made a moderate yet significant progress toward intensive
growth in the interwar period.
88Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , p.77.
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Table 5.11.: Estimated Cultivation Costs in Egypt, 1914-1945
Seeding cost Fertiliser imports Oil prices Oil and
maintenance
cost index
Oil and
maintenance
cost at 1938
prices
LE Million LE Million Piastres/4 Gallons LE Million
1914 2.8 0.61 12 948 4.63
1915 2.9 0.66 12.4 974 4.75
1916 3.2 0.38 13.9 1047 5.11
1917 4 0.75 20 1582 7.72
1918 5.3 0.09 22.7 1772 8.64
1919 5.3 1.43 28.6 2108 10.28
1920 7.7 2.90 27.1 2070 10.1
1921 6.4 0.67 31.8 2566 12.52
1922 4.4 1.44 33.1 2544 12.41
1923 4.1 1.06 21.2 1782 8.69
1924 3.9 1.79 15.4 1266 6.18
1925 4.8 2.46 16.6 1372 6.7
1926 4.5 2.28 13.1 1124 5.49
1927 4 1.90 12.4 1066 5.2
1928 3.8 2.32 11.5 976 4.76
1929 4.1 2.55 12.5 1084 5.29
1930 3.4 2.42 11.6 1048 5.11
1931 3 1.80 10.1 915 4.47
1932 3.4 1.65 8.1 687 3.35
1933 2.5 1.85 7.6 604 2.95
1934 2.4 2.17 10.6 880 4.29
1935 3.2 2.56 10.4 842 4.11
1936 2.9 2.66 10.8 872 4.25
1937 2.7 3.39 10.8 875 4.27
1938 2.9 2.96 11.1 932 4.54
1939 3.1 2.86 9.6 792 3.87
1940 2.9 3.27 10 812 3.96
1941 3.2 0.11 11.2 922 4.5
1942 4.3 2.74 17.4 1408 6.87
1943 7.2 3.41 18.4 1369 6.68
1944 7.5 5.32 19 1460 7.12
1945 8.9 4.18 13.7 1041 5.08
Source: See the text.
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Table 5.13.: Meat Output in Egypt: Sheep and Goats, 1914-1945
Sheep Goats Slaughtered
animals
Output Prices Output
value
thousands thousands thousands tons piastres/kg LE
millions
1914 816 331 439 6340 6.90 0.44
1915 755 290 400 5798 6.40 0.37
1916 688 263 364 5274 7.84 0.41
1917 808 308 427 6190 9.99 0.62
1918 854 231 416 6136 12.79 0.78
1919 858 326 453 6570 14.30 0.94
1920 824 334 443 6396 18.66 1.19
1921 986 424 540 7766 12.87 1.00
1922 942 395 512 7371 12.04 0.89
1923 962 401 522 7520 10.42 0.78
1924 1085 455 590 8490 11.06 0.94
1925 1091 455 592 8530 11.58 0.99
1926 1144 530 641 9170 11.79 1.08
1927 1232 622 710 10103 10.62 1.07
1928 1180 548 662 9466 10.63 1.01
1929 1003 731 664 9193 10.75 0.99
1930 1129 644 679 9576 10.14 0.97
1931 1239 636 718 10204 7.70 0.79
1932 1344 664 769 10958 6.18 0.68
1933 1345 680 775 11028 5.77 0.64
1934 1409 688 803 11452 6.14 0.70
1935 1430 730 827 11755 6.92 0.81
1936 1496 754 862 12260 6.88 0.84
1937 1542 793 894 12706 6.95 0.88
1938 1590 833 928 13168 6.89 0.91
1939 1639 876 963 13648 6.79 0.93
1940 1441 774 848 12011 6.28 0.75
1941 1242 671 733 10373 8.09 0.84
1942 1236 641 719 10210 13.26 1.35
1943 1231 612 706 10047 19.29 1.94
1944 1214 600 695 9897 21.73 2.15
1945 1197 589 684 9747 19.46 1.90
Source: See the text.
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Table 5.14.: Milk Output in Egypt, 1914-1945
Cattle Buffaloes Sheep Goats Total output Milk prices Output value
tons tons tons tons tons piastres/kg LE millions
1914 159602 248590 2644 940 411776 1.47 6.03
1915 146989 235347 2448 824 385608 1.51 5.82
1916 130799 225293 2228 747 359068 1.88 6.73
1917 136691 247431 2616 876 387615 2.64 10.22
1918 137200 249779 2768 655 390402 3.06 11.96
1919 134117 236061 2780 925 373884 3.34 12.49
1920 149082 255985 2668 947 408682 4.90 20.02
1921 158228 282336 3195 1205 444965 4.45 19.82
1922 155271 269627 3051 1121 429070 3.79 16.25
1923 167652 287034 3118 1138 458942 3.56 16.35
1924 182992 317973 3514 1291 505771 3.56 18.02
1925 179901 316186 3535 1292 500915 3.34 16.73
1926 191621 333764 3705 1505 530596 3.23 17.14
1927 196344 331476 3992 1767 533579 3.01 16.04
1928 210211 344854 3822 1558 560445 3.01 16.85
1929 212611 359770 3248 2077 577705 3.01 17.37
1930 206030 347940 3658 1829 559457 2.90 16.20
1931 210309 358563 4015 1806 574693 2.78 16.00
1932 241316 385955 4355 1886 633512 2.23 14.11
1933 242141 374647 4357 1930 623075 2.00 12.49
1934 245377 388186 4565 1955 640083 1.89 12.12
1935 253041 393187 4632 2073 652933 1.89 12.36
1936 276561 407767 4847 2143 691318 1.89 13.09
1937 285411 418777 4997 2252 711437 1.89 13.47
1938 294544 430084 5152 2367 732147 1.89 13.86
1939 303970 441696 5312 2487 753465 1.89 14.26
1940 283571 423177 4668 2197 713613 1.89 13.51
1941 263172 404659 4024 1906 673761 2.12 14.26
1942 280161 401087 4006 1822 687075 3.01 20.66
1943 297150 397516 3987 1737 700390 4.23 29.64
1944 304923 419162 3933 1705 729722 5.12 37.38
1945 312696 440808 3879 1672 759055 5.12 38.88
Source: See the text.
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Table 5.15.: Wool Output in Egypt, 1914-1945
Output Output value Estimated average
raw wool price
Tons LE Million LE/kg
1914 1771 0.83 0.47
1915 1639 0.78 0.48
1916 1492 0.90 0.60
1917 1752 1.35 0.77
1918 1854 1.63 0.88
1919 1862 1.72 0.93
1920 1787 2.62 1.47
1921 2140 2.50 1.17
1922 2043 2.08 1.02
1923 2088 2.05 0.98
1924 2354 2.27 0.96
1925 2368 2.16 0.91
1926 2482 2.25 0.91
1927 2674 2.09 0.78
1928 2560 2.18 0.85
1929 2176 2.24 1.03
1930 2450 2.10 0.86
1931 2689 1.99 0.74
1932 2917 1.77 0.61
1933 2918 1.58 0.54
1934 3058 1.56 0.51
1935 3102 1.61 0.52
1936 3246 1.63 0.50
1937 3347 1.87 0.56
1938 3450 1.81 0.53
1939 3557 1.79 0.50
1940 3126 1.76 0.56
1941 2695 1.90 0.71
1942 2683 2.83 1.06
1943 2671 4.11 1.54
1944 2634 5.08 1.93
1945 2598 5.17 1.99
Source: See the text.
6. Estimating Industrial Growth in
Egypt, 1919-1945
6.1. Introduction
Making a comprehensive estimate of output growth in Egyptian industry be-
fore World War II is a difficult task and has never before been attempted.
Hansen has come closest in his attempt to estimate the consumption of several
goods, including cereals, tobacco, sugar and cotton cloth, for some benchmark
years between 1886/87 and 1937, although his coverage was far from repres-
entative of the whole of industry because his main concern was to measure
consumption, rather than output per se.1 Other than that, it is worth men-
tioning two notable studies on the history of Egyptian industry. First, the
monograph on the Egyptian cotton industry written by Andre Eman in 1942
included some output indices of cotton yarn and cloth for the 1930s.2 Second,
Samir Radwan’s detailed long-term study of capital formation in Egyptian
industry and agriculture provides the only estimates of fixed capital for 1882-
1967, which remain the only long-term series to give an indication of industrial
performance for the interwar period.3
The conventional interpretation of Egypt’s industry in the interwar period
was summarised in the Introduction. It draws heavily on anecdotal evidence,
trade statistics for some key commodities and some further fragmentary out-
put evidence, all of which are frequently cited in the main historical texts.
For instance, the output data of some highly capitalised and concentrated
industries like sugar and cement is easy to obtain.4 For other less docu-
1Hansen, Income and Consumption.
2Andre Eman, L’Industrie du Coton en Égypte. Imprimerie de L’Institute Français, 1943.
3Radwan, Capital Formation.
4This kind of data can be found in Aly Ahmed el-Gritly, The Structure of Modern In-
dustry in Egypt. Ph.D thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1947,
pp.233-38; Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.141; and Crouchley, Economic Develop-
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mented branches, like cotton yarn, seed oil and cloth, by contrast, just a few
benchmark figures, usually representing factory output, have been provided.5
Furthermore, trade statistics give an idea of the local consumption of goods
for which Egypt was wholly dependent for imports (like iron products and
machines). An oft-cited work on the development of industry during the war
estimated the domestic share of the supply of some goods by 1939, and these
figures have usually been considered as indicative of the depth of import sub-
stitution over the course of the 1930s.6
However, neither long-term series nor comprehensive benchmark estimates
of industrial output exist to date. This is mainly because, despite the abund-
ance of statistical material for other areas of economy, such as agriculture
and foreign trade, extensive material on industrial activities only began to be
published as late as the World War II period. The first industrial census was
undertaken in 1944, and for the inter-war period the most direct comprehens-
ive industrial data is limited to employment and related statistics published as
part of the population and industrial and commercial censuses of the earlier
years.7 However, as seen in the summary of the results of the population
censuses in Table 6.1, they do not seem to be particularly consistent. Most
remarkably, the share of the population employed in manufacturing, utilities
and construction seems to have declined between 1927 and 1937, which seems
strange because industrialisation is widely believed to have begun in Egypt
during the 1930s.
Industrial activity during World War II, by contrast, has received more
empirical attention. First, there is the estimate of constant price industrial
“value added” for 1939-1945 by Anis.8 His methodology is, however, laden
with ambiguities and appears imprecise – indeed, it just seems to be an index
produced by means of extrapolating backward a 1945 value added estimate by
a low-quality employment index. The second estimate covering 1938-1946 is
ment , pp.227-31.
5Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , p.114; and O’Brien, Egypt’s
Economic System, pp.13-14. Tignor, State and Private Enterprise brings together this
kind of evidence throughout his book, along with various contemporary official estimates
of textile output not cited in other classic works, which will be used in the present
estimate as well. Tignor, State and Private Enterprise, pp.38-39, 52-53, 101, 131, 133.
6UK, Egypt: Review of Commercial Conditions. His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1945.
7Note that the “industrial and commercial censuses” carried out in 1927, 1937 and 1947
and the “industrial censuses” after 1944 were different in methodology and coverage.
8Anis, A Study of National Income.
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Table 6.1.: Composition of Economically Active Population in Egypt (%):
Census Results
1907 1917 1927 1937 1947
Agriculture 68.2 68.0 67.4 69.5 61.6
Mining 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction 11.0 9.9 10.1 8.4 10.4
Trade and Finance 4.7 7.5 8.7 7.5 8.9
Transport and Communication 2.9 3.5 3.7 2.4 3.1
Services 13.0 11.0 9.8 12.0 15.8
TOTAL (Thousands) 3433 4309 5249 5783 6612
Population (Thousands) 11287 12751 14218 15933 19022
Source: Radwan, Capital Formation, p.283. Based on population censuses.
attributed to Ismail Rifaat, although its construction is completely unknown.
Mabro and Radwan maintain that it should be taken seriously, since it seems
to be based on official unpublished sources.9 Another estimate of manufactur-
ing output is provided by Hansen and Marzouk for 1939-1962, but the selected
commodities are not spelled out.10 Then we have the benchmark estimates for
1939 and 1945 suggested by Mead and for 1938 and 1946 by Issawi.11 The first
is based on the output indices of some commodities, which were not stated
explicitly, combined with 1947 value added weights. Issawi based his index
on the output of a number of commodities without an explicit mention of the
index methods he used. Finally, Mabro and Radwan provides a Laspeyres
output index of 24 commodities for 1938-1946, for which direct output data
or suitable proxies are available.12 All these estimates will be discussed and
compared with the present estimates at the end of the chapter. For now, it
should be said that these alternative series seem to agree on around 35-40 per-
cent aggregate output growth during the war, much of which happened thanks
to the substantial contraction of imports at the beginning of the war leading
to a greater use of domestic capacity. However, this initial spurt could not be
9Mabro and Radwan, Industrialisation of Egypt , p.244. Issawi also refers to the same
study. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.143.
10Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , p.117.
11Mead, Growth and Structural Change; and Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.173.
12Mabro and Radwan, Industrialisation of Egypt , p.244. The sectors and the number of
output series for each are as follows: cotton ginning (1), textiles (2), food (5), beverages
(2), tobacco products (1), building material (1), chemicals (6), paper and products
(1), petroleum (4) and mechanical (1). Unfortunately, since no further methodological
details are provided, it is impossible to compare the individual indices and weights with
those produced later in this chapter.
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maintained in the final years of the war due to supply side constraints.13
6.2. Methodology and Data: An Overview
In view of the absence of consistent long-term measures of industrial activity,
this chapter attempts to construct an output index representing the whole
industrial sector for the first time. The time span covers all the interwar period
extending up to the end of World War II, that is, 1919-1945. Ideally, it would
be useful to cover World War I as well, when industrial activities probably
expanded because of the wartime conditions.14 However, the methods and
data used for the present estimates are probably not sufficient to capture this
growth. First, some of the series used do not go back as far as the 1910s.
Second, some of the assumptions made in the construction of the series for
the 1920s probably do not reflect the extraordinary foreign trade conditions
of the war. And last but not least, the import statistics play a key role in our
methodology and unfortunately the discontinuity in some key statistics – for
instance, in silk and woollen textiles – would lead to complications.
The methodology employed is similar to the one employed in the construc-
tion of output indices for Turkish industry in Chapter 3. First, we construct
the individual output indices, both for the main sectors where direct output
data is available and for those where we could construct suitable consumption
proxies. For sugar, vegetable oil and mining output, there is continuous or
interrupted direct output data. For most other sectors (milling, dairy and
cigarette making), raw material consumption measures are used as a proxy.
Finally, for textiles, domestic yarn output is combined with net yarn imports
to get the total yarn consumption, which represents the growth of domestic
textile output. These indices are obtained through a careful examination of
the structure of each industry. In the cases where the domestic raw mater-
ial output is not precisely known, the massive dependence on imports made
the procedure relative easy. Silk cloth is an example of this, as the local
raw silk production was negligible, making the yarn and cloth production
almost exclusively dependent on the import of the raw material. The same
applies to cigarette making, since tobacco was not produced in Egypt, so all
tobacco leaves and manufactured tobacco products were imported. Table 6.2
13Mabro and Radwan, Industrialisation of Egypt , p.81.
14Egypt, Rapport .
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Table 6.2.: Overview of the Sectoral Output Estimates for Egyptian Industry
Sector Proxy measure
Cotton ginning and pressing Raw cotton output
Cotton textiles Cotton yarn consumption
Woollen textiles Woollen yarn consumption
Silk textiles Silk yarn consumption
Cereal milling Wheat and maize consumption
Vegetable oil Cotton seed oil output
Sugar Refined sugar output
Dairy Milk consumption
Tobacco Manufactured tobacco consumption
Mineral extraction Index of petroleum, phosphate, manganese output
Fuel-connected Index of fuel derivatives output
Construction Index of cement, iron, steel, timber consumption
summarises all the measures for the sectors under consideration.
The next step is to combine the individual output series with the estimated
value added shares for three benchmark years: 1927, 1937 and 1944. These
shares are worked out backwards from the value added figures of the 1944
Industrial Census. For the backward projection, we use a combination of
employment, output and price data, depending on how much is available, as
is explained below. Finally, the sectoral value added at 1944 prices is obtained
by extrapolating the estimated sectoral value added, based on the results of
the 1944 industrial census, with the sectoral output indices and the sum of
value added in each sector gives the total industrial value added at 1944 prices.
Here the value added breakdown available from the census data determines
the degree of refinement in the value added construction.
The main data sources used throughout the study are the comprehens-
ive Egyptian statistical yearbooks (Annuaire Statistique), the official foreign
trade statistics (both annual and monthly collections), the industrial and ag-
ricultural censuses of 1927 and 1937 and finally the British consular economic
reports, which not only provided valuable extra data and succinct descriptive
notes on the history and structure of various Egyptian industries, but had not
been used extensively elsewhere. All these sources are combined with other
available fragmentary quantitative and qualitative evidence. Inevitably, both
the methodology and data quality are far from ideal, but the degree of impre-
cision remains at an acceptable level, and in order to check the plausibility
of estimates, they are crosschecked with alternative sources and anecdotal
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accounts, whenever such evidence exists.
6.3. Sectoral Output Estimates
6.3.1. Cotton Textiles
Before 1930 local cotton fabric consumption was for the most part dependent
on imported goods as a result of the strong export orientation of the economy.
The share of imported cotton fabrics was no less than 80 percent of total
consumption before the 1930s, as will be shown shortly. In this period, only
a few spinning and weaving factories were operational and handicrafts could
supply only low-quality fabrics for the domestic market by processing both
imported and local yarns.15
The first attempt to build up a modern cotton textiles industry in Egypt
goes back to Muhammed Ali’s ambitious but failed industrial projects in the
first half of the 19th century. Afterwards, around the turn of the 20th cen-
tury, two modern factories were built: one in Cairo with 20,000 spindles by
the Egyptian Cotton Mills Company in 1899 and another in Alexandria by
the Anglo-Egyptian Spinning and Weaving Company.16 Both were intended
to supply coarse yarns spun from domestic cotton for the domestic market.
However, soon after they started their operations, an 8 percent excise tax,
exactly equal to the import duty, was introduced by Lord Cromer, the British
consul-general, in the name of free trade, which totally neutralised the small
tariff protection.17 The former company closed down in 1907 and the latter
only just survived thanks to the excise tax exemption given exclusively to
the company by Lord Cromer’s successor. Nevertheless, in 1912 the surviving
company became the well-known Filature Nationale d’Egypt with additional
German capital and it would go on to become one of the fast-growing textile
15Hansen and Nashashibi argue that the turning point in the history of handicrafts was
the introduction of perennial irrigation and the resulting extension of agricultural work
to the whole year, which consequently limited the idle time of peasants who had other-
wise been devoted to non-agricultural work, particularly in Upper Egypt. Hansen and
Nashashibi, p.208.
16Hansen and Nashashibi, Foreign Trade Regimes, p. 207.
17Whether the excise tax was brought up out of the ideological stance of Lord Cromer or
the Lancashire interests, or both, is a matter of controversy. Hansen and Nashashibi,
Foreign Trade Regimes, p. 207. For a longer discussion, see Roger Owen, Lord Cromer
and the Development of Egyptian Industry, 1883-1907. Middle Eastern Studies, 2(4)
1966.
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companies in the 1930s. By that point, the Bank Misr had already founded a
small factory, Misr Spinning and Weaving Company, at Mahalla and Kubra
in 1927, in anticipation of tariff reform. It too would grow massively dur-
ing and after the 1930s. Haroun views the establishment of this factory as
the most important cause of the huge increase in raw cotton consumption in
Egypt from around 1 percent of the total crop output in 1930/31 to 8 percent
in 1940/41.18 In addition, the Company of Fine Spinning and Weaving was
built in the 1930s, in order to produce the fine yarns that were not produced
by the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company.19
In addition to these factories, there were a large number of handlooms
scattered all over the country. During the 1930s, both existing companies
expanded their operations and new ones were established, but overall the
textile industry became increasingly concentrated. Tignor maintains that the
textile artisans were doomed by the cheap Japanese, Italian and Indian textile
imports and by the rising local modern industry in the 1930s.20 El-Grithly
states more openly that the expansion of the cotton industry was not the result
of a simultaneous growth of all firms, but rather of the spectacular growth of
a few firms controlled by powerful financial interests, particularly in spinning.
This was so much so that the three leading firms in the spinning industry
produced 80 percent of all domestic yarn in 1941.21 Yet market concentration
was not so pronounced in weaving, as the four major firms produced only half
of the output by then.22
A couple of explanations have been put forward for why Egypt’s cotton
industry had remained so underdeveloped before the 1930s, despite the ob-
vious raw material abundance in Egypt. The most prominent is the lack of
protection for the local manufactures.23 Moreover, it has been claimed that
the prohibition of raw cotton imports into the country during 1916-1925 dealt
a blow to cotton textiles because Egyptian cotton was too expensive to be
used for the domestic market. The issue is, however, controversial, as even
18Ali Ahmed Haroun, Cotton in the Egyptian Economy. Institute de Geographie, Universite
Catholique de Louvain, 1979, p.113.
19Haroun, Cotton in Egypt , p.116.
20Robert Tignor, Egyptian Textiles and British Capital, 1930-1956. The American Univer-
sity in Cairo Press, 1989, p.11.
21el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry, p.205; and Eman, L’Industrie du Coton, p.61.
22el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry, p.231.
23A contemporary, Eman, considered the lack of import protection to be the most critical
issue. Eman, L’Industrie du Coton, p.28.
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from the 1930s onwards, mostly the short staples and lower grades of Egyp-
tian cotton were consumed by the local industry.24 And second, as Eman
maintains, the removal of the prohibition in 1925 did not cause any visible
revival in domestic textiles.25
Most importantly, the conventional view on the issue lacks the fundamental
output series, as the available evidence is limited mostly to factory output
after 1930 and a few benchmark estimates of the number of looms and out-
put. Three sets of reports were produced on the state of Egyptian textiles
between 1910 and 1925.26 The first set was published in L’Egypte Contem-
poraine by Sydney Wells, the Director of Agricultural, Industrial and Com-
mercial Education in Egypt, based on the detailed reports of inspectors in
the major handicrafts centres, such as Qalyubia, Fayoum and Daqahlia.27 Al-
though these reports are not fully exhaustive, they provide the number of
looms, wages, raw materials used, prices and types of fabric produced. The
second set was part of the comprehensive report of the Egyptian Commission
on Commerce and Industry published in 1918.28 Unfortunately, the latter is
not as detailed as Wells’ reports, as they only provide only a general out-
look for textiles, largely repeating the results of the 1907 population census.
And thirdly, after World War I the Ministry of Commerce and Industry sent
out inspectors to report on local manufacturing centres and their reports for
1922/23 were published in Sahifa el-Tiraja after 1924.29
Table 6.3 brings together the estimates in these reports with some other
estimates that can be found elsewhere, such as in the British consular reports.
The table gives a sense of the direction in which Egyptian textiles moved. It
seems that both the number of looms and total fabric output increased during
the 1920s by slightly less than half, but it is not easy to figure out which sector
of textiles (that is, cotton, wool or silk goods) was responsible for this since
the comparable figures for 1930 do not exist. Yet, if the output composition
had not changed between 1922/23-1930, then the cotton fabric production
24Brown argues that 80 percent of local consumption was Ashmouni and Zagora, two short
staple varieties of the crop. Brown, Egyptian Cotton, pp.151-53.
25Eman, L’Industrie du Coton, p.30.
26Tignor, Egyptian Textiles, p.10-11.
27Sidney H. Wells, Note Préliminaire sur L’Industrie du Tissage en Egypte. L’Égypte Con-
temporaine, 1910; Sidney H. Wells, L’Industrie du Tissage en Egypte. L’Égypte Con-
temporaine, 1911.
28Egypt, Rapport .
29Tignor, Egyptian Textiles, pp.8-11.
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Table 6.3.: Existing Benchmark Estimates for Egyptian Textiles
1907 1922/23 1930 1936 1938
Looms Looms Output Yarn spun Looms Output Output Output
1000 m2 tons 1000 m2 1000 m2 1000 m2
Cotton 9,000 15,000 3184.5 76,000 96,250
Wool 2,000 4,000 228.1
Linen 300 500 51
Silk 2,000 3,000 252.1
Total 8,750 13,300 22,500 20,000 30,000
Sources: 1907: Egypt, Rapport , p.110; 1922/23: Tignor, State and Private Enterprise, p.38; 1930: L.B.S.
Larkins, Economic Conditions in Egypt. Department of Overseas Trade, UK, 1931, p.54 (this was also
repeated in Ali Soliman, L’Industrialisation de l’Égypte. Bosc Freres, M. et L. Riou, 1932, p.151; an
alternative total predicted number of looms for 1931 is 16,000 by Eman, L’Industrie du Coton, p.104;
1936: Crouchley, Economic Development , p.228 (handicrafts are responsible for half of this figure, around
35-40 million m2); 1938: C. Empson, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt.
Department of Overseas Trade, UK, 1939, p. 43 (handicrafts production is 30 million m2).
should have been around 20 million m2, which implies that the output increase
would have been around five times over the course of the 1930s, since the total
cotton fabric produced attained almost 100 million square meters by 1938.30
Thus, these available figures are used here to crosscheck the plausibility of
our independent indices.
The present output series is based on the direct raw cotton consumption
by local looms, originally estimated by the National Bank of Egypt.31 These
figures reflect cotton consumption by the mechanised spinning mills, which
were located in Alexandria until 1930 and in both the interior regions and
Alexandria afterwards. We combine these raw consumption figures with the
yarn imports to arrive at the total yarn consumption, while allowing for a 20
percent weight loss during spinning.32 To show the importance of imports, it
suffices to say that they formed more than half of the total yarn consumption
before 1930 and quickly declined afterwards, in line with the massive import
substitution in spinning. We then take the three-year moving average of the
30Eman refers to the estimate made by a Lancashire mission for 1938 and points out that
another assessment was made on the same occasion for 1939. The forecast was 130 mil-
lion square meters with the following shares: Misr Spinning and Weaving Company 65
million, Filature Nationale 35 million and handicrafts 30 million m2. He also provides an
enumeration for the war period, estimating the total number of working and registered
looms at around 29,000. Eman, L’Industrie du Coton, pp.90, 105.
31Haroun, Cotton in Egypt , pp.145-46.
32Eman, L’Industrie du Coton, p.70. He suggests that the waste in spinning varies greatly
with the raw cotton type, equipment used and the type of yarn spun. Nonetheless, the
concern of the spinners to keep competitive led to the use of low quality cottons, and
thus a consistently higher rate of waste. Overall, the waste is reported at between 12
and 35 percent.
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total yarn consumed, considering inventory changes. Lastly, we get fabric
consumption by deducting the annual changes in the year-end inventories of
the cotton fabrics, which are only available between 1928 and 1945, from the
aggregate local yarn consumption combined with the fabric imports.33
The downside of this procedure is that it ignores the hand-spun yarn pro-
duced in the countryside. However, the anecdotal evidence indicates that in
the local centres many handlooms mainly consumed either imported yarn of
Indian, British or American origin or mechanically spun yarn from domestic
cotton.34 However, there is no reliable indicator of the share of hand spun
yarn. If one takes the total yarn spun figure referred to by Tignor for 1922/23
(3,200 tones) and compares our mechanically-spun yarn figure (around 2,000
tons) for the 1922/23 period, the difference might be indicative of the size
of handicraft spinning. This would suggest that hand-spun yarn was roughly
500-1,500 tons, which remains in the range of 10-25 percent of total yarn
consumption for those years. It could therefore be argued that our local yarn
series only slightly underestimates total yarn consumption in the 1920s, which
keeps the error margin reasonably acceptable. However, one should consider
that both Tignor’s and our figures have relatively large error margins, so it
is almost impossible to make a definitive judgement based on them. Never-
theless, one can reasonably argue that the hand-spun yarn output declined
over the course of the 1930s due to the intensifying concentration in spinning,
although the degree of such a decline is totally unknown.
Figure 6.1 clearly indicates the spectacular expansion of fabric output in
the 1930s. Output, measured by total domestic yarn consumption, was rather
stable around 5,000 tons during 1919-1930, but the 1930s witnessed a strong
upward trend. Overall, it had increased by around four times by 1939. This
trend was maintained in the first half of World War II. At the same time, there
33The year-end inventories in the public warehouses were reported in each volume of An-
nuaire Statistique. Before 1921, some fabric types were recorded in weight and the rest
in length. To get a single weight figure, the items recorded in length are assumed to
have had the same weight distribution as in 1930. In the 1930 classification, all cotton
fabrics are classified according to their average weight per m2: 140 grammes or heav-
ier, 110-140, 90-100, 70-90, 50-70, 30-50 and 30 grammes or lighter. The midpoints of
these brackets are used to make the length-weight conversions for the pre-1921 period.
Furthermore, a relatively small amount of mixed textiles made of cotton and silk is not
taken into account, since these were usually recorded in length and there is no explicit
way to turn the figures into cotton-equivalent.
34Wells’ cited reports are particularly informative in this connection and also see Eman,
L’Industrie du Coton, p.28.
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Table 6.4.: Cotton Textiles in Egypt (Tons), 1918-1946
Consumption
of raw
cotton
Import of
cotton
yarn
Cotton
yarn
output
Fabric
imports
Total
cotton
textile con-
sumption
Per capita
consump-
tion
(kg)
1918 2559 2859 5344
1919 1527 2907 4774 23463 28238 2.16
1920 2200 3132 4754 27266 32020 2.42
1921 2470 3193 4633 23039 27672 2.07
1922 3188 2618 5083 24878 29961 2.22
1923 2110 3153 4976 27479 32455 2.38
1924 2559 2944 5093 24274 29367 2.13
1925 2604 2897 4708 29372 34079 2.44
1926 2649 2463 4902 21787 26689 1.89
1927 2470 3097 4805 28785 33590 2.35
1928 2784 2676 5209 26266 31475 2.18
1929 2021 3531 5012 28976 33408 2.29
1930 2919 3009 5043 26630 30737 2.08
1931 4984 2409 4955 20431 26551 1.78
1932 8531 1508 5960 24343 30901 2.05
1933 11494 815 7591 26962 34375 2.25
1934 11764 441 9123 24681 33185 2.15
1935 17736 681 11336 25962 38613 2.47
1936 19621 92 12652 22600 34047 2.15
1937 22944 -2113 15424 22915 36981 2.31
1938 25593 53 17556 16956 35586 2.17
1939 29365 201 20838 9775 31724 1.91
1940 33810 -62 24068 7248 32689 1.94
1941 38345 1050 27565 7172 33989 1.98
1942 40006 491 30382 8950 39578 2.27
1943 39288 -124 31531 1708 33171 1.86
1944 43418 117 32742 365 33851 1.87
1945 47010 66 34718 830 34975 1.89
1946 52443 200 37808
Notes: Total raw cotton consumption (column 3) is the three-year moving average of the
sum of cotton yarn imports and local raw cotton consumption multiplied by 0.8. Total
fabric consumption (column 5) is the sum of fabric imports and cotton yarn output. See
the text for details.
was a progressive decline in cloth imports – so much so that the market shares
of domestic and imported goods were almost equal by 1938. Nonetheless, this
impressive expansion did not translate into any improvement in per capita
consumption. Fabrics consumption per capita was between 2 and 2.5 kg
during much of the 1920s, but it declined slightly during the 1930s. Import
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Figure 6.1.: Cotton Fabrics in Egypt: Output, Imports and Consumption,
1918-1945
Source: Table 6.4.
substitution in textiles thus went hand in hand with stagnation, or a small
contraction, in per capita consumption, probably due to the fall in incomes in
the 1930s and possibly also as a result of rising domestic textile prices, which
might have been driven up by the higher import duties.
How plausible are these findings? They actually turn out to be very close to
the textile output figures for 1938-1945 published in Annuaire Statistique.35
For the earlier years, the available output figures of the major firms are usually
stated in length terms, so it is difficult to compare them. However, the growth
rates show how the factory output outpaced aggregate growth, implying the
contraction in handicrafts. For instance, the aggregate output increased by
around 4-5 times between 1930 and 1938, but the factory output grew by 11
35Egypt, Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique, 1944/45, p.452. This “official”
estimate seems to use a similar method, yet our series follows it with a one year lag,
since the raw cotton consumption figures in a year is here taken forward one year due
to the need for seasonal correction, given that the raw cotton consumption figures are
given for cotton seasons, which do not overlap with the import statistics. For instance,
the consumption figure for the 1924-25 season stands in this estimate for the year 1925.
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times over the same period.36 Aside from this, the estimates of yarn and cloth
output by the National Bank of Egypt for 1938 employ a similar methodology
and find similar figures of yarn and cloth output.37 Again, the yarn output
figure referred to by Crouchley for 1936, 36 million lbs (16,380 tons) of yarn,
is within the reasonable range of our estimate (14,279 tons).
6.3.2. Woollens
In Egypt, wool was consumed in much smaller amounts than cotton because
the country’s hot climate made wool unsuitable for cloth making. What is
more, cotton goods were cheaper than woollens,38 the shortage of pasture in
the country contributed to the backwardness of sheep husbandry and local
wool types were suitable only for the production of rugs and carpets, so that
most of the fabrics, blankets, covers and ready made cloths were either impor-
ted or woven of imported woollen yarn of finer quality.39 Eman’s prediction of
the consumption of different types of textiles in 1939 indicates how cotton was
much more in demand: 32,000 tons of cotton textiles were consumed against
1,864 tons of woollens, 600 tons of natural silk, 2,000 tons of artificial silk and
600 tons of linen.40
Most of the spinning was undertaken by a large number of peasants in
Upper Egypt and in the 1920s two spinning factories were established to
produce coarse yarns for rug making.41 Apart from this, there is no record of
any sustained effort to development a modern woollen industry. Unlike in the
case of cotton textiles, World War II probably did not bring much change in
the output level: one very rough prediction of output capacity indicates that
the pre-war output level was 1,600 tons, of which 700 tons were blankets, with
the rest being knitted goods, suiting and hats and the war brought about only
36G.H. Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt. Department
of Overseas Trade, UK, 1937, p.115; Empson, Report on the Economic and Commercial
Conditions in Egypt , p.43; and Eman, L’Industrie du Coton, p.136.
37Tignor, Egyptian Textiles, p.115. Local yarn output are 20,500 and 49,700 tons in 1938
and 1948. The corresponding cloth output figures are 20,300 and 48,700 tons.
38Eman, L’Industrie du Coton, p.131.
39Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.118.
40Eman, L’Industrie du Coton, p.131-32. Of the total figure of woollens, only 300 tons
were of domestic wool, though whether this figure represents the raw wool, woollen
yarn or textiles is unclear. One can therefore infer that the domestic market was largely
supplied by imported woollens.
41UK, Report of the United Kingdom Trade Mission to Egypt. Department of Overseas
Trade, UK, 1931, p.56.
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“some increase”.42 The only direct indication of the local output of woollens
is the one Tignor referenced for 1922/23, according to which 2,000 handlooms
produced 4 million square meters of finished goods and 228 tons of yarn were
spun (Table 6.3).43
The present output estimate therefore relies on the greasy wool series, which
was estimated in the previous chapter as part of livestock output. We deduct
the exports of “wool in grease” and “washed or scoured” wool, as reported in
the official trade statistics, to arrive at the domestic available raw wool. How-
ever, the category “washed wool” does not precisely match with the “clean
wool” category that we used in the chapter on Turkish industry, where we
assumed an average of 40 percent weight loss during the wool washing. The
average price differential over 1930-1937 between the “wool in grease” and
“wool washed or scoured” in the export statistics is only 1.05, so we take this
price differential as an indication of the average weight difference between
“wool in grease” and “wool washed or scoured”, whatever it means. Then we
turn all these figures into the greasy wool equivalent and then a 40 percent
weight loss is applied to the estimated greasy wool series to obtain the avail-
able clean wool. After taking the three-year moving average of the clean wool
net of exports to take into account the inventory changes, we add the net
imports of woollen yarn to obtain the total domestic consumption of woollen
yarn. A 10 percent loss is then allowed during spinning. Finally, the estim-
ated woollen goods are added to the imports of such goods (pure and mixed
woollen cloths, including blankets and carpets) to get the total consumption
of woollen goods.44
42UK, Report of the United Kingdom Trade Mission to Egypt .
43Tignor, State and Private Enterprise
44Throughout, a number of corrections have had to be made because of the modifications in
the commodity classification in the foreign trade statistics. First, the raw wool exports
were not specified separately as greasy or washed before 1930, so for the 1920s the total
raw wool figures are roughly allocated as two thirds greasy and one third washed wool,
based on the ratios in 1930. Second, some woollen fabrics were recorded in length and
the others in weight before 1935. To convert the length figures into weight for the 1920s,
we take the distribution of fabric imports in 1930 as a reference point. For instance,
the 3.3 million square meters of fabric imported in 1929 is allocated according to the
different weight intervals: in 1930 12 percent of the fabrics recorded in length weighed
less than 200 grams per m2, 59 percent between 201 and 350 grams, 20 percent between
351 and 550 grams and 9 percent were heavier than 550 grams per m2; the mean points
of these intervals were taken and multiplied by the respective percentages of the sum of
fabrics. As for 1930-1935, the length figures for each interval are already known, so they
are simply multiplied with the mean points. Third, for the woollen carpets, a different
procedure is followed: a length series was constructed from the import statistics and
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Figure 6.2.: Woollen Textiles in Egypt: Output, Imports and Consumption,
1918-1944
Source: Table 6.5
Figure 6.2 presents the domestic output, imports and average per capita
consumption. A number of patterns can be detected from these estimates.
Following an up-down cycle in the immediate aftermath of World War I, the
output remained around 400 tons until 1930. Thereafter, the remaining period
witnessed a 5.6 percent annual trend growth rate. If the 1924-1930 level is
taken as the reference point of the pre-tariff reform period, the output seems
to have more than doubled by 1939. On the other hand, as we saw in the
case of cotton textiles, the per capita consumption of woollens had a notable
decrease, though with major fluctuations owing to the volatility in imports.
While the consumption per capita was around 0.2 kg in the 1920s, it fell to
below 0.15 kg in the 1930s. The high volatility might in the first place have
been due to the precarious import prices, since unlike cotton goods, the local
consumption remained substantially dependent on imports. In the second
place, the price elasticity of demand was likely to be higher than in the case
then it was turned into a weight series by taking the average carpet weight as 1.61 kg
per m2, which was the average figure between 1930 and 1940.
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of cotton, since it was not an essential consumption good.
Finally, the resulting figures seem to be largely compatible with the only
reliable and relatively precise estimate available, which was made for 1922/23.
We approximate that the amount of woollen yarn spun in 1922 and 1923 was
404 and 261 tones respectively, which are rather close to the 228 tones referred
to in the survey for 1922/23. However, since the exact timing of the survey is
not known, it is hard to push the comparison. That said, the output jumps
in 1931 and 1933 also seem on a par with the upward revised import duties,
which will be discussed in the following chapter. It was stated in the consular
reports that local production increased to supply third- and partly second-
quality blankets for the domestic markets after the 1932 revision.45
6.3.3. Silk
What distinguished the Egyptian silk industry from other textiles is that it
was almost totally dependent on imports of raw materials, that is, of artificial
and natural silk yarn. Local looms manufactured the imported yarn into silk
textiles or mixed it with other fibres, mainly cotton. Local cocoon production
was extremely limited in scale and restricted to a small locality, in Menouef
region, where only 35 tons of fresh cocoons were produced annually in the
early 1930s.46 Since the number of mulberry trees in the region did not
change much between 1929 and 1939 – 600 in 1929 and 728 in 1939 – one can
reckon that the local raw silk production remained fairly small over the whole
period.47 Similarly, artificial silk was not produced at all in Egypt.48
On the output side, there are sources suggesting that the number of silk
looms were around 2,000 and the annual production of silk cloths was about
3 million square meters.49 Since these figures were first cited for 1922/23,
it seems that later sources just referred to the same original source in the
absence of a better alternative. On the other hand, it was also observed that
artificial silk consumption increased to a large extent in the 1930s, which is
45Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.97.
46Egypt, Almanac. Cairo: Government Press Publications Office, 1933, p.190.
47Egypt, Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Census 1929; Egypt, Ministry of Agriculture,
Agricultural Census 1939.
48Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.75.
49Tignor, State and Private Enterprise, p.38; Soliman, L’Industrialisation, p.151; Selous,
Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.116; and UK, Egypt:
Review of Commercial Conditions, p.38.
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was not obvious in the numbers of looms but could be clearly seen in the
increasing amount of imported artificial silk.50 Subsequently, World War II
led to a dramatic change, whereby most of the looms were converted to cotton
due to the foreign supplies being cut off. One study of the change in the local
capacity points out that around 80 percent of domestic capacity was converted
into cotton with the local silk weaving output being reduced to around 400
tons during the war.51
Mechanised weaving also made some progress. Bank Misr bought a factory
in Damietta that had originally been founded in 1849. It imported the first
power loom in 1920 and then became the Misr Silk Weaving Company in
1927. The factory started large-scale operations after the tariff reform in
1930, manufacturing both natural and artificial silk fabrics 52 Despite this
moderate mechanisation in the 1930s, the industry remained predominantly
small scale until the postwar years.
The present output estimate relies almost entirely on the imports of raw
silk and silk yarns. The domestic raw silk output is fixed at 35 tons of fresh
cocoons, as referred to above, which is equivalent to 5.8 tons of raw silk
assuming 1/6 weight loss during the drying of fresh cocoons.53 This figure is
combined with the sum of raw silk and silk yarn, both natural and artificial, to
arrive at total domestic yarn consumption. Note that import statistics do not
report natural and artificial silk yarn before 1925, so we consulted the Italian
foreign trade statistics to get the amount of artificial silk yarn imported into
Egypt, since Italy was by far the principal exporter.54
To get the total consumption of silk goods, the local silk yarn consumed is
then added to the silk yarn fabrics, as per usual. However, the silk fabric stat-
istics are somewhat complicated. All the fabrics of natural and artificial silk
fabrics were reported separately and in weight terms from mid-1932 onward.
In the earlier period, only in 1924 and 1925 were the categories separately
reported, but some goods were reported in length and others in weight terms.
Therefore, since a reliable disaggregation between artificial and natural fab-
50Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.116.
51UK, Egypt: Review of Commercial Conditions, p.38.
52In addition, Usines Textiles Alkashire S.A.E. had 350 looms and there were a few other
smaller factories. Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt ,
p.118; and Egypt, Almanac, p.190.
53For this coefficient, see the construction of the silk output in Turkey in Chapter 3.
54Italy, Ministero Delle Finanze, Movimento Commerciale del Regno d’ItaliaItalia. Roma:
Ministero delle Finanze, 1924 and 1925.
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Figure 6.3.: Silk Textiles in Egypt: Output, Imports and Consumption, 1918-
1945
Source: See Table 6.6. All series represent the sum of natural and artificial silk.
rics cannot be made for the years before 1932, we aggregate both natural and
artificial silk goods for the period for which there is data on value and weight,
that is, 1919-1925 and 1932-1945.55
Figure 6.3 shows that domestic output was smoothly increasing during the
1920s and the following decade gave a further stimulus to the ongoing trend.
However, this massive growth was almost entirely due to the artificial silk
yarn consumption, as seen in its accelerating growth (Figure 6.4). World War
II then saw a phenomenal contraction in the imports of both types of yarn.
On the consumption side, the pattern substantially differs from the cases of
cotton and wool, in the way that both cloth imports and domestic output
massively increased in the first half of the 1930s. It appears that the per
capita consumption increased by around four times between 1925 and 1935,
which came to a halt in the second half of the 1930s but still remained three
times the 1925 level by 1939.
This unparalleled rise in silk goods consumption is particularly impressive
if one considers, first, the depression of the early 1930s and, second, the
55Also for the pre-1932 period as a whole, the output estimates in weight are made by
assuming that the average unit prices of the goods reported in length was the same as
those for the goods reported in weight.
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Figure 6.4.: Natural and Artificial Silk Yarn Consumption in Egypt (Tons),
1918-1945
Source: See the text.
decline in the per capita consumption of other textiles (cotton and woollens) in
Egypt, as demonstrated in the preceding sections. However, this was the case
far beyond Egypt because the world production of raw natural and artificial
silk was on a par with the Egyptian trend: while natural silk output was
rather stable, artificial silk output increased by almost six times between 1915
and 1936.56 As for artificial silk final goods, world output made remarkable
progress during the depression, with the US and Japan making the biggest
leaps and some other developing countries like Greece and Romania following
suit.57 Taking notice of this worldwide expansion, in 1935 the League of
Nations argued that “during recent years, artificial silk, benefiting by constant
technical progress, reduced prices and the favour of consumers has tended to
compete more and more with the older textiles – silk, cotton and wool –
especially in the knitting branch of the industry”.58 Federico also shows that
the growth in the world consumption of artificial silk by far exceeded that
56League of Nations, World Production and Prices 1936/37. Geneva, 1937, p.100.
57League of Nations, World Production and Prices 1935/36. Geneva, 1936.
58League of Nations, World Production and Prices 1925-1934. Geneva, 1935.
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Table 6.6.: Silk Textiles in Egypt (Tons), 1919-1945
Domestic
raw silk
output
Natural
silk yarn
imports
Artificial
silk yarn
imports
Domestic
total
yarn
con-
sump-
tion
Imports
of silk
fabrics
Total fabric
consump-
tion
Per capita
fabric con-
sumption
(kg)
1919 5.8 186.6 0 153.9 129.3 283.2 0.02
1920 5.8 249.1 0 203.9 200.8 404.7 0.03
1921 5.8 208.7 0 171.6 156.1 327.7 0.02
1922 5.8 200.1 2.5 166.8 177.3 344.1 0.03
1923 5.8 227.0 25.2 206.4 197.6 404.0 0.03
1924 5.8 283.2 59.2 278.6 296.2 574.8 0.04
1925 5.8 240.2 149.6 316.5 258.0 574.5 0.04
1926 5.8 187.2 227.5 336.4 348.4 684.8 0.05
1927 5.8 254.0 287.3 437.7
1928 5.8 235.2 393.7 507.8
1929 5.8 205.0 315.3 420.9
1930 5.8 200.8 498.4 564.0
1931 5.8 146.1 412.1 451.3
1932 5.8 235.0 535.4 621.0
1933 5.8 292.2 643.1 752.9 1386.5 2139.4 0.14
1934 5.8 396.0 961.0 1090.3 1791.5 2881.8 0.19
1935 5.8 399.1 928.4 1066.7 2164.3 3231.0 0.21
1936 5.8 469.1 1099.8 1259.8 1464.0 2723.9 0.17
1937 5.8 537.6 1867.9 1929.1 1138.9 3068.0 0.19
1938 5.8 454.3 1742.9 1762.4 603.2 2365.6 0.14
1939 5.8 381.0 1769.9 1725.5 391.3 2116.7 0.13
1940 5.8 155.1 2221.6 1906.0 252.7 2158.8 0.13
1941 5.8 88.7 2913.4 2406.3 110.0 2516.3 0.15
1942 5.8 14.6 641.1 529.3 226.6 755.9 0.04
1943 5.8 2.8 148.4 125.6 15.8 141.5 0.01
1944 5.8 4.1 113.8 99.0 6.5 105.5 0.01
1945 5.8 26.1 272.2 243.3 49.5 292.8 0.02
Notes: Column 4 is 0.8*(Columns 1+Column 2+Column 3). See the text for details. The import data,
and thus estimates of consumption, is not available for 1927-1932 due to unclear classification in the
foreign trade statistics.
of other fibres between 1913 and 1928.59 All this is in line with Eman’s
argument that artificial silk came to compete with other fibres in the late
1930s in Egypt.60
The relative textile prices might be indicative of different consumption
growth patterns of artificial silk and cotton: Figure 6.5 strikingly shows how
59Federico, Economic History of Silk Industry , p.44.
60Eman, L’Industrie du Coton, p.131.
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Figure 6.5.: Cotton and Silk Cloth Price Indices for Egypt (1919=100), 1919-
1939
Source: See the text.
the relative imports prices changed starting from the mid-1920s. The decline
in prices was more pronounced in silk cloths in the second half of the 1920s
and the relative prices moved against cotton even more markedly in the early
1930s, when silk consumption significantly increased.
6.3.4. Food Processing and Tobacco
Food-related industries by definition cover a wide array of activities related
to the preparation and transformation of domestic or imported agricultural
produce. Direct output is usually unobserved, except for in a few branches,
such as sugar and tobacco. We therefore use the most apparent raw mater-
ial consumption in other branches as a proxy for output. Dairy production
is measured by the total milk output, which was estimated in the previous
chapter.
Milling
Grain milling output is measured by wheat and maize consumption. Direct
output data is impossible to obtain due to the presence of a large number of
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mills of different sizes scattered throughout the country. The modern factories
were built after protective tariffs were introduced in 1932, when the increasing
amount of acreage came to be devoted to wheat to the effect that Egypt
became almost self-sufficient.61 Evidence for this comes from the way in
which in 1932 Egypt stopped importing large amounts of flour, which had
been typical of the earlier years.
Our annual proxy is thus the wheat and maize output net of the seeds re-
quired for the following year plus the net wheat and maize imports. When
these figures are added to the net imports of wheat flour and divided by the
total population, as the official index does, we obtain the per capita cereal
consumption. Each Annuaire Statistique volume includes an estimate of an-
nual wheat and maize consumption, based on crop output, foreign trade and
seeding requirements. This official estimate assumes zero inventory change,
which can be justified by the fact that the yearly changes in the public ware-
houses were so small in comparison with the aggregate consumption. The
results appear to be consistent with the long-term decline in textile consump-
tion: while around 200 kg wheat and maize per capita were consumed in the
1920s, the 1930s witnessed a small decline to around 160-170 kg. As for the
domestic output, it went up from roughly 2.5 million tons to 3 millions by
1929 and then returned to the early 1920s level (Figure 6.6). What drove a
wedge between consumption and output was the cereal imports in the 1920s,
which came to an end in the 1930s.
Sugar
Sugarcane had been produced in Egypt since the Middle Ages, but the in-
dustry’s development began in earnest in the 1860s when world cotton prices
collapsed, which made Khedive Ismael look for alternative crops.62 Follow-
ing the subsequent downturn in the first decade of the 20th century, the
industry was revitalised during World War I and the total area under sug-
arcane remained around 50,000 feddans during the 1920s. Afterwards, the
upward revision of the import tariff in 1930 and 1932 and later World War
61Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , pp.105-06. The
report argues that the new mills on the one hand enjoyed tariff protection and on the
other suffered from the stocks depreciated by the government from time to time.
62For a brief history of Egypt’s sugar industry, see Hansen and Nashashibi, Foreign Trade
Regimes, pp.228-29.
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Figure 6.6.: Milling: Output and Consumption
Source: Table 6.12.
II gave it further stimulus, which can be observed in the increasing acreage
under sugar cane, particularly after the mid-1930s. Yet the most important
development in the domestic market occurred in February 1931, when the
government signed a convention with the Société Générale des Sucrecies et
de la Raffinerie d’Egypte, which had been established in 1892 and was then
the biggest producer. This convention reserved for the company the exclusive
right to sell sugar for five years, which was later to be extended.63 Thus,
in 1931 the sugar market practically turned into a strongly protected quasi-
monopoly. Furthermore, government supervision was most strongly felt in the
sugar industry: next to import protection, the government was authorised to
set the acreage under sugarcane, prices (both consumer and farm gate) and
import quotas.64
Before 1931, then, refined sugar was produced in a few modern factories in
Upper Egypt, while small local enterprises supplied molasses and brown sugar
63Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.112.
64Hansen and Nashashibi, Foreign Trade Regimes, p.228.
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Figure 6.7.: Refined Sugar in Egypt: Output and Consumption, 1918-1945
Source: Table 6.13.
of low quality, mainly for the domestic market in various localities.65 The
total refined sugar and molasses produced by Société Générale were reported
in each volume of Annuaire Statistique, yet the period before the convention
was signed remains obscure due to the lack of data on the sugar and molasses
produced by the smaller firms. For this reason, the production of Société
Générale in the 1920s would underestimate the aggregate figure for that dec-
ade, leading to an overestimation of the output growth rate over the whole
period. Instead, the most reasonable method to get a reliable output series
is to use sugarcane consumption to proxy the change of output before 1931.
To do this, the total sugar cane output is combined with the imports of raw
sugarcane, since exports were negligible. This sugarcane consumption estim-
ate turns out to be very well compatible with the the output of the Société
Générale between 1931 and 1940 with the acceptable variation due to the neg-
lect of stocks, making it a suitable proxy. Hence, the refined sugar output of
Société Générale in 1932 is extrapolated backward with the three-year mov-
ing average of sugarcane consumption. This yields a more reasonable pattern
65Hansen, Income and Consumption, p.38.
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where the output was stable around 100,000-120,000 tones prior to 1930, and
the 1930s witnessed a moderate rise in output (Figure 6.7). Furthermore, we
calculate the aggregate refined sugar consumption by taking into account the
refined sugar imports and the inventory changes of Société Générale.66 The
resulting per capita consumption fluctuates between 6 and 10 kg per person
with relatively high volatility, which might have been due to the high price
elasticity of demand. Yet overall consumption had a small upward trend,
thanks to the additional wartime demand in the 1940s.
Vegetable Oils
In Egypt cotton not only provided the main textile fibre but was also the
main source of vegetable oil. According to the available figures, 72 percent
of domestic vegetable oil in 1938 and 92 percent in 1939 was produced from
cotton seed, the rest was obtained from linseed, sesame and castor.67 In
addition, a large amount of olive, coconut, castor and linseed oil, among
others, were imported to complement the insufficient local production.
The domestic cotton seed oil was partly exported and partly used for ali-
mentary purposes and soap making.68 By the late 1930s, all cotton seed was
pressed in hydraulic presses and the yield was 20 percent oil, with the rest
being the cotton seed cake, which was a valuable cattle food and mainly ex-
ported to Europe.69 The direct output of cotton seed oil for 1925-29, 1931 and
the post-1933 years is obtained from the British consular economic reports
and the official statistics.70 To estimate the data for missing years (1919-1924,
1930 and 1932), a separate index based on cotton seed consumption is con-
structed. This index is calculated as the sum of total cotton seed output and
the stocks in Alexandria taken over from the previous year minus the seed
used in sowing in the following year, exports and finally the stocks forwarded
to the following year. For the years for which the data exists, except during
wartime, this index behaves very similar to output data, so we complete the
66The year-end inventories were reported in Annuaire Statistique.
67Empson, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.51.
68In soap making, the cotton seed, coconut and palm oils were mixed with caustic soda and
olive oil, which was almost entirely imported. Annual domestic olive oil production was
as little as 100 tones because the Egyptian climate was not suitable for olive production.
69Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.119.
70Larkins, Economic Conditions in Egypt , Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial
Conditions in Egypt ; Empson, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in
Egypt ; and Annuaire Statistique, 1944/1945.
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Figure 6.8.: Cotton Seed Oil in Egypt: Output and Consumption, 1919-1945
Source: Table 6.14.
estimation by extrapolating the 1925 figure backward, and for 1930 and 1932
from 1930 forward with the index.
The resultant series suggests slightly expanding production over the 1920s
(Figure ). Then it almost halved between 1930 and 1933 and recovered to
the 1930 level by the end of decade. As for consumption, we add the imports
of all kinds of vegetable oil (olive, coconut, linseed and the rest) and get
the aggregate figures: it seems the per capita consumption moved much in
parallel with domestic output. This was mainly because of the fact that, first,
imports were small compared to local production and, second, there was not
a significant contraction in imports in the years before World War II, unlike
in the case of other commodities.
Tobacco
Cigarette making in Egypt was perhaps the most well-established branch of
manufacturing, which is reflected in the total capital invested, the number of
workers and degree of mechanisation. Since tobacco cultivation was forbidden
for fiscal reasons, the producers depended totally on tobacco imports, so the
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Figure 6.9.: Tobacco Processing in Egypt: Output and Consumption, 1919-
1945
Source: Table 6.15.
latter can serve as a perfect proxy for the output of the industry. The local
factories, which were usually located in Cairo and Alexandria, mainly supplied
the domestic market.71 Modern facilities were installed in the factories, and
the traditional way of manufacturing was restricted only to certain types of
luxury brands.72
Here we measure the output by using the foreign trade data in the same way
that Hansen does: all imported tobacco leaves and manufactured tobacco is
taken to represent the production, without allowing for any weight difference
between them.73 Note that this sum perfectly moves with the withdrawals
from the public warehouses, which are reported in Annuaire Statistique. This
suggests that inventory changes were not likely to have been substantial. For
consumption, the cigarette exports and the imports of cigars and cigarettes
were deducted from the local output. In this way, we find that the annual
71Larkins, Economic Conditions in Egypt ; and UK, Report of the United Kingdom Trade
Mission to Egypt , p.53.
72Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , pp.96-97.
73Hansen, Income and Consumption.
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Table 6.7.: Consumption Per Capita in Egypt: Trend Growth Rates (%),
1919-1944
1919-1939 1919-1944
Cotton textiles -0.2 -0.5
Woollen textiles -1.1 -2.6
Refined sugar 0.4 0.4
Wheat and maize -0.1 -0.4
Vegetable oils 0.6 1.2
Tobacco products -3.2 -0.7
Source: See the text for details. Log of consumption per capita figures are regressed over time trend.
output was around 8,000 tons during the 1920s, which thereafter diminished to
6,000 tones in the 1930s (Figure 6.9). As expected, it surged massively during
World War II, up to 12,000 tones by the end of it. Since cigarette exports
made up a small portion of production, around 2-5 percent, consumption
behaved almost identically as production.
At this point, it would be reasonable to examine how the consumption of
textiles and food products changed over time. Table 6.7 brings together the
trend growth rates of per capita consumption of all the goods that have been
estimated so far, for 1919-1939 and 1919-1944 separately. As seen in the
table, the most widely consumed goods, that is, cotton and cereals (wheat
and maize), had negative trends, -0.2 and -0.1 percent per year respectively,
between 1919 and 1939. Tobacco and woollen consumption contracted more
severely (-3.2 and -1.1 percent respectively). On the other hand, sugar and
vegetable oil consumption had small positive trends. Overall, all the con-
sumption curves moved within a narrow range, even though the resulting
trend rates varied from one to another. Other than this, the estimated trends
for the period extending up to 1944 show the impact of the war on con-
sumption: textiles and cereals consumption declined even more during the
war, whereas the trend in vegetable oils and tobacco consumption recovered
slightly. Overall, it seems that these consumption figures more or less con-
firm the stagnant per capita income hypothesis put forward in the Egyptian
economic historiography.
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6.3.5. Other Industries
Minerals and Oil Processing
Mineral extraction did not occupy an exceptional place in Egyptian industry
prior to World War II. The leading locally produced minerals were crude
petroleum, phosphates and manganese ore.74 The exploration and refining of
petroleum were still in their infancy in the pre-World War II period and total
output was lower than the country’s consumption, so a large amount of oil
derivatives, such as kerosene and benzine, were imported.75
The present mining output index is constructed by combining the output of
three minerals, reported in Annuaire Statistique, with the fixed price relatives
for 1938. The reason for not deriving a more suitable price-weighted output
index is the absence of manganese ore prices. Accordingly, the average prices
of phosphate, petroleum and manganese in 1937 are as follows: 0.8, 1.22 and
1.34 per unit.76 Figure 6.10 shows the three output indices (in metric tons)
and the resultant fixed-price output index. As is seen there, the aggregate
index is dominated by the petroleum and, to a lesser degree, phosphates, due
to their large shares, and particularly by petroleum because of its outstanding
output growth rates and the associated slump in the others during World War
II.
As for oil processing, the domestic and imported petroleum were refined
in the two refineries and turned into derivatives, mainly benzine, kerosene,
fuel oil and asphalt. The output figures of all of them are available in An-
nuaire Statistique for 1926-1945. These quantity series are combined with the
corresponding import prices to produce a Laspeyres quantity index with the
base year as 1937. For the pre-1926 period, this quantity index is extrapolated
backward with total crude petroleum output, which is the only suitable proxy.
It can be noted that all these except fuel oil seem to follow a common mod-
erately upward increasing pattern. Also, the massive increase in petroleum
production led to the huge increases in fuel oil output, in particular during
World War II.
74These three created more than half of the total value of mining in 1938. Anis, A Study
of National Income, p.378.
75Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields Limited owned the oil drills and one refinery in Suez, while
another refinery was owned by the Egyptian government.
76Anis, A Study of National Income, p.378.
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Figure 6.10.: Mining Output in Egypt, 1919-1945
Source: Tables 6.16 and 6.17.
Construction
Construction activity is measured by an index of the consumption of iron,
steel, cement and timber. The term construction here refers mainly to urban
building activity and public works, such as irrigation and drainage works,
where these products were basically consumed.77 Egypt was at the time
completely deficient in iron sources and lacked sufficient forests for building
and industrial purposes, making the country almost entirely dependent on
imports.78 All of these items except for cement were mainly imported from
abroad, so the import volumes give a direct measure of domestic activity.79
77Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.95.
78“Survey of material resources and industry in Egypt and Sudan”, National Archives,
FO/371 20898.
79The unit of imported timber changed in 1930 from volume (m3) to weight (metric tons).
To make the adjustment, we use the data of January-February 1930 with the older
classification, and the rest of the 1930s with the new classification. First we make an
estimate of timber imports in weight, based on the assumption that the average unit
price was constant during the year, by dividing the total import value during January-
February 1930 with the average prices per metric gross ton in the rest of the year. Then
we obtain the volume-weight conversion for these two months by dividing the estimated
weight by the import volume. This gives a coefficient of 0.41 metric ton/m3, which we
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As for cement, the local production was quite substantial and progressed
substantially in the 1930s. The first factory was founded in 1895 by Société
Anonyme des Ciments d’Egypte (a Belgian concern), and were joined by an-
other owned by a Swiss group in 1927.80 These firms merged in 1930 and
created an oligopolistic structure with government aid.81 Local output was
around 24,000 tones during World War I and the figures for 1925 and after are
obtained from various British consular reports.82 Cement output saw a phe-
nomenal expansion in the 1930s: it grew by around five times between 1929
and 1938 and kept increasing thereafter at a more moderate pace, all of which
was accompanied by a decline in imports. Hansen and Nashashibi argues that
the 15 percent duties placed on imported cement led to the disappearance of
imports and it was complemented by an excise tax at the outset of the war.
In the present estimate, the local output is added to cement imports, which
yield total cement consumption.83
A Laspeyres quantity index is then constructed based on three consumption
series (cement, iron and steel and timber) and the average import prices of
the base year 1937.84 The choice of import prices as weights is due to the fact
that not much is known about the shares of value added of each raw material
in the total value added of the whole of construction. Thus, for simplicity it
is assumed that each item contributes to the total value added in proportion
to their relative cost. Moreover, since stocks are not visible, we have used
the three-year moving averages of the consumption figures to capture stock
changes. The resulting index shows that total construction activity moved
quite differently from the other branches of industry (Figure 6.11). Much of
use to convert import volumes into weight equivalents for all the earlier years.
80Larkins, Economic Conditions in Egypt , p.51
81For bibliographical information on the structure of the industry and selling arrangements,
see el-Gritly, pp.233-37.
821926-1929: UK, Report of the United Kingdom Trade Mission to Egypt , p.51; 1930-1934:
G.H. Selous, Economic Conditions in Egypt. Department of Overseas Trade, UK, 1935,
p.94; 1936: Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.95-
96; 1937-38: Empson, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt ,
p.48; and finally 1939-1945: Annuaire Statistique, 1944/45, pp.452-53. The 1935 figure
is obtained by a simple interpolation and the 1919-1924 figures are obtained by a simple
linear interpolation between World War I and 1925.
83Hansen and Nashashibi, Foreign Trade Regimes, p.243.
84The foreign trade data does not differentiate between iron and steel imports, so they are
included in the same quantity and price series. In the trade classification the following
items are grouped: bars, rails, sheets, tubes and pipes, structures and nails and screws.
All items are made of iron or steel.
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Figure 6.11.: Consumption of Cement, Timber, Iron and Steel in Egypt, 1919-
1944
Source: Table 6.18
the progress seems to have been made in the 1920s rather than in the following
period. The consumption of all items, and therefore the index, increased in
the 1920s, while the 1930s saw more or less stable activity with ups and downs
after 1930. During World War II, thanks to the domestic production, cement
consumption continued to grow, while the imports of iron, steel and timber
substantially dropped.
6.4. The Aggregate Output Index
Up to this point, we have set out the details of how the sectoral output series
are constructed and now we need to combine them to get a single output
index. The absence of annual indicative price series and value added estimates
leaves constant share weighting the only plausible option. These shares are
here first obtained from the 1944 industrial census and then we do the best
to our capacity to derive the relevant shares for the 1930s and 1920s by using
employment, price and output data.
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In Egypt the first industrial census was carried out in 1944 and was re-
peated every three years thereafter.85 Before that the most direct sources
on industrial activities are the industrial and commercial censuses, carried
out in 1927 and 1937.86 Prior to that, the population censuses provide the
basic employment figures from 1907 onwards every ten years, so sectoral em-
ployment data can, in principal, be traced back to 1907. The classifications
in these censuses are not, however, compatible to an acceptable degree, so
making them compatible requires a considerable degree of guesswork. As for
the additional data on output, costs, salaries, et cetera, the relatively reli-
able data starts from 1944. Thus, we begin with the 1944 industrial census,
which contains the value added data reported at a broadly-defined 41 categor-
ies. Unlike the 1927 and 1937 censuses, this census left out the repair shops,
thereby eliminating a large number of enterprises. As in similar censuses at
the time, there may also have been underreporting, although there is no way
of checking its extent, so we have to assume that the degree of bias in the
reporting of output value and production costs were more or less similar.
To obtain the shares of the undocumented industries, we follow a two-stage
procedure. First, the observed food processing series (milling, sugar, cotton
seed oil and dairy) and textile series (cotton weaving and spinning, wool and
silk) represent the whole broad food processing and textile categories. When
this is done, our output series appears to account all together for 74 percent
of total industrial value added. The remaining undocumented industries are
chemicals, leather, mechanical engineering, utilities and so on. In the second
stage, the available series represent the remaining ones in proportion to their
share in the total of the documented sectors. The value added is calculated
as the output value net of the costs of raw materials, energy and depreciation
of buildings and machines.
The value added distribution in 1944 turns out to be quite reasonable for
a traditional industrial structure: textiles, which does include cotton gin-
ning and pressing, were responsible for around 28 percent of all value added.
85Egypt, Ministry of Finance and Economy, Statistical Department, Census of Industrial
Production, 1944. Government Press, 1947; Egypt, Ministry of Finance and Economy,
Statistical Department, Census of Industrial Production. Government Press, 1952.
86Egypt, Statistical and Census Department, Ministry of Finance, Industrial and Com-
mercial Census, 1927. Cairo: Government Press, 1931; Egypt, Ministry of Finance
and Economy, Statistical Department, Industrial and Commercial Census, 1947. Cairo:
Government Press, 1955.
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Food-processing sectors, meanwhile, had a rather large share (40 percent) and
cigarette making was 12 percent, which makes sense since it was really one of
the most developed sectors in Egypt. However, the value added figures for the
sub-sectors in textiles and food processing are not available. To find the share
of each sub-industry, we calculate the approximate value added by looking at
the share of each sub-sector within textiles and food processing output value,
assuming that the value added was proportional to the total output value. To
approximate the cotton weaving and spinning, woollen and silk output values,
we rely on our own estimation of yarn and fabric output and average import
prices. For food processing, the domestic retail prices in Cairo of flour, cotton
seed oil, sugar and milk are multiplied with the corresponding output figures
obtained above.
Obviously, the sectoral composition might have changed during World War
II due to wartime dislocations. A very striking example of this was the decline
in the silk industry. As a result, using the same shares for the pre-war period
would be wrong. To adjust sectoral shares for the 1930s, the method employed
here is to project the 1944 value added figures back to 1937. To do so, the em-
ployment figures from the 1937 census are matched with a few modifications
(see Table 6.11). Then the value added per worker in each broad category
(see the first column of Table 6.8) is taken back to 1937 by multiplying it
with the number of workers, which gives the value added at 1944 prices. Here
we just assume that worker productivity at constant prices did not change
between 1937 and 1944. After obtaining the value added in broad categories,
we employ the same method as with the 1944 data to get the value added
in each sub-industry, that is, assuming the value added distribution was the
same as the output value distribution. For this, we use the estimated output
values and prices referred to above: the average cloth import prices and the
domestic retail prices of the relevant commodities (wheat flour, sugar, cotton
seed oil and milk).
As for the 1920s, the employment data provided by the 1927 census cannot
be reliably compared to 1937 or 1944 because both the classifications and the
category definitions changed and it is hard to make them compatible without
a lot of guesswork. We therefore prefer to modify the estimated 1937 shares
using output and price information. Keeping an eye on output and price
changes between 1927 and 1937, the value added at 1944 prices are extended
back to 1927 in proportion to the change of total output value, which is based
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Table 6.8.: Value-Added Shares in Egyptian Industry in 1927, 1937 and 1944
(%)
Broad sectors Sub-industries 1927 1937 1944
Cotton ginning and pressing 11.4 8.0 8.5
Textiles Cotton fabrics 4.5 12.1 14.8
Cotton yarn 3.1 9.8 13.4
Silk 3.5 2.8 0.1
Woollens 2.0 2.2 1.0
Food processing Milling and bakery 32.4 28.0 20.2
Sugar 5.1 8.0 7.7
Vegetable oils 3.7 2.9 4.7
Dairy 3.8 2.6 7.7
Mineral extraction 1.9 2.8 2.9
Construction 8.6 8.5 4.1
Fuel-connected 1.9 3.7 3.1
Tobacco 18.1 8.7 11.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: See the text.
on the assumption that value added moved in parallel with output value.
Again, the output and prices represent the apparent output in each sector.
Taken together, a number of points stand out from the estimated shares for
1927, 1937 and 1944 presented in the Table 6.8. First, these clearly confirm
the increasing importance of cotton-related industries all over the period and
particularly in the 1930s. The relatively high share of cotton ginning and
pressing should be viewed in the context of Egypt’s position in the world cot-
ton market and its huge cotton production and exports, as the overwhelming
proportion of the local raw cotton was ginned and pressed in local factor-
ies and then exported. Second, cigarette making clearly had a special place,
though its share moved with the general trend in consumption, that is, it
declined in the 1930s and picked up during World War II. Third, the decline
of silk during the war and the stagnation and then decline in cereal milling
are clearly reflected in the estimated shares.
Figure 6.12 shows the resulting aggregate output index, along with the
food and textile indices separately (Table 6.19). All of them are constant-
weight indices, with three different weighting schemes used for the 1920s, the
1930s and 1939-1944, as was explained above.87 More generally, three phases
87It should not come as a surprise that the 1937-based index underestimates the fast-
growing industries in the 1920s and 1940s. Precisely for this reason, weights are adjusted
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Figure 6.12.: Final Output Indices for Egyptian Industry: Aggregate, textile
and food processing (1937=100), 1919-1944
Note: All are linked indices with different weighting schemes used for 1919-1929,
1930-1938 and 1939-1944. See Table 6.19.
of industrial development can be detected from these estimates. The slight
improvement in the 1920s, the small downturn at the beginning of the 1930s
and the relentless positive trend thereafter up to mid-World War II. The
trend growth of the aggregate index was 1.3 and 2.4 percent per annum over
1919-1939 and 1919-1944 respectively, whereas the output grew more rapidly
during the 1930s with 4.5 percent per annum (Table 6.9). Nevertheless, this
aggregate picture hides the huge variation in growth rates between textiles
and food-processing industries. The food processing suffered from a long-term
stagnation. In sharp contrast, textiles saw a very strong expansion starting
immediately at the beginning of the 1930s: the trend growth was 7.9 percent
between 1919-1939, and 9.4 percent if the period is extended to cover World
War II. Thus it becomes clear that the industrial expansion of the 1930s
was overwhelmingly due to the textile expansion, while it slightly spread to
the other sectors during the 1930s and World War II. On the other hand, it
should be repeated that this phenomenal rise in textiles was simultaneously
accompanied by the stagnant, if not declining, consumption of manufactures.
to avoid that underestimation.
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Table 6.9.: Trend Growth Rates in Egyptian Industry: Aggregate, Textiles
and Food-Processing, 1919-1944
Period Aggregate output Textile output Food-processing output
1929-1939 4.5 17.3 -0.3
1919-1939 1.3 7.9 0.0
1919-1944 2.4 9.4 0.3
Note: These figures are found by regressing the natural logarithm of the output index on the time trend
and constant.
Table 6.10.: Output Estimates Egyptian Industry, 1938-1945
I II III IV V VI
Anis
(1950)
Raafat
(1949)
Mead
(1967)
Hansen&
Marzouk
(1965)
Mabro&
Radwan
(1976)
Own
estimates
1938 89 87 93
1939 100 100 100 100 100 100
1940 115 106 102 105
1941 141 115 113 114
1942 151 121 119 124
1943 150 122 124 127
1944 154 121 127 127
1945 138 119 195 135 135
Sources: (I), (II), (III), (IV) from Mabro and Radwan, Industrialisation of Egypt , p.245; (V) from Mabro
and Radwan, Industrialisation of Egypt , p.83.
As discussed earlier, there is not any other alternative estimate of aggregate
industrial activity to compare our findings with. But for the World War II
period, at least, there are a couple of alternatives, all of which are presented
in comparison with the present findings in Table 6.10. In particular, Raafat,
Mabro and Radwan and the present estimates are pretty close to each other
and point out 20-30 percent growth between 1939 and 1944. On the other
hand, Mead’s estimate of 95 percent growth between 1939 and 1945 is overly
exaggerated. As for Anis’ 54 percent growth between 1939 and 1944, it is pos-
sibly biased due to the fact that he uses an employment proxy to extrapolate
the 1945 output level backwards, instead of physical output series.
6.5. Conclusion
Charles Issawi once argued that “in the absence of statistics on output, or
of accurate figures on employment, it is difficult to judge the extent of in-
6.5. CONCLUSION 253
dustrial advance” in Egypt before World War II.88 Since then, this absence
has remained the most significant barrier to putting the interwar Egyptian
industrialisation in a historical perspective. Indeed, the data shortage for
industry stands in sharp contrast to the existence of high quality and abund-
ant statistical evidence on agriculture, foreign trade, transportation and so
on, which go back as far as the late nineteenth century. The origins of this
unbalanced statistical development goes beyond the confines this study, but
it should definitely be viewed in relation to the process of state formation
in Egypt, which was characterised by British rule until the early 1920s and
gradual decolonisation thereafter up to the post-war years.
This chapter aimed to fill this empirical gap by constructing the first long-
term output estimates at both aggregate and sectoral level for the major
Egyptian industries. The final aggregate output index is based on 12 indi-
vidual series, which are all produced through a careful examination of each
branch of industry. These individual series are first combined with the fixed
value added shares for 1944 and then these shares are adjusted for 1927 and
1937. Three sets of fixed weights are thus used to combine all the series for
the 1920s, 1930s and the wartime period (Table 6.8).
Until now, the conventional interpretation has viewed the 1930s as the start-
ing point of Egypt’s industrialisation, based largely on fragmentary evidence
that consists of some output data, import statistics and various conjectures.
Our estimates largely confirm this hypothesis: while the aggregate industrial
output grew by 1.7 percent per year in the 1920s, the annual trend growth
rate reached 4.3 percent between 1930 and 1944. Moreover, the trends during
the 1930s and early phase of World War II were quite similar. The small
incremental improvement in the aggregate activity in the 1920s was followed
by a moderate downturn after 1929 for a few years and then there began a
strong upward trend in the mid-1930s, which was intensified in the first half
of the war. Thus, the present estimates provide a more accurate and nuanced
view of industrial growth.
Furthermore, and perhaps equally importantly, these estimates point to a
very striking phenomenon: the disaggregated indices show the huge variation
within Egyptian industry, as the expansion of the post-1930 period turns out
to be predominantly due to textiles growth, which grew by 14.3 percent per
88Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century , p.141.
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year during 1930-1944. Thus, textiles outperformed by far all other branches,
even though most of them also witnessed moderate growth rates. Over the
course of the same period, the food-connected industries, including cigarette
making, grew by only 1.2 percent per year. One should remember that cotton
goods made up a high proportion of textiles output, leading to the fact that
overall industrial growth would have been much slower without the perform-
ance of the cotton sector. It should be noted that, as el-Gritly has pointed
out and as was mentioned earlier, the cotton industry became increasingly
concentrated, as only a few highly capitalised businesses monopolised the
whole sector, mostly at the expense of handicrafts and imports.89 As will
be discussed in the next chapter, import duties would become increasingly
restrictive as a result of the lobbying of these powerful interests.
On the other hand, one might question the plausibility of these findings. To
this end, we have estimated the per capita final consumption of textiles and
other goods, all presented in Table 6.7, and they appear to a large extent con-
sistent with the existing literature: although there is some variation among
the consumption trends of different goods, they have either small negative
(as in the case of cotton textiles, cereals and tobacco) or small positive (as in
the case of vegetable oils and sugar) trends, which in all likelihood support
the received wisdom that the per capita Egyptian income remained stagnant
in the interwar years. Given that the stagnant income hypothesis was also
in accordance with our farm income estimates, the consistency of our estim-
ated consumption figures with the hypothesis reinforces the plausibility of our
output estimates.
89el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry.
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6.6. Data Appendix
Table 6.11.: Industrial Employment in Egypt in 1937
Number Groups Number of employees Derived categories Groups combined
1 Vegetable food connected 47785 Food processing 1,2
2 Animal food connected 3644 Tobacco 4
3 Connected with drinks 1853 Textiles 13, 14, 15
4 Tobacco manufacturing 9058 Fuel connected 5, 21
5 Extraction of oils and fats 3628 Construction 19, 23, 24
6 Chemical industries 3370 Mineral extraction 26, 27
7 Manufacture of paper and articles in paper 2703
8 Printing, book binding and photography 8584
9 Manufacture of rubber 130
10 Manufacture of scientific instrument 2261
11 Miscellaneous manufactures 5937
12 Manufacture of leather and furs 2205
13 Textile industries 48637
14 Manufacture of clothing 30575
15 Manufacture of misc articles of cloths 2253
16 Cleaning of clothes 6254
17 Metallurgy and manufacture of metal articles 17793
18 Manufacture of machine and machine tools 3824
19 Wood working, working in canes and corks 13060
20 Manufacture of transport means 17670
21 Mineral fuel connected 192
22 Generation and distribution of power 11891
23 Preparation of materials of construction 9928
24 Contractors of buildings 7158
25 Contractors of public works 295
26 Exploitation of mines 987
27 Exploitation of quarries 2379
28 Exploitation of salines 2734
29 Hairdressing and beautifying 6369
Total 273157 179284
Source: 1937 Industrial and Commercial Census. The share of cotton and ginning within textiles is
determined according to the the share in its employment in 1944.
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Table 6.15.: Cigarette Making in Egypt, 1918-1945
Imports of
raw tobacco
Withdrawals
from public
warehouses
Net imports
of
manufactured
tobacco
Total con-
sumption
Per capita
consump-
tion
tons tons tons tons kg
1918 6965 6916 -349 6616 0.60
1919 8303 8766 -515 7788 0.65
1920 9048 8798 -402 8646 0.59
1921 7919 7864 -61 7858 0.54
1922 7485 7655 -206 7279 0.53
1923 7207 6863 8 7214 0.54
1924 7437 7638 17 7454 0.54
1925 7594 7886 -10 7584 0.53
1926 7442 7746 37 7479 0.51
1927 7241 7425 13 7253 0.55
1928 7881 7978 18 7899 0.54
1929 7811 7946 12 7822 0.39
1930 5956 7346 -205 5751 0.41
1931 6219 6246 -167 6052 0.37
1932 5702 5797 -167 5535 0.34
1933 5461 5560 -219 5242 0.36
1934 5694 5726 -168 5526 0.36
1935 5878 5917 -196 5682 0.37
1936 5943 5969 -83 5861 0.37
1937 6038 6117 -157 5881 0.36
1938 5908 5995 -87 5821 0.35
1939 5823 6045 -74 5749 0.35
1940 5644 5598 273 5917 0.37
1941 6418 6093 8 6426 0.56
1942 7701 7423 2088 9788 0.59
1943 9163 8993 1407 10570 0.77
1945 11714 11282 1263 12977 0.70
Source: See the text.
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Table 6.16.: Minerals Extraction in Egypt, 1918-1945
Phosphate rock Crude petroleum Manganese ore Total output
Metric tones Metric tones Metric tones LE Million at 1938 prices
1918 31147 281885 27498 0.41
1919 29365 224300 48734 0.36
1920 114813 147950 77562 0.38
1921 122024 182668 55065 0.39
1922 60220 172878 104143 0.40
1923 25370 153402 132384 0.38
1924 87869 163341 150194 0.47
1925 106808 179651 80589 0.41
1926 232008 172952 121868 0.56
1927 279389 184556 152845 0.65
1928 200563 268323 137502 0.67
1929 215311 272114 191477 0.76
1930 313478 285088 121211 0.76
1931 257011 289419 101781 0.70
1932 349780 270792 327 0.61
1933 440632 237725 187 0.64
1934 437933 221028 959 0.62
1935 473896 182103 87303 0.72
1936 531031 182521 134972 0.83
1937 517002 170860 186320 0.87
1938 458404 225736 153112 0.85
1939 547538 666419 64912 1.34
1940 183464 928957 2637 1.28
1941 111708 1220557 2175 1.58
1942 328440 1181810 8169 1.72
1943 315566 1284966 7079 1.83
1944 318186 1352943 30 1.91
1945 349374 1349473 47 1.93
Note: The output is obtained by combining the individual output figures with 1938 average prices, which
are from Anis, A Study of National Income, p.378.
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Table 6.19.: Final Output Indices for Egyptian Industry: Aggregate, Textiles
and Food-Processing (1937=100), 1919-1945
Aggregate Textiles Food-
Processing
Industrial
Value added at
1937 prices
(LE Million)
1919 74.5 25.5 96.8 10.3
1920 81.4 26.8 105.3 11.0
1921 81.3 30.5 100.5 11.2
1922 78.9 30.2 99.3 11.0
1923 84.3 31.6 101.0 11.8
1924 83.4 25.7 99.2 11.6
1925 90.5 28.5 106.4 12.6
1926 91.7 28.0 106.0 12.8
1927 94.1 32.0 107.5 13.1
1928 91.6 29.2 107.6 13.0
1929 94.9 32.6 107.1 13.6
1930 79.6 26.6 99.0 13.1
1931 82.4 30.2 105.9 13.5
1932 82.6 37.6 107.7 13.6
1933 78.6 54.2 93.4 12.9
1934 86.8 67.5 94.4 14.2
1935 88.3 69.6 97.9 14.5
1936 96.2 94.5 97.6 15.8
1937 100.0 100.0 100.0 16.4
1938 111.8 122.1 102.8 18.4
1939 120.1 141.6 103.1 19.3
1940 126.6 151.4 103.7 20.1
1941 137.4 181.1 103.1 21.4
1942 149.5 190.2 115.4 22.5
1943 152.6 193.4 124.2 22.7
1944 152.5 190.9 122.8 22.6
1945 24.8
Notes: All are linked indices as explained in the text. To derive the value added for 1945,
the aggregate output is assumed to have moved in line with the change in the observed
indices, that is, all except the output of cotton fabrics, tobacco and construction. See the
text for details.
7. Protection and Industrial
Growth in Egypt: the Case of
Textiles
The preceding chapter provided the first estimates of industrial output in
Egypt during the interwar period and in doing so showed that the 1930s
witnessed the beginning of Egypt’s industrialisation. It was also shown that
industrialisation was mainly a textiles-driven process, although moderate pro-
gress was made in other branches as well. This chapter therefore aims to
identify the sources of manufacturing growth by looking at the case of tex-
tiles. This is important because the extent to which the manufacturing growth
was achieved due to import protection or other favourable developments has
never been closely examined. To answer this question, the case of textiles is
appropriate not only because it grew fastest but also because textiles, partic-
ularly the cotton industry, was at the heart of the protectionist policies during
this period.
In what follows, we first briefly discuss trade policy choices in the interwar
years in Egypt. Then we apply the same theoretical and empirical framework
employed in the corresponding chapter on Turkey to the case of Egyptian
textiles, by first describing the data in detail and then setting out the results
of the empirical analysis.
7.1. The Shift Towards Protectionism
As mentioned in the Introduction, the history of trade policy in Egypt can
be classified into two historical eras: before and after the 1930 tariff reform.
Muhammed Ali’s attempt to build a modern industrial sector in the first half
of the 19th century was doomed to fail for many reasons, one of which was
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that the Ottoman Empire gave foreigners full freedom of trade due to the
1838 trade agreement with Britain, which also applied to Egypt because she
was a dependency.1 The convention limited import duties at 5 and export
duties at 12 percent. Subsequently, the Franco-Turkish Treaty of 1861 raised
the uniform import duty up to 8 percent and lowered the export rate further
down to 1 percent.2 Only a few changes to these rates were made between 1915
and 1921, although a 2 percent excise tax was imposed on a large number of
imported goods.3 Until 1930, these rates prevailed with only a few exceptions
such as the imports of tobacco, alcohol, sugar, timber, petroleum and live
animals, which became taxed more heavily. What is more, the controversial
excise tax on mechanically produced cotton piece goods, which was discussed
in the previous chapter, was introduced in 1901 by Lord Cromer and it was
only abrogated in 1926. Apart from tariffs, other means of trade control
were nonexistent, with the only exception being that raw cotton imports
were prohibited after 1916.4 Moreover, the application of the unconditional
most favoured nation treatment to all countries made it impossible for the
government to take discriminatory actions.5 Thus, it is clear that tariff policy
was far from protectionist and probably purely fiscal in character and that
the Egyptian economy operated under almost free trade conditions between
1838 and 1930, lacking any means of protection for domestic manufacturing
activities against foreign competition.6
Towards the end of this long era, particularly after World War I, the con-
cerns about the lack of protection gained great currency in policy circles, in
line with the growing nationalism of the time. For instance, the oft-cited
economic report published by the Commission of Commerce and Industry in
1918 called for protection for domestic goods that could be competitive with
state support and the reduction in duties on the raw material imports ne-
cessary for industry and agriculture.7 However, the realisation of such hopes
1Hansen and Nashashibi, Foreign Trade Regimes, p.3.
2Mabro and Radwan, Industrialisation of Egypt , p.50.
3Hansen, Egypt and Turkey , p.87.
4Hansen and Nashashibi, Foreign Trade Regimes, p.4.
5el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry, p.317.
6Since some domestic industries enjoyed a certain degree of natural protection due to trans-
portation costs or local tastes, even low import rates might have given some protection.
For instance, vegetable oil and soap consumption were to a large degree dependent on
cotton seed oil due to local preferences, so a small degree of tariffs might have greatly
benefited the local oil and soap producers.
7Egypt, Rapport .
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and plans had to be postponed until February 1930, when Egypt gained tariff
autonomy, as the trade agreement with Italy, which was the last of the bi-
lateral the agreements that had been signed with various countries between
1884 and 1909, expired.8
In the second half of the 1920s, some initial proposals as to the new tariff
scheme had been drafted and negotiated between different parties.9 The final
version was issued as a law on 17 February 1930. The main architect of the
reform was J.G. Levi, then the General Secretary of the Egyptian Federation
of Industries, which had been formed in 1922 and was the chief supporter
of industrial interests. Tignor maintains that the main idea of the tariffs
was to forge an alliance between industrialists and landowners, as he believes
that import-substituting industrialists and export-oriented cotton cultivators
could be akin to the “wheat-steel amalgam” erected in Germany in the late
19th century.10 Considering these groups as separate entities is controversial,
given that many landowners also invested in industrial activities, while it is
notable that the new scheme did indeed favour both interests.
The new classification introduced a three-tier scheme, mostly consisting
of specific tariffs. The ad valorem equivalent on raw materials, fuel and ma-
chinery was set at 4 percent (lower than before), while most semi-manufactured
goods were rated at 6-10 percent and manufactures at 15-30 percent. Thus,
while most manufactures were granted a moderate though significant degree
of protection, the scheme effectively lowered the rates on the main inputs used
in cotton cultivation, such as fertilisers and fuel. Furthermore, the duties on
wheat and flour were heightened, which probably increased wage costs in in-
dustry, while, importantly, securing the cereal market for landowners at a
time of erratic and persistently low cotton prices.11 Nevertheless, the reform
was not without objections: leaving aside the weak opposition from the la-
bour movement, the French and British Chambers of Commerce raised their
disapproval, as the former was concerned about the high duties on luxury
items in which French exporters were specialised, while the British expressed
their uneasiness on the ground that the living costs for the poorer segments
of the society would be threatened due to the likely increases in the prices
8Mabro and Radwan, Industrialisation of Egypt , p.50.
9For a brief history of these preliminary tariff schedules, see el-Gritly, Structure of Modern
Industry, pp.319-20.
10Tignor, State and Private Enterprise, p.110.
11Tignor, State and Private Enterprise, p.111.
7.1. THE SHIFT TOWARDS PROTECTIONISM 267
of textiles and foodstuff.12 However, these objections did not amount to a
serious conflict, since the new rates remained fairly moderate.
Before and after World War II, these rates were revised a number of times.
For instance, the duty on sugar was increased between 1930 and 1932, that
on cotton piece goods underwent revisions in 1931, 1933 and 1938, as will
be explained later on, and silk goods were taxed increasingly more heavily.
In addition to the specific tariffs, a supplementary uniform 1 percent tax on
the import value was introduced in 1932 and it was doubled in 1936. An
extra excise tax of 20-30 percent was imposed on luxury items and some
other goods such as cigarettes, alcoholic drinks and perfumes.13 Moreover a
stipulation imposed an extra levy, called the Wharfage Duty, at 10 percent of
the duty paid on all imports and exports except tobacco. These subsequent
changes in the tariff schedule had different motivations. First, as Hansen
argued, highly flexible tariffs were placed on wheat, flour and sugar to stabilise
prices at a high level.14 Second, fiscal motives led to revisions in the cases
of the supplementary ad valorem taxes and Wharfage duty. For instance,
the reduction and finally elimination of the cotton tax in the first half of
the 1930s required something to make up for the revenue loss, which led
to the occasional increases of duties on certain products.15 Last and more
importantly, the rates on goods such as textiles, cement and footwear were
intended to grant protection to the local producers, regardless of their actual
consequences.
In addition, a supplementary provision that the 1930 tariff law introduced
was used effectively. It allowed an equalisation tariff to be imposed on imports
from a country that promoted its exports through subsidies, devaluation or
dumping.16 In 1935 the depreciated currency surtax of 40 percent on the
imports of cotton and rayon piece goods from Japan was the first instance
of the application of this provision. The same provision was also used for
some goods of Chinese origin in the same year, but Japan was the main
12Tignor, State and Private Enterprise, p.109.
13Mabro and Radwan, Industrialisation of Egypt , p.51.
14Hansen, Egypt and Turkey , p.87.
15“Abolition of Octroi ax and increase in import duties on tobacco” and “Increase of certain
Egyptian import and excise duties”, National Archives, FO/371 15416.
16Another provision was that an additional duty could be imposed on goods originating
from countries which did not enjoy preferential treatment through bilateral agreements.
This was applied to the Soviet Union in 1930-31 and Romania in 1935. Mabro and
Radwan, Industrialisation of Egypt , p.50.
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target, since cheap Japanese cotton and rayon textiles had flooded Egypt very
heavily in the first half of the 1930s.17 Increases in tariff rates could not stop
the inflow, but in the event the surtax effectively decreased Japanese imports
after 1936. el-Gritly argues that the surtax on Japanese imports aimed to
placate Lancashire interests,18 yet while it is true that such a discriminatory
action could in no way hurt British imports, it was the locally produced
heavy and grey cotton goods that eventually replaced the decline in Japanese
imports, as the surtax proved to be not particularly beneficial for the British
in the medium term.19
In this way, Egyptian trade policy became undisputedly protectionist to a
considerable degree after 1930. However, compared to some popular policy
instruments in other developing countries at the time, in Egypt protectionism
was relatively simple and straightforward. el-Gritly considers the preference
for local goods in government contracts as the most widely used tool, next to
tariff protection.20 This had begun in the early 1920s when the purchase of
foreign goods that could be satisfied by local production was discouraged, in
an effort to stop discrimination against local goods. In the 1930s this policy
was intensified, as, for instance, a minimum 10 percent preference in govern-
ment contracts was to be given to local producers, irrespective of quality.21
In addition, a few more protectionist policy tools were also used: railway
rebates were provided for the transportation of raw materials; machinery and
spare parts were exempted from import taxes; monopolies of sugar and alcohol
were granted; and direct subsidies were given in a few certain instances – in
1931, for instance, a subsidy was granted to large cotton mills when a large
17For the Japanese penetration in cotton textiles market in Egypt, see G.H. Selous and
L.B.S. Larkins, Economic Conditions in Egypt. Department of Overseas Trade, UK,
1933, pp.58-59; and Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in
Egypt , pp.56-59. The former argues that “apart from a certain output by the local mills
alluded to above, practically the entire business in the heavier qualities of grey cloth is
now in the hands of the Japanese [...]. The United Kingdom, however, still remains the
largest supplier in the lighter qualities and particularly in the finer counts”.
18el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry, p.323.
19It is not clear how the British supported the decision of the Egyptian government to put a
surtax on the Japanese textiles, since they actually favoured the introduction of a quota
system based on the imports of 1929-1931 due to the concern that a unilateral action
against Japan would cause a further depreciation of the Japanese Yen. See “Commercial
negotiations between Egypt and Japan”, National Archives, FO/371 19050.
20el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry, p.338.
21Selous and Larkins, Economic Conditions in Egypt , p.53.
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Figure 7.1.: Total and Textile Imports of Egypt (Current Prices), 1919-1939
Source: Egypt, Ministere des Finances (various issues). Table 7.3.
quantity of cotton was sold to them on an extended credit.22 On the other
hand, import licensing and export taxes were not used until after World War
II.23 Direct quantitative controls were discussed as a possibility at times during
the 1930s but never realised, as in many other countries in the British trade
network. And even when import quotas were discussed, it was related to the
concerns about the massive Japanese textile imports before 1935 and later to
British economic diplomacy to secure its exports rather than the Egyptian
government’s desire to protect local industry.24
It follows that the protection for domestic industries was overwhelmingly
due to import duties during the 1930s, which were complemented by other
means, most importantly the preferences in government contracts. As seen
in the Figure 7.1, total imports were slightly less than LE 60 million in the
1920s, declined by almost half between 1919 and 1932 and remained around
that level until World War II. It can also be seen that textiles were around
22el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry, p.335-36.
23Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , p.151.
24“Increase in Egyptian customs duties on the cotton goods and yarns: Proposed estab-
lishment of quota system”, National Archives, FO/371 21954.
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Figure 7.2.: Tariff Revenues as a Ratio of Total Imports and Government
Revenues in Egypt, 1919-1939
Source: Egypt, Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique (various issues). Table 7.4.
30 percent of imports until 1933 and gradually declined thereafter. Three
main factors were responsible for the import contraction in value terms: the
decline in incomes due to the depression, the decline in import prices and tariff
protection. The change of import composition in favour of raw materials and
semi-manufactured goods due to import substitution in manufactured goods
also contributed to the this decline in import value, since the prices of raw
materials decreased more than final goods (Figure 7.6).
Looking at the nominal protection rate, measured by the duties/imports
ratio, it remained slightly above 20 percent in the 1920s, more or less doubled
between 1929 and 1932 and remained at that level for the rest of the 1930s
(Figure 7.2). Besides that, import taxes made up around 30 percent of total
government revenues until 1930, then progressively increased up to 40 percent
during the 1930s. That was because, first, the tariffs never reached prohibitive
levels and, second, the Egyptian government had to get rid of the cotton tax
to alleviate the difficulties due to the decline in cotton prices.
There can be no doubt that the increasing tariff protection contributed
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to the growth of manufacturing output, yet existing studies have not gone
beyond pointing out this concurrence and have not assessed the actual im-
pact of protection on local output. The widely-held view is limited to vague
statements, such as “behind the tariff walls, a few industries expanded and
a number of new ones were established”25; “the new tariff, while predomin-
antly fiscal in character, afforded some protection to certain sectors”;26 and
this time from a contemporary observer, “a policy of moderate protection was
adopted designed to encourage the development of local industry. As a result,
since 1930, there has been very considerable industrial development”.27 For
support, such statements can point toward the import substitution that took
place, as it is believed that the branches that expanded the most were the ones
where local output came to replace imports. Hence, a widely quoted source
estimates the percentage of local production in total consumption by the eve
of the World War II to be more than 90 percent of the domestic consumption
of sugar, alcohol, flour, cement, soap and footwear, 65 percent of beer, 60
percent of vegetable oils and 40 percent of cotton cloth.28
However, Hansen and Nashashibi rightly maintain that there was also an-
other key development operating in favour of domestic industries in the 1930s:
the low profitability of agricultural investment and the relative fall in agricul-
tural prices.29 Furthermore, some decline in imports can be attributed to the
decline in real income. And the increase in nominal tariff rates is, in any case,
not an appropriate indicator of protection, since the effect of higher rates de-
pends on various supply and demand elasticities for each product, so a given
tariff can be high for a certain good while being low for another, in terms
of its protective effect.30 For that matter el-Gritly argues that the coarser,
and thus cheaper, types of cotton cloth, soap, cement, blankets and footwear
responded to the increasing tariffs more quickly and positively than others.
His insight sounds true, yet needs more elaboration.31
As a result, this chapter attempts to show the degree of causation between
tariff protection and output growth by looking at the case of textiles. The
25Hansen and Nashashibi, Foreign Trade Regimes, p.4.
26el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry, p.320.
27Crouchley, Economic Development , p.227.
28UK, Egypt: Review of Commercial Conditions, p.22.
29Hansen and Nashashibi, Foreign Trade Regimes, p.4.
30el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry, p.321.
31el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry, p.331.
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choice of textiles is justified on three grounds. First, the local consumption
of cotton, silk and woollen goods had been mostly supplied by imports in the
1920s, while a significant degree of import substitution happened in the 1930s.
Second, the output growth rates were much higher than in other branches,
as demonstrated in the previous chapter. And last, the protective nature
of tariff policy can be best and most clearly observed in textiles in view of
the motivations of the policy makers. That said, a clarification is in order:
this study is not interested in other aspects of import protection, such as the
welfare costs of tariffs, how living costs were affected for different sections of
the population or the long-term feasibility and consequences of protectionism.
For instance, textiles became a highly concentrated industry in Egypt in the
1930s, unlike in Turkey, and this must have combined with tariffs to lead to
the artificial price increases in the domestic market. So while the question
of how a more competitive domestic industry would have changed output
growth may be an interesting research topic, it is beyond the scope of the
present study.
7.2. Exploring the Sources of Textile Growth
It was earlier argued in Chapter 4 that the partial equilibrium model de-
veloped by Irwin and Davis and Irwin and Temin is suitable to analyse the
effect of tariff protection on domestic output for three reasons. First, it does
not impose any restrictions on domestic final good prices.32 It is empirically
and theoretically true that higher tariffs should have increased domestic prices
to the extent that domestic production became competitive with imports, yet
the extent of such an increase is unknown due to the lack of data.33 Second,
the reduced form output growth equation allows us to estimate the effects of
explanatory variables on final output growth without estimating all the de-
mand and supply equations. And last, it is based on a sound theoretical model
incorporating the supply and demand equations. Added to these reasons is
that while the import-restricting policies were more complicated in Turkey
due to the use of quotas and exchange controls, they were mostly based on
tariffs in Egypt, which makes the model even more relevant.
32Irwin and Davis, Antebellum US Iron Industry; and Irwin and Temin, Antebellum US
Cotton Industry.
33For Egypt, the domestic prices of cotton and silk textiles are only available after 1935.
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To recap, the details of the solution of the partial equilibrium model are
shown in Appendix B and the reduced form output equation takes the follow-
ing form:
lnQ = β0 + β1t+ β2ln
[
p∗(1 + τ)
pc
]
+ β3ln(
pa
pc
) + β4ln(
pc
w
) + β5lnY + 
(7.1)
where Q is final output, p∗ average imported fabric prices, τ average nominal
tariff rates, pa the aggregate price level, pc input prices and finally w and Y
denote manufacturing wages and real income.
This model is originally estimated from time series data, but since the
scope of analysis is here expanded to account for the all textiles, we need
to consider the substitution effects between cotton, woollen and silk goods.
Such effects must be given due attention, since there is anecdotal evidence, as
discussed earlier, that artificial silk textiles in Egypt in the 1930s might have
replaced the existing fabric varieties to a certain extent, particularly natural
silk and, to a lesser degree, cotton textiles. In this respect, the original demand
equation is revised to include the relative substitute textile prices (ps
p
) as an
independent variable – ps and p denoting the substitute prices and aggregate
prices respectively. Thus, the reduced form equation takes a slightly different
form, as explained further in Appendix B:
lnQ = β0 + β1t+ β2ln
[
p∗(1 + τ)
pc
]
+ β3ln(
pa
pc
) + β4ln(
ps
pc
)
+ β5ln(
pc
w
) + β6lnY +  (7.2)
As argued in Chapter 4, the signs of all coefficients are expected to be pos-
itive, based on reasonable parameter values, which is explained in Appendix
B. The downside of panel data estimation in comparison with time series is
that it produces an average value of parameters across the range of different
textiles. If the supply elasticities vary, say, from cotton to silk, or vice versa,
the model will fail to capture the degree of individual parameters. For in-
stance, if cotton production is more elastic to the import prices than silk or
woollens, then the estimated coefficients will only reflect its average impact on
output growth. On the other hand, the fact that all the textile branches grew
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massively in the 1930s in Egypt means that the difference between the actual
individual elasticities and the estimated average ones can be supposed to be
relatively small. This is also why the present model specifically focuses on the
fast-growing textiles, instead of covering other manufacturing branches, such
as food processing, which grew much more slowly.
7.2.1. Data
The analysis considers cotton, woollen, natural and artificial silk production.
We here discuss the construction of the variables in the main specification
outlined above for each textile branch: the nominal protection rates, import
prices, input prices, substitute prices, aggregate price index, wages and the
real domestic income.
Nominal protection rates (τ)
In February 1930 the new tariff law placed specific tariffs on imports of cotton
piece goods.34 Their average ad valorem equivalent for all cloth types was 18
percent in 1930. Then in February 1931 the duties on all piece goods weighing
more than 70 grams per m2 were slightly increased.35 Due to this last revision
and the ongoing decline in import prices the nominal rate turned out to be
25 percent in 1931 and 29 percent in 1932. However, these revisions did
not stop the inflow of cheap Japanese cotton goods, which were mostly of
coarser types, so another revision was made in May 1933, which targeted the
piece goods weighing between 110-140 grams per m2 by increasing specific
rates by 30 percent.36 However, Japanese competition was so strong that the
British were worried about it rather than the high duties per se.37 Yet this
move failed to stop the imports from Japan and the government decided to
put a 40 percent surtax on the cotton and rayon piece goods from Japan in
34See statistical code 499 and its sub-positions in the 1930 tariff schedule. Egypt, Customs
Tariff. Ministry of Finance, Egypt, 1931.
35Journal Officiel, 16 February 1931, Numero Extraordinaire, no. 18.
36Journal Officiel, 15 May 1931, no. 44. In the tariff schedule, the piece goods heavier than
140 grams per m2 are classified as “heavy” and those lighter than 140 grams per m2 as
“light”. The heavy and light goods are further classified according to their weights and
for each weight category and the imports in weight and value were reported according to
the type of cloth: grey (unbleached), bleached, dyed and printed. (“Dyed” was divided
into “dyed in the yarn” and “dyed in the cloth” thereafter.)
37Selous and Larkins, Economic Conditions in Egypt , p.53.
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September 1935.38 In the meantime, as mentioned above, in June 1932 an
additional 1 percent ad valorem tax was introduced for fiscal purposes and
subsequently it was increased to 2 percent in 1936.39
Up to this point, tariff policy aimed at protecting the local production of
the heavier piece goods, so much so that a British consular report stated that
by the last quarter of 1936 “local industries have practically acquired a mono-
poly in heavy grey, formerly supplied by Japan and hand loom weavers have
registered better sales for their drills etc. following [the] decline of Japanese
competition”.40 Yet the dyed, printed goods and, in general, lighter goods
continued to be imported from countries such as Britain and Italy. 41 And
during this whole time, a series of negotiations between Egyptian authorities
and the Manchester Chamber of Commerce were held as to the introduction
of import quotas on cotton goods, which the British expected would have
secured their share, yet these negotiations did not bear fruit.42 Instead, the
Egyptian government extended the scope of high tariffs to the finer piece
goods in June 1938 by increasing the rates on heavy goods by 100 percent
and those on light goods by 70 percent.43 In fact, the increase in the rates on
certain types even exceeded 100 percent. This led to widespread protests on
the part of Lancashire since the new rates greatly threatened their position
in the textile trade. The Egyptian government justified this revision on the
grounds that foreign producers were not operating on the same cost schedule
because the domestic factories had to use expensive Egyptian cotton due to
the prohibition on cotton imports, while the imported goods were made of
cheaper raw cotton of American or Indian origin. 44 The following months
38Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.14.
39Journal Officiel, 12 May 1932, Numero Extraordinaire, no. 42; and Selous, Report on the
Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.14. For the changes in the uniform
rate during World War II, see Mabro and Radwan, Industrialisation of Egypt , p.58.
40Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.57.
41Italy and India replaced Japan as strong competitors against Britain in the second half
of the 1930s. Empson, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt ,
pp.22-23.
42Empson, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.24.
43Journal Officiel, 10 April 1938, no. 44. The rates on the goods lighter than 50 grams
per m2 remained unchanged.
44Egyptian cotton tariffs: Lancashire’s trade. The Manchester Guardian, 29 April 1938;
and New Egyptian Duties: British protests. The Manchester Guardian, 14 April 1938.
The higher duties on dyed and printed goods, which had not been produced in Egypt,
were probably related to the projected plant of the Bradford Dyer’s Association. See
Big blow to Lancashire. The Manchester Guardian. 12 April 1938.
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witnessed the attempts of Lancashire to put pressure on the Egyptian govern-
ment to make concessions, such as the introduction of a quota system. But
such attempts faced the Egyptian industrialists’ counter-campaign in favour
of the new tariffs.45 In the end, the new tariffs remained unchanged.
The present estimate of the ad valorem equivalents of specific duties is cal-
culated as the total duties collected based on the specific tariffs given in tariff
schedules and subsequent laws, the additional ad valorem tax, the Wharfage
tax (10 percent of import duties) and finally the Japanese surtax, applied
after September 1935.46 However, the coverage of the estimate is restricted to
the grey (unbleached) and cotton piece goods weighing more than 110 grams
per m2, since domestic production was actually competing with this group,
at least until mid-1938. Also note that since some changes in the tariff sched-
ule were made in the middle of a year, we assume a uniform distribution of
imports across months for simplicity.47 Figure 7.3 indicates that the nominal
protection rate for heavy grey piece goods increased from 18 percent in 1930
to 37 percent in 1932 and stabilised around it until 1935. Then the Japanese
surtax increased it up to 55 percent in one year, yet in the following years due
to the recovery in import prices, the nominal rate fluctuated between 35 and
55 percent.48
For silk products, the 1930 reform introduced the new ad valorem rates
on all silk piece goods without differentiating between natural and artificial
silk. The new rates were set at 18 percent for all types, except 20 percent
for embroidery and tapestry. In June 1932, the rates on finished goods were
increased up to 20 percent and those on piece goods were converted into
specific terms.49 In addition, the natural-artificial silk distinction was put into
force in the trade statistics at the same time. Then in 1933 and September
1934 further minor revisions to the rates on natural silk goods were made
and the tariff classification was elaborated further.50 The 1935 depreciated
45Bourse appeal to egypt: Tariffs too high. The Manchester Guardian, 3 June 1938.
46Egypt, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Department, Annual Statement of Foreign Trade;
Egypt, Customs Administration, Statistical Office, Monthly Summary of the Foreign
Trade of Egypt. Cairo: Government Press, 1910-1946.
47This is not the case for 1930, as imports during the January-February of 1930 were
counted separately.
48Note that a 4 percent tax on the domestic cotton textile production was abandoned in
February 1925.
49Journal Officiel, 2 June 1932, no. 48.
50Journal Officiel, 30 May 1933, no. 49; and 3 September 1934, no. 76.
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Figure 7.3.: Ad Valorem Tariff Rates for Egyptian Textiles, 1922-1939
Source: Table 7.5
currency surtax on imports from Japan was applied to artificial silk fabrics
as well, which made Japanese imports decline. Finally, the most decisive
revision was in April 1936, when the rates on artificial silk piece goods were
increased by around 150 percent.51 On the other hand, silk yarn was much
less heavily taxed in the 1930 schedule and only two modifications were made
subsequently to its rates: the rate on one type of artificial silk yarn (“crepe,
dyed”) was increased by six times in July 1938 and changes of a similar size on
the other types (“not dyed” and “beaded and looped”) followed suit at the end
of the same year.52 All this contributed to the increasing local fabric output,
mainly of simple types, since technical backwardness limited the scope for
producing finer goods.53 The method of calculation of ad valorem equivalents
for silk piece goods is the same as employed for cotton: it is based on all piece
goods and the distribution of imports during a year was assumed uniform for
51Journal Officiel, 29 April 1936, no. 47.
52Journal Officiel, 11 July 1938, no. 84; and 13 December 1938, Numero Extraordinaire,
no. 137.
53Selous, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt , p.76.
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simplicity whenever necessary.54 The nominal rates were estimated for natural
and artificial silk goods separately. Figure 7.3 clearly shows the extraordinary
increase in the nominal rates, particularly on artificial silk, which reached 100
percent by the end of the decade, while natural silk textiles were rated at 60
percent in the second half of the 1930s.
Compared to cotton and silk, woollen cloths represent a more straight-
forward case in terms of the nature of tariffs. The 1930 tariff law set the
ad valorem rate at 15 percent for all woollen cloths and carpets and rugs.55
Only a few minor revisions were subsequently made. In September 1935 the
rate on wool-dominated mixed textiles was converted into specific terms, then
increased in December 1937.56 Meanwhile, the rates on piece goods except
carpets and rugs were converted into specific tariffs.57 Here we limit out at-
tention to the rates on carpets and rugs, since the local Egyptian industry was
oriented towards these goods due to the low quality local wools, as mentioned
in the previous chapter. Therefore, the nominal protection rate is taken as 15
percent for all years after 1930.
Prices
Average import prices (p∗) are directly calculated from the import statistics.
For cotton, the price series is based on the grey piece goods heavier than 110
grams per m2, so the tariff-inclusive import prices are the prices of the heavy
grey piece goods plus the ad valorem duty rates. The same applies to woollen
goods but we only consider the import prices of carpets and rugs.
For natural and artificial silk goods, the import prices between 1933 and
1939 are calculated the same way. However, a different procedure is followed
for the earlier years, since the import classification underwent a number of
changes that make it difficult to get consistent and comparable figures. The
main difficulty lies, first, in the fact that no distinction was made between
natural and artificial silk and, second, in that during 1927-1929 the mixed
cloths made of cotton and silk were reported separately, which was not the case
54Statistical Code 479 and its sub-codes in the 1930 tariff schedule cover silk piece goods,
both natural and artificial; and code 475 and its sub-codes list silk yarn, both natural
and artificial. Egypt, Customs Tariff 1931 .
55The statistical codes of woollens were 486 and 487-491. Egypt, Customs Tariff 1931 .
56Journal Officiel, 29 September 1935; and 1 December 1937. The rate on woollen yarns
was increased at the same time.
57Journal Officiel, 29 April 1936, Numero Extraordinaire, no. 47.
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for other years. Considering such difficulties, we prefer to extract the average
export prices from Italian and French foreign trade data, that is, the two
main silk good exporters to Egypt.58 Although Japan supplied a significant
share of silk goods between 1930 and 1932, Italian and French export prices
can be considered representative because they remained important exporters.
Thus, we first calculate the total amount and export value of natural and
artificial silk goods exported to Egypt from these countries and then correct
the average export prices with the corresponding exchange rates.59 The 1933
average silk good import prices are then extrapolated backwards with these
export price indices.
Figure 7.4 illustrates the calculated average import prices for all fabrics.
Except woollens, all price levels nearly halved throughout the period under
consideration, yet the decline in prices was well under way even before 1929.
While this downward trend mostly happened in the mid-1920s in the case of
artificial silk, it was perpetuated thereafter for cotton and natural silk goods.
Also, in line with the international trends, the prices began to recover in the
second half of the 1930s.
Egyptian cotton prices are used as the raw material prices (pc) for the cot-
ton industry. As a matter of fact, domestic production was equally dependent
on Egyptian raw cotton and imported cotton yarn before the early 1930s but
almost entirely on domestic raw cotton thereafter: the share of imported cot-
ton yarn in domestic consumption was around 50-70 percent in the 1920s, but
this rapidly declined to less than 5 percent by the end of the 1930s. There-
fore, using Egyptian cotton price series for the 1920s might seem problematic,
but until 1931 local raw cotton prices moved in a highly correlated manner
with the yarn import prices, so they can be taken as representative of raw
material prices.60 As for silk weaving, the average import prices of imported
natural and artificial silk yarn are the straightforward choice, since almost all
the raw material was imported. These import prices are then inflated with
import duties, which were 8 percent before 1930 and remained in the range of
58Italian exports are obtained from Italy, Ministero Delle Finanze, Movimento Commer-
ciale; and French exports from France. Direction Générale des Douanes, Tableau
Général du Commerce et de la Navigation..
59The Egyptian pound was tied to the British pound at a fixed parity and the value of the
British pound against the Italian Lire and French Franc are taken from Global Financial
Data: https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/index.html.
60The correlation coefficient between the average wholesale prices of Egyptian cotton and
imported yarn is 0.92 between 1919 and 1931.
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Figure 7.4.: Average Prices of Textile Imports in Egypt, 1922-1939
Source: Table 7.6.
10-16 percent for natural silk and around 10 percent for artificial silk during
the 1930s. Note that the difference between the ad valorem rates on the yarn
and piece goods progressively and rapidly increased during the 1930s, so the
effective protection rates substantially increased over the course of the decade.
As seen in Figure 7.5, the decline in the raw material prices was no less
pronounced than the average import prices. This decline reached spectacular
levels in the case of artificial silk yarn due to the fast technical change in the
interwar years, as the prices decreased by around 6 times between 1922 and
1926 and continued to go down, though more slowly, in the rest of this period.
Other prices also almost progressively halved.
The aggregate price indicator (pa) used here is the only available official
aggregate index based on the wholesale prices of 26 commodities with 39
varieties in Cairo, all reported in each Annuaire Statistique volume.61 The
61The full list of commodities covered by the index is: cotton (Good-Fair Sakel), domestic
wheat, beans, lentils (two types), domestic barley, maize, sorghum, fenugreek, sesame,
sugar, molasses, flour (of wheat and maize), peanuts, onions, banana, dates, oil, eggs,
butter, rice, soap, alcohol, fuel and coal. See the explanatory note in Egypt, Ministere
des Finances, Annuaire Statistique, 1936/37, pp.489-93.
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Figure 7.5.: Average Raw Material Prices for Egyptian Textiles, 1922-1939
Source: Table 7.7.
index mainly covered agricultural and food products (except soap, fuel and
coal), which were all consumed on a major scale in Egypt. It was calculated as
the geometric mean of the percentage changes in each individual index relative
to the 1913-1914 average, so its shortcoming is that it does not reflect the
relative contribution of each item either in the total sales or in the production
value. Subsequently, since the coverage of this old index became insufficient
in view of the growing range of goods consumed and produced in the country
over time, the Statistics Department expanded the scope of commodities to
87 articles with 278 varieties and began to publish the new individual price
indices every year after 1935 relative to the annual average of 1935.62 The
new index was superior in two ways: first, the commodity coverage was much
larger and, second, it gave different weights to the different products according
to the size of domestic sales. However, this study uses the old index, since it
is impossible to extend the later index backward with the same kind of data.
Lastly, in the absence of long-term data on domestic textile prices, the sub-
stitute prices are constructed by the backward extrapolation of the domestic
62Egypt, Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique, 1936/37, pp.489-93.
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textile prices of 1935-1939 with the tariff-inclusive fabric import prices. This
can be justified on the grounds that domestic textiles basically competed with
the imported goods before 1935, and the duties placed on imports might have
been captured by local producers to a certain degree. We suppose on the basis
of anecdotal evidence that artificial silk competed with cotton and natural silk
goods, and cotton goods competed with woollens.63
Real Incomes and Wages
As mentioned earlier, national income estimates are not available for the pre-
Word War II years. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning two attempts. First,
Hansen made an effort to estimate rural and urban value added indices.64 The
former is taken as the crop output minus the “purchased inputs”, with the
assumption that rural income was more or less close to agricultural income.
As we showed earlier, although this was not precisely true, the bias of the
assumption was relatively small. On the other hand, the urban value added
index was rather tenuous, since the index of exports and imports was taken
to represent the value added in trade, the railways represented transportation
and finally the urban and rural population shares were used as weights to
combine these two value added indices. Due to the large level of crudeness of
this direct estimate, Hansen compares this direct index with the alternative
income indices derived from the consumption of some major commodities,
such as cereals, tobacco and sugar, in order to check the plausibility of the
earlier direct estimate. In this exercise, he uses several possible values of
price and income elasticities, relying on the development literature and all
the results are presented in his study for some benchmark years: 1886, 1898,
1905, 1912, 1920, 1929 and 1937. Although these indirect indices derived
from individual consumption levels exhibit a considerable degree of variation,
a broad consistency is also shown: the simple average of the indirect income
indices shows a 13 percent decline in per capita income between 1912 and
63In the post-1935 domestic price data in Annuaire Statistique, natural silk (yarn and cloth)
and artificial silk (yarn and cloth) were reported separately without the disaggregation
between yarn and fabrics. Here we simply take them as indicating fabric prices. On
the other hand, there are five separate series for cotton textiles: bleached (2), grey (2),
printed (1), coloured (1) and castor (1). To get a representative cotton textile price
index, these series are combined with the weights in the parentheses that the Statist-
ical Department used. Egypt, Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique, 1936/37,
pp.489-93.
64Hansen, Income and Consumption.
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1920, and this was almost totally corrected by a recovery during the 1920s.
Then the 1930s witnessed a 20 percent decrease again. The direct estimate of
per capita income shows similar trends, but the extent of cycles is less severe
than in the indirect indices. All in all, these results are consistent with the
conventional view of the long-term movement of Egyptian national income
before World War II.
The second attempt mentioned above was made by Yousef, who estimated
nominal and real GDP growth rates for the period 1886-1945.65 Yousef em-
ploys a heterodox money-based co-integration method, counting on a measure
of broad money and the relationship between Egyptian and British monetary
variables. However, there are a number of serious inconsistencies between his
and Hansen’s indices. First of all, for the entire period that Hansen and Yousef
consider, i.e. 1886-1937, Yousef’s estimate of the average growth rate (1.42
percent per annum) is considerably larger than the 0.47 percent that Hansen
arrived at. Second, combined with the GDP estimates of Anis for the World
War II period, Hansen finds an almost complete stagnation from the begin-
ning of the first half of the 20th century up to 1945, whereas Yousef predicts a
0.41 percent average annual growth rate.66 And last and most strikingly, for
the two crisis periods (1898-1912 and 1930-1937), Hansen’s negative annual
growth rates of the real per capita income contrasts with Yousef’s prediction
of significant improvement.67 Thus, Yousef’s money-based approach produces
quite controversial results as to both the overall growth performance and for
the 1930s as well.
In the absence of proper comprehensive national income estimates, the
present suggested methodology is to derive the real income from the quite
reliable agricultural consumption figures. In the economic history literature,
an early example of this was suggested by Crafts, who calculated the change
of English agricultural output from some income measures, using the income
and price elasticities taken from the development economics literature.68 The
method was thereafter developed by Allen using consumer theory and later
65Yousef, Egypt’s Growth Record.
66Anis, A Study of National Income.
67For 1898-1912, while Hansen’s average annual growth rate of per capita income is -0.17,
Yousef finds 1.44 per capita growth. Similarly, for 1929-1937, Hansen’s estimate is -0.76
per year, while the growth rate was 0.52 percent according to Yousef. Yousef, Egypt’s
Growth Record, p.572.
68N.F.R. Crafts, British Economic Growth During the Industrial Revolution. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1985.
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applied to estimate the long-term agricultural output of India and Japan by
Broadberry and Gupta and Broadberry et al..69 According to this methodo-
logy, real agricultural consumption is viewed as a function of the own-price
of the agricultural goods in real terms (pa/p), the price of non-agricultural
goods in real terms (pna/p) and real income as follows:
C = (pa/p)
α1(pna/p)
α2Y α3
where α1 is the own price elasticity of demand, α2 the cross price elasticity
and α3 income elasticity. Consumer theory requires that price elasticities and
income elasticity should add up to zero.70 In fact, this method is a more
consistent version of the method used in the indirect income estimates of
Hansen.71 While the latter derived several separate income indices from the
consumption of various commodities and took a simple average of all these in-
dividual indices, we consider the whole net agricultural consumption, thereby
getting rid of the variation resulting from different demand elasticities for dif-
ferent commodities. We then also introduce the cross price elasticity, allowing
for the possible shifts between agricultural and non-agricultural consumption
over time due to changes in relative prices.
Here, agricultural consumption is taken as the net agricultural output (crop
and livestock) plus the net import of agricultural and livestock products.72
Then the nominal consumption figures are deflated with the agricultural price
index to obtain the real consumption. The agricultural price index is ob-
tained from the wholesale prices of a number of agricultural commodities,
whose prices were reported in Annuaire Statistique.73 The non-agricultural
69Robert Allen, Economic Structure and Agricultural Productivity in Europe, 1300-1800.
European Review of Economic History , 3 2000; S.N. Broadberry and B. Gupta, India
and the Great Divergence: An Anglo-Indian Comparison of GDP per capita, 1600-1871.
University of Warwick 2010; and S.N. Broadberry et al., Japan and Great Divergence,
730-1870. University of Warwick 2011.
70Broadberry and Gupta, India and the Great Depression, p.8.
71Hansen, Income and Consumption.
72In the import classification, the first category (“cereals, flour and agricultural produce”)
and the second (“animal products”) are combined with cotton exports to arrive at the
aggregate net imports. Remember that the net agricultural output was calculated in
Chapter 4.
73The relative prices of the following goods are combined with the shares in parentheses:
Cotton- Sakel Fully Good (29), wheat(15), beans (4), lentils (1), barley (2), maize (16),
sorghum (4), fenugreek (1), sesame (1), peanuts (1), onions (2), bananas (1), dates
(1), eggs (2) and rice (4). These weights reflect the relative sales in the market and
were employed in the construction of the new wholesale price index developed by the
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price index is constructed based on the available wholesale prices of the non-
agricultural goods in Cairo, which were mostly semi-manufactured and manu-
factured goods.74 As for the aggregate price index, the Statistical Department
produced two price indices for Cairo for the years before and after 1935, so
they are here linked to generate a long-term index.
The three price indices – aggregate, agricultural and non-agricultural – that
are produced here are shown in Figure 7.6. The contrast between the move-
ment of the agricultural and non-agricultural prices appeared very strikingly
in the 1930s, when a consistent gap between them came into view after 1929.
Until then, the price trends were very much in parallel.
Finally, we work with two possible sets of elasticities. Relying on the stat-
istical analysis carried out on a large sample size in 1958-1959, Hansen uses
the following elasticities for the cereals, starches and dry beans: own price
elasticity is -0.75 and the income elasticity 0.5.75 But since our agricultural
consumption estimates have a wider coverage, including more income- and
own-price elastic goods, we slightly adjust these figures up: -0.8 own price
and 0.6 income elasticity and allow 0.2 for the cross elasticity. In the second
scenario, we directly employ the elasticities Allen (2000) assumes for early
modern Britain: the own price elasticity -0.6, cross price 0.1 and income
elasticity 0.5.76 Note that these income elasticity figures are broadly in line
with developing country experience, where a comprehensive review shows the
food expenditure elasticities change roughly between 0.5 and 0.7.77 Some ex-
Statistical Department. Egypt, Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique, 1936/37,
pp.489-93.
74For the years before 1935, the basket is as follows: Sugar (5), molasses (1), wheat flour
(1), vegetable oils (2), butter(3), soap(2), alcohol (1), fuel (3) and coal (3). After 1935,
the coverage significantly expanded: Steel (1), alcohol (1), benzine (2), timber (2),
bricks (2), coal (3), cement (1), copper (1), tin (1), iron (3), flour (1), cotton yarn (3),
oils (2), wool (1), flax (1), molasses (1), nickel (1), nitrate (2), paper (1), skins (1), oil
derivatives (3), stones (1), lead (1), soap (2), salt (1), silk (2), caustic soda (1), sugar
(5), sulphate (1), phosphate (1), tobacco (1), tea (1), cotton fabrics (7), glass (1) and
zinc (1). The numbers in parentheses represent the weights, which were introduced by
the Statistical Department after 1935. The two indices for the periods before and after
1935 are spliced.
75Hansen, Income and Consumption. For the original percentage expenditure elasticities
see Mostafa Mostafa and Moharram Mahmoud, Analytical Study of the Relationships
Between Consumption Expenditure on Different Groups of Commodities and Total
Annual Consumption Expenditures. Institute of Planning, UAR Memo no. 597 1964.
76Allen, Economic Structure and Agricultural Productivity.
77H. Houthakker, An International Comparison of Household Expenditure Patterns Com-
memorating the Centenary of Engel’s Law. Econometrica, 25 1957, pp.541-42.
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Figure 7.6.: Price Indices for Egypt: Aggregate, Agricultural and Non-
Agricultural (1913=100), 1913-1940
Source: Table 7.8
Figure 7.7.: New Estimates of Real Income Per Capita (1915=100), 1915-1939
Source: Table 7.9
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Table 7.1.: Comparison of Estimates of Egyptian Real Income Per Capita,
2930-2937
Hansen
(1979)
Hansen (1979) Yousef
(2002)
Own
estimates
Own
estimates
Direct
estimates
Derived Estimates Model 1 Model 2
1920 100 100 100 100 100
1929 112 114 117 106 107
1937 102 93 122 91 99
Notes: For comparison, the indices are referenced so that 1920 equals 100. The second column is the
simple average of the derived per capita income indices from the consumption of cereals and pulses,
coffee, tobacco, sugar and passenger kilometres. Own estimate (Model 1): own price elasticity is -0.8,
cross price elasticity 0.2 and income elasticity 0.6. Own estimate (Model 2): own price elasticity is -0.6,
cross price elasticity 0.1 and income elasticity 0.5.
perimentation over the possible other values do not lead to significant changes
on the estimated per capita income growth rates and the two possible mod-
els, presented in Figure 7.7, show similar trends: a quick recovery after World
War I, an upward trend in the 1920s and a fall in the 1930s, whose degree
depends on the assumptions about price and income elasticities.
Thus, Table 7.1 compares the present estimates with the earlier attempts.
As can be clearly seen, the estimated trends for the 1920s and 1930s are
similar in Hansen’s two indices (first and second column) and in the present
estimation (last two columns). Yousef significantly differs from all others by
pointing toward positive growth rates during 1930-1937.
As for wage data, it is, in terms of empirical evidence, perhaps the most
problematic area in Egypt’s historiography for the pre-war period due to the
fact that systematic official data only started to be published as late as 1942
and we only have relatively reliable estimates for 1937-1941.78 Therefore, the
best that we can do is to approximate it with the best possible indicator.
To do so, we consider wheat and maize prices, since they were the most
important consumption goods in Egypt. Two pieces of evidence reinforce our
choice. First, the data for 1937-1945 shows a large correlation between the
available wage series and wheat and maize prices. And second, cereal prices
tended to move with rural wages in the interwar years.79 We therefore use
the geometric mean of wheat and maize prices to approximate the change in
78Anis, A Study of National Income, p.396.
79Bent Hansen, Marginal Productivity Wage Theory and Subsistence Wage Theory in
Egyptian Agriculture. Journal of Development Studies, 4 1966; and Richards, Egypt’s
Agricultural Development .
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industrial wages.
7.2.2. Estimation Results
Our panel dataset thus covers cotton, woollen, natural and artificial silk out-
put and the other relevant variables for the period 1922-1939. We begin
by estimating the main reduced form output equation without the substi-
tute textile prices. We expect positive elasticity of output with respect to
the tariff-inclusive import prices: high import prices relative to input prices
should lead to positive growth in domestic output.80 The same applies to
the relative aggregate prices and real income, meaning the relatively cheaper
input prices and higher real income should induce positive domestic growth.
The trend may take positive or negative values, depending on the context,
as it reflects the combined effect of technological change, capital growth and
exogenous demand shifts. On the other hand, the input price ratio (pc/w)
may have a positive or negative effect.
Table 7.2 presents all the estimation results. At this stage, we need to de-
termine if the sector-specific disturbances in the error term are correlated with
the explanatory variables, in which case the fixed effects model should be used
and the random effects model otherwise. To do so, we run the conventional
Hausman test, which confirms the presence of fixed effects. As explained in
the corresponding analysis on Turkish textiles, this is rather intuitive, due to
the industry level data. Thus, the pooled OLS coefficients on the column 1
of Table 7.2 are biased and random effects are not efficient. Thus we consider
the fixed effects model, presented in the columns 3-5.
The base model without the substitute prices is shown in column 3. In this
model, the relative tariff-inclusive import prices and the relative aggregate
prices turn out to be significant at the 90 percent significance level. The
estimated coefficients imply that a 10 percent increase in the relative tariff-
inclusive import prices leads to a 9.6 percent increase in domestic output.81
80The expected signs are explained in a technical manner in the Appendix.
81Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation. The cross
sectional dependence might be an issue with the macro panels, yet in this case, the
Pesaran test does not show its presence. Likewise, an F-test for the null hypothesis that
all coefficients of time effects are different from zero fails to reject the null hypothesis.
Also, as explained in the Appendix, the estimated coefficient of the input price ratio
should be lower than the sum of the coefficients of the relative import prices and the
relative aggregate prices, that is, α4 < α2 +α2. This condition holds in the base model
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Table 7.2.: Sources of Textile Output Growth: Estimation Results
Dependent variable: log of output growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Random Within Within Within
P*(1+t)/Pc 1.995 1.995** 0.958* 0.956* 0.929**
(0.935) (0.935) (0.356) (0.340) (0.264)
Pa/Pc 0.637 0.637 1.424* 1.395* 1.700
(0.909) (0.909) (0.534) (0.531) (0.781)
Pc/w -0.881 -0.881 0.268 0.232 0.253
(0.717) (0.717) (0.580) (0.548) (0.512)
Real income 1 -0.386 -0.386 -0.202
(0.526) (0.526) (0.251)
trend -0.100 -0.100 0.0164 0.0192 0.0380
(0.0615) (0.0615) (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0305)
Real income 2 -0.231 -0.340
(0.212) (0.266)
Ps/Pc -0.316
(0.304)
Constant 11.74 11.74 7.036 9.207 12.66
(10.75) (10.75) (7.338) (7.634) (9.443)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.416 0.789 0.790 0.798
Number of pr 4 4 4 4
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables in logs except trend
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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And an increase in the relative aggregate prices of the same size cause an even
larger impact (14 percent increase). These results are robust when the second
real income estimates, which, as mentioned above, were based on different
income and price elasticities, are used (column 4). All other variables turn
out to be insignificant in both models. On the other hand, the inclusion of
the relative substitute prices makes the relative aggregate prices insignificant
and the impact of the tariff-inclusive import prices even stronger (Column 5).
However, this might be due to measurement error, since we can only observe
domestic prices after 1935 and have only poorly approximated the prices of
the earlier years.
In all the three fixed effects estimations, the coefficient of the relative tariff-
inclusive import prices is significant and around 0.95. One can interpret this
as quite expected: as the import prices that the domestic output competes
against increase more and more relative to the raw material prices, then the
domestic producers increase their output. Then, when the base model is
considered (column 3), the larger decline in the raw material prices compared
to the aggregate prices had a positive impact on the domestic output, probably
by increasing profit rates. Therefore, the perceived import prices appear a
significant driver, yet they also combined with relative prices to determine the
course of domestic textile growth. What is equally important is the fact that
the stagnation in real income in the 1930s seems to have checked domestic
output. And this stagnation was mainly due to the stagnant agricultural
output, so it follows that although the domestic output replaced imported
textiles to a significant degree, it was limited by stagnant real incomes.
At this point, one may ask to what extent tariff protection accounts for
output growth. To answer this question, we will conduct a counterfactual
simulation by fixing the ad valorem rates at a moderate level and assuming
the estimated output growth elasticities used in the base model. This exercise
is conducted in the following way. First, we take the predicted growth rates
estimated by the model based on historical values of nominal protection rates
and then separately calculate the counterfactual rates based on counterfactual
values. For cotton, natural silk and artificial silk textiles, the ad valorem rate
is fixed at 18 percent, which was the one that prevailed immediately after the
1930 tariff reform. As known, these values progressively increased over the
and its extension (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 7.2).
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Figure 7.8.: Actual and Counterfactual Textile Output Levels in Egypt (1,000
Tons), 1923-1939
Source: See the text.
course of the 1930s, up to around 50 percent in the case of cotton and natural
silk and almost 100 percent for artificial silk goods. For woollens, the level of
protection was already moderate in the 1930s at 15 percent, so in this exercise
it was fixed at 8 percent, which was the pre-reform level.
Then the difference between the predicted growth rates and counterfactual
ones is deducted from the actual growth rates to obtain the final counterfac-
tual growth rates. The results are presented for each textile branch in Figure
7.8. The effect of the protection is most obviously seen in the much smaller
counterfactual output levels of silk goods: while the average annual growth
rate of the natural silk goods in the 1930s was 10.6 percent, the counterfactual
level decreases to 7.5 percent. In other words, 30 percent of growth in natural
silk output in the 1930s is accounted for by the high tariff rates. The dispar-
ity turns out to be slightly more pronounced in the case of artificial silk: the
growth rate declines from 18.2 percent to 12.3 percent in the counterfactual
case. That is, one third of the growth in artificial silk textiles was due to the
7.3. CONCLUSION 292
high tariffs. On the other hand, for cotton, around 15 percent of the growth
is accounted for by the excessive tariffs and lastly there is a very small effect
of the tariffs (less than 10 percent) for the output of woollen goods. In short,
in each case, the wedge between the import prices and input prices turns out
to be a more decisive factor for output growth than the nominal tariff rates
per se.
7.3. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to identify the sources of manufacturing
growth in the interwar period by looking at the case of textiles, which was
the fastest-growing branch of manufacturing. The estimated coefficients based
on a partial equilibrium model leads to three conclusions.
To begin with, the relative tariff-inclusive import prices appears to be the
most significant driver of domestic output growth: on average, a 10 percent
increase in the cost of imported textiles relative to raw material prices res-
ults in around a 9.5 percent increase in domestic output. This finding is far
from striking, considering the protectionist import policies of Egypt in the
1930s and the concomitant manufacturing revival. However, as demonstrated
in the counterfactual simulation built around more moderate tariff rates, the
increasingly high tariff rates do not turn out to have been responsible for
the output growth, since if the nominal tariffs had remained only moder-
ately high (around 18 percent in each case after 1929), the resulting average
output growth would have been 15-33 percent less than actual levels. What
explains this is the fact that the wedge between the average import prices
and raw material prices already operated in favour of domestic producers, so
even moderate tariffs could still have granted the local producers sufficient
protection to compete with imports.
On the other hand, the limitation of this study is that the effects of the
preference in government contracts for domestic producers remain unknown.
If this boosted the competitive position of domestic firms, as suggested by
el-Gritly, then this might explain the implication that the excessive tariffs
accounted for a relatively small part of the output growth.82
82el-Gritly, Structure of Modern Industry, p.338. The other measures to protect the do-
mestic producers, such as railway rebates and the tax exemptions for imports of ma-
chinery, are considered to have had a minimal effect, as argued above.
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Second, the gap between the aggregate prices and raw material prices was
another, and perhaps more important, determinant of output growth. Al-
though we are unable to observe the domestic prices, this disparity might
be indicative of the high domestic textile prices, relative to the input prices
and thus necessarily higher profitability. Hansen and Nashashibi’s argument
about the relative fall in the prices of agricultural goods is extremely valid in
this connection.83 Third, the real income and trend variables appear statist-
ically insignificant. The stagnation in domestic income in the 1930s due to
the agricultural stagnation was clearly an impediment to domestic growth, as
it put a check on domestic demand. And the lack of trend moreover signifies
the absence of exogenous technological change and capital growth.
83Hansen and Nashashibi, Foreign Trade Regimes, p.4.
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Table 7.3.: Total and Textile Imports of Egypt, 1914-1939
Total imports Textile imports Share of textile imports
LE million LE million %
1914 21.7 5.5 25.2
1915 19.4 5.7 29.4
1916 31.1 9.6 31.0
1917 33.2 11.7 35.3
1918 51.2 22.2 43.4
1919 47.4 18.8 39.8
1920 101.9 34.4 33.8
1921 55.5 14.7 26.5
1922 43.3 14.9 34.3
1923 45.3 16.5 36.5
1924 50.7 17.1 33.7
1925 58.2 18.0 30.9
1926 52.4 13.6 26.0
1927 48.7 13.9 28.6
1928 52.0 15.4 29.7
1929 56.1 16.1 28.7
1930 47.5 12.4 26.2
1931 31.5 7.8 24.7
1932 27.4 7.6 27.7
1933 26.8 8.0 29.9
1934 29.3 8.2 28.0
1935 32.2 8.1 25.1
1936 31.5 7.6 24.1
1937 38.0 8.8 23.2
1938 36.9 7.0 19.1
1939 34.1 5.6 16.5
Source: Egypt, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Department, Annual Statement of Foreign Trade.
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Table 7.4.: Import Duties and Government Revenues in Egypt, 1914/15-
1938/39.
Import duties Government revenues Duties/Total imports Import du-
ties/Government
revenues
LE million LE million % %
1914/15 3.1 15.4 16.04 20.18
1915/16 3.8 17.8 12.30 21.57
1916/17 4.8 19.9 14.59 24.29
1917/18 5.0 23.2 9.72 21.45
1918/19 6.9 27.7 14.61 25.04
1919/20 10.5 33.7 10.26 31.04
1920/21 10.9 46.4 19.65 23.48
1921/22 10.1 41.8 23.22 24.07
1922/23 10.5 35.8 23.26 29.44
1923/24 10.9 36.3 21.53 30.14
1924/25 11.9 37.7 20.44 31.57
1925/26 12.3 39.6 23.47 31.07
1926/27 12.1 41.9 24.93 28.94
1927/28 11.5 38.6 22.13 29.86
1928/29 12.4 40.4 22.05 30.64
1929/30 13.1 41.4 27.65 31.72
1930/31 12.6 41.2 40.02 30.61
1931/32 13.1 37.8 47.59 34.55
1932/33 12.4 37.1 46.34 33.40
1933/34 12.2 32.6 41.64 37.39
1934/35 13.3 33.7 41.35 39.50
1935/36 14.3 35.0 45.30 40.80
1936/37 15.1 35.5 39.66 42.50
1937/38 15.2 37.1 41.05 40.81
1938/39 15.5 37.6 45.32 41.07
Source: Egypt, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Department, Annual Statement of Foreign Trade; Egypt,
Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique.
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Table 7.5.: Ad Valorem Import Protection Rates for Egyptian Textiles (%),
1929-1939
Cotton Woollens Natural silk Artificial silk
1929 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
1930 18.2 15.0 18.0 18.0
1931 33.8 15.0 18.0 18.0
1932 37.1 15.0 31.0 56.2
1933 39.3 15.0 44.0 61.0
1934 39.5 15.0 57.1 66.3
1935 44.7 15.0 60.5 83.9
1936 52.8 15.0 54.5 106.1
1937 35.0 15.0 58.9 100.7
1938 46.3 15.0 56.3 101.2
1939 47.7 15.0 48.4 84.0
Note: Cotton figures represent heavy grey cotton textiles and woollen figures are for carpets and rugs.
See the text for details.
Table 7.6.: Average Prices of Textile Imports in Egypt (LE/kg), 1922-1939
Cotton Woollens Natural silk Artificial silk
1922 0.18 0.28 2.17 0.63
1923 0.17 0.25 2.30 0.72
1924 0.18 0.24 2.04 0.70
1925 0.17 0.23 1.80 0.61
1926 0.12 0.36 1.45 0.52
1927 0.12 0.20 1.47 0.31
1928 0.13 0.19 1.68 0.38
1929 0.12 0.17 1.43 0.39
1930 0.09 0.20 1.52 0.39
1931 0.08 0.36 1.32 0.34
1932 0.08 0.33 1.34 0.41
1933 0.07 0.35 1.21 0.39
1934 0.07 0.31 0.77 0.37
1935 0.07 0.24 0.73 0.32
1936 0.08 0.26 1.11 0.35
1937 0.09 0.25 0.98 0.46
1938 0.09 0.25 1.02 0.54
1939 0.13 0.24 1.18 0.95
Note: Cotton figures represent heavy grey cotton textiles and woollen figures are for carpets and rugs.
See the text for details.
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Table 7.7.: Raw Material Prices for Egyptian Textiles (LE/kg), 1922-1939
Raw Cotton Raw wool Natural silk yarn Artificial silk yarn
1922 0.15 1.02 1.37 1.36
1923 0.14 0.98 1.34 1.21
1924 0.18 0.96 1.23 1.02
1925 0.18 0.91 1.16 0.46
1926 0.14 0.91 1.14 0.23
1927 0.10 0.78 0.85 0.27
1928 0.13 0.85 0.79 0.28
1929 0.12 1.03 0.91 0.24
1930 0.09 0.86 0.78 0.22
1931 0.05 0.74 0.71 0.19
1932 0.04 0.61 0.60 0.19
1933 0.05 0.54 0.55 0.17
1934 0.05 0.51 0.53 0.17
1935 0.06 0.52 0.53 0.15
1936 0.06 0.50 0.50 0.14
1937 0.06 0.56 0.54 0.17
1938 0.05 0.53 0.56 0.16
1939 0.05 0.50 0.54 0.29
Source: See the text.
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Table 7.8.: Price Indices: Aggregate, Agricultural and Non-agricultural
(1913=100), 1913-1939.
Agricultural Non-agricultural Aggregate
1913 100.0 100.0 100.0
1914 80.6 112.3 87.0
1915 90.0 126.3 97.3
1916 125.3 182.1 136.7
1917 186.9 278.4 205.2
1918 193.5 370.9 228.9
1919 218.2 351.2 244.8
1920 377.4 403.0 382.5
1921 143.2 266.3 167.8
1922 138.2 182.4 147.1
1923 136.3 159.0 140.9
1924 159.2 158.5 159.0
1925 188.0 139.3 178.3
1926 131.8 141.3 133.7
1927 119.4 126.4 120.8
1928 130.9 121.9 129.1
1929 125.0 114.4 122.9
1930 99.5 108.5 101.3
1931 82.2 107.4 87.3
1932 71.9 104.8 78.5
1933 62.8 105.0 71.2
1934 86.7 105.6 90.5
1935 78.0 108.7 84.1
1936 78.8 110.7 84.9
1937 81.9 136.2 88.8
1938 82.9 136.2 89.7
1939 79.5 146.7 91.0
Source: See the text. Main data source is Egypt, Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique.
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Table 7.9.: Estimates of Real Income Per Capita in Egypt, 1915-1939
(I) (II) (III)=(I)+(II) (IV) (V) (VI)
Net
agricultural
output
Total net
agricultural
imports
Agricultural
consump-
tion
Agricultural
consump-
tion at
1938 prices
Income per
capita at 1938
prices Model I
Income per
capita at 1938
prices Model
II
LE million LE million LE million LE million 1915=100 1015=100
1915 46.8 -21.6 25.2 28.1 100.0 100.0
1916 58.7 -32.3 26.4 21.8 71.3 60.8
1917 89.7 -34.2 55.5 25.2 87.0 83.8
1918 116.2 -38.2 78.0 25.2 69.3 69.8
1919 112.7 -66.7 46.0 26.8 87.8 88.1
1920 200.1 -65.3 134.8 33.3 121.3 122.9
1921 115.4 -24.3 91.1 37.1 97.6 107.4
1922 89.7 -41.2 48.5 37.3 113.6 120.0
1923 98.2 -49.0 49.2 29.5 113.0 112.2
1924 113.1 -56.6 56.5 31.6 123.4 122.8
1925 128.4 -48.0 80.4 39.5 135.9 138.0
1926 116.3 -31.0 85.3 41.6 122.0 128.4
1927 90.9 -39.3 51.6 41.0 122.6 128.7
1928 100.0 -46.9 53.1 37.6 128.1 131.2
1929 106.0 -40.7 65.3 46.0 125.8 132.3
1930 93.9 -20.7 73.3 53.4 116.5 126.0
1931 74.0 -18.6 55.4 55.9 110.0 121.1
1932 61.6 -17.6 44.0 50.6 108.7 119.9
1933 55.1 -21.0 34.2 43.9 104.8 115.8
1934 62.0 -24.5 37.5 42.1 117.2 124.9
1935 68.6 -25.9 42.7 44.0 111.9 121.3
1936 72.1 -24.0 48.1 47.9 111.0 121.4
1937 75.3 -28.3 47.1 51.3 106.5 118.7
1938 75.3 -19.7 55.6 51.4 106.8 118.9
1939 72.4 -23.4 49.0 55.1 100.7 114.0
Notes: (IV) is the 3-year moving average of (III), which is deflated by the agricultural price index. See
the text for the assumed elasticities in the real income per capita models I and II.
8. Explaining the Sources of
Economic Divergence Between
Egypt and Turkey: New
Insights
“We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.”
T.S. Elliot
The preceding chapters have attempted to pin down the extent and sources
of agricultural and industrial growth in interwar Egypt and Turkey. In doing
so, they have served two purposes. The first is to provide consistent out-
put estimates of agricultural and industrial growth, given that the existing
quantitative evidence is either insufficient or misleading. And the second is
to explore the sources of output growth. The output decomposition in the
chapters on the agricultural sector and the partial equilibrium analysis of tex-
tiles output growth in the chapters on protectionism serve the latter purpose.
The following chapter brings together the main findings of the earlier chapters
in a comparative manner in order to obtain insights regarding the contrasting
economic performance of the economies of Turkey and Egypt in the interwar
period. In addition, it provides a brief discussion of how our findings fit with
the monetary and fiscal policies adopted by policy makers in the 1930s and
an attempt to further the theoretical insights that were discussed in the In-
troduction based on the experience of other economies. It is here argued that
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the monetary and fiscal policies to a large extent remained passive in interwar
Turkey and Egypt and policy makers implemented a protectionist agenda to
varying degrees. Turkey pursued more aggressive protectionist policies, yet
this difference had more impact on the extent of industrialisation than on the
recovery in domestic demand, which was for the most part driven by factor
endowments, geographical characteristics and the economic problems Turkey
and Egypt inherited from the pre-World War I period.
8.1. A Summary of Findings
In both Egypt and Turkey, the interwar period’s economic shock was external
in origin and massive in size. The Great Depression was transmitted, just as it
was for many other developing countries, mainly via the decline in agricultural
prices, the terms of trade and export earnings. However, as much as the
source of depression was external, the origins of the response and the extent
of economic recovery turned out to be internal.
The evidence of price levels and terms of trade indicates the depth of the
depression. The net barter terms of trade of both countries was reduced
by around 40 percent between 1926-1929 and 1933 (Figure 8.1).1 On the
other hand, the movement of Egypt and Turkey’s terms of trade diverged
in the second half of the 1930s: while they remained almost unchanged in
Turkey, Egypt suffered a further loss. This might have been due to two factors.
First, Turkey’s foreign trade became increasingly oriented towards Germany
via the clearing system in the second half of the 1930s. Germany might
have paid for exports from Turkey above market prices. Second, Turkey’s
export basket was more diversified, so the average export prices might have
recovered more compared to cotton, which was Egypt’s main export. This was
particularly important because while exports made up around 10 percent of
GDP in Turkey, they most likely made up twice as much in Egypt. Therefore,
the direct impact of the fall in the terms of trade was considerably greater in
Egypt.
The extent of the shock was also reflected in the movement of agricultural
prices, which had a far broader impact on the domestic market due to its
spillover effects (Figure 8.2). Average prices declined by 60 percent in Turkey
1Since the export prices were unusually high in 1925, the average of 1926-1929 is a better
reference point.
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between the late 1920s and 1933 and slightly recovered thereafter, whereas
the extent of deflation remained around 40 percent in Egypt. Yet the smaller
decline does not mean the crisis was less severe in Egypt because the bulk
of the Egyptian peasantry was involved in commercial relationships, whereas
large-scale commercialisation was restricted to a few regions in Turkey, which
enabled a part of the peasantry to escape a severe debt-deflation shock.
Overall, although there were some differences in the movement in agricul-
tural prices and terms of trade in Egypt and Turkey, there is no doubt that the
crisis was felt severely in both countries between 1929 and 1933. And what is
equally important was that the deterioration in the terms of trade and defla-
tion in agricultural prices were to a large extent prolonged until World War
II, which not only impacted on the medium-term economic performance, but
also the formation of economic policies, as will be discussed later on.
Given that both economies were predominantly agricultural, we first look
at how the total agricultural output responded to the sharp deflation. Fig-
ure 8.3 compares net agricultural output per worker, the sum of both crop
and livestock, in Egypt and Turkey, as estimated in Chapters 2 and 5. The
divergence in the movement of output after 1930 is obvious. In Turkey the out-
put per worker increased, with a 2.3 percent annual trend growth rate over
1925-1939, and only a temporary decline between 1933 and 1935, whereas
Egypt witnessed a -1.6 percent annual decline over the whole period. These
results should be viewed in relation to the background of severe deflation.
Undoubtedly, the performance of Turkish agriculture was impressive in view
of the 50-60 percent decline in agricultural prices, while the increase in crop
yields in Egypt only partially offset the adverse impact of the decline in agri-
cultural prices.
What led to the contrasting pattern of agricultural development in interwar
Turkey and Egypt were the constraints and potentials created by the previous
development path, geography and, to a lesser degree, policies. To begin with,
population, both total and agricultural, grew rapidly in both countries: its
compound annual growth rate was 1.15 percent in Egypt and 1.82 percent in
Turkey from 1925 to 1939.2 However, the consequences of population growth
2The respective rates from 1914 to 1939 were 1.14 percent in Egypt and 0.61 percent in
Turkey. The huge decline in population during World War I and subsequent demo-
graphic changes until the mid-1920s kept the population growth over 1914-1939 at a
modest rate.
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Figure 8.1.: Net Barter Terms of Trade in Egypt and Turkey (1928=100),
1925-1939
Sources: Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri , Additional Table 52; and Mead, Growth
and Structural Change, Table V.A.7.
Figure 8.2.: Agricultural Prices in Egypt and Turkey (1928=100), 1925-1929
Sources: Data appendix in Chapters 2 and 5.
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Figure 8.3.: Net Agricultural Output Per Worker (Constant Prices) in Egypt
and Turkey (1928=100), 1925-1939
Source: Data appendix in Chapters 2 and 5.
were totally different. In Turkey the population growth stimulated output
growth as a result of the available cultivable land, whereas its effect was
quite adverse in Egypt, since the country had already reached the limits of its
spare cultivable land by the onset of World War I, as repeatedly pointed out in
the Egyptian historiography. This contrast in land use is easily noticeable in
Figure 8.4, which shows that the total cropped acreage in Turkey increased by
one fourth during the 1930s, whereas it was almost stagnant in Egypt.3 Arthur
Lewis’ theory of the unlimited supply of labour is probably applicable to
Egyptian agriculture, despite cotton production being quite labour-intensive
and becoming even more so during the interwar period because of the increase
in the use of water and chemical fertilisers.4
3Note that the cropped area was expanded between 1914 and 1926, unlike in the following
period. See Radwan, Capital Formation, p.270.
4W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies. Manchester School
May 1954. Lewis’ theory is based on the idea that an unlimited supply of labour in
agriculture, working with a negligible marginal productivity, is a characteristic phenom-
ena of a traditional economy. Thus, in a typical developing country, where there is no
opportunity for investment in the traditional sector and there is surplus labour at low
wages in an unlimited amount, the scope of industrial development is only limited by
the availability of cheap labour and food. The model is applied to Egyptian agriculture
for the period 1937-1965 by Mabro and he found that although there was disguised
unemployment and a labour surplus in Egyptian agriculture, industrial development
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Therefore, the dynamics between available land and population were one of
the key factors that determined the extent of agricultural growth in the inter-
war period. The decomposition of crop output growth, separately carried out
for Turkey and Egypt in Chapters 2 and 5 respectively, provides an illustra-
tion of the sources of agricultural growth. For Egypt, the years 1913-1939 can
be assessed as a single period, because they differ from the earlier period in
terms of the economic problems that Egyptian agriculture faced, that is, the
end of easily available cultivable land and the previous deterioration in yields.
During that period, the price index declined by around 20 percent, but its in-
fluence on the total value of output was totally offset by the combined effect
of the improvement in yields (18 percent), a small increase in the cropped
acreage (2 percent) and the shift towards more valuable crops (3 percent).
By contrast, in Turkey between 1925 and 1939, the total output level was
maintained, which was the result of a 75 percent increase in yields and a
48 percent increase in total acreage, despite the 66 percent decline in prices.
The emphasis placed on the open land frontier in Turkey in the conventional
wisdom therefore ignores to a large degree the rise in land productivity. As
argued earlier, this positive trend in yields was mainly explained by wheat and
cash crops. Although an accurate judgement is difficult to make due to the
limited data, it seems that in the case of cash crops, such as cotton and sugar
beet, government policies and the expansion of new industries contributed to
the implementation of better cultivation techniques and the adoption of better
seeds. Wheat yields, on the other hand, rose in the coastal regions where the
scope of land expansion was limited. Turkey thus experienced a much greater
increase in yields, as shown in Figure 8.5, which compares the quite limited
increase in Egyptian yields with the highly volatile but increasing yields in
Turkey.5
Furthermore, the role of government policies in agricultural performance
should be considered in the context of the developments that had taken place
in the earlier period. In Egypt the rapid progress of cotton cultivation before
1914 had been made by extending the frontier with the help of irrigation,
was not able to absorb the surplus due to the high population growth rate. Robert
Mabro, Industrial Growth, Agricultural Under-Employment and the Lewis Model: The
Egyptian Case, 1937-1965. Journal of Development Studies, 3(4) 1967.
5The higher volatility in the case of Turkey was the result of the greater dependence of
the agricultural production on rainfall, which was not the case in Egypt owing to the
large-scale irrigation.
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Figure 8.4.: Cultivated Area in Egypt and Turkey (1928=100), 1925-1939
Source: Data appendix in Chapters 2 and 5.
Figure 8.5.: Average Crop Yields in Egypt and Turkey (1928=100), 1925-1939
Source: Laspeyres indices. Crop yields are weighted with acreage times prices. Data
appendix in Chapters 2 and 5.
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land reclamation and population growth. Therefore, the agricultural sector
in the interwar period had to deal with land shortages and the deterioration
in cotton yields. The government initiated large-scale drainage and some fur-
ther irrigation projects, and made continuous efforts to improve cotton yields
in order to return to the higher levels of before. Such attempts eventually
proved to be successful. On the other hand, the reversal of the decline in
prices was a more difficult task, as reflected by the failure of the occasional
restrictions on cotton acreage between 1921 and 1932. Whether it was based
on economic logic or the interests of landlords is an open debate, but after
1933 Egyptian policy makers came to the conclusion that the policy had to be
oriented towards increasing cotton output. On the other hand, the policies of
Turkey’s republican governments, such as the abolition of the tithe in 1925,
the extension of railroads towards the interior’s hinterland and the support
for cash crop production in all likelihood stimulated output growth, yet the
strong rhetoric centred around agricultural modernisation and development
did not yield notable improvements in the use of technology, whether by
mechanisation or through other agricultural techniques.
It is widely accepted that the 1930s marked the beginning of industrial-
isation in both Egypt and Turkey. However, the lack of comparable data
has so far not allowed us to accurately compare the two countries’ growth
performance. To do so, we have provided the first comprehensive estimates
of Egyptian industrial output, as well as re-estimates of Turkish industrial
output that are more reliable and detailed than the earlier ones presented by
Bulutay et al. and Zendisayek.6 The new estimates confirm the existence of
industrial take off during the 1930s in both countries (Figure 8.6). Yet it turns
out that the extent of industrial growth was rather different. The index of ag-
gregate physical output in Turkey increased by two and a half times between
1929 and 1938, whereas it only grew around 30 percent in Egypt during that
period. Thus, the strong growth in Turkey stands in sharp contrast to the
moderate growth in Egypt.
On the other hand, this aggregate comparison hides an important aspect
of Egyptian industrialisation. In both countries the textiles output grew by
an unprecedented degree, by four to five times in the 1930s, whereas food
processing output expanded twice in Turkey but remained stagnant in Egypt
6Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli Geliri ; and Zendisayek, Reevaluation.
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Figure 8.6.: Aggregate Industrial Output in Egypt and Turkey (1928=100),
1925-1939
Source: Data appendix in Chapters 3 and 6.
Figure 8.7.: Textiles and Food Processing Output in Egypt and Turkey
(1928=100), 1925-1939
Source: Data appendix in Chapters 3 and 6. The indices cover cotton, woollen, silk and
hemp goods.
8.1. A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 309
(Figure 8.7). While in Turkey almost all sectors such as milling, tobacco and
alcohol processing grew to a significant degree, in Egypt most sectors did
not see significant growth until World War II. Therefore, by comparison, it
appears that the industrial expansion in Turkey was much more balanced as
the variation in the growth rates within industry was more pronounced in
Egypt, despite the fact that textiles grew the most in both economies. In
particular, the output of the food processing sector in Egypt moved in line
with the sluggish domestic incomes. Foodstuff imports were reduced over
the 1930s, but the impact on output growth rates remained limited because
imports had made up a small proportion of total consumption before 1930. For
instance, the share of imports in domestic wheat consumption was just 10-15
percent, and it declined to negligible levels by the end of the 1930s. Vegetable
oils were another case, since the consumption of cotton seed oil was already
totally supplied by domestic production, while other types, such as olive oil,
continued to be imported, so the share of imported vegetable oil, which was
around 20 percent, remained stable. In sharp contrast, the share of imports
in cotton textiles consumption in Egypt was around 80-85 percent during the
1920s and as a result of rapid domestic growth it fell to 50 percent in 1938 and
even further during the war. Nonetheless, the estimates presented in Chapter
6 indicate negative or sluggish growth in the consumption of textiles and
foodstuff, which apparently placed an enormous check on Egypt’s industrial
development.
In order to assess the determinants of output growth in the fastest growing
sector in both economies, that is, textiles, we suggest a partial equilibrium
analysis, which differentiates between the impact of import prices, relative
aggregate prices and real income on the domestic output of cotton, woollen,
silk and hemp textiles. The analysis shows that the tariff-inclusive import
prices had a statistically significant impact on textiles output in Turkey: a 10
percent increase in the relative tariff-inclusive import prices led to 8-8.5 per-
cent increase. Furthermore, there was another factor that operated in favour
of output growth: in Turkey a 10 percent increase in real income on average
resulted in a 13.7 percent increase in output, which leads to the conclusion
that import protection combined with the improvement in domestic incomes
determined the high rates of growth in the textiles sector. In order to gauge
the particular impact of tariff rates instead of tariff-inclusive import prices per
se, we ran a few counterfactual simulations and showed that growth would
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have been 34-56 percent less than actual rates if the moderate tariff rates had
been maintained after the 1929 tariff reform. The same exercise also shows
that the growth rates would have been 16-28 percent less if the per capita na-
tional income had not increased after 1935, which underlines the importance
of domestic income in the industrial expansion. One should thus note that
the growth in agricultural output played a prominent role in the growth of
national income.
In Egypt, just as in Turkey, import prices turn out to be a strong and
robust predictor of output growth: a 10 percent increase in the relative tariff-
inclusive import prices on average led to a 9-9.5 percent rise in output. On
the other hand, due to the absence of income estimates for Egypt, we make a
crude estimate of the change in real income based on the total consumption of
agricultural goods and relative prices of manufactures and it does not seem to
have had any significant impact on domestic output. Instead, relative prices,
specifically the ratio of the aggregate price index to raw material prices, appear
as a significant determinant of output growth. In addition, a similar counter
simulation indicates that the growth rates would have been 15-33 percent less
than actual ones if tariff rates had been kept at moderate levels after 1930.
Therefore, these findings make it possible to discuss the role of tariff pro-
tection in interwar industrialisation in Egypt and Turkey. First, there were
similarities at the macro level between the tariff policies: Figure 8.8 shows
that economy-wide nominal tariff rates moved in a similar manner in the in-
terwar period. In both countries the average rates followed pretty much the
same pattern, by increasing from 10-20 percent to 40-50 percent after the
tariff reforms. Second, the structure of the new tariff schedules changed after
1929-1930, as final goods became more heavily taxed than intermediate goods
and raw materials, so that effective rates increased more than nominal rates
in both economies. And third, the share of imports in domestic consumption
was at similar levels before the tariff reforms, resulting in a similar scope in
both countries for import replacement during the 1930s. In effect, there was
a significant decline in imports of manufactures in both countries, with an
expected degree of variation. However, in the end, the aggregate industrial
output grew much faster in Turkey.
At this stage, it is useful to make a distinction between textiles and food
processing for analytical purposes because their growth patterns were totally
different. As argued earlier, textile output grew almost to the same degree
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in both countries. As demonstrated in the counterfactual simulations, in
Egypt textile output could have expanded more than it did with higher duties,
particularly on finer cotton textiles, just as in Turkey (Figure 8.8).7 However,
even higher growth rates in textiles would not have had much impact on the
aggregate growth rates because of the slow growth rates in the food processing
sector. That was the crux of the problem for Egypt’s industry and foreign
competition was not its ultimate cause. In this respect, in Egypt the real
constraint on the scope of industrial growth was the sluggish consumption,
which was a reflection of stagnant domestic incomes, rather than the lack of
protection. In other words, higher tariff protection could have given some
more impetus to local manufacturing, but such an impact was doomed to
fail due to depressed incomes. In this respect, the impact of tariff protection
on industrial growth was even smaller than we observe its impact on textiles
sector, as the growth of food-processing was more dependent on domestic
incomes, compared to textiles.
There were also other factors behind the industrial growth that do not ap-
pear as clearly as they should in the econometric analysis provided above due
to the limitations of the model. These factors were directly related to profit
margins in manufacturing. For one thing, the movement of the domestic terms
of trade was undoubtedly in favour of manufacturers in both countries.8 As
discussed above, relative aggregate prices turned out to be a significant de-
terminant of textiles output in Egypt. Although the data on the prices of final
foods is lacking, this more or less reflects the wedge between the prices of final
goods and raw materials prices, so it can be taken as representing industrial
profits. Another measure which likewise reflects profit margins is the domestic
terms of trade, that is, relative industrial prices. Its movement is shown in
the Figure 8.9 and indicates that industrial prices increased by 50 percent
relative to agricultural prices in the early 1930s in Turkey and remained there
for the rest of the decade, which was far from surprising in view of the strong
protectionism at the time. But the escalation in the manufacturing prices
7Note that the size of counterfactual tariff rates are set differently for Turkey and Egypt in
the preceding chapters. The criteria is the counterfactual assumption that the countries
continue with the moderate tariff rates, which were determined by specific historical and
economic conditions in each country. One needs to take this account when interpreting
the results.
8For a similar argument, see Kazgan, Türkiye Ekonomisinde Depresyon, pp.260-62. She
considers the changes in terms of trade and the decline in import capacity as signs of
increasing profit margins, without providing evidence.
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Figure 8.8.: Nominal Tariff Rates in Egypt and Turkey (%), 1925-1939
Source: Data appendix in Chapters 4 and 7.
Figure 8.9.: Domestic Terms of Trade, Egypt and Turkey (1928=100), 1925-
1939
Source: Data appendix in Chapters 2 and 7.
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was more pronounced in Egypt as it continued after 1936. Therefore, it can
be inferred that manufacturers in both countries greatly benefited from the
cheap raw materials and the high prices of final goods.
Moreover, while reliable information on manufacturing wages is lacking, the
available indicators suggest that manufacturing profits were also supported by
favourable wages. In Turkey the available series provided by Bulutay et al.
exhibit a certain degree of nominal rigidity in the 1930s. The wage index
was 45 in 1927 and 44 in the years 1933 and 1939. This index may, however,
have been based on data from large enterprises. Another estimate of wages in
small workshops in Istanbul indicates that average wages declined by 15-20
percent between 1927 and 1933.9 Nonetheless, whether wages were stagnant
or declined, it is almost certain that industrial prices fell more than wages
up to 1933. But for the period when industrial output surged, that is, 1933-
1939, industrial prices increased by 20 percent, while wages were stagnant.
Another supporting piece of evidence is that Tekeli and Ilkin calculate that
the share of wages in the output of the enterprises that benefited from the Law
for Encouragement of Industry, which were mostly medium- and large-scale
firms, declined from 11.2 to 9.7 between 1932 and 1935, whereas the share of
profits increased from 28.8 to 36.6.10 As for Egypt, next to nothing is known
on wages in industry, as was stated in Chapter 7. Yet the sharp decline in
rural wages and cereal prices, which are the most relevant wage goods, after
1929 implies that the role of wages was probably even more favourable than in
Turkey. At the theoretical level, this can be justified on the ground that the
existence of a labour surplus, that is, a high population density, and factor
mobility should have helped to keep wages at low levels in Egypt.
Overall, the new estimates of output growth in agriculture and industry give
us an idea of their relative contribution to national income. The percentage
change in real GDP can be decomposed into the relative change in value added
in agriculture, industry and services with respect to the initial level of GDP
in the following way:
9Tekeli and İlkin, Uygulamaya Geçerken, p.24.
10Tekeli and İlkin, Uygulamaya Geçerken, p.20.
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where Y stands for real income, A, I and S for the value added in agriculture,
industry and services, Yi for the initial level of national income. For the sake
of comparability, we choose 1925 as the initial year and 1939 as the final
year. One should recall that we have already produced the revised GDP
estimates for Turkey by bringing together the new agricultural and industrial
value added estimates with the services output provided by Bulutay et al. in
Chapter 4.11 According to these new estimates, GDP at 1927 prices increased
by 84.5 percent between 1925 and 1939, while the value added in agriculture,
industry and services did so by 23.6, 20.3 and 40.6 percent respectively. This
implies that 27.9 percent of GDP growth was due to agricultural growth,
24 percent to industrial growth and 48.1 percent to the growth in services.
Therefore, it appears that the direct contribution of agriculture and industry
to aggregate output was both substantial and similar in size.
On the other hand, the same exercise cannot be easily carried out for Egypt
due to the lack of reliable income estimates. However, we can make relatively
consistent predictions based on the agricultural and industrial value added
estimates presented earlier in the present work. To begin, during 1925-1939
the estimates of net output in agriculture and industry presented in Chapters
5 and 6 indicate 20 percent growth in agricultural output and 40 percent
growth in industrial output. Then, to get a sense of the contribution of the
sectoral growth rates to aggregate output, we need the share of agriculture
and industry in total GDP. In the absence of reliable figures, the best thing is
to consult the available estimates closest to the interwar period. Hansen and
Marzouk present all the available estimates of Egyptian GDP.12 The estim-
ates for 1939-1945 are based on Anis’ work, which suggests that the share of
agriculture and industry in GDP varied between 24 and 29 percent and 7 and
10 percent during the war.13 On the other hand, the official estimates for the
1945-1954 period give higher shares: 30-42 percent for agriculture and 12-14
11Table 4.6 in the data appendix of Chapter 4.
12Hansen and Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy , pp.318-20.
13Anis, A Study of National Income.
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percent for industry. The latter figures might be more accurate, however, as
the share of agriculture was in all likelihood higher in the interwar period than
in the postwar period due to the sustained industrial growth during and after
the war. Therefore, it seems that the these post-war figures can be reasonably
adjusted in favour of agriculture for the interwar period, for instance, 40-45
percent for agriculture and 7-10 percent for industry. Consequently, based on
these predictions, a 20 percent growth in agricultural output should have led
to a 8-9 percent increase in real GDP and a 40 percent growth in industrial
output to a 3-4 percent increase. In short, the contribution of industrial ex-
pansion to national income was probably around half of that of agriculture. It
is no wonder that population growth rate was higher than these figures, which
most probably led to a decline in real income per capita, as was predicted by
our estimates based on agricultural consumption.14
8.2. Protectionism and the Broader Policy
Framework
Now, it is worth asking, first, if the monetary and fiscal policies played a part
in economic performance in the 1930s in Egypt and Turkey and, secondly,
about the extent to which the policy choices are in conformity with the dom-
inant conceptual framework discussed in the Introduction, which, it will be
recalled, suggests that the countries that adhered to fixed exchange rates had
to resort to greater import repression during the 1930s because they were less
free to increase the money supply by open market operations or to pursue
deficit-financing because the primary emphasis was placed on maintaining
exchange rates.
During the whole interwar period, the money in circulation in Turkey re-
mained quite stable and independent of the changes in domestic demand.15 In
the 1920s this was not a deliberate policy since the government did not have
any means to manipulate the volume of money. Only after Bankalar Konsor-
siyumu, a transitory regulatory body, was founded in 1930, and the Central
Bank began to be operative in 1932, were policy makers able to pursue an
independent policy. For the 1930s the main reason for the stable volume of
14Table 7.9 in the data appendix of Chapter 7.
15Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , pp.110-12.
8.2. PROTECTIONISM AND THE BROADER POLICY FRAMEWORK 316
money was, however, the prevailing vigilance. It was believed by policy makers
that the paper money printed during World Way I had lost its value against
gold and thus led to inflation. This fear caused a rather strict policy stance
as far as the money in circulation was concerned. On the other hand, the
bank deposits, the other component of the money supply, slightly increased
over the course of the 1930s in line with the development of private banking.
However, even then, the ratio of total money supply to GDP declined (Figure
8.10).
By the same token, fiscal policy remained rather conservative as the Turkish
government strictly avoided budget deficits. Total expenditure progressively
increased in nominal terms, yet its share in GDP was stable throughout the
1930s. The guiding perspective of “tight money-balanced budget” maintained
in the 1930s thus provided a rigid framework for short-term policy initiatives.
Turkey’s exchange rate policy was also largely in line with the perspective
described above. Foreign exchange controls began as soon as the foreign
exchange crisis broke out in 1929, shortly before the Great Depression, and
the rates remained controlled throughout this period. The value of the Lira
had been determined without any government intervention before 1930. In
August 1930, however, it was pegged to the British pound at the rate of 1.03
TL/Sterling, and after Britain went off gold in 1931 it was tied to the French
France at 0.083 TL/Franc.16 Just as was the case in money supply policy, the
concerns about inflation led policy makers to avoid depreciation throughout
the period and, as Tezel maintains, the value of the Lira was considered a
matter of honour. Hence, the Lira appreciated against the US Dollar and the
British Pound between 1930 and 1934, as seen in figure 8.11, and the parities
remained stable thereafter.17 As a result, overvalued exchange rates put an
external constraint on the import-competing sectors, while they also punished
the export sectors.
However, two developments eased the exchange rate constraint on the ex-
port sectors. First, in 1936 importers began to buy convertible foreign ex-
change, such as dollars and sterling, from exporters in the open market by
paying a premium. This led to the emergence of informal rates and the ex-
tent of its spread saw the government to accept those rates in 1939.18 The
16Aziz Köklü, Türkiye’de Para Meseleleri. Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1947, p.82.
17Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.110 and pp.154-56.
18Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.156.
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Figure 8.10.: Money Supply and Government Expenditure as Percentage of
GDP in Turkey, 1926-1939
Sources: Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , pp.110-12, 389; and Bulutay et al., Türkiye’nin Milli
Geliri .
Figure 8.11.: Exchange Rates, Turkey
Source: Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dönemi , p.154.
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size of such informal dealings is not known, but apparently the system to a
certain degree reduced the burden of overvaluation in favour of the export
sectors, while also favouring the import-competing sectors. While the official
TL/Sterling rate was 6.25 in 1936, the premium rate was 7.41, which increased
until 1939, while the official rates were almost the same. On the other hand,
the depreciation in the premium rates did not reach extreme levels, as they
actually returned to the peak level of the late 1920s. What is more, the official
values of the Lira were not in operation against the non-convertible curren-
cies, most importantly against the German Mark. Consequently, the impact
of the emergence of informal rates seems to only have reduced the exchange
rate pressure on traders who exported to the countries whose currencies were
non-convertible with the Lira. Second, the clearing arrangements that in-
creasingly framed Turkish foreign trade in the second half of the 1930s most
likely worked in favour of exports, as Germany paid prices above world mar-
ket levels for its exports, while the system also replaced some sort of barter
trade.
What was the impact of protectionism on macroeconomic growth? The
drawback of the partial equilibrium approach employed earlier is that it ad-
dresses the sources of industrial growth but the general equilibrium effects of
tariffs are largely ignored. Eichengreen refers to this point by emphasising
that it is hard to make a convincing case about tariffs’ effect on growth and
output without discussing the responses of wages and exchange rates.19 Ac-
cordingly, there is evidence that tariffs would stimulate growth and output
in the presence of rigid money wages and fixed exchange rates. In contrast,
if protectionism drives up wages or exchange rates, then it may put pressure
on the export sector and import-competing sectors alike, thus absorbing the
expansionary impact of tariffs. Unfortunately, the issue is beyond the confines
of this work and requires a more detailed study. However, it is possible to
argue that the available evidence indicates that the movement of wages and
exchange rates was probably far from sufficient to offset the expansionary
stimulus of tariffs. As argued above, the data at hand points to the presence
of a nominal rigidity in industrial wages or some decline in line with the de-
creasing food prices and, as was stated in the preceding paragraphs, the rather
conservative policy of maintaining the value of the Lira led to a significant
19Eichengreen, Political Economy of Smooth Hawley.
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appreciation between 1930 and 1934, yet as soon as its contractionary impact
on the export sector surfaced a hybrid informal/formal exchange rate system
emerged.
Egyptian monetary system was fundamentally different. The National
Bank of Egypt was a private and foreign-owned bank and did not serve as a
central bank until 1951, but it nevertheless performed the note issuing func-
tion.20 Until World War II capital movements were free and the Egyptian
pound was pegged to Sterling at a constant rate of 0.975 LE=1 Sterling,
which continued to be the case until 1947. The money supply was thus a
function of the domestic demand for money, which in turn depended on the
country’s export earnings.21 In other words, the domestic money supply was
a derivative of cotton proceeds and therefore world cotton prices, which im-
parted a greater amount of instability to domestic incomes due to the erratic
price movements of the interwar period. On average, money in circulation at
constant prices did not show any trend, yet it was subject to large fluctuations
during the period of deflation (1925-1939) (Figure 8.12). Data on the total
amount of bank deposits is lacking, but the deposits of the National Bank of
Egypt is a good indicator, which more or less followed the sluggish movement
of the volume of money in circulation. In short, Egypt effectively did not have
an independent monetary policy, so it remained quite passive and transmitted
the instability emanating from external factors to the domestic economy.
Egypt’s fiscal policy was also rather conservative due to institutional and
political constraints. Before World War I the budget had been balanced and
public investments were financed by current revenues, while budget surpluses
prevailed for most of the interwar period.22 The main constraint on increasing
revenues and thus expenditure was the Capitulations, which ruled out tax
reform until 1936. Import revenues were limited to the 8 percent uniform tax
up to 1930 and they slightly increased thereafter with the new duties. The
bulk of government revenues had been made up of land and building taxes,
which had been fixed as a small share of rentals at the end of nineteenth
century. Hansen argues that there was a heavy pressure on governments in
the period of independence (the post-1923 years) to lower land taxes due to
20Pamuk, Intervention During the Great Depression, p.448.
21C.Bresciani Turroni, Some Considerations on Egypt’s Monetary System. 1934, p.167.
22Hansen, Egypt and Turkey , p.59.
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Figure 8.12.: Indicators of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Egypt (LE ’000),
1925-1939
Source: Egypt, Ministere des Finances, Annuaire Statistique, 1940/41.
the decline in cotton prices.23 Furthermore, the tax reform initiatives that
began in 1936 could not be finalised until 1939, and failed to bring about
an effective system based on the taxation of land and export revenues. The
constant price government expenditures confirm these points (Figure 8.12):
while there was a significant rise during the 1920s as a result of high cotton
proceeds, it was first reduced in the early 1930s and only went up slightly in
the 1930s.
As for the economy-wide effects of tariffs, we need to look at exchange rates
and wages. Following Britain’s policy, Egypt returned to the Gold Standard
in 1925 and left gold in 1931. Being pegged to the British Pound, the Egyp-
tian Pound depreciated against other currencies in the first half of the 1930s,
while the rest of the decade saw either stability or some appreciation. Hansen
maintains that the LE might have been overvalued in the 1920s, but it cannot
be said for the 1930s in view of the changes in tariffs.24 Since Britain was
one of the major markets for Egyptian cotton, the impact of appreciation on
the export sector remained rather limited. Similarly, the limited evidence for
23Hansen, Egypt and Turkey , p.60.
24Hansen, Egypt and Turkey , p.209.
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wages, as described above, implies that industrial wages declined, perhaps
with some degree of rigidity. Therefore, it is possible that the general equi-
librium impact of tariffs was rather limited in Egypt as far as the wages and
the pressure of exchange rates on the export sector were concerned.
Furthermore, another issue that needs to be emphasised here is that we
have so far not paid much attention to the role of the state in industrial-
isation apart from the trade policy choices, and more specifically the tariff
policy. However, in the Turkish literature there is a lot of emphasis on state
entrepreneurship, although it has been argued earlier that the role of state
enterprises in terms of their share of industrial output was less significant
than is usually thought. That being said, one can argue that the state might
have acted to ease the lack of investment and/or coordination failure in the
economy. Such a point reminds us of the argument that Gerschenkron made
that the more backward a country, the greater the extent to which the state
or large banks must substitute for the lack of prerequisites for development,
referring to the late industrialising countries in the nineteenth century.25 In
the context of interwar Turkey and Egypt, the state entrepreneurship that
came into existence with Turkey’s Five Year Plan in 1933 or the Bank Misr’s
activities in Egypt during the whole interwar period can give support to the
argument. Admittedly, our approach does not sufficiently address the role
of the state or the banks in easing capital scarcity or a shortage of entre-
preneurial capacity. Therefore, by focusing on the impact of tariff policy on
industrial growth, we may be underestimating the role of institutions. In this
respect, the greater government activity in the industrial sector might have
been a major difference between Turkish and Egyptian industrialisation in
the interwar period. Similarly, it is quite likely that the high tariffs not only
increased domestic prices but also influenced the expectations of local pro-
ducers by guaranteeing them a protected domestic market, thus supporting
their propensity to invest.
As a result, it is possible to argue that in both countries the monetary
and fiscal policies remained passive or perhaps pro-cyclical at best during
the 1930s. In Turkey, it was due to the conservative perspectives of policy
makers, which was the outcome of the prior experience of wartime inflation.
25A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. In A. Gerschenkron,
editor, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. Harward
University Press, 1962a.
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By contrast, in Egypt the lack of independent monetary policy and the Ca-
pitulations were the major political and institutional constraints that were
inherited from British rule and they did not allow the authorities to pursue
autonomous policies. Therefore, in the absence of expansionary policies, the
shift towards protectionism was the only way to stimulate growth by shifting
demand away from imported goods. For this reason, in both countries, import
repression came to be viewed as the dominant policy.
8.3. Conclusion
The present paired case study of economic growth in interwar Egypt and
Turkey sheds fresh light, first and foremost, on our understanding of the
beginning of industrialisation in these two large Middle Eastern countries in
the 1930s. Although our findings do not invalidate the conventional wisdom
regarding the interwar Egyptian and Turkish economies, it suggests a much
more nuanced interpretation. Moreover, as the economic history literature
has not paid due attention to the experience of agricultural economies after
the Great Depression, this work contributes to this literature by bringing two
major agricultural economies under close investigation. In effect, it reinforces
the received wisdom in some ways, and challenges it in others.
To begin with, this dissertation looks at proximate rather than fundamental
causes of economic growth. Otherwise, a more appropriate approach would be
focusing on institutional change, technology and human capital, as demanded
by the modern theories of economic growth, since such factors are considered
as the long-term determinants of growth. However, since our research question
is to investigate the income per capita divergence between Turkey and Egypt
in the interwar period, we are instead interested in the short- to medium-term
sources of growth. To do so, we employ a sectoral perspective by looking
into the sources of growth in agriculture and industry. The need to look at
agriculture and industry is obviously driven by the fact that both economies
were predominantly agricultural at the time, in terms of the composition of
employment and the national income, while they also witnessed the beginning
of industrialisation in the interwar period. In neither Turkey nor Egypt did the
industrial growth of the 1930s result in a significant structural change, some
progress in this direction notwithstanding, but the post-war developments
had their roots in the interwar period.
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The brief discussion of the historical background provided in the Introduc-
tion contends that the received wisdom on the economic history of interwar
Turkey has for the most part been preoccupied with industrial growth, which
has been attributed to import substitution and state entrepreneurship (et-
atism). It was also argued that the over emphasis on the role of the state
is misplaced because much of the industrial expansion was accounted for by
the small- and medium-scale private enterprises, even though the government
made an important contribution to the ongoing industrialisation by invest-
ing heavily in large-scale enterprises in key industries and possibly easing the
capital shortage and coordinations failures.
This dissertation instead directs attention to two relatively under-appreciated
areas in the interwar Turkish economy. First, the role of growth in agricul-
ture has largely been underrated, as it has simply been taken as a matter
of extensive growth. However, the significant output growth in agriculture
was the result of a more complex process of land expansion, improvements
in yields, population growth and, to a lesser extent, the shift to cash crops.
Thus, the boundary between intensive and extensive growth is being blurred
at this point. Not least, the agricultural growth also created a favourable
environment for industrial expansion by increasing the rural demand for man-
ufactures. The adverse movement of the domestic terms of trade have usually
drawn the attention of the historian to the hardships of the peasantry, but
it is shown here that the significant rise in output more than offset the de-
cline in prices. Therefore, without an exogenous recovery in farm income –
exogenous in the sense that the output growth in agriculture was not the dir-
ect consequence of policies–, the industrial expansion would have been much
more limited. The role of agriculture in the recovery is even more striking
considering the conservative monetary and fiscal policies and the persistent
crisis in the export sector during the 1930s.
Second, although much has been said of import substitution in the literat-
ure, most of the discussion has been based on poor-quality value added estim-
ates or fragmentary evidence. Therefore, we first re-estimated the industrial
growth at sectoral and aggregate levels in order to give a more reliable picture.
We confirmed rapid growth but at lower rates than the officially accepted fig-
ures imply. Moreover, we focused on the role of tariff policy and argued that
the tariff reform in 1930 indeed triggered industrialisation, which has been
pointed out often in the literature, as the introduction of high tariffs, com-
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plemented with exchange controls and quotas, provided local enterprises with
excellent opportunities to enjoy the artificially inflated domestic prices, as per
usual in most import-substituting processes. But we furthermore showed that
one major factor was also responsible for the strong industrial performance:
the rise in profit margins due to the favourable movement of the domestic
terms of trade and wages. Both factors were to a certain extent independent
of trade policies in the 1930s.
In contrast with the Turkish literature, the Egyptian scholarship has pre-
dominantly been concerned with the problems of agriculture in the interwar
period. Our findings confirm the argument already raised in the literature:
the limitations inherited from earlier developments put strong constraints on
agricultural growth. These were mainly the land shortage, high population
density and earlier deterioration in cotton yields. In addition, Egyptian ag-
riculture was highly exposed during the interwar era to external shocks via
the sharp decline in cotton prices and the terms of trade. However, the crop
output decomposition shows that some improvement in crop yields was also
achieved and as such it eased the adverse impact of prices on aggregate output.
Yet this impact was obviously insufficient to bring about any sizeable increase
in the total output. In this way, the geographical constraints, external pres-
sures and historical legacies played a prominent role in the agricultural crisis
in Egypt and thus in the stagnation of national income.
The literature on the Egyptian economy fundamentally differs from that
on the Turkish economy because the statistical data on the industrial sector
has been extremely limited. This dissertation therefore fills this huge gap by
providing the first estimates of output growth. And these estimates not only
inform us about the extent of growth but also its character: as opposed to
the growth in Turkey, it was a largely textiles-driven process. Although the
rate of industrial growth in Egypt, 4.5 percent over the 1930s, was obviously
respectable in view of the massive external shocks, the growth in the sectors
other than textiles remained quite limited. This was because the industrial
expansion was far more dependent on the contraction of imports, as the stag-
nating domestic demand put a strong check on industrial growth, as opposed
to the case in Turkey. Again, the domestic terms of trade and wages were as
favourable as in Turkey.
It is remarkable that the monetary and fiscal policies largely remained pass-
ive, or pro-cyclical at best, in both countries. The policy menu at the disposal
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of policy makers in Egypt was rather small because of the institutional and
political constraints related to the gradual decolonisation process, whereas
Turkish policy makers preferred passive policies due to the memories of war-
time inflation and Ottoman debt default. Yet, policies played a prominent
role in the field of trade: the emphasis was placed on maintaining the trade
balance and reducing imports of manufactures in favour of local production,
although to varying degrees. While Turkey resorted to a complicated policy
mix of aggressive tariff and non-tariff protection (quotas and exchange con-
trols), Egyptian policy makers almost solely relied on tariff protection, which
was more moderate in nominal terms, due to the complex coexistence of in-
dustrial, landed and foreign interests.
This comparative study also has important implications in terms of the
received wisdom on the extent and sources of the economic recovery in inter-
war economies. As was argued in the Introduction, the dominant view of the
economic recovery after the Great Depression, as best seen in the writings of
Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin, considers the early departure from the
Gold Standard, devaluation and/or expansionary monetary and fiscal policies
as the most important factors that induced early recovery and higher growth
rates among the industrialised economies. This was largely because recovery
was dependent on the home market in the 1930s, and thus on the factors
stimulating domestic demand, all be it at the expense of export sectors and
foreign economies. They also argue that the countries that stuck with fixed
exchange rates succumbed to protectionism more heavily than others.26
This framework is largely in conformity with the analysis put forward for,
for instance, the Latin American experience by Diaz-Alejandro, who argues
that reactive countries on average performed better than passive ones and
they were usually large and had policy autonomy.27 The countries willing to
devalue their currencies moved toward the new domestic relative prices more
speedily than those with fixed exchange rates, and they were able to limit both
price and monetary deflation and contain their negative impact on real output.
In such countries, manufacturing growth was more impressive than overall
growth, as the average annual rate ranged between 3 and 8 percent over 1929-
1939. Industrialisation was largely due to import substitution, as measured
by the share of local production in domestic consumption. Bulmer-Thomas
26Eichengreen and Irwin, Slide to Protectionism.
27Diaz-Alejandro, Latin America.
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refines this framework by arguing that in Latin America home demand was
the most important source of growth, and its main component was private
consumption, which was promoted by the recovery of the export sector and
loose fiscal and monetary policies.28
Although this framework may successfully point to the diverging experi-
ence between reactive and passive countries, it does not address the variation
among the countries that employed different policy tools. In our particular
case, the more relevant question is what determined the extent and timing of
recovery among the countries that did not pursue expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies, whether by choice, as in Turkey, or due to political and institu-
tional constraints, as in Egypt, but shifted more heavily towards import pro-
tection. For instance, the experience of Eastern and South-eastern European
countries differed from Latin America, where the policy experimentation was
different in nature and greater in scope and most countries devalued their
currencies in the early 1930s. By contrast, the agrarian countries in Eastern
Europe remained either in the Gold Bloc or the German trade bloc through-
out the 1930s and continued with fixed exchange rates. Unfortunately, we are
still far from understanding the dynamics of recovery within this group. We
know that these countries commonly pursued highly protectionist policies and
also experienced strong industrial growth, but with sluggish national income.
Turkey in particular had much in common with this group of countries in
terms of its main policy choices and development path during the 1930s, as
it saw a strong industrial growth helped by protectionist policies.
In both Egypt and Turkey the impact of protectionism on income growth
and home demand was minimal, if not negative. For instance, at a time
of sharp declines in agricultural prices, the policies had limited impacts on
the movement of prices, as best exemplified by the failure of Egypt’s cotton
policy to increase the price of Egyptian cotton. Similarly, the wheat pur-
chasing program initiated in Turkey after 1933 only served to stabilise prices
rather than bringing any increase. Therefore, agricultural policies instead
targeted increases in physical output or crop diversification, but they did not
yield substantial improvements due to the rigidities in supply and demand.
Instead, geography and factor endowments, for instance, played their part:
the characteristics of the Nile and the shortage of available water in Egypt
28Bulmer-Thomas, pp.209-10.
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placed a check on land expansion, whereas the high land/labour ratio in Tur-
key and the open land frontier made it possible to bring new areas under
cultivation.
Therefore, the home demand was largely driven by structural and extra-
policy factors, such as the factor endowments in agriculture, population growth
and commodity prices. Turkey was endowed with a favourable set of endow-
ments that was conducive to growth, whereas Egypt continued to suffer the
persistence of the traditional export economy structure at a time of massive
deflation, and stimulating demand through expansionary policies was not a
viable option due to the lack of full sovereignty. In this regard, Egypt was
an illustrative example of an export economy described by Bulmer-Thomas:
export-led growth was subject to strong cycles as fiscal and financial systems
reinforced the cycles emanating from the export sector.29 On the demand
side, any increase in urban concentration might have produced expanding
markets based on wage labour and a growing middle class, but it was not the
case in Egypt due to the fact that the structure of cotton production, being
dependent on the bulk of the peasantry remaining on the land, hindered the
scope of growth of urban sectors.
On the other hand, policies played a prominent role in industrialisation.
The analysis of the sources of textiles output growth in Chapter 4 and 7 shows
that tariff-inclusive import prices were a significant driver of output growth in
both countries, so tariff protection combined with the additional favourable
factors (domestic terms of trade and wages) to stimulate industrialisation.
However, we also show that the main difference between industrial expansion
in Egypt and Turkey lied in the limited growth in the non-textiles sectors in
Egypt, which was the outcome of the stagnant home demand. Furthermore,
the latter had little to with the difference between nominal protection rates,
which implies that the more aggressive protectionist policy of Turkey does
not explain the whole difference in the extent of industrial expansion.
In this sense, when it comes to industrialisation, Egypt instead needed
to pursue non-protectionist expansionary policies. Diaz-Alejandro maintains
that the larger the institutional barriers to domestic resource mobility, the
more difficult it was for the growing sectors to dominate the shrinking ones
and Bulmer-Thomas adds that the shocks created disequilibria that policy
29Bulmer-Thomas, p.171.
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makers had to address as a matter of urgency.30 The relevance of these points
is best illustrated in the case of interwar Egypt: the Egyptian economy con-
sistently suffered from insufficient investment and capital scarcity in the inter-
war period, limiting its capacity to divert resources towards manufacturing.31
In such circumstances, Yousef argues, an optimal export tax would have gen-
erated the much-needed resources to invest in the development of the domestic
economy by altering the incentive structure for producers and consumers.32
Based on the hypothetical identification of potential losers and winners of an
export tax, he concludes that such an action was incompatible with the bal-
ance of power within Egypt’s ruling elite, in particular the cotton exporters
and foreign importers who exerted influence over policy making. As a result,
the 1930 tariff reform was actually a sub-optimal solution ensuring protection
for domestic production and financial support for cotton producers simultan-
eously. Similarly, Egypt’s government finances remained based on land taxes
in the 1930s and even though the attempts to reform the system began as soon
as the Capitulations came to an end with the Anglo-Egyptian agreement in
1936, it took three years for the new rates to be finalised as a result of the
bargaining process that reflected the influence of large landowners and the
result was again an unsatisfactory compromise.33 Therefore, both examples
strikingly show how the entrenched vested interests in Egypt impeded change
in the existing structure of incentives, limiting government capacity at a time
when it was needed to overcome the deflationary pressures. Nonetheless, tariff
protection itself was also a politically contentious issue, as its extent and form
was determined by the specific constellation of political forces. For instance,
the 1930 tariff reform was a moment of compromise between agricultural and
industrial interests and Lancashire remained a part of policy making regarding
tariffs on cotton textiles during the 1930s. As such, decolonisation proceeded
gradually in Egypt, greatly hindering the ability of the country to exploit the
interwar crisis in the interests of structural transformation.
By contrast, Turkish policy makers were largely able to implement their
nationalist and developmental agenda due to the absence of the influence
30Diaz-Alejandro, Latin America, p.38; and Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin
America, p.196.
31Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.35; Issawi, Egypt at Mid-
Century , p.93; and Mabro, Egyptian Economy , p.17.
32Yousef, Explorations in Economic History 37 [2000].
33Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p.37.
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of landed or foreign interests. In this context, the fact that they avoided
devaluation, easy money or budget deficits was associated with the memories
of wartime inflation and of the sovereign debt default, which meant that they
were seen by policy makers as sources of economic instability. Instead, import
repression was viewed as an effective way of ensuring the trade balance and
supporting industrial interests simultaneously.
In short, the dichotomy of reactive-passive policies suggested in the literat-
ure falls short of explaining the contrasting growth performances in Egypt and
Turkey, even though Turkey’s relatively more aggressive trade policies were
responsible for some part of the difference in the extent of industrial growth.
Instead, one should also consider the impact of different paths of institutional
development, geographical differences and factor endowments to get a better
understanding of economic recovery in the 1930s. Such an approach though
requires further comparative research not only on the interwar Middle East,
but also the other regions on the periphery of the world economy.
A. Formulas for Decomposition of
Crop Output
The decomposition of crop output growth, carried out in Chapters 2 and 5,
is based on the following formulas presented by Jamal and Zaman.1
The total change in output in value terms (V) are decomposed into four
components: area (A), price (P), yield (Y) and crop-mix:
ln
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= ln
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where act denotes the relative share of the crop c in the total acreage at year
t. The acreage effect is simply equal to ln(Acreage) = ln(At
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B. Solution of Reduced Form
Output Equation
Chapters 4 and 7 use a reduced form output equation in order to look into the
sources of textile output growth in interwar Turkey and Egypt. The correct
solution of this output equation, which is based on Irwin and Temin’s article,
is as follows:1
The output supply equation is originally defined as
Qs = Ae
pitCα1Lα2Kα3 (B.1)
where K = Keδt, growing at an exogenous rate, pi is the rate of Hicks neutral
technological change, t time trend, C raw material, L labour and K capital.
The prices of C and L are equal to their marginal products:
C =
α1PQ
pc
(B.2)
and
L =
α2PQ
w
(B.3)
Taking logs of equations (B.1-B.3) and inserting lnC and lnL into the supply
equation we obtain the following:
1Irwin and Temin, Antebellum US Cotton Industry. The final reduced form output equa-
tion is different from the one that can be found in Irwin and Temin’s article because they
come up with an incorrect solution, as explained in the text above. We have consulted
Douglas Irwin about the issue.
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lnQ = lnA+ pit+ α1(lnα1 + lnP + lnQ− lnPc)
+ α2(lnα2 + lnP + lnQ− lnw) + α3lnK
= lnA+ pit+ α1lnα1 + α2lnα2 + (α1 + α2)lnQ+ (α1 + α2)lnP
− α1lnPc − α2lnw + α3lnK
Solving the above equation for lnP:
lnP =
(1− α1 − α2)lnQ+ α1lnpc + α2lnw +D
α1 + α2
where D = lnA+pit+α1lnα1 +α2lnα2. For simplicity, we define a = 1−α1−α2α1+α2 ,
b = α1
α1+α2
, c = α2
α1+α2
, and d = D
α1+α2
then
lnP = alnQ+ blnpc + clnw + d (B.4)
On the demand side, the output demand equation is defined as follows:
Qd = Be
ψt(
Ep∗(1 + τ)
p
)b1(
pa
p
)b2Y b3 (B.5)
then, taking logs we have,
lnQ = lnB + ψt+ b1ln(Ep
∗(1 + τ)) + b2lnpa − (b1 + b2)lnp+ b3lnY
Plugging lnp in equation B.4 into the equation above yields,
lnQ = lnB + ψt+ b1ln(Ep
∗(1 + τ)) + b2lnpa
− (b1 + b2)(alnQ+ blnpc + clnw + d) + b3lnY
Solving the above equation for lnQ gives:
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lnQ(1 + ab1 + ab2) = lnB − d(b1 + b2) + ψt+ b1ln(Ep∗(1 + τ)) + b2lnpa
(B.6)
− b(b1 + b2)lnpc − c(b1 + b2)lnw + b3lnY
Therefore, to be able to get the following reduced form equation, Irwin and
Temin come up with,2
lnQ = β0 + β1ln
Ep∗(1 + τ)
pcw
+ β2ln
pa
pcw
+ β3lnY + β6t+ 
it should be assumed that:
b =
α1
α1 + α2
= 1
and similarly
c =
α2
α1 + α2
= 1
which would imply α1 = α2 = 0. This would mean that both the supply
elasticity of raw material and labour supply are zero, which is of course non-
sensical.
Instead, the correct solution of the reduced form equation can be obtained
in the following way. Given that b = 1− c, equation B.6 becomes:
2Irwin and Temin, Antebellum US Cotton Industry, p.785.
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lnQ(1 + ab1 + ab2) = lnB − d(b1 + b2) + ψt+ b1ln(Ep∗(1 + τ)) + b2lnpa
− b(b1 + b2)lnpc − c(b1 + b2)lnw + b3lnY
= lnB − d(b1 + b2) + ψt+ b1ln(Ep∗(1 + τ)) + b2lnpa
− (1− c)(b1 + b2)lnpc − c(b1 + b2)lnw + b3lnY
= lnB − d(b1 + b2) + ψt+ b1ln(Ep∗(1 + τ)) + b2lnpa
− b1lnpc − b2lnpc + c(b1 + b2)lnpc − c(b1 + b2)lnw + b3lnY
= lnB − d(b1 + b2) + ψt+ b1ln
[
Ep∗(1 + τ)
pc
]
+ b2ln(
pa
pc
)
+ c(b1 + b2)ln(
pc
w
) + b3lnY
If the coefficients are arranged and simplified, the final equation turns out to
be:
lnQ = β0 + β1t+ β2ln
[
Ep∗(1 + τ)
pc
]
+ β3ln(
pa
pc
) + β4ln(
pc
w
) + β5lnY + 
(B.7)
where β4 = c(β2 + β3) < (β2 + β3) must hold since c = α2α1+α2 < 1.
The expected signs of the all coefficients, except that of time trend, are
all positive, based on the following reasonable assumptions: First, b1, b2, b3
(demand elasticities of Ep
∗(1+τ)
p
, p
a
p
and real income, respectively) are positive.
They are all sensible, since we expect the domestic production to increase,
if the import prices and the prices of other commodities increase relative to
domestic textile prices and moreover the higher real income induces demand
to increase. Second, 1 − 1
α1+α2
< 1
b1+b2
must hold. It is hard to verify the
latter, but as long as α1 + α2 < 1, that is the sum of output elasticity of raw
material and labor is smaller than unity, it certainly holds.
These two conditions can be illustrated with one example: the coefficient
of pa
pc
is β3 = b21+ab1+ab2 . Therefore for β3 > 0 holds, both the numerator and
denominator should be positive. The denominator is 1+ab1+ab2 = 1+a(b1+
b2) = 1 +
1−(α1+α2)
α1+α2
(b1 + b2), which is equivalent to (1 − 1α1+α2 )(b1 + b2) < 1.
The last inequality certainly holds if α1 + α2 < 1. However the sign of β3 is
obviously dependent on the values of parameters α1, α2, β1, β2, that is the
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demand elasticity of raw material and labor consumption and output elasticity
of relative tariff inclusive import prices and relative aggregate prices.
When the output demand (equation B.5) is expanded to include the imper-
fect substitution between different kinds of textiles by adding ps, the price of
substitute goods, then we have:
Qd = Be
ψt(
Ep∗(1 + τ)
p
)b1(
pa
p
)b2(
ps
p
)b3Y b4 (B.8)
In this case, we come up with a similar reduced form output equation:
lnQ = β0 + β1t+ β2ln
[
Ep∗(1 + τ)
pc
]
+ β3ln(
pa
pc
) + β4ln(
ps
pc
)
+ β5ln(
pc
w
) + β6lnY +  (B.9)
where β5 = c(β2 + β3 + β4) < (β2 + β3 + β4) must hold since c = α2α1+α2 < 1.
Consequently, in Chapter 4 and 7, we estimate the final reduced form output
equations B.7 and B.9 in order to explain the sources of textiles output growth.
Note that the term Ep∗ originally refers to the the prices of imported goods
in local currencies (nominal exchange rates times import prices in foreign
currency), so it can also be written as p∗ in our final equation, because we
have already calculated import prices in local currency (TL in Turkey and LE
in Egypt).
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